back into their normal orbits, they give off powerful bursts of pure light.

The core of the laser usually is a tiny, synthetic ruby red, silvered at one end to force the manufactured light through the other. Various types of gases also can be

used as the core of a laser.

Researchers across the Nation are working around the clock to develop lasers for military use.

Westinghouse defense center in Baltimore, like many other firms, is working on the project. And, like other companies, it is pouring its own funds into the race as well as government money. This year alone, Westinghouse has allocated $5 million of its own money for laser research-probably the greatest single effort of any firm in the country.

MESSAGE CARRIER?

Among other things, Westinghouse is attempting to send messages via laser beams. Because lasers have much shorter wave lengths than radio beams, many more messages could be sent on each beam. Theoretically, one laser beam could carry as many messages as all the radio frequencies in the world currently in use.

The difficulty lies in breaking or modulating the laser beams to carry messages or possibly producing sidebands which would serve as information carriers.

Laser communication also has military application because the beam can carry a message without detection unless the beam is interrupted.

In the case of radio, the message is radi

ated in all directions from a transmitter. Anyone within the circle of effective radio range can tune in the frequency if he has the proper type receiver.

Using a laser, however, all the energy is concentrated and focused on one point.

Since the beam is flashed only for a few mil

lionths of a second, it is virtually jamproof, since it must be blocked or intercepted with a physical obstruction between the source and the target.

Power requirements are fantastically lowered through the use of laser, since it requires only one millionth of the power to achieve the same results as radio equipment with the same output.

Radar applications of laser could provide

better range and accuracy than present techniques.

USED IN SURGERY

Linked to a telescope, the laser could be sighted like a rifle. The beam following the line of sight of the scope could direct a missile to a target with a minimum of risk to personnel in the field.

Because of their tremendous heat and energy, laser beams already have been used effectively in eye surgery to weld detached optic nerves to the retina. Since the beam can be aimed directly through the pupil of the eye, the need for many surgical eye operations is eliminated.

DEMANDS WHICH SHOULD BE MADE OF THE SOVIET UNION Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, Columnist John Chamberlain, writing in the Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Gazette, has thought-provoking comments on what the United States should demand in future dealings with Russia.

I believe those points are well taken and should be read by everyone.

I ask unanimous consent that the article, entitled "Things We Should Demand in Future Dealings with Russia," may be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THINGS WE SHOULD DEMAND IN FUTURE
DEALINGS WITH RUSSIA

(By John Chamberlain) The test ban treaty is now part of our world, and taken by itself I persist in thinking it a desirable thing. The chance that Russia might, in the absence of further atmospheric testing, beat us to producing an effective antimissile missile or a means of jamming military communications systems on a continental and oceanic scale

seems really remote. This may testify to my technological innocence, but I haven't seen anything yet that would indicate that either side is on the trail of either the abso

lute nuclear weapon or the absolute anti

weapon.

Furthermore, it is not in the cards that

the United States and the Soviet Union will ever fight an atomic war no matter what is done in the realm of further test

ing. At atomic struggle would bring two

sets of "overkill" into action-and the peo

ples who live at the ends of the earth, far and poisoned shambles of the east EuroContinent, would live to capitalize on the pean "heartland" and the North American disappearance of two monster world powers.

away from what would become the smoking

Assuming there is an iota of self-interest in Soviet Russia and in the United States, neither Khrushchev nor John F. Kennedy will ever press a button that would effectively hand the world over to the Red Chinese.

However, if the test ban merely recogmate, it exposes the United States to all mannizes the fact of a mutual atomic checkner of psychological dangers. We are al

ready hearing that there must be a further

relaxation of tensions.

The thought of this is alluring, but the terms are not defined. Tensions, we know by the example of people in madhouses, can be relaxed by the cultivation of illusions.

PEACE-LOVING SOUL

Or they can be relaxed on one side by exploiting the tensions of the other side. The danger is that the American peace movement, which has always been softheaded, will prove strong enough to win the day for a saftey-through-illusion victory.

