On page 38, line 18, before the word government "by" insert "(2)".

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I repeat that this amendment is identical in type to my amendment with respect to the Development Loan Fund, so I do not think I need to repeat my previous statements in regard to the need for congressional authorization and supervision over such a revolving fund.

If the Senator from Arkansas is willing to accept the amendment, the debate on it can be cut short.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I accept this amendment to the committee amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 314, submitted by the Senator from Colorado [Mr. DOMINICK], to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.

The amendment (No. 314) to the committee amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY in the chair). The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, is open to further amendment.

of Czechoslovakia for which no recompense has yet been offered. Those claims have been adjudicated, found valid, and awarded by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. They amount to more than $113 million, representing 2,630 cases. Some, 1,346 claims were rejected by the Commission, but 2,630 were found to be valid, and they totaled $113 million.

It is my understanding that there is an agreement in process to settle these claims for approximately $101⁄2 or $11 million, which would be less than 10 cents on the dollar.

There have been a number of similar situations. Since World War II the United States has negotiated claims conventions with six different nations. The first was with Italy, in 1947, and was for 100 percent of the value of the U.S. claims. The second was with Yugoslavia, in 1948, for 91 percent of the value of U.S. claims. The third, in 1950, was with Panama, for 90 percent. The fourth, in 1960, was with Rumania, and was for 24 percent. The fifth was with Poland, for claims that have not yet been completely processed, so it is impossible to know what will happen in that case.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The settlement was for 40 percent. clerk will call the roll.

The most recent country involved in the claims process is Bulgaria, and the

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 247, and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment of the Senator from New York will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. At the end of the bill it is proposed to add the following:

PART V-MISCELLANEOUS

SEC. 501. It is the sense of the Congress that any agreement hereafter entered into between the Government of the United States and the Government of Czechoslovakia relating to the settlement of claims, determined by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, by nationals of United States against the Government of Czechoslovakia for losses resulting from nationalization or other taking of property of such nationals, shall be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.

the

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, the purpose of the amendment is to assure that the Senate will be given an opportunity to review any agreement which is reached between the U.S. Government and the Government of Czechoslovakia with regard to U.S. claims against that Government before the agreement goes into effect. The claims involved are claims for property rights or interest owned by U.S. citizens taken or naturalized on or prior to January 1, 1945, by the Government of Czechoslovakia. It should be made clear that those claims are not for war damage or injury of that type. They are compensation for deliberate seizure by the Communist

It is rather ironic that the two free world countries paid 100 percent and 90 percent, respectively, of the claims against them, while the Communist nations are succeeding in paying a much smaller share. It seems to me particularly disturbing that the number of awards on the Czech claims, 2,630, is larger than the number for any other country.

I have a list of claimants. There are a few large claimants. There are many small claimants-people with small businesses which were taken in Czechoslovakia. Claims were made and have been adjudicated to be valid. Now those

claimants are asked to take 10 cents on the dollar. I have the names and addresses of the claimants in the various States, representing the 2,630 claims, and I have received some pitiful letters from some of them.

I ask Senators to put themselves in the position of a U.S. citizen who owned a little tobacco store, let us say, in Czechoslovakia, and had it nationalized. After hiring a lawyer and going through the Claims Settlement Commission, it was adjudicated that he was entitled to $3,000 for the property that had been taken away from him. Now he is being asked to take less than $300 for his claim. That is a tough proposition.

All the amendment would do would be to say that it is the sense of Congress that any agreement between the two governments should be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.

There may be some special, unusual situation which justifies a settlement of situation which justifies a settlement of less than 10 cents on the dollar in this one case. If so, let us hear what the reasons are. Let the Senate have a voice in the matter.

That is what was done in the Panamanian settlement, so there is a prece

dent for such action. That settlement was ratified by the Senate on August 9, 1950, and since the settlement amounted to 90 percent, it seems to me a fairly good precedent to follow. A settlement of less than 10 percent of the awarded claims is not, it seems to me, by any stretch of the imagination, the mere execution of a policy laid down by Congress.

A U.S. agreement on less than 10 percent compensation is surely not what Congress intended when it established the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, which was charged to determine "the fair or approved value of the said property right or interest."

This has now taken place after many years of hearings. Therefore, I strongly believe that the Senate should request formally, by resolution, that the agreement with the Czechoslovaks, now under consideration, not go into effect until the Senate has offered its advice and consent.

