have a much sounder bill. But I have suggested to some of the proponents of the bill that we ought to face the reality of what the final appropriation is likely to be. In my judgment, it will not be more than $300 million, and probably not that much. If we are to have a conference with the House, it would be well to have figures below the House figures, at least for consideration.

Be that as it may, I had hoped that some understanding could be reached on an additional $40 million cut. It would bring the total cut in the Senate to $500 million. It stands at $460 million now. Although we could save more money, so far as I am concerned that would be a pretty workable figure to take to conference. It would save much time because, unless we can arrive at what we think is a workable figure, we shall have to continue to try to cut the authorizations in the bill amendment by amendment, which will involve a list of amendments providing for cuts country by country.

I have said that I do not believe that defeating those of us who believe this cut should be greater by yea and nay votes-which will continue to show, I am sure, a substantial number in this body who are fed up with the bill and the programs it represents-is helpful to obtaining ultimately good foreign aid support in this country. But if that is the way the administration wants to operate, it is all right with the Senator from Oregon. I will not be deterred by what probably was a very unsound speech of the President in New York City the other night. The President himself, or his secretary ought to be in consultation with us on this subject. We have no intention of stopping the fight. We are going to give the Senate an opportunity to work its will amendment by amendment.

I thank the Senator from Idaho very much. I am not rejecting his suggestion and shall go into consultation with other Senators about it later. However, this is the place where the administration could agree to take another $40 million cut and have a stronger bill, because if there is one area which we ought to reform, it is in connection with supporting assistance. Supporting assistance is the payroll on which we put nations all over the world that are unwilling to put their economic houses in order and unwilling to live within their means.

We offer to make up the difference between the scale on which they want to live and the scale on which they can afford to live, and we do it with supporting assistance, at the expense of the American taxpayer.

Supporting assistance goes into a nation's budget and is forever lost to the sight of the American taxpayers whose money it was. Wherever there is a country in the world receiving supporting assistance, there is a country that wants a military machine that it cannot support, or maintains inefficient socialized industries that are really used to give jobs to the unemployed, or a country that is simply thought to be important to us for political reasons.

In my opinion, none of these reasons justifies our giving them supporting assistance.

I invite Senators to come to

my desk and inspect the list I have prepared of major recipients of aid around the borders of the Communist bloc, which shows how much supporting assistance they are down for in fiscal 1964. I cannot read the figures, because they are marked "top secret." They should not be top secret. There is no reason why the American taxpayer should not be informed of these figures. I can put in the RECORD, and I shall, the figures for fiscal 1963, 1962, 1961, and 1960, and from the beginning of the support assistance program, but we must not disclose to the American people the figures for 1964. Such a procedure cannot be justified. I wonder why we cannot disclose the figures. All the reasons given are fallacious. It is argued that if we disclose this information, some of the countries that do not receive as much as others will request more, on the ground that they are being discriminated against. That is more nonsense.

It is argued that we should not disclose information that would be of use to our potential enemies. Does anyone believe that Russia does not know that we give substantial support to certain countries? Of course she does. I am more inclined to think that we canot make the figures public because the Government does not want the American citizen to know, because the American citizen might not be kind about it. I hope the American people will not be kind about the program itself, and will be more unkind because their Government will not take them into its confidence. I am not going to support that kind of government by secrecy. There is little I can do about it, because my lips are sealed, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, by the "top secret" label. I do not propose to engage in any improper course of action. Let Senators take a look at the millions of dollars that it is proposed to give to countries which ought to be told, "Your Santa Claus period is over. It is not going to be Christmas for you 365 days a year any more, with Uncle Sam putting on the attire of Santa Claus. You must stop it."

aid

All my present amendment proposes to do is to make a cut of $50 million. That is long overdue. I hope that the Senate will adopt the amendment. None of the reasons given justifies our giving supporting assistance. That is why I invite Senators to inspect the list I have prepared of major recipients of aid around the borders of the Communist bloc, which shows how much supporting assistance they are scheduled to receive in fiscal 1964. The figures show a total far under the $350 million I am proposing. One of the arguments of the State Department is, "We must give this supporting assistance to countries on the periphery of the Communist bloc." The total indicates that many countries which are not on the periphery of the Communist bloc are to receive millions of dollars of support assistance. That is why I say that the figures show a total far under the $350 million that I am proposing in my amendment so far as countries on the periphery of the Communist bloc are concerned.