As a peace-loving soul, I would gladly have my own political tensions relaxed. Then I could apply for a pleasant job covering the New York Mets. However, illusions have never appealed to me, and I should hate to lose that tense feeling merely because I have been put on the receiving end of one of Khrushchev's one-two punches.

It seems to me that in this time of incipient euphoria, the diplomacy of our country should take the precaution of becoming ironhard. It is in short a time for a sched

Let us make a stab at formulating such a

schedule:

1. Yes, we should take advantage of the crop failure in the Soviet Union. But if we are going to sell wheat to Russia we should get more than gold or dollars in exchange. We might offer a certain amount of wheat

on condition that free farming, with private ownership of acreage, be restored in all the captive nations of Eastern Europe. We might offer still more wheat if free farming were to be restored in Russia itself.

2. Yes, we should have more reciprocal movement of journalists, tourists, students, artists, athletes, and technicians across borders. But we should insist that movement inside the borders really be free. When Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman returned recently from an 18-day trip to the Soviet Union without having been let in on the secret that the Russian wheatlands weren't producing, it was, to put it mildly, a little ridiculous.

CUBA MISSIONS

3. Yes, we should have a detente on Berlin and Eastern Europe. But in exchange for recognizing a neutral belt stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, we should insist that the Berlin wall come down and the Germans be allowed to unify on their own uninhibited terms. Moreover, the new East European neutrals should be permitted the free elections that were originally promised in the Yalta deal.

4. Yes, we should be willing to sign a comprehensive nonaggression pact with Khrushchev. But not until he has taken his minions out of Cuba, dismantled his fifth columns everywhere, and denounced the sly tactic of encouraging indigenous revolutions under the name of Titoism.

This is just scratching the surface of the "yes-buts." Let's hear from a hundred million other "yes-butters" in the United States. Given a sixth or a seventh crop failure (and don't think he won't have it), Khrushchev must some day be disposed to listen.

Like most Senators, I voted to approve the test ban treaty, but I pointed out that I would go along with the majority of Senators with the clear understanding that I wished to see some action on the part of the Soviet Union which would bear out the claims of the proponents of the treaty that such action was an opening to better relations and easing of tensions. I have not seen any evidence of better relations.

The treaty was hardly signed before we had more trouble on the autobahn in East Germany. And now we have heard of the seizure of Professor Barghoorn on the trumped-up charge of being a spy.

In today's issue of the New York Times there is a lead editorial entitled "Freedom of Exchange." It points out that this seizure could be a deliberate provocation on the part of the Soviet Union to bring about an end to the cultural exchange program, because the Soviets are concerned about their people knowing how we live in the United States and about their people seeing our visitors in the Soviet Union on a cultural exchange program.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this editorial printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FREEDOM OF EXCHANGE

President Kennedy stated well yesterday some of the larger implications of the outrageous conduct of the Soviet Government in the case of Prof. Frederick C. Barghoorn. It will be simply impossible to carry on any program of cultural or scholarly exchange

with the Soviet Union if Americans asked to participate in it must face the risk of arrest by the secret police and indefinite confinement in a Soviet jail before the American Embassy is even notified.

The barbaric and unacceptable character of the Soviet behavior toward Professor Barghoorn is so clear that the suspicion must arise that this incident is a deliberate provocation aimed precisely at ending the cultural exchange program. Certainly the Soviet officials who ordered this action must have foreseen that it would leave the U.S. Government no alternative but to call off the negotiations scheduled to begin next week for renewal of the agreement on cultural and scholarly exchanges. A motive for such conduct is apparent in the Soviet leaders' acknowledged fear of the penetration of Western ideas among the people of the Soviet Union. Such maneuvering, aimed at putting the blame for an end to the exchange program upon the United States, would certainly be in the best Stalinist tradi

tion.

Another possibility is that the Soviet leaders seized Professor Barghoorn in the belief that he could be traded for one or more Soviet spy suspects now imprisoned in this country. President Kennedy indicated yesterday that if the Soviet action is based on any such presumption it will not be successful. This is the only possible stand. Any other policy would make it extremely hazardous for any American citizen without diplomatic immunity to be in the Soviet Union at any time that the United States arrested a Soviet spy suspect. Surrender to such

blackmail would only encourage repetition

of such extortion tactics.

