Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think they have to worry about all costs; otherwise they could not meet the competition. They cannot sell to us at any higher price than that offered by any other country. Any country that produces any product has to worry about costs. Mr. HARTKE. It is true that, so far as Communist and Socialist governments are concerned, they can export items at prices that have no relation to production or labor costs. There is no definite way to make a determination in the Tariff Commission as to what the costs are. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for an answer? Mr. LAUSCHE. First, we must adjust our prices to the cost of production. Communist countries do not have to do so, and deliberately do not do so, because their intent, first, is to dupe their own people; and, second, they are intense in their belief that the free nations will perish, and subsequently they will be able to do whatever they please. slav Government. We are talking about trade in consumer goods. There is no question of any strategic materials whatsoever being involved. And quite frankly, we should be cutting off our noses to spite our faces if we Americans refused to make such trade possible when without doubt our Western European allies will continue to engage in such trade. But the paramount question here is the political and psychological one. It is not just a matter of pushing Mr. Tito into the arms of Khrushchev if we erect prohibitively high tariff barriers against Yugoslavia. On the contrary, this is an issue which will serve to influence our whole policy toward the unfortunate countries of Eastern Europe which have been sucked into the orbit of the Kremlin. The one peaceful and promising means we have of opening a window to the West for the satellite states surely is through trade. If our long-established aim of liberation of those countries from Soviet imperialism is to remain more than an empty phrase, we Mr. MANSFIELD. I would just as must preserve and expand any opportusoon have a vote. I yield now to the Senator from Montana. Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. LAUSCHE. I yield to the Senator from Vermont. Mr. AIKEN. My understanding is that 20 percent of the grain produced by Polish farmers is sold to the Government, and the other 80 percent is sold on the open market. Poland and Yugoslavia are two Communist countries that have not taken the land entirely away from the people. I do not think the Polish Government has forcibly acquired any of the land of its farmers. Twenty-five percent of the land in Yugoslavia is Gov ernment owned, but the people are not required to sell to the Government. nities we now have to create normal commercial ties with Eastern Europe. That, Mr. President, is the basic reason why this amendment is vitally important to our foreign policy. It is the basic reason why I strongly oppose the Lausche amendment. I hope it will be soundly defeated. MOST-FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT TO POLAND It is important that Senators be clear Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I as to exactly what is—and is not apologize to the Senator from Colorado [Mr. DOMINICK], inasmuch as he is one of the original sponsors of the amendI suggest that it be called the Dominick-Hartke-Lausche amendment. ment. Lausche Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I rise to support fully and completely the action taken by the Committee on Foreign Relations which the amendment seeks to overturn. In effect, I am in favor of maintaining the existing situation, I am against an abrupt and unreasonable change of course. Such a change, though seemingly modest on its face, would have enormously important implications for the whole course of our foreign policy with respect to Eastern Europe. What the Committee on Foreign Relations is trying to do, Mr. President, is to continue treating Yugoslavia as a nation which is neither a pariah nor actively hostile to the United States, but rather as a country with which we would like to maintain as normal commercial relationships as possible. We are not talking about foreign aid here. We are not talking about giving unusual preferential treatment to a Communist country. We are not talking about our personal dislike for the Yugoslav form of government. We are not expressing any fondness for the head of the Yugo involved. In the first place, the language in the committee bill does not represent a new policy on the part of the United States. On the contrary, it will make it possible for the United States to continue the policy it has been following. There is no new or special concession involved. Both Poland and Yugoslavia now receive mostfavored-nation treatment. The bill will simply enable the President to make it possible for them to continue to do so. In the second place, most-favored-nation treatment does not represent any especially favorable position, and in this respect the term itself is somewhat misleading. As a matter of fact, prior to 1951, U.S. law required the extension of most-favored-nation treatment in matters of foreign trade to all nations and foreign areas. The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 directed the President, as soon as practicable, to withdraw most-favorednation treatment from the Soviet Union and from "any nation or foreign area dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement:" It is important to note that this did not apply to nations with Communist governments per se, but only to those nations dominated by international communism. The distinction is crucial. Under the terms of the 1951 act, mostfavored-nation treatment was withdrawn from the Soviet Union and all Soviet-dominated countries. But it was not withdrawn from Yugoslavia which had broken with the Soviet bloc in 1948, though retaining a Communist government. Beginning in 1956, Poland likewise began to manifest a degree of independence from the Soviet Union, and this developed to the point where, by 1960, President Eisenhower reinstated mostfavored-nation treatment to Poland. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 contained a provision directing the President, "as soon as practicable," to withdraw most-favored-nation treatment from "any country or area dominated or controlled by communism." Note the difference from the act of 1951, which withdrew most-favored-nation treatment from only those countries dominated by the international Communist movement. Compliance with the 1962 act in the case of Yugoslavia would involve the abrogation of a treaty dating back to 1881. This is a process which, by the terms of the treaty itself, requires 1 year. In the case of Poland, compliance with the 1962 act would involve breaking an understanding on the basis of which a $40 million claims settlement was reached with Poland. Because of the treaty with Yugoslavia and the claims settlement with Poland and because the Congress has been reconsidering its action of last year, the President has felt justified in not initiating steps to withdraw most-favored nation treatment from those countries. It should be clear, however, that the United States has the legal right to abro gate the treaty with Yugoslavia, in accordance with the treaty's terms. Further, the United States is not committed to maintain most-favored-nation treatment for Poland into the indefinite future. It should be recognized, however, that if we do withdraw most-favored-nation treatment from Poland, the Poles will most probably stop payments on the claims settlement and refuse to negotiate a still-pending settlement on outstanding dollar bonds. All of this, however, the United States could survive. What is really important about the provision of the committee bill is that it enables the President to use trade as an instrument of foreign policy to encourage the growth of national independence in Eastern Europe. The realistic alternatives in Eastern Europe are between a monolithic structure of docile satellites firmly controlled by the Soviet Union and a collection of states which have Communist governments but which also maintain a degree of national independence. The latter is clearly to be preferred by the United States. The powers which the committee bill gives to the President will help to achieve it, though there is no guarantee that they will be successful. But it is plainly a wild delusion to base our policy toward Eastern Europe on the unfounded hope that a series of liberal democracies can be brought into being there in the foreseeable future. The Eastern Europeans themselves will plainly be better off with some freedom than with no freedom. The whole purpose of this section of the committee bill is to contribute to that end, and I strongly urge the Senate to uphold the committee's decision. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] for himself and other Senators, to the committee amendment, in the nature of a substitute, as amended. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that the Senator from Nevada [Mr. BIBLE), the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. EDMONDSON], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHN STON], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Louisiana Mr. LONG], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. MCNAMARA], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF], the Senator from Virginia [Mr. ROBERTSON], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. WALTERS], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH] are absent on official business. I also announce that the Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE] is absent because of illness. On this vote, the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON] is paired with the Senator from Missouri [Mr. LONG]. If present and voting, the Senator from South Carolina would vote "yea,” and the Senator from Missouri would vote "nay." On this vote, the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] is paired with the Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND). If present and voting, the Senator from Kansas would vote "yea," and the Senator from Florida would vote "nay." On this vote, the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. EDMONDSON] is paired with the Senator from Michigan [Mr. McNAMARA]. If present and voting, the Senator from Oklahoma would vote "yea," and the Senator from Michigan would vote "nay." Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT), the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON], and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] are necessarily absent. On this vote, the Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT] is paired with the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER]. If present and voting, the Senator from Utah would vote "yea" and the Senator from Kentucky would vote "nay." On this vote, the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER] is paired with the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL]. If present and voting, the Senator from Arizona would vote "yea” and the Senator from Massachusetts would vote "nay." On this vote, the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] is paired with the Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND). If present and voting, the Senator from Kansas would vote "yea" and the Senator from Florida would vote "nay." The result was announced-yeas 14, nays 55, as follows: Beall Dodd Dominick Cotton Hruska Lausche Mechem Allott Anderson Bartlett Bayh Boggs I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE] the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the Senator from Virginia [Mr. ROBERTSON], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. WALTERS), and the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH] would each vote "nay." On this vote, the Senator from Nevada [Mr. BIBLE] is paired with the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. BYRD]. present and voting, the Senator from Nevada would vote "yea," and the Sen- Ellender ator from West Virginia would vote “nay.” Brewster Burdick Cannon Carlson Jordan, N.C. Jordan, Idaho Keating Monroney Morse Morton Nelson Sparkman Symington Case Kennedy Church Kuchel If Young, N. Dak. Young, Ohio Metcalf Fulbright Gore Bennett Byrd, Va. Byrd, W. Va. Cooper Eastland Edmondson Williams, N.J. NOT VOTING-31 Engle Ervin Goldwater Gruening Hayden Johnston Long, Mo. Long, La. McCarthy McGee McNamara Pastore Pearson So the Lausche-Hartke-Dominick amendment to the committee amendment was rejected. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I move that the Senate reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected. Mr. SPARKMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I offer my amendment identified as No. 306, and ask that it be made the pending question, for consideration on Tuesday. It is the so-called NATO amendment. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with and that the amendment be printed in the RECORD at this point. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment, ordered to be printed in the RECORD, is as follows: On page 47, delete lines 15 to 21, inclusive, and insert the following: "(i) No assistance shall be furnished under this Act to any economically developed nation, except to fulfill firm commitments made prior to July 1, 1963. The President is directed to make no further commitments for assistance to such economically developed nations and is directed to terminate such commitments made prior to July 1, 1963, at the earliest practicable time. The President is further directed to report, not later than July 1, 1965, to the Speaker of the House and to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the steps which he has taken to comply with this provision. "As used in this subsection, the term 'economically developed nation' means any nation listed as an exception to the definition of 'economically less developed nation' contained in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1875 (S. IV) and, in addition, the German Federal Republic and Switzerland." ORDER OF BUSINESS Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the joint leadership can have the attention of the Senate, we remind Senators that the Senate is going over until 12 o'clock on Tuesday. The amendment of the Senator from Oregon is pending. It is anticipated that there will be votes shortly after 12 o'clock on that day. It is our hope that all Senators will be back on Tuesday, and that the absenteeism which has become chronic in this body, will in some fashion come to an end. dislike bringing up these figures, but I think we ought to have them in the RECORD. I A week ago today, 23 Senators were absent. These figures are on the basis of votes. Last Tuesday, 20 Senators were absent; on Wednesday, 11; on Thursday, 22; at 4 o'clock this afternoon, 26; at 4:45 this afternoon, 26; at 5:07, 27; at 6:41, 31 Senators were absent. We have work to do. We have a long way to go before action on the bill will be completed. I hope all Senators will be on hand where they are supposed to be-in this Chamber. Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, what is the pending business before the Senate? The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. BREWSTER in the chair). The pending business before the Senate is amendment No. 306, offered by the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE). Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I move to table the amendment. The Senate does not have to vote on the motion tonight. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Illinois to table the amendment offered by the Senator from Oregon. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Illinois withhold that motion? Mr. DIRKSEN. I will withhold it temporarily, without losing my right to make the motion. Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator's right is maintained. I was about to suggest that the Senate take a recess until Tuesday; and that what the Senator wants to do, he can do next Tuesday. Mr. DIRKSEN. I will withhold my motion, except that I will ask for recognition at that time to offer the motion to table. Mr. MANSFIELD. There will be no further voting tonight. When the Senate stands Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, what is the pending business? I will not lose my right. Mr. MANSFIELD. No, the Senator would not lose his right to the floor. The only thing I wish to say is that there will be no further voting tonight. If Senators wanted to speak, there would be no action on the amendment. Mr. DIRKSEN. Will I be recognized on Tuesday, the first thing, without discussion, to offer the motion to table? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Illinois. The pending business is the amendment by the Senator from Oregon. The Chair is not in a position to inform the Senator what will happen on Tuesday next. Mr. DIRKSEN. Except that I will not lose my right to ask for recognition to offer the motion to table? Mr. MANSFIELD. Any Senator can be recognized at any time for that purpose. Mr. DIRKSEN. I will not withdraw my motion to table if I am going to lose my right to be recognized. The PRESIDING OFFICER. the Senator make the motion? Does Mr. DIRKSEN. I make the motion. Mr. MANSFIELD. Will the Senator again withhold the motion? Mr. DIRKSEN. I withhold it temporarily. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Illinois yield the floor? Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield the floor. SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, earlier this afternoon, I placed in the RECORD the first nine pages of the news conference held by the Secretary of State today. The RECORD will show that I said that those were the only pages that were then available. Assistant Secretary of State Dutton told me the other pages would be made available to me when they were typewritten. In fairness to the Secretary of State, the entire transcript of his news conference should be placed in the RECORD. I ask unanimous consent that the rest of the pages of the news conference be printed in the RECORD, and that they be printed together with the first nine pages, so that there will be continuity in the RECORD. That is only fair, in view of the fact that I expressed disagreement with some of the observations of the Secretary of State, but expressed also my high praise for the ability of the Secretary of State. There being no objection, the text of the entire news conference was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 8, 1963 Secretary RUSK. I know you have many matters on your minds this morning, so I won't take your time with opening statements. I am ready for your questions. Question. Mr. Secretary, the secrecy around the wheat negotiations with the Russians is greater than usual. Your aids here in the Department, whose job has been to inform us, claim that they know nothing because they are not briefed. Now, this has been going on for weeks, and we believe we have a legitimate interest. Can you tell us how it stands? Answer. Well, we are in a period in which the wheat problem is being discussed with of bargaining going on. Obviously it is not in our interest to disclose the details of a bargaining situation. I wouldn't mind telling you gentlemen what the situation is if you would promise not to tell the Soviet Union the process of this bargaining. the Soviet Union. There is a certain amount But, as Mr. Khrushchev indicated yesterday, some progress has been made, but we The President indicated in his last press don't know yet what the outcome will be. conference that these matters ought to be left to the negotiators, and I would be content to leave it there for the time being. They are meeting this morning, and there may be other meetings, I don't know. Question. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your appraisal of the situation now in Vietnam, since we have recognized it, and what do you see ahead in the future as to the impact on U.S. policy in southeast Asia? Answer. Well, I think the great question which has been in front of us all along has been how to get on with the main job of assuring that South Vietnam is secure and able to work out its own future under its own leadership and without any interference from the outside. Now, we were very much concerned when in 1959 the Vietcong, with public support from Hanoi, moved to interfere in South Vietnam, and indeed threatened to take it over, and there has been steady growth in assistance and help by the United States and others to South Vietnam in that struggle. We were also concerned in May and June and July of this year when developments in South Vietnam indicated that there was a growing gap between the Government and the people of that country, and there was some danger that the solidarity of the country itself in meeting this threat would be undermined by differences within the country. Now it is our hope that the political and the military leadership that has now formed a new government there in Vietnam will be able to rally the country, consolidate the effort, get on with the job, so that that country can be independent and free and secure. As far as the United States is concerned, we do not have and have never had any special U.S. interest in terms of military bases or anything of that sort. Our primary concern with Vietnam is that it be secure and independent, as it is entitled to be, and we are hopeful now that there will be a consolidation of effort and that the central problem there will be dealt with with expedition, and we will do