Even so, the supporting assistance to many countries should be drastically cut,

even if they are on the periphery of the Communist bloc. Supporting assistance to nations in Latin America, which are not included on the chart, should probably be eliminated altogether.

We have agreed to a $10 billion Alliance for Progress program for the next 10 years for Latin America. We have entered into two agreements with Latin American countries, the Act of Bogotá and the Act of Punta del Este. They are signed agreements, in which commitments were made by our Latin American friends that they would submit plans, which were to be submitted in advance of approval for Alliance for Progress funds. Such plans would outline the program of economic reform and other reforms essential in those countries if there is to be any hope of their becoming stable economies.

Only eight countries have submitted plans, and many of those plans need drastic revision, because the mere submission of a plan which is not sound and feasible does not entitle the particular country to Alliance for Progress funds. However, certain countries have circumvented the Acts of Bogotá and Punta del Este by obtaining funds from other sources.

A major source is supporting assistance funds. We are not going to make the Alliance for Progress program work if we are to give these countries an escape hatch which they can use to walk out on their obligations under the Alliance for Progress program.

Brazil and Argentina are two notorious examples. That is why I say that for Latin American countries supporting assistance money should be cut off entirely, and we should say to them, "Keep the commitments you have made in exchange for our proffer to cooperate with you in the Alliance for Progress program."

When we permit Latin American countries to obtain money from the supporting assistance program, we are a party to defeating the Alliance for Progress program.

I put into the RECORD yesterday the article written by Tad Szulc of the New York Times at São Paulo, Brazil, showing the stagnation in the economies of one Latin American country after another, and pointing out that, instead of the situation improving, it is growing worse. We do not have enough money in this country. We could pour all the wealth of the United States into Latin America and it would all go into a sinkhole, and not stabilize those countries. The leaders of those countries and the people of those countries must be willing to reform their economic and political systems.

The President can say all he wants to say in New York City about the rich Having only 6 perhelping the poor. cent of the world's population, the United States cannot solve the problems of poverty throughout the world.

Furthermore, we had better take a look at some of our own domestic needs. The President makes a nice sounding, plausible, emotional argument when he talks about this program being a moral issue. Some basic moral issues are involved in the fight over the foreign aid

bill. One of them is that it is about time this Government started treating the American taxpayers fairly and stopped sinking millions of American taxpayers' dollars into sinkholes on the basis of some political slogan to the effect that the rich must help the poor. When countries in which millions of poverty-stricken people live are willing to reform themselves, we will then go in on the basis of sound economic projects and be of assistance to them. But the rich of Brazil, the rich of the Argentine, the rich of Ecuador, and the rich of every other Latin American country must stop making huge profits out of the American foreign aid program in Latin America, and depositing such profits in New York and Swiss banks, while American taxpayers, through their Government, through their support of the assistance program, and through the Presidential contingency fund, pour millions upon millions more of American taxpayer dollars into Latin America.

I yield to no other Senator in my capacity as chairman of the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, in my desire to make the Alliance for Progress work. Together with many others, I worked hard to help bring the program into being in the first place. But some of the fiscal policies being followed by our Government may defeat the Alliance for Progress, and this is one of them. We cannot justify a dollar of supporting assistance to Brazil, Argentina, or Ecuador, so long as those countries' governments take the position, which they have taken to date, of not fulfilling their commitments under the Alliance for Progress.