AMENDMENT OF FOREIGN ASSIST

ANCE ACT OF 1961

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 7885) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes.

Mr. MILLER. Mr.

I

President, I thought it was significant when President Kennedy said yesterday that the kidnaping deal of the Soviets could jeopardize the wheat sale program. believe that point was fairly well made, because last evening when the Senate was considering the Mundt amendment, it was pointed out that we cannot trust the Communists, that the promissory notes which would be given for threequarters of the cost of the wheat sales would not be worth the price of the paper they were written on. At least, that was the point made and I believe very well made and properly so-by the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT].

If there are any doubts among Members of the Senate regarding the validity of the statement of the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT], let them be laid at rest. On that very basis, the

President of the United States said yesterday that this type of activity by the Soviets indicates that we cannot trust them. This is all the more reason why we had better get cash on the barrelhead for the wheat.

In connection with the Mundt statement, there has been considerable reference to the recently authorized sale of wheat to Russia and other bloc nations. Assertions have been made that this will produce some relief to our balanceof-payments deficit problems.

I believe such assertions are well founded. We should understand that the relief will be only partial and tem

porary.

There have also been some assertions about savings to the taxpayers which have appeared to be exaggerated. I am referring particularly to savings estimates made by the Secretary of Agriculture, Orville Freeman.

On November 7 I placed in the RECORD a letter I had written on October 15 to the Secretary, inquiring about statements he had made that the proposed sale of 150 million bushels of wheat to the Soviet Union and the other bloc nations would result in savings to the U.S. taxpayer of about $200 million in storage and other costs. I sought an explanation of how this could be accomplished since the expense for more than 1 billion bushels in inventory came to only $201 million in fiscal year 1963. I noted that, as of that date, I had received only a reply from another official in the Department stating that he was assembling the data and would forward it at an early date. I wondered then why the Department did not have the information readily available in order to support Secretary Freeman's statement of savings.

In introducing the letter into the RECORD, I also referred to an article which appeared in the Wall Street Journal of October 15. The article, in noting Mr. Freeman's $200 million savings estimate, asserted that he "didn't break down this estimate, but the Agriculture Department has estimated the savings in storage, transportation, and handling costs would total $225 million during the current fiscal year and $30 million in

fiscal 1965."

This Journal statement was borne out by the Department's background report to correspondents on October 10 on "U.S. Wheat Supply and Distribution." Let me quote from page 9 of that report:

In fiscal year 1964, the chief effect on the Federal budget would be a net reduction of around $225 million in budget expenditures, lated costs. The actual costs would depend on the level of world prices and the consequent amount of export subsidy that would be required. In the fiscal year 1965, the impact would be to reduce CCC expenditures for storage and interest by about $30 million as a result of the reduction in CCC holdings.

including CCC's storage, acquisition, and re

This is from one of Mr. Freeman's Department's publications.

Mr. President, on November 13, I received a direct reply from Secretary Freeman. Instead of the savings being effected in 1 year, as the report indicated, his letter now advises that the

savings would accrue over a 5-year period.

It would be next to impossible to effect savings of $225 million in this fiscal year-which Mr. Freeman now recognizes since the wheat probably will not be moved out until near the end of the current fiscal year, if it can be moved out at all by then. Unless he commandeered all the freight cars in the United States-which is unlikely that wheat cannot be moved to the ports in such time. This means storage costs are accumulating, interest is mounting, not to mention the eventual $90 million or so in export subsidies which would have to be added.

But to return to Mr. Freeman's 5-year plan of savings. According to his computations, it costs a total of 26.21 cents a bushel to keep wheat in inventory, which, multiplying this by the 150 million bushels involved in the proposed Soviet transaction, would result in annual costs of $39.3 million.

