the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber, either for the purposes of husbandry, or for the ordinary use of the occupant. Where a known farm or a single lot has been partly improved, the portion of the farm or lot that has been left not cleared, or not inclosed, according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining country, is deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time, as the part improved and cultivated. Co. Proc., 83, am'd. Munro v. Merchant, 26 Barb. 383; s. c., 28 N. Y. 10; Bedel! v. Shaw, 59 d. 46; Sands v. Hughes, 53 1d. 286; Hilton . Bender, 2 Hun, 1; Wheeler v. Spinola, 54 N. Y. 377; Robinson v. Phillips, 56 1d. 634; Cramer v. Benton, 4 Lans. 291; Becker v. Van Valkenburgh, 29 Barb. 319. § 371. Adverse possession under claim of title not written. Where there has been an actual continued occupation of premises, under a claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a written instrument, or a judgment or decree, the premises so actually occupied, and no others, are deemed to have been held adversely. Id., 84. Becker v. Van Valkenburgh, supra. $372. Id.; what constitutes it. For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession, by a person claiming title, not founded upon a written instrument, or a judg ment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in either of the following cases, and no others: 1. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 2. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. Id., 85. Becker. Van Valkenburgh, supra; Miller v. Garlock, 8 Barb. 153; Munro v. Merchant, 28 N. Y. 10; Doolittle v. Tice, 41 Barb. 181; Bedell v. Shaw, 59 N. Y. 46; Sands v. Hughes, 53 1d. 286; Wheeler v. Spinola, 54 id. 377; Hilton v. Bender, 2 Hun, 1; Borden v. Smithside, 5 id. 184; Devyr v. Schaefer, 55 N. Y. 446. § 373. Relation of landlord and tenant, as affecting adverse possession. — Where the relation of landlord and tenant has existed between any persons, the possession of the tenant is deemed the possession of the landlord, until the expiration of twenty years after the termination of the tenancy; or, where there has been no written lease, until the expiration of twenty years after the last payment of rent; notwithstanding that the tenant has acquired another title, or has claimed to hold adversely to his landlord. But this presumption shall not be made, after the periods prescribed in this section. Co. Proc., 86. Tompkins v. Snow, 63 Barb. 525; Hilton v. Bender, 1 T. & C. 270; s. c., 2 Han, 1; Tyler v. Heldorn, 46 Barb. 441. § 374. Right not affected by descent cast. The right of a person to the possession of real property is not impaired or affected, by a descent being cast, in consequence of the death of a person in possession of the property. Id., 87. § 375. Oertain disabilities excluded from time to commence action. If a person, who might maintain an action to recover real property, or the possession thereof, or make an entry, or interpose a defence or counterclaim, founded on the title to real property, or to rents or services out of the same, is, when his title first descends, or his cause of action or right of entry first accrues, either: 1. Within the age of twenty-one years; or, 2. Insane; or, 3. Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution upon conviction of a criminal offence, for a term less than for life; The time of such a disability is not a part of the time, limited in this title, for commencing the action, or making the entry, or interposing the defence or counter claim; except that the time so limited cannot be extended more than ten years, after the disability ceases, or after the death of the person so disabled. Id 88. Halsey v. Beid, 4 Hun, 777; Fogal v. Pirro, 10 Bosw. 100; Tyler v. Heidorn, 46 Barb. 441; Sanford v. Sanford, 2 Hun, 4; a. c., 4 T. & 0.56; affirmed, 62 N. Y. 553; Bucklin v. Bucklin, 1 Keyes, 141; Wood v. Riker, 1 Pal. 616; Moore v. Erwin, 4 Wend, 58; Colden r. Moore, 13 Johns. 513; Fleming v. Griswold, 3 Hill, 85; Becker v. Van Valkenburgh, 29 Barb. 319; Bunt o. Ransom, 10 Johns. 407; Swartwout v. Johnson, 5 Cow. 74; Roosevelt v. Wheat, 18 Johns. 40; Bradstreet v. Clarke, 12 Wend. 602; Corson v. Cairns, 20 Johns. 301. TITLE II. Actions other than for the recovery of real property. Bag. 376. When satisfaction of judgment presumed. 877. Effect of return of execution. 378. How presumption raised. 379. Limitation of action to redeem from a mortgage. 382. Within six years. 385. Within one year. 386. When cause of action accrues on a current account. 387. Action for penalty, etc., by any person who will sue. 388. Actions not before provided for. 289. Actions by the people subject to the same limitations. 390. Actions against a non-resident, upon a demand barred by the law of his residence. 891. When person liable, etc., dies without the State. 392. Cause of action accruing between the death of a testator or intestate, and the grant of letters. 293. No limitation of action on bank notes, etc. 394. Action against directors, etc., of banks. 395. Acknowledgment or new promise must be in writing. § 376. [Amended, 1894.] When satisfaction of judgment presumed. A final judgment or decree for a sum of money, or directing the payment of a sum of money, heretofore rendered in a surrogate's court of the State, or heretofore or hereafter rendered, in a court of record within the United States, or elsewhere, or hereafter docketed pursuant to the provisions of section thirty hundred and seventeen of this act, is presumed to be paid and satisfied, after the expiration of twenty years from the time, when the party recovering it was first entitled to a mandate to enforce it. This presumption is conclusive, except as against a person, who, within twenty years from that time, makes a payment or acknowledges an indebtedness of some part of the amount recovered by the judgment or decree, or his heir or personal representative, or a person whom he otherwise represents. Such an acknowledgment must be in writing, and signed by the person to be charged thereby. In effect, as amended, April 17, 1894; Laws 1894, ch. 307. §377. Effect of return of execution.- If the proof of payment, under the last section, consists of the re turn of an execution partly satisfied, the adverse party may show, in full avoidance of the effect thereof, that the alleged partial satisfaction did not proceed from a payment made, or a sale of property claimed, by him or by a person whom he represents. New. Henderson v. Cairns, 14 Barb, 15. 378. How presumption raised. A person may avail himself of the presumption created by the last section but one, under an allegation that the action was not commenced, or that the proceeding was not taken, within the time therein limited. See § 413, post, and Fisher v. Mayor, 6 T. & C. 100; s. c., 3 Hun, 653. § 379. Limitation of action to redeem from a mortgage. - An action to redeem real property from a mortgage, with or without an account of rents and profits, may be maintained by the