Yesterday the United States was the subject of an insulting speech by the President of Brazil, who raised the question as to whether American aid is really of any value to Brazil. That is gratitude. How long shall we take it? How long will this administration take it? How many more millions of dollars will the President, through his contingency fund, pour into Latin America? I have tried to give the Senate an opportunity to check it. I gave it that opportunity last night. I shall figure out other parliamentary ways of giving the Senate another opportunity before the debate is concluded, for that hole must be plugged.

The Senate cannot justify allowing millions of dollars of supporting assistance funds be spent in this manner. Funds spent this way defeat some of the most precious objectives of the American foreign policy. One of them is the objective of a workable Alliance for Progress. That is why I have said in this speech that, in my judgment, all supporting assistance to Latin America probably should be stopped, and the Latin American countries told that we have a program to help them, the Alliance for Progress, but that, of course, it creates obligations upon them to do something to help themselves. They must reform the system that has brought them into the stagnation that Tad Szulc reported in the previously mentioned article.

The main reason why the Latin American economy is stagnate is that our Latin American friends, in country after

country, are refusing to adopt the economic changes that are essential if they are to have a stable, growing, expanding economy, instead of a stagnating, degenerating one.

Ever since the closing years of the Eisenhower administration, we have been told that American foreign aid is now more than 60 percent loan and less than 40 percent grant. That figure relates only to economic aid; if it took into account military aid, which is all grant, the percentages would be reversed. The statistics of the State Department are inaccurate, in the sense that what they include as loans do not meet the definition of loans in the terminology of the American taxpayer. A loan at threefourths percent interest, with from 40 to 50 years to pay and a 10-year grace period in which not a cent has to be paid, is not a loan.

Furthermore, I ask Senators to put it down in their memory, for future recollection, that the largest percentage of those loans will never be repaid. It will be only a few years until speeches will be made on the floor of the Senate urging the forgiveness of those loans because the countries have not made a move to repay them. It will be argued that we must not play the part of Shylock. It will be argued that the failure to repay is creating friction, misunderstanding, and problems; and that therefore, in our great generosity, we ought fore, in our great generosity, we ought to forgive those loans. That is the way this game is played.

It is time to write a new rulebook for the State Department, and to say, "You must play from now on in accordance with the rules of this rulebook. You will no longer have the opportunity to filch from and milk the taxpayers of this country in a program that is so economically unsound as the program innomically unsound as the program involving, for example, supporting assistvolving, for example, supporting assistance."

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. DOMINICK. In connection with the Senator's point as to whether loans will be repaid, an interesting table appears on page 712 of the hearings, to which I referred yesterday. As to the repayment of loans, the table shows that repayment of loans, the table shows that for Alliance for Progress loans, which for Alliance for Progress loans, which have been in effect for only a few years, $13,858,789.97 has been disbursed. Under the heading "unrepaid balance," the identical amount is shown. There has not been a single instance of repayment not been a single instance of repayment

of such a loan.

Secondly, as to the overall loan disbursements, the table shows that we have disbursed over a long period of years $6,517,974,743.06, while $5,728,534,659.28 is still owed to us. In other words, about 90 percent of the total

amount that has been loaned in the pro

gram through the years is still owed to

we should say to the borrower, "These are the terms and conditions on which the loan will be made. You will have to undertake certain obligations to obtain the loan. You will have to pay an interest rate that will cover the cost of the use of the money to the American taxpayers. You will pay for the service rendered.”

Then the borrowers will pay some attention to their investment of that money, and will put it into economic projects which will do economic good for the mass of the people. They will be projects which will pay out. That is what I call exporting economic freedom, and that is what we should be exporting, because until there are established in those countries systems of economic freedom based upon sound fiscal policies, the people of those countries never will be saved from poverty and degeneration.