He projected this annual cost over a 5-year period since, he stated, recent wheat disposition history shows that wheat acquired in 1963 would remain in inventory for slightly more than 5 years. Secretary Freeman wrote:

Based on that hypothesis, the savings on 150 million bushels of wheat that otherwise would be in CCC holdings would eliminate carrying charges of $196.5 million over a 5-year period-$39.3 million per year-at 26.21 cents per bushel.

I have a feeling, however, that Secretary Freeman is inflating that savings estimate somewhat, especially since the Department of Agriculture, in that background statement to correspondents alluded to earlier in my remarks, noted that because "the current U.S. wheat crop is smaller than overall requirements, there is a tight supply of privately held wheat, and the trade must buy 'extra' supplies from the CCC." In other words, the trade will be forced to turn to the Government for wheat in order to meet its needs; these needs appear to be great since, according to USDA compilations, the United States is the world's only country with a large and readily available wheat supply.

And how tight is this supply of privately held wheat? In its "Wheat Situation," also referred to as the "1964 Outlook Issue," released on September 5-well before any determination of a

United States-Soviet wheat dealUSDA's Economic Research Service noted the "free" or privately held supply of old-crop wheat on July 1, 1963, earlier, it said, the free carryover was was about 4 million bushels. A year estimated at 130 million bushels.

Certain other aspects of Mr. Freeman's letter disturb me. In computing the 26.21 cents a bushel-or $39 million annual savings-he included not only storage, handling, and interest charges, but reseal payments and transportation costs for each year. The reseal payments, including processing, were figured at the rate of 1.24 cents a bushel, or a total of more than $9 million in the 5-year period he used. This is erroneous. Reseal payments, of approximately

have to have exaggerations or halftruths or mistruths. Give them the facts, and they will be all right. I am quite sure that if they are given the facts they will be able to make a sound judgment.

be easy for Russia to pour on more fertilizer, use more and more insecticides and herbicides, and thus increase her production of wheat and other commodities 20 to 30 percent.

We think we have a good agricultural

Mr. MILLER. I yield.

Mr. CARLSON. The Senator from Iowa mentioned the sales that have been made by other foreign countries to the Soviet Union. In the statement I placed in the RECORD as a part of my remarks, it is interesting to note:

Statistics for 1962 show that West Germany trade agreements with Russia alone totaled about $700 million. Germany is now

the third largest industrial nation in the world. Italy has a 4-year trade agreement with the Soviets for $1.11 billion worth of goods. France has signed a 3-year trade pact with Russia for $100 million in trade. India has a 4-year trade pact with Russia which provides annual trade of $440 million. Japan has a 3-year trade pact with Russia that calls for $365 million. The United States and Russian trade last year was $16 million each way.

It is my contention that we cannot live in this age, in this period, without world trade. As I said earlier, I favored the sale of wheat to the Soviet Union. Not only that, but I think the time has ar

rived for us to send out some people with briefcases, to sell in the world markets. Mr. MILLER. I thank the Senator from Kansas for his comment. The figures he has recited point up the facts of life. It is all very well to talk in terms of theories. I am all for theories. But I think we ought to know where we are going and why we want to get there. We have a condition to be concerned

about when we are trying to move toward our objective. The condition is that we are not calling the turn on our allies. I am not sure we could. Even if we could, I am not sure it would be desirable to force them to an isolation of the free world from the Communist world.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator from Iowa yield?

Mr. MILLER. I yield.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. There is something more important involved than in the sale of wheat to Russia. We must consider our overall military security and the effect it would have on the whole U.S. economy. How would the sale of wheat to Russia affect the se

curity or the economy of our country? Some 10 or 12 years ago the United States refused to sell wheat to Russia, so the Russians broke up millions of acres of new land. Until a drought occurred the last 2 years, they had become net exporters of wheat. Now the Russians are engaged in a program of more irrigation to increase wheat production. That will prove to be rather expensive. But their other program will succeed; that is, to pour on fertilizer, as we do. Also, they are beginning to use more and more insecticides and herbicides. They have not been able to purchase this material from the United States, but we sell it to England and other countries, which in turn resell it to Russia. So it would

duction per acre in Japan is probably twice as much as it is in the United States. So Russia does not have to go far to find new techniques to increase greatly her agricultural production.