what we can to assist, and we have every reason to believe that the present leadership will do everything they can on their own side. Question. Mr. Secretary, could you comment on the suggestion of the Communists this week that the administration might pos sibly find some benefit in attempting to develop a political settlement or a truce with the North Vietnamese? Is that conceivable? Answer. I don't see quite what is involved there. So far as we can tell from what has been said in Hanoi, what they have in mind is that the regime at Hanoi would remain exactly as it is, the Communist regime, a member of the Communist bloc, and that they would then press for far-reaching changes, something that they call neutralization, in South Vietnam. Well, we have run into that before, where they say, "On our side of the line nothing is to be changed, but on your side of the line something must be changed." Now, let's look at this neutralization aspect for a moment. Up until about 1958 or 1959 there was no difficulty anywhere about the general attitude of South Vietnam. They weren't committing aggression against anybody. They weren't a military base for anybody. They weren't an ally in any formal sense with anyone. They were simply a country trying to be independent. Now, the American military presence there at the present time was a direct consequence Communist world, to take over South Vietof the efforts of the Vietcong at Hanoi, the nam. If everyone else would leave South Vietnam alone, there is no problem. But to negotiate on far-reaching changes in in North Vietnam seems to be not in the South Vietnam without far-reaching changes cards. committed in the original Geneva settleThe other side was fully committed-fully ment of 1954 to the arrangements which provided for South Vietnam as an independent entity, and we see no reason to modify those in the direction of a larger influence of North Vietnam or Hanoi in South Vietnam. Now, this is not-there is no problem about South Vietnam if others would leave it alone. The same thing is true of Laos. Let these people work out their future in their own way without outside interference. Question. Mr. Secretary? Answer. Yes. Question. May I ask a question on a different subject? Answer. Yes. Question. Could you give us your thoughts on the views in the Senate to restrict aid to Yugolsavia, Egypt, and Indonesia? Answer. Well, I must say that I am very much concerned about the tendency in the Congress to legislate foreign policy as it might apply to specific situations or specific countries. The legislative cycle moves a year at a time. The world moves very fast. It is not possible for the Congress to anticipate in advance what the circumstances are going to be in any given situation, so I am very much concerned about the tendency to try to build into law attitudes in the use of our aid program, for example, with regard to particular countries. These are responsibilities carried by the President of the United States. They are very heavy responsibilities. The President is the one whom the country will hold responsible if things go wrong. So I am very much concerned about the loss of flexibility, the loss of any ability to move to protect and forward the interests of the United States wherever they might be engaged anywhere in the world. So I would hope very much that the Congress would withhold its hand and not try to legislate in detail about the application of an aid program to a particular country. Question. Mr. Secretary, on the larger view of the foreign aid situation, the Congress is in the process of tearing it to shreds; and this is only the authorization. The news is going to be a lot worse when you get to appropriations; this is quite clear. Now how do you respond to this? You are getting a message, at least they say on the Hill, which tells you, the administration, the Congress is fed up with foreign aid, as it is now being operated. What do you propose to do about it? Answer. Well, we are in daily, sometimes hourly, contact with the Congress about this matter. I must say that I don't understand the tendency to cut back on our foreign aid program as deeply as is now being discussed in the Congress. The large and dangerous questions are still in front of us, whether it is Berlin, or Cuba, or Laos, or Vietnam, or whatever it may be. There is no detente in the sense that there is a general easing of relations between the free world and the Communist world. There have been some limited and specific agreements, some of them have been important, such as the nuclear test ban treaty. There have been explorations of the possibilities of agreements on other subjects. But this is no time to quit. There is too much unfinished business ahead of us. The United States has almost a million men outside of the continental limits of the United States, ashore and afloat. We must support those men. They are out to do a job for the free world. And I think they are entitled to have us support them by trying to get the job done without committing them to combat, if possible. Now we spend gladly-we spend gladlyabout $50 billion a year in our Defense budget. I don't see why we can't spend 10 percent of that, if necessary, to get the job done without war, if possible. So I am very much concerned about the general attitude that somehow we can relax, we can cut back on our foreign aid, we can become indifferent to what is happening in other