It is interesting to note that the Foreign Relations Committee in its unsigned report made a good many criticisms similar to mine, but the committee "passed the buck" to the administration; the committee slapped the administration on the wrist, and said, "Next year, bring us a program which will take into account some of these criticisms." But the committee cannot "pass the buck” insofar as its responsibility to the American people is concerned, for if all the things the committee has said all along are wrong with the program are wrong with it-and there are also many other things about it that are wrong-the committee had an obligation in writing the bill to proceed to correct all the wrongs it knew about in the program. If the committee had done that, we would not have had to turn the Senate into a Committee of the Whole to proceed to rewrite the bill paragraph by paragraph, section by section. But the committee gave us no alternative, if the opponents to the bill are to carry out our commitments to our constituents.

It matters not to me how inconvenient that process may be to certain Senators. They were elected to serve in this body, and they should adjust their convenience to their job.

I have done my best to try to reach a fair negotiated settlement of our differences, and it still is possible to do so. But until such a settlement is reached, I shall continue to offer amendment after amendment and, with each amendment, to make a record for future reference as to what is wrong with the parts of the addressed. program to which my amendments are

When the administration claims that

the foreign aid bill is now 60 percent

loans and less than 40 percent grants, I point out that those statistics are "phony." In the first place, they deal only with the economic side; in the second place, they do not tell the true story about the nature of the loans, which in effect are in large measure grants concealed by a veil of semantics; but if we take a long look, we can see through the veil. Thus it is that I say that if the administration's own statistics took into account military aid, which is grant money, the percentages would be reversed.

Moreover, the economic aid program itself has remained rather stationary at the proportion of roughly 65 percent loan to 35 percent grant. That proportion should become one of 90 percent loan and 10 percent grant for economic aid. Supporting assistance is the major roadblock to attainment of that objective. It bears no relationship to any given project or program. It is extended, not on the basis of the sound financial undertakings of the recipient, but on a political basis.

The $400 million proposed by the Foreign Relations Committee for this category of aid is only $35 million less than the amount carried in the original bill. If Congress is going to steer the administration down the path of true and meaningful reform in foreign aid, we must reduce further this huge source of nonproject grant money, as provided in my amendment. We can do it by reducing supporting assistance to $350 million, as provided in the amendment.

Congress has tried over the years to reduce this category of aid. Our effort has not been notable for the cooperation it has received from the executive branch, which is another reason for my loss of faith in the ability of the executive branch to recast its anachronistic foreign aid structure.

My colleagues know that we on the Foreign Relations Committee have made many attempts to compel the executive branch to recast the foreign aid program into a manageable one, with specific goals and objectives. We have tried to promote an examination of a basic philosophical premises about foreign aid, and, indeed, to find out whether such fundamental tenets actually exist. Prominent among such efforts has been the "Mansfield amendment."

Mr. President, before I discuss the Mansfield amendment, I note the presence in the Chamber of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. I am perfectly willing to submit him as a wit

ness to the statement I now make, and then let him deny it if it is not true. Again this year in the committee discussion in regard to supporting assistance, which goes into supporting the military forces of a good many other countries, it was alleged that they are not able to support by themselves military forces of the size we seek to have them maintain, and there was discussion about countries such

and at high salaries, too; and the American taxpayers are paying the bill. But can taxpayers are paying the bill. But if anyone believes Chiang Kai-shek's army is worth a tinker's dam to the United States, in connection with the defense of the Pacific, I point out that that is far from the fact. If an attempt ever were made to land that army on the mainland of China, I am of the opinion on the basis of many reports I have ever seen in regard to the military efficiency or lack of efficiency of that army-that it would trample itself to death in the process of retreat.

I repeat that neither Taiwan nor South Korea is of support to the American defenses in the Pacific. The support of American defenses in the Pacific depends American defenses in the Pacific depends upon thousands of American troops who are stationed throughout the Pacific area, on the 7th Fleet, and in the U.S. Air Force.