In my opinion, the United States would be much better off to have Russia dependent on us for a part of her food needs than to have Russia become selfsufficient, as Hitler and Mussolini tried to do for their countries prior to their engaging in World War II.

Mr. MILLER. I agree with the views of the Senator from North Dakota. However, I think we must emphasize what the President pointed out to the American people, namely, that we cannot count on the sale of wheat to Russia as a basis for future agricultural programs. We must look upon this transaction as a one-shot deal. We can be action as a one-shot deal. We can be quite sure that the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc nations will do their utmost to see to it that they do not have another crop failure.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr.

It makes me wonder about the world price rule that the President laid down when he gave to the American people his conclusions concerning whether the proposed wheat sale should be approved. I suppose it is this kind of question that prompted 10 Republican House Members to call on President Kennedy to "reveal and explain" details of the negotiations on the wheat deal with Russia. The article states:

They contended that what had been originally billed as a private trade deal was becoming a "government-to-government" transaction.

Also, the Baltimore Sun for today, November 15, has published an article entitled "Guidelines on Grain Set." The article refers to the guidelines with respect to the shipments of wheat. It will be recalled that when the President gave his approval of the sale of wheat, he set forth as one of the conditions that the shipments be made in American-owned bottoms, if they were available. That sounded good; but after a while news reports indicated that shipping charges in American-owned bottoms were higher by quite a bit than shipping charges in forquite a bit than shipping charges in foreign-owned bottoms, and that the Soviet negotiators were not happy about that and were resisting.

Trial balloons, about which we read so

Mr. MILLER. I yield. Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. They intend to become as nearly self-sufficient as possible. A nation as big as Russia, and having as much land as Russia has, can do so easily.

If

Mr. MILLER. That is correct. this is to be a one-shot deal, as the Sen

ator from North Dakota has said, we might as well let Russia spend its money for our wheat, rather than spend it on something else, such as bringing more land into production in the hope that there will be a good crop next year.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. In the past 11 years, the United States has purchased $92 million more in goods from Russia than Russia has purchased from us. In other words, Russia has repast 11 years to use in spreading comceived $92 million of our money in the munism throughout the world. Russia can do much more damage with our dollars than she can with our wheat.

Mr. MILLER. I thank the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. President, the New York Times for today, November 15, has published an article entitled "Eight Million Dollars of Wheat Sold to Hungary." The article

states:

The sale of 100,000 more tons of wheat to Hungary was disclosed today

That is, on November 14

The Commerce Department announced that it had issued an export license for the $8 million sale. This price is $400,000 more than was received for 100,000 tons sold November 8.

That is what caught my eye. Why should the sale of wheat on November 8 have been for $400,000 less than the amount for which the same quantity of wheat sold a week later?

were sent up. Someone suggested that if owned bottoms were higher than the the charges for shipping in Americancharges for shipping in foreign-owned bottoms, perhaps the American-owned bottoms were not available within the context of the President's conditions.

But the negotiators finally got around that situation to the point that it appears

that if the exporter can show that he will ship the wheat 50 percent in American bottoms, and cut the cost somewhat, such an arrangement will be satisfactory.

That is another reason why this entire proposition should be brought into the open. The American people should know not only what the President's conditions were, but how they are being met. It is fine to tell the people about fair with them and tell them how he conditions; but it is much better to play conditions are being met and interpreted.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the articles from the New York Times and the Baltimore Sun be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles

were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, Nov. 15,

1963]

EIGHT MILLION DOLLARS OF WHEAT SOLD TO HUNGARY SECOND LOT OF 100,000 TONS GETS $400,000 RAISE IN PRICE

(By William M. Blair) WASHINGTON, November 14.-The sale of 100,000 more tons of wheat to Hungary was disclosed today.

The Commerce Department announced that it had issued an export license for the $8 million sale. This price is $400,000 more than was received for 100,000 tons sold November 8. The November 8 deal was the first sale of wheat to a Soviet-bloc country since President Kennedy approved sale of farm