parts of the world. The world is not in that shape at the present time, and effort is still crucial to getting the great job done on behalf of freedom. Question. Mr. Secretary? Question. Could you give us your assessment of how the latest Berlin difficulty has affected Moscow-Washington relations in the larger sense? Answer. Well, I think that one would have to say that these three interruptions on the autobahn in the last several weeks have raised some very serious questions. I can't pretend to know what is in the minds of the people on the other side on this matter. But they surely do understand, and must understand, that access to West Berlin is utterly fundamental from the point of view of the Western Powers, and from the point of view of the United States. Now, in detail, sometimes these incidents look rather futile, look rather artificial, as thought it were some sort of elaborate minuet about procedures of one sort or another. But that is not really the issue. The point is not whether a particular tailgate is lowered. The point is freedom of access to West Berlin. Chief Justice John Marshall once said that "The power to tax is the power to destroy." Well, in a rough analogy, the power asserted by the other side to insist upon, on its own initiative-to insist upon particular procedures or regulations, could be converted into a power to interrupt access to West Berlin. That, we can't have, because our position in West Berlin is of vital interest to the United States and of the West, and we must insist upon free access to that city. So these incidents are serious, and I think Mr. Khrushchev's remarks the other day indicated that he recognizes that they are serious. But we must insist, and we have insisted, that existing procedures be fully complied with. Question. Mr. Secretary, your remarks on neutralization in Vietnam may be subject to misinterpretation. Just to sum it up here: You reject neutralization as a solution to the problem in Vietnam? Answer. Well, I don't know-my point is I don't know what Hanoi talks about when they talk about neutralization. South Vietnam was not allied with anyone; it was not a military base for anyone. It was subjected to attack from the outside through penetration, infiltration, arms supplies, subversive activities, matters of that sort. There can be peace in southeast Asia if others would leave South Vietnam and Laos alone, and let the peoples of those countries work out their own future. My point is I don't know what they mean by neutralization, except that I suspect that it means that they are trying to find some formula by which they can bring South Vietnam within the Communist world. Question. Mr. Secretary? Answer. Yes. Question. Since the military coup in South Vietnam, there has been a good deal of discussion about our general attitude toward the military coup. Could you tell us what we are telling our Latin American neighbors on this point today? Answer. Well, I think it is difficult to make a general statement that would apply in theoretical exactitude to 112 different countries. I think that the developments in South Vietnam promise to move rapidly toward constitutional government, and a sense on the part of the people that they have a stake in their future. Now it is true that in certain other areas when questions of recognition arise, we will give a good deal of attention to the attitude of the governments who are neighbors and who are very much involved in the same problem. In this hemisphere, for example, we have very far-reaching commitments to support constitutional and democratic governments, and there is a hemispheric commitment to this problem. And the possibilities that military coups in this hemisphere could become could start-chain reactions of such events are matters of great concern to the governments of this hemisphere. So we are in very close consultation in the hemisphere about how these questions should be handled here. Similarly, there have been one or two occasions in Africa where our own attitude had to take into account the attitudes of other African states who had an immediate and direct interest in that situation. But I think it would be difficult to draw a broad conclusion that would be applicable in detail to all of the 111 or 112 countries with whom we do business. Question. Mr. Secretary? Question. You have expressed serious concern about the interruptions on the autobahn. And it has been indicated, both from Moscow and from here, that the chances are that there are likely to be more such incidents in the future. Is there any alternative, in your judgment, to simply waiting until these incidents occur; or is there some initiative that might be taken from the Western side to actually, as the last protest note said, put an end once and for all to these harassments? Answer. Well, the West has made over the years a series of suggestions about farreaching and fundamental solutions of the German Berlin question. We have had discussions, in the last 22 years since I have been in my present office, about Berlin. It would be possible to work out better arrangements if the other side would, in a spirit of genuine reciprocity, recognize the vital interests of the West in these matters. But those discussions have not been particularly fruitful thus far because there has not been adequate recognition of the Western vital interests in the situation. Whether the situation will change, we