Mr. President, we are spending too much money in South Korea, in Taiwan, and elsewhere in that area, in supporting assistance; and I am asking that it be cut back $50 million.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield? Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. In the Foreign Relations Committee the subject of the amount of money which should be allocated for supporting assistance was discussed, and it was stated that probably a cut could be made.

I submitted written questions to Secretary McNamara in an endeavor to find out how many troops were in the Armies of Vietnam, Thailand, the Republic of China, Korea, Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. I desired to know how many troops might be available in those foreign countries if we became involved in trouble. If Senators will look at page 217 of the hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate during June and July of 1963, they will find the answers to the several questions which I asked. The answer to the particular question which I have described was as

follows:

Answer. The total number of troops maintained by the 8 nations mentioned is 2,793,

My recollection is that the answer also identified the number in each of those identified the number in each of those nations, but the number was deleted benations, but the number was deleted because supposedly the information was classified.

I then asked how much it cost to main

than the cost to the United States of providing military men from among its citi

zens.

In round figures, for every military man that we in the United States can provide at a cost of $3,948, the Republic of China can provide 23 military men, because the cost of maintaining a military man in Taiwan is only $177 per man. The Republic of Korea can provide about 15 men for every 1 that we provide.

I am not making an argument one way or the other. I am merely stating the figures. I could not wait until the Senator from Oregon had concluded his questions. I submitted written questions. I feel that the questions and answers are deserving of reading and study.

I have the following issue to decide in my own mind: Would we profit by reducing the number of Korean military men and the number of military men in Taiwan, with the probable consequence that we would have to increase the number of our own military men? I should like to hear what the Senator from Oregon has to say on that question.

Mr. MORSE. I am delighted to reply. What the Senator has stated is typical Pentagon fallacious propaganda. Its major premise is erroneous. Its major premise is that maintaining a Chinese Army in the large number Chiang has on Taiwan is some help to the defense of the United States.

Mr. LAUSCHE. That is the argument made.

ment. If there is to be an invasion of Mr. MORSE. It is not a valid argu

what would stop it. It would not be Formosa, the Senator from Ohio knows

Chiang's army. It would be the Ameri

can 7th Fleet and the American air armada.

merely a house of cards that McNamara has built up in order to justify pouring out wasteful support assistance.

What the Senator has been told is

Let us consider South Korea.

Does

the Senator know what ought to be done

with most of the members of the army in South Korea? We ought to be put them to work building roads. We ought to put them to work on irrigation projects. We ought to put them to work in civilian jobs, because South Korea will not be defended by that army. South Korea should have an army, but its size should be greatly reduced to the point at which the economy of the country could

discussion, several Senators expressed perplexity and a lack of understanding as to why we should continue to pour so much money into South Korea, and they asked whether that was one place where some money could be saved. Mr. President, my amendment would do that to the extent of at least giving the administration an opportunity to cut back our supporting assistance in Korea.

Taiwan is another example.

The American people are maintaining there the army of Chiang Kai-shek; and, as I have said before in this debate, Chiang Kai-shek maintains more generals than the total number of generals in the entire U.S. Military Establishment

and how much it cost in the respective countries identified on page 218 of the

hearings. Senators will note that in 1962 it cost $3,948 to maintain a man in the U.S. Army, not including paraphernalia and equipment. The cost in the other countries is listed. In Belgium the cost is $1,571, Denmark $2,107, France $1,966, Germany $1,689, and Italy $878.

I shall not mention each nation individually, but the cost to maintain a military man in Korea is $247; in the Republic of China-Taiwan-$177. I desired that information for the purpose of determing whether financially we were not better off by having those nations provide military men at less cost

Red China should make a move toward South Korea, again we shall go into action with the 7th Fleet. We will not be wasting the lives of free American boys on the basis of thinking that we can win a conventional war against the Red Chinese with South Korea's army.

(At this point Mr. INOUYE took the chair as Presiding Officer.)