But I repeat, this would not stop the agreement. It would say that the Senate should have some voice in it, as the Senate did in the case of the Panamanian settlement.

I ask unanimous consent to include at this point in my remarks a further statement on this issue.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SENATE REVIEW OF CZECHOSLOVAKIAN CLAIMS

In general, the Constitution prescribes that treaties of the United States shall be made by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, "provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." It has been the practice of the executive branch to contract with foreign states in relation to a variety of matters through the medium of so-called executive agreements on which Senate ratification has not been sought. The Constitution does not contain any definition of a treaty and makes no statement declaring under what circumstances an arrangement purporting to bind the United States must be handled as a treaty. Nevertheless, authoritative commentators have concluded that the alternative technique of the executive agreement cannot be employed to frustrate the constitutional requirement of Senate ratification in appropriate cases: "The declaration that the President 'shall have power by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to

make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur,' sustains the conclusion that it was not to be rendered abortive by recourse to a different procedure for the use of which no provision was made, and that there were to be found tests of improper evasion in the character of what was

sought to be achieved despite the absence

Other

of a specific textual prohibition. wise, the scheme for the cooperative action

of the President and the Senate would have been a relatively valueless injunction, and the solitary constitutional guide for contracting would have been of slight worth.” It is necessary to turn to precedents in executive branch-congressional relations and to the policy considerations in the particular case at issue to determine when Senate ratification of a foreign agreement is called for since there is no governing case law. any claims settlement with Czechoslavakia of the unpaid claims adjudicated by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, both the precedents and the applicable policy considerations indicate Senate ratification should be sought.

For

It has been accepted that the executive branch can, without Senate ratification, enter into lump-sum claims settlement agreements to be administered pursuant to the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as amended. The United States-Polish Claims Settlement Agreement of 1960 is an illustration. Where, however, the claims agreement provides that a claim against the United States is to be offset against the claims of U.S. nationals against the foreign government, Senate ratification has been obtained. The 1950 claims agreement with Panama, administered pursuant to the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, was such an agreement and was submitted as a treaty for Senate ratification. In the Panama agreement, a $53,800 Panamanian claim against the United States was offset against $403,156 in claims of U.S. nationals, resulting in a net Panamanian payment of $349,356. In a Czech claims settlement agreement, the Czech claim against the United States for the taking of the steel mill will be offset against the amount to be paid by Czechoslovakia on the claims of U.S. nationals. A Czech claims agreement should, therefore, be handled as the Panamanian claims agreement was, as a treaty with Senate ratification.

In a sense, however, since Congress has already incorporated the first stage of Czechoslovakian claims settlement in legislation, these claims cannot be compared to other claims settlement precedents. The 1958 amendments to the International Claims Settlement Act which led to the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission adjudication of U.S. claims against Czechoslovakia made provision for a claims settlement agreement if such an agreement were executed within the following year and delayed adjudications for that period. Since no such agreement was arrived at, there is a strong implication that the subsequent adjudications of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission were not to be virtually nullified by a later claims agreement executed without any reference to the Congress. This is particularly so now that the actual adjudications have shown that the steel mill sales proceeds were grossly inadequate to meet claims that totaled $113,600,000 rather than the $25 to $45 million anticipated by the executive branch. There is a provision in the Czechoslovakian claims legislation stating that subject to the provisions of any claims agreement hereafter concluded between Czechslovakia and the United States, payments from the steel mill proceeds shall not be deemed to extinguish any claim not paid the full amount of the Commission award. This, of course, does not state either way how such a future claims agreement should be handled.

It stands to reason, however, that having provided for a 4-year Federal Czech claims adjudication program, Congress did not have in mind that the executive branch could subsequently settle these claims for less than 10 cents on the dollar without having to explain to the Congress why no better settlement was possible.

As a policy matter, there is no reason why Senate ratification should not be required and every consideration in favor of it. There can hardly be a need for speedy action since the Czechs have dragged their feet on the matter for almost 15 years. There is no problem of settling claims in order to work out recognition of the Czech Government (the justification cited in tthe Belmont and Pink cases for handling the 1933 claims settlement with Russia by executive agreement). On the other hand, it is important that the Congress, the claimants and those Americans proposing to do business with Czechoslovakia know the full considerations behind any claims settlement with that country. In effect, the claimants are being called to sacrifice over 90 percent of their CIX-1359

claims and forego over $100 million in approved claims.