cannot say. But the West has repeatedly made proposals, far-reaching proposals, for a permanent settlement of the German and Berlin questions on the basis of the needs and the wishes of the German people themselves. There is no objective reason, there is no reason in logic why these questions cannot be settled in a way that meets the vital interests of both sides. But thus far it has not been possible to do so. Question. Mr. Secretary, in Latin America, sir, will the United States back the Venezuelan and Costa Rican proposal before the OAS Foreign Ministers meeting in order to discuss the defense of democracy in the face of a coup? Answer. I have already indicated that as far as I am concerned, I would be glad to meet with the inter-American Foreign Ministers if this is the consensus of the Foreign Ministers themselves, to talk about further steps we can take in the hemisphere to strengthen the constitutional processes in the hemisphere. But this is a matter of consultation in the OAS and elsewhere, so that I don't think that I have heard yet whether that consensus has been reached. But as far as we are concerned, we are prepared to engage in such conversations, and I think it would be quite important. Question. Mr. Secretary, in connection with Mr. Harriman's trip yesterday to South America, could you discuss two phases? One, his meeting today or tomorrow with President Illia of Argentina, and if you hope, if you think that something can develop to conciliate the oil problem, the problem of the oil contract; and, two, what your hopes are in connection with the InterAmerican Economic and Social Council Ministerial meeting in São Paulo? Answer. Well, Governor Harriman will be making calls in Buenos Aires and I believe also in Brazil, in addition to his visit with the Inter-American ECOSOC. The principal purpose of his journey is, of course, the ECOSOC meeting, where there will be an opportunity to review broadly the progress of the Alliance for Progress and measures which might be taken to strengthen it. I think that it might be said that we ought to anticipate that the Alliance for Progress program will encounter many difficulties and, indeed, will be associated with tension in one country or another. Quite apart from anything that the United States might do in this respect, Latin America is in the process of revolutionary changes, far-reaching changes, in their economic and social structures. Now, these changes would be going on in any event. We have felt for some time that it was important for the United States to assist those countries in taking hold of those necessary changes and moving them along through democratic process, and through constitutional processes, in ways that make sense. Now, it isn't easy to bring about important changes through democratic methods. the result is going to be that there will be tensions inside of a number of countries as these changes occur, and undoubtedly there will be some tensions between some of these countries and the United States because they will feel that we need to do more than we can do and that perhaps we are too exigent in asking that changes occur on their side before we come in with substantial amounts of aid. So there is a certain amount of tension built into these changes. But we have been encouraged by the steady progress that has been made in country after country. We think they are headed in the right direction. We think that those changes can occur by peaceful means rather than by revolutionary means, and that the United States ought to play a very important part in assisting them in finding the external resources which those changes will require. Question. Mr. Secretary, in South Vietnam, do you think that the new regime can prosecute the war more effectively than Diem did? If so, why? Answer. I think, actually, the principal problem that developed with respect to the previous regime was the alienation of apparently very large sections of the population. We believe that the present regime has moved promptly to consolidate public effort, that they will be able to resolve some of the internal difficulties that grew up, and that there will be a possibility that the people of that country will move in greater unity on behalf of the total effort. We are encouraged about the possibilities. But there is a good deal of unfinished business and some real problems ahead. But the reception, the support of the people themselves will be vital in this type of guerrilla warfare. The attitude of the peoples becomes absolutely crucial. As I think it was Mao Tse-tung said "If guerrillas are operating within a friendly population, every bush is an ally." Well, in the last period we feel that as far as the villages are concerned and the countryside is concerned, they become more and more the allies of the effort to eradicate the Vietcong aggression. And we believe this will get an impetus from recent events and they can go ahead now with more confidence. Question. Mr. Secretary, you have twice referred to Hanoi's idea of neutralization in Vietnam. What is your understanding of the French point of view and their mention of a truce? Answer. I think that was perhaps a comment from a very long-range point of view. It had very little to do with what happens tomorrow or the next day, perhaps commenting on the basis of what was anticipated at the time of the 1954 Geneva Accords. But we see no-we see no development