Mr. MORSE. We know that we could not whip them in that manner. We could greatly reduce their numbers. The argument is made by the Pentagon that we could go around the periphery of the Communist bloc and maintain the native armies for less money than we can maintain the American army.

The point is that we would not have to substitute an equal number of American boys for that army, because we would not be fighting that kind of war if we had to fight a war over there.

We ought to be demobilizing a great many of the soldiers in those indigenous populations and putting them to work rehabilitating the country, serving clear notice that we would not weaken their

defenses and would not encourage any

invasion of Formosa. The Red Chinese know the 7th Fleet and the air armada are present. The Red Chinese The Red Chinese have heard the announcement of the United States, for it is known to all the Communist world, "You make an attack on an ally of freedom and you have had it." That is the only check we have against war, and not Chiang Kai-shek's overaged army.

Has the Senator seen the statistics on the military efficiency of the South Korean Army? They could be whipped with Boy Scout troops.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr.LAUSCHE. The record shows also that our Government has been insisting upon the utilization of the troops in those countries in the very projects that the Senator from Oregon has recommended. I agree with him entirely.

(See table below.) ANNUAL PER CAPITA MILITARY PERSONNEL COSTS

Cost estimates for countries receiving military assistance shown below are confined to pay, allowances, subsistence and individual clothing. They do not include operation and maintenance expenditures, as no meaningful comparisons could be made due to differing weapons systems and technologies.

For comparative purposes, figures are included for 1961. Principal reasons for changes, where where available, are indicated. Changes are primarily due to either new exchange rates, increased pay and allowances, or the proportion of personnel in the lower pay grades.

1961

United States. Denmark. Belgium.

$4,014

1,571

1,650

will

France...

1,788

+178

1,689

960

878

-82

-61

1,706

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I should like to have printed in the RECORD a transcription of the questions which I asked and the answers given. They appear on pages 217, 218, and 219 of the hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the bill, S. 1276, in June and July 1963. Mr. MORSE. I am delighted to have them in the RECORD.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD the portion of the hearings to which I have referred. There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The CHAIRMAN. I wish to submit, Mr. Secretary, or to your aid, some written questions that Senator LAUSCHE asked me to submit to you. He had to go to another meeting.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Surely. I will be very pleased to answer them, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Please answer them in writing. Senator LAUSCHE had to attend the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce this morning.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The following questions were submitted in writing by Senator LAUSCHE with answers to be provided as inserts for the record:

Question. It is my understanding that over 60 percent of the total military assistance program will be allocated to eight key countries in south Asia, the Far East, and

Thailand.

Vietnam...

Republic of China.
Philippines.
Japan..

is your belief that the military assistance Question. It is my understanding that it program should be continued because in addition to other advantages to the United States, the program insures "our continuing access to oversea bases and installations which are still essential to full deployment of our military strength." If we must still have continuing access to oversea bases and 22 give up the Turkish base? installations, why did we after last October

Answer. Recent actions involving replacement of Jupiter missile squadrons in Turkey (and Italy) did not result in any significant change in existing U.S. base rights. Thus, access to oversea bases and facilities required to support U.S. oversea deployments was not affected by the Jupiter replacement action. Utilization of oversea bases and facilities by the United States and allied forces is subject to almost constant change as new weapons systems enter the operational inventories of these forces and as the overall strategic situation varies. One such change, involving modernization of NATO forces, was replacement of the Jupiter missiles. These missiles, originally provided under the military assistance program, were replaced by

U.S. manned Polaris submarines. The submarines are now operating in the Mediterranean and are assigned to SACEUR, as were the Jupiter squadrons they replaced.

Replacement of Jupiter missiles was initially taken under consideration in 1961,

Increase due to greater number of junior officers and increase in Government retirement contribution.

ances.

Decrease due to more realistic exchange rate.