During 1953 and early 1954 the Senate, in considering the Bricker amendment (S.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong. 2d sess., 1954), gave considerable attention to the problem of when executive agreements should have Senate ratification as treaties. In 1953 during the hearings of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Bricker amendment, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made a commitment to consult with "appropriate congressional leaders and committees" to determine the most suitable way of handling international agreements when there was any serious question as to Senate ratification:

"It has long been recognized that difficulties exist in the determination as to which international agreements should be submitted to the Senate as treaties, which ones should be submitted to both Houses of the Congress, and which ones do not require any congressional approval.

"Differences of opinion resulting from these difficulties have given rise in the past to disputes between the executive branch and the Congress concerning the handling of international agreements. It must be recognized that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to fit all agreements into set categories. At times there may be disagreement as to the manner in which agreements are to be dealt with. While recognizing this, the executive branch cannot surrender the freedom of action which is necessary for its operations in the foreign affairs field. In the interest of orderly procedure, however, I feel that the Congress is entitled to know the considerations that enter into the determinations as to which procedures are sought

to be followed. To that end, when there is any serious question of this nature and the circumstances permit, the executive branch will consult with appropriate congressional leaders and committees in determining the most suitable way of handling international agreements as they arise."

This assurance did not head off prolonged

debate on the need for Senate ratification of

executive agreements having any significant internal effect in the United States. Senator George, of Georgia, proposed an amendment to the Bricker amendment, the essence of which was the requirement that "an international agreement other than a treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only by an act of the Congress." During debate on his amendment, Senator George commented (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 100, pt. 1, p. 1401):

"I am saying to the Senator from Missouri that if nothing is to be done in the field of executive agreements, which have multiplied out of all real proportion to the treatymaking power of the President as exercised under the Constitution itself, we may as well close up shop."

Senator George later pointed out that, if the executive branch would submit the executive agreements he was concerned about for Senate ratification, he would not be concerned about the need for further congressional action:

"That is why I mean to say that the President should submit, as a treaty, to the Senate every executive agreement having the effect of internal law. He should submit it to the Senate. If the Senate by two-thirds vote approved the treaty, then I would have

no doubt at all that it would become a coexistensive part of the law of the United States.

"That is where we are now, so far as treaties are concerned. I am only concerned with executive amendments which never have been acted on by the Senate."

Senator George, in his discussion of executive agreements, expressed the most concern about the effect of the Supreme Court decision in the case of U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203

(1942). The Pink case litigated the effect of the 1933 executive agreement known as the Litvinov assignment. In this agreement the Government of the U.S.S.R. released and assigned to the U.S. Government all amounts due the Soviet Government from American nationals in preparation to a final settlement of the outstanding claims and counterclaims between the United States and the U.S.S.R. In the Pink case the Supreme Court held that, regardless of the legal status under New York law of the assets of a former Russian insurance company, the U.S. Government, by virtue of the Litvinov assignment, took title to these assets which had been nationalized by the U.S.S.R. Senator George felt that the executive branch should have treated the Litvinov assignment as a treaty requiring Senate ratification since it dealt with property and claims to property in the United States. (It might be pointed out that the Czech claims program, by virtue of title IV of the International Claims Settlement Act, gives the American claims against Czechoslovakia the status of claims against property located within the United States since the proceeds of the Czechoslovakian steel mill sale have been allocated by Congress for this purpose.)

Senator George's amendment, made into a substitute for the Bricker amendment, was agreed upon by a vote of 61 to 30 in the Senate.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, with regard to the amendment, the instances which the Senator from New York has cited were with regard to settlement of claims made in pursuance of legislation and not of a treaty.

The Congress gave the executive branch authority to conclude conclude these claims settlements when it enacted the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949. Section 4(a) of that act provides that the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission shall have jurisdiction to receive and adjudicate claims of U.S. citizens "included within the terms of any claims agreement hereafter concluded between the Government of the United States and a foreign government providing for the settlement and discharge of claims of the Government of the United States and of nationals of the United States against a foreign government, arising out of the nationalization or other taking of property, by the agreement of the Government of the United States to accept from that government a sum in en bloc settlement thereof."

The only exception to this procedure that I can find-and there may be others, but not in recent years-was in the case of Panama. In that settlement there was involved a liability of the United States to Panama. Because there was an adjustment of liability on each side, a convention was arrived at.

To illustrate through means of the Claims Convention between the United States and Panama, it involved the U.S. liability of $53,800 as against a Panamanian liability of $403,156; and under the terms of that convention the United States received a net balance of $349,356.

The Senator from New York made reference to Yugoslavia in 1948, to Poland in 1960, and to the Lombardo Agreement with Italy. Those settlements were made in pursuance of legislation, which has been the accepted principle. I do not know of any good

reason why we should reject this established principle for the settlement of claims with Czechoslovakia.

This amendment was not offered in committee, and the committee has not had an opportunity to study it or have the advice of those in the Government who are directly concerned.

I do not believe it is necessary or good practice.

I would be prepared, if the Senator feels strongly about it, to take the amendment to conference, which would give us an opportunity to consult with the administration about it. If there is any good reason why this should be done by a treaty rather than in the usual procedure, I would have no great objection. However, I do not wish to encourage the Senator to believe that I would fight, bleed, and die for it in conference, because I currently believe the established procedure, under the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, is the proper way to handle the claims.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am glad to yield. Mr. KEATING. That was exactly the situation in the case of Panama. The Czechoslovak Government does have a claim against the United States, for taking a steel mill, which is to be offset against the amount paid by Czechoslovakia on the claims of U.S. nationals. The value of that steel mill was about $82 million. It is proposed to have Czechoslovakia put up only about $2 or $22 million, to represent the settlement of all the claims.

The reason given for having the Senate pass upon the Panamanian claim applies in exactly the same terms to this claim of Czechoslovakia. There were mutual claims on both sides. That was the reason for a convention and the reason for the Panamanian claim being considered as a treaty, for the purpose of getting the advice and consent of the Senate.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. As I said, I personally do not have any strong feelings about it, because I have had no background on the subject. I do not think the claim of Czechoslovakia is admitted by this country. However, I do not know. Before I take a strong position on it, I should like to afford the administration an opportunity to express itself. I thought the claims commissions had operated quite well. It requires a good deal of negotiation to ascertain the claims, verify them, and so on.

If the Senator is willing for me to accept the amendment on that basis, I shall be glad to take it. Perhaps the administration has no objection to it. If it did not, I would not have.

Mr. KEATING. I am sure those in control of the Government would not want to get the advice and consent of the Senate. They would want to feel free to handle the situation in any manner they saw fit. I am quite certain they would prefer not to have this case treated in the way the Panamanian case was treated. They would prefer to have carte blanche to treat it in any way they wished.

I appreciate the fairness and frankness of the distinguished Senator from Arkansas in saying he would take the amendment to conference. The words "take it to conference" sometimes have had a rather sinister connotation to some of us.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Not always. Sometimes the situation is due to lack of information; we do not have strong feelings about the matters involved.

Mr. KEATING. I understand. As the Senator has said, this matter was not brought before the committee, and it was not brought forcefully to my attention at the time, or I would have presented it to the committee at that time. I have submitted it heretofore time. I have submitted it heretofore to the staff, to the Senator from Arkansas, and to the Senator from Iowa kansas, and to the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER], the ranking Republican on the committee.

The Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] joined me in offering the amendment. I think, in fairness, I should confer with them about the proposal to take it to conference. I hesitate to ask for a rollcall, but I think I shall ask for a quorum call in order that I may communicate with the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], who have similar problems and who have joined me in cosponsoring this amendment.

I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I withdraw my amendment temporarily, because the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] is on his way to the Chamber. I will reoffer it later after disposition of the amendment which the Senator from Minnesota is about to offer.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk, on behalf of the Senator from New York [Mr. KEATING] and myself to the committee amendment as amended. I ask that the amendment be read. I have discussed it with the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

distinct items apart from foreign assistance. They should not be included within what we call the foreign aid program as contemplated in the Foreign Aid Act. As far as I am concerned, they should not be used as disciplinary measures to be applied to countries with which we may have some disagreement. They ought to be looked upon as peopleto-people programs, and as programs which lend themselves to human betterment and better understanding of nations' cultures.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, as one who has supported very strongly the antiaggression amendment, I feel that this is a desirable provision, and therefore I am happy to cosponsor the amendment with the distinguished Senator from Minnesota. This is a people-topeople program. It is quite different from what is intended within the reach of the Gruening amendment, which was cosponsored by so many Senators. The Peace Corps and the exchange program, under the so-called Fulbright Act, should be continued in countries with which we have this relationship, and they should not be interfered with by the provisions of the Gruening amendment. I hope very much that the amendment will prevail.