specifically along that line from Paris, or any ideas about any particular moves that ought to be taken at this time. Question. Mr. Secretary, going back to Berlin, some of the Russians here have been telling us that we were using salami tactics against them, and specifically in connection with the note that we sent them which they say has changed the procedures in Berlin. Do you think there is any justification to that charge? Answer. No. I don't understand that assertion. We have been following the practices that we have been following for years on the autobahn. We have not changed those practices in either direction. Our convoy conducted itself in exact accordance with established procedures and moved ahead on the basis of established procedures. I don't know any element of change, as far as we are concerned, in our own practices. And, of course, we can't accept changes called for by the other side. There has been no discussion of that and no change in Question. Mr. Secretary, could you please Answer. No, quite frankly, I can't. I would mislead you if I thought that I understood just what's in their minds on these three incidents because it seems to cut across and interrupt a good many other things that they have been saying and efforts that have been made in small as well as some of the larger problems to find new points of agreement after the test ban treaty. But when you try to cross the gap of to say I don't understand it. Question. Sir, would you tell us, please, Answer. Well, I think the answer to that is self-explanatory, that our policy is that when people testify before congressional committees they should tell the truth. [Laughter.] Question. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask a do you respond to the critics of the deal who Answer. Well, in the first place, the ques- a good many elements that needed review, But I would suppose that the reason for There was no preliminary discussion with Question. Mr. Secretary-▬▬▬▬▬▬ Question. Senator DODD, on the floor of the Answer. Well, this question has come up Question. Then aren't you participating at all in the transmittal of letters of dismissal for Mr. Otepka? Did somebody else make the Answer. The procedures on that are established under long-standing regulations, and the letters have gone from other offices of the Department. Under existing practice, if Mr. Otepka uses the machinery that is available to him, then in due course it would come to me for complete review. And therefore I think it's important for me to reserve my own position on the matter until I have it before me officially. Question. Mr. Secretary, many Congressmen, and also, I believe, the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has called for a drastic revision of the foreign aid program in the future. The fiscal 1965 program is now being put together in the Department. Are new concepts and fresh organizational structures being built into this program, and if so, in response to these demands-and if so, could you tell us something about them? Answer. I think the suggestions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are being given the most serious and fullest consideration. We are studying those at the present time. And our proposals for next year will take those very much into account. Exactly in what way remains to be seen. But I think the underlying point is that the foreign aid effort is a postwar effort which requires us to keep our backs in it year after year, if we are to get this job done. I think we should not suppose that changes in detail or changes in administrative arrangements will necessarily prove the key that unlocks the necessary effort. I think we have got to have a general national understanding that it is in our vital interest to go ahead with a substantial aid program for the next years ahead, and to be ready to do that in the most effective way possible. And I think it's this broader need for the foreign aid program that we need fully to understand. Question. Mr. Secretary, I think it's useful just every few months to take a pulse on the Allied nuclear navy. Over the past year, we have ranged from tolerance; that is, if the Europeans want it, we will listen to their ideas, to various forms of enthusiasm. In the light of the Italian difficulties at the moment, the British preelection period, the German changeover, how do you gage the odds, our enthusiasm, and the future of this whole project? Answer. Well, now that we know that a number of our Allies are very much interested in it, we are prepared to go ahead with it, we'd like to go ahead with it. At exactly what pace depends upon the circumstances of the other governments more than upon Question. Is the United States making any progress with its Allies in working out uniform credit policies toward the Soviet? Answer. No, that is a matter which will be discussed. These are matters that are regularly discussed in NATO, and the OECD. Credit policies have been a matter of general coordination, not only as far as the Soviet bloc is concerned, but also with regard to the free world. And I would suppose these matters would be discussed further. But I have nothing specific on that to say this morning. Question. Mr. Secretary, it was reported that Soviet arms have been reaching Algeria from Cuba, and from Egypt. Do you think that the Soviets are engaged here in a new gambit, or do you think it's an initiative of |