-215 Decrease due to decontrol of peso. +32

Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, primarily as a result of a report by the Joint entitled "The Study of U.S. and NATO Nuclear Weapons Arrangements," dated February 11, 1961. Secretary McNamara testified at length on this report, and subsequent actions relative to Jupiter missiles, in February and March of this year before the Senate Committee on Armed Forces. Appropriate passages of this testimony appear in the published record of hearings on military procurement authorizations, fiscal year 1964 (pp. 7, 8, 147, 312, 313, 314, 349, and 350).

Question. What direct payment do we make respectively to Spain and Portugal for the bases which we have there?

Answer. We do not make any direct payment, in the sense of rental, to Spain for the bases jointly used with the Spanish. We have provided military and economic assistance to Spain in accordance with bilateral military assistance and economic assistance agreements.

We do not make any direct payment, in the sense of rental, to Portugal for our use of the base facilities in the Azores. We have

provided military assistance to Portugal in accordance with a bilateral military assistance agreement.

Question. It is my understanding that in addition to the direct payments for the right to have the bases, we grant other military and economic aid?

Answer. As mentioned in the answer to the previous question, we do not make any direct payments, in the sense of rental, to either Spain or Portugal.

In the 1953 defense agreement between the United States and Spain, the United States agreed to support Spanish defense efforts for agreed purposes by providing military end-item assistance to Spain during a period of several years to contribute to the effective air defense of Spain and to improve the equipment of its military and naval forces.

In the same agreement, Spain authorized the United States to develop, maintain, and utilize for military purposes, jointly with the Government of Spain, such areas and facilities in territory under Spanish jurisdiction as may be agreed upon. [Deleted.]

Since 1953 the United States has provided Spain a total of approximately $500 million in military assistance and a total of $1.4 billion economic aid in the form of defense support, technical asistance, Public Law 480, and Export-Import Bank and development loan funds.

In the 1951 Defense Agreement on the use of facilities in the Azores, as specified by the Defense Agreement of 1957, Portugal granted the United States certain rights in the Azores. We also have a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Portugal. Since 1950 Portugal has received $328 million in military assistance to assist in maintaining tugal has not requested or received any U.S. economic asistance since fiscal year 1951, except surplus agricultural products under

forces to meet NATO commitments. Por

Public Law 180.

[Deleted.]

Mr.LAUSCHE. Finally, I feel a bit of comfort in the knowledge that in those countries there are 2.8 million men in military uniform. I cannot vouch for I cannot vouch for their efficiency, but I feel much better to know that they are there than I would feel if I knew they were not there.

Mr. MORSE. I would have them working for the rehabilitation of the economies of their countries, rather than sitting around in Army uniforms on American payrolls. I am satisfied that they would not be of any effective assistance in time of war.

Mr. President, the statistics deal with the amount of money required to maintain some of the foreign soldiers in Taiwan, South Korea, and elsewhere. In addition to the arguments that I have already made against supplying supporting assistance, I stress the point that those countries cannot support such armaments. Their economies will not support them. We are supporting them. It is better for the defense of the United States and of those countries that they support armaments only large enough to be supported by their own economies, and that we help them build up their economies so that they in turn can build up their defenses. We should make loans to them for economic projects.

By maintaining these arms with supporting assistance we are putting their whole economy on the American dole. It is degenerating and dissipating, and it has not encouraged them to build themselves up, but, rather, as a type of international beggar, really, made them rely upon us. Furthermore, I point out that in time of war they would be of little help to us, because in addition to our own war effort, we would have to

maintain them completely, by an additional war subsidy to them. That might turn out to be a real disadvantage to the United States. It is much better to have them maintain the arms that their economy will support and have us, under a foreign aid program, come to their assistance in the economic field, to help strengthen their economy, so that their economy will expand, and in that way put them in a better position to protect themselves.

Mr. President, I shall now discuss the Mansfield amendment of several years ago, because the subject matter covered in the amendment has been under discussion in the Foreign Relations Committee for a number of years.