Even where aggression has taken place, there is need for continuing contacts between people. We can remain in touch and communication with these nations through people-to-people programs even if we have cut off cash outlay programs.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, it is important that absent Senators be made aware of the pending amendment, because there are those who do not share the point of view that under no circumstances should the Peace Corps be taken out of a particular country that is following a serious anti-American course of action. I should like to suggest the absence of a quorum so that Senators who have that point of view at least will have full notice that this amendment is under consideration.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold that suggestion for a moment?

Mr. MORSE. Yes.

The PRESIDING amendment will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 51 between lines 13 and 14, add the following new subsection:

(f) After SEC. 637 add the following new section:

"PEACE CORPS ASSISTANCE

"SEC. 638. No provision of this Act shall be construed to prohibit assistance to any country pursuant to the Peace Corps Act as amended or the Mutual Educational and

Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 as amended."

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, the purpose of the amendment is to maintain the Peace Corps program and the educational and cultural exchange program, which is basically the Fulbright scholarship program, as separate and

Mr. HUMPHREY. And also make it clear that the Hickenlooper amendment, if adopted, would not affect the Peace Corps or the educational and cultural exchange program.

Mr. HART. And the Hickenlooper amendment. We must make sure that there is an explicit recital of our intention, that these programs shall not be subject to termination. The amendment is a useful one, and I hope it will be agreed to.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I agree with the Senator from Oregon that there should be a quorum call so any Senator who is vitally interested may be

properly notified, even though I wish to make it clear I did say that at an appropriate time the amendment would be offered. Further, the two programs do not relate to direct economic aid, as the Senator from Oregon knows, because the Fulbright scholarship program, for example, is an educational program. I believe it has demonstrated its worth to our national security and national interest and national reputation.

The Peace Corps, while it relates to the social and economic well-being of a country, is essentially a service program. It does not carry with it a large appropriation for the purpose of bringing goods and material to a country. It brings our people into contact with the people of other countries. It makes a definite contribution to the kind of world we would like, a world of peace and freedom.

There are, of course, feelings and attitudes which have been expressed, to the effect that when we cut off cooperation by our country with another, we ought to do it on every facet. We should take a good look at such a view, because it could include travel by American tourists, which actually is an instrument of aid to another country. Through tourism large amounts of money are brought into another country. I believe the two programs involved in the amendment should stand on their own feet, that they ought not to be a part of any disciplinary action by us, and that they have demonstrated they are in our interest as well as in the interest of the people they

sissippi [Mr. STENNIS] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE] is absent because of illness.

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER] is necessarily absent.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That will not be the impression at all. The amendment would do two things: Where the text of the bill states that no funds under this act or under any other act shall be made

The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I am in sympathy with much of the Humphrey amendment to the committee amendment, particularly the section on cultural exchanges; but I am not so sure that the exchanges; but I am not so sure that the amendment is sound insofar as the Peace Corps is concerned. Corps is concerned. The amendment would be sound in most instances; but I wish to report to the Senate that some days ago the former Ambassador to the Dominican Republic conferred with some of us, and pointed out that, after all, the Peace Corps is closer to the people of the Dominican Republic than probably any other work we are doing there, and that the Peace Corps really is working in the neighborhoods of that country. So when there is in that country a situation which is so serious that we are withholding our aid, or if there is a situation-speaking hypothetically-in a which a country has begun a strong anti-American course of begun a strong anti-American course of action, I wonder why we should permit the Peace Corps to continue to operate there.

Our former Ambassador to the Dominican Republic also said to us, "If the Peace Corps were to be taken out, the people of the country really would know they were in trouble with the United they were in trouble with the United States." He said that the mass of the people there really do not know about the other parts of our program.

I wish there were a provision which, in such a situation, would result in discontinuing our Peace Corps operations in such a country, but at the same time would not handicap the operations of the Peace Corps in situations in which there is not a strong anti-American feeling or where, by permitting the Peace Corps to continue its operations, we would not seem to be countermanding other action we take.

It would be better to have this amendment permit the Peace Corps to continue its operations until some affirmative action to the contrary was taken. But, although I would feel inclined to vote against the amendment in its present form, and although I had hoped we would modify the amendment, the difficulty is that I do not have in mind any specific proposal for its modification.

I repeat that, in accordance with my view and in accordance with the views which others have expressed to me, there are instances in which the operations of the Peace Corps should be stopped; and I do not want the Senate to give the impression that in such situations the Peace pression that in such situations the Peace Corps is to stay in or is to continue its operations there.

the Fulbright scholarship program or the Peace Corps, which are essentially peoples-to-peoples programs, and do not carry with them large amounts of goods or economic resources. It seems to me that such programs build for the long term, and do not have immediate political significance.

Senators may recall that when the Senate passed the Peace Corps bill, the Secretary of State said that although the Peace Corps is considered a significant part of the U.S. overall effort in the international field, it is not to be considered an adjunct to the Nation's foreign policy, in terms of the national security, but is in a sense a peopleto-people program in which we place great confidence for the future.

It is my hope that we might protect its integrity and not bring it within the purview of the aid, or within the purview of the disciplinary action which this country take with respect to any other nation.

The amendment would not mean that the Peace Corps must be sent to every country. That is not the purpose of the amendment. The purpose is to make sure that the limitations and the prohibitions that we have placed in the bill would not apply to the Fulbright scholarship program or the Peace Corps program. It would leave to the President of the United States the right to determine whether or not it would be desirable to have a Peace Corps operation in any particular country.

Mr. MORSE. Will the Senator answer a hypothetical question for the purpose of making legislative history?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I shall be glad to

Mr. MORSE. I shall tell the Senate what my fear is. If we do not make legislative history, and if we get into some difficult situation in the future, the position might be taken that the Senate had gone on record in opposition to taking the Peace Corps out of a country, even though the fact situation might warrant such action.

I should like to use as the basis of my hypothetical question such facts as we have concerning the Dominican Republic, where constitutional government was overthrown. The administration announced that it was withdrawing aid, at least until it found out what the new government would do in regard to constitutional rights.

My hypothetical question contemplates the withdrawal of all forms of assistance. There is no question that the Peace Corps, although not foreign aid assistance, is a valuable assistance to a country. If the President should decide that the Peace Corps ought to come out of a certain country, it would

not be intended or contemplated by the amendment of the Senator from Minnesota to restrict the President in any way from making a decision to bring out the Peace Corps.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Absolutely not. The decision as a matter of policy would be left in the hands of the President, as it is now. It would merely mean that the amendments which have been overwhelmingly adopted would not apply specifically as a prohibition to the Peace Corps or to the so-called Fulbright scholarship program. But the authority of the President to withdraw the program would remain as it is.

Mr. MORSE. I wanted to bring out that point.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I appreciate the Senator's question. It is very worth while.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I am obliged to express thoughts which are not in accord with the discussion which has taken place. If I should remain silent, I would feel that I had done so on the basis of fear to speak up at a time when I was convinced that statements were being made that were not sound. By my silence I cannot subscribe to the proposition that a democratic republic overthrown in South Vietnam should immediately be given consideration by way of aid and recognition while the Dominican Republic, in which likewise a constitutional government is overthrown, is denied recognition. Both of the overthrown governments were chosen in a democratic process. In South Vietnam blood was shed, lives were taken, and personnel of the incumbent regime were destroyed. No such thing happened in the Dominican Republic. In the Dominican Republic, from the beginning to the end,

the result was subscribed to by a combination of the citizens. In South Vietnam it was only the military that actively participated in the overthrow. In my judgment, the passing of another week without giving recognition to the Dominican Republic would not be in the interest of our country.

Mr. President, in my hands I have a letter written to the editor of the New York Times. It was published in the New York Times on Sunday, October 27. The letter was written by Thomas F. Reilly, bishop of San Juan de la Maguano of the Dominican Republic. In the letter the bishop, who vigorously supported Bosch, points out that the revolution in the Dominican Republic became inevitable in consequence of the soft-handed treatment accorded to the Communists by Bosch. In effect, the letter points out that Bosch was an idealist and sentimentalist, not having any possession of reality. The Communists were making conspicuous inroads that resulted in the general public, from the beginning to the end, desiring to be assured that communism would not take hold of the Dominican Republic. On that basis the revolution occurred.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter be printed in the RECORD as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WHY BOSCH WAS OUSTED DOMINICANS WERE APPREHENSIVE OF ANOTHER CUBA, PRELATE

SAYS

to the EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

Tardily I have seen your editorial comment (September 29) on the overthrowing ment (September 29) on the overthrowing of the Bosch government in Santo Domingo. Dr. Bosch, a most astute campaigner, proved himself as President to be hypersensitive, doctrinaire, contemptuous of many elements devoted to democracy and strangely out of touch with the traditions of his country. I feared that his Government would fall in the last week of July and spoke strongly in the effort to save it. At the same time, the Apostolic Nuncio Emmanuele Clarizio and the other Bishops in friendly talks with Doctor Bosch and members of his government indicated what must be done to regain some measure of lost popular support.

TOLERANCE OF COMMUNISM

I regret the coup d'état and have a deep compassion for Doctor Bosch, who had reason to consider himself a hard-working, honest President bent upon establishing his personal notions of democracy and social justice in the Dominican Republic. Yet it is undeniable that responsible civilian groups were disturbed by the open smuggling of small arms to the little Communist groups, the bland tolerance of communism, the formation of a Bosch-directed militia ostensibly to protect the canefields.

There was widespread determination that the Dominician Republic would not permit itself to become another Cuba. Dr. Bosch obstinately refused any gesture to the nation to show that he shared this determination.

I do not believe that we have a rigid oligarchy in Santo Domingo. After the Bosch triumph in the elections of December 1962, the party of the business community and property owners found a spirit of willing cooperation among its members.

But on

February 17 Dr. Bosch began his derisive

taunts against them and brought things to a head with his wild project of the law of confiscations. Meanwhile the level of government administration declined sharply from the fairly efficient procedures which the provisional government achieved. the poorer people came to feel that the lavish campaign promises of Dr. Bosch were a bitter jest.

UNDISCIPLINED YOUTH

And

I have no attachment to any political group and indeed feel very unhappy about the present muddle. Our boys and girls in the high schools and the university will be more undisciplined than ever in the weeks to come. They cherish hopes for sweeping changes-an integral revolution-but have only reached the first stage, wherein Latin American youths indulge in school strikes, rock throwing, and heroic oratory.

Withal, I am not without hope for the new civilian regime. After the coup, the army and the police retired swiftly to their

Mr.LAUSCHE. Another reason that I must speak is that I do not believe we ought to subscribe to a proposition that would make the Fulbright scholarship program and the Peace Corps program sacrosanct. We should not hold out to the world that whatever these young men do is above everything else that our country is doing. If we deny these nations aid, and if we refuse to help them on the basis that they have not followed a course consistent with the security of the United States, I do not believe that we ought to place the Peace Corps and the Fulbright students in a different class.

Why do I make that statement? This afternoon there came to my desk a letter from a Peace Corps worker in the Dominican Republic. The words of his letter are of such a character as to reveal that the writer is an actual participant in the political controversy that is going on in the Dominican Republic. When the Peace Corps bill was passed, I am certain that on the floor of the Senate it was repeatedly declared that the Peace Corps members would not become the propagandists of economic theories or a political philosophy. In the nations to which they would be sent they were to participate in manual work and ordeals. They were not to participate in political arguments. By its wording and spirit the letter which I received today clearly indicates that that young man is actively engaged in the political controversy in the Dominican Republic.

To summarize, I do not agree with the argument that the Dominican revolutionary government should be rejected. I make that statement because we are showing a great proclivity to reject governments which are friendly to the United States and hostile to communism, and to favor what are supposed to be democracies that are favorable to communism and hostile to the United States. In my judgment it is a mistake to single out any function which we are providing to help other countries, giving that function superiority over the general class of services that we are rendering.

I do not believe this amendment should be adopted, and I urge Senators so to vote.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I am glad to yield. Mr. KEATING. Does the Senator realize that this amendment does not provide that aid under the Peace Corps or under the Fulbright exchange program shall not be cut off, but merely that those two programs will be exempt from the mandatory cutoff which is embodied in the amendment offered by the Senator from Alaska?

Mr. LAUSCHE. I understand that thoroughly, and I am glad the Senator from New York asked the question. In the 52 years I have been a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I have decided that we try to balm our consciences by having inserted in bills that "this shall not be done until such and such findings are made." We provide an escape clause, and then believe that we