In 1959 the distinguished senior Senator from Montana took the fine initiative of securing the acceptance of section 503 (c) in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. This section directed the executive branch to present concrete plans for reducing and terminating bilateral grants of economic aid in the defense support and special assistance categories.

For those who have lost their way in our decade-long game of semantics, I should note that these categories have Since joined together under the title of supporting assistance; when the latter is combined with military aid the two are entitled strategic assistance.

The greatest phrasemakers imaginable are in the State Department and the

Pentagon.

To a greater extent than any other group I have ever met, they can coin new phrases to disguise meaning and conceal programs not in the public interest.

Now just where do we stand, 4 years after the notable initiative of our respected majority leader? I fear the answer is: In pretty much the same old place.

CHANGES SINCE 1960

Both reports delivered in response to section 503 (c) are depressing reading, and I shall spare my colleagues the pain and boredom of having to hear lengthy quotations from the unclassified version. Suffice it to say that much of the latter is devoted to a pedestrian defense of grant aid-although the Mansfield amendment contemplated no such evasion in directing that a specific plan be made for ending that aid in recipient countries. That is what the Senator from Montana was after, an ending of it, not a reshuffling and a continuation of it under a new semantic label of "supporting assistance."

Thus we read, for example, that:

Against this background, the overall pur

poses of the defense support and special assistance programs are sound. *** To reduce or end the requirements for grant aid by altering or abandoning the goals of such

aid is a conceivable but not an acceptable

approach.

In other words, it is all right for the Congress to have conceptions, but the executive branch in its majesty and wisdom does not have to pay particular attention to them.

The mistake we made in the Mansfield amendment was putting in the words "insofar as practicable" when we asked

that specific plans be worked out for ending supporting grants.

In a blaze of honesty, the unclassified report of 1960 revealed that AID had no real intention of eliminating the defense support aid to the five countries which received about 75 percent of that aid in 1960. It comes as something of a shock, therefore, to discover that two of the five are not receiving supporting assistance today. But there are many other categories of assistance, and our two friends together are scheduled to receive a total approaching half a billion dollars in the coming fiscal year, not including the Public Law 480 program.

After virtually excluding 75 percent of the economic grant program from serious consideration, the executive branch report of 1960 grudgingly saw a possibility of ending grant aid over a 5-year period in 10 countries receiving something over half the remaining 25 percent. Here there has been some progress: Nine were on the list for this aid in fiscal 1962; this year only four are getting these grants. I think there is some reason gratefully to ascribe this progress to the change of administrations downtown.

Next, we turn to the list of eight countries which the executive branch considered as being subject to reductions. We find that five of the eight are still firmly entrenched in the supporting assistance category. In short, we were not promised much in 1960, and we have not gotten much reduction today.

The executive branch scarcely bothered to think about specific reductions in small grant programs. Despite its unwillingness to contemplate change, changes did occur, and six of nine listed areas are not now on the supporting assistance list. On the other hand, new candidates have appeared to vitiate the meaning of this development. Indeed, the executive branch unclassified report forecast this in noting:

Moreover, new needs for grant aid are likely to arise. The grant method of ecoinstrument of foreign policy and, in an uncertain world, promises to remain so.

nomic assistant *** has been an essential

We were thus told that foreign aid administrators expect to give grant aid as long as the world situation remains uncertain. Under such circumstances, the American taxpayer might start looking to the Almighty for relief, since he would be unlikely to get it on this earth.

I do not want to minimize the importance of the Mansfield amendment. Without it I daresay we would have made no progress at all. And we have made some small progress.

On the face of it, we seem to have reduced the total of that assistance quite substantially. In fiscal year 1960, the actual appropriations for defense support and special assistance totaled $940 million. In contrast, the appropriation for supporting assistance in fiscal year 1963 amounted to $395 million. That looks like real, if slow, progress.

CONGRESS MUST GO FURTHER

But stop a moment and consider the end result. By the time the executive branch completed its normal mystifications-including recoveries, carryovers, transfers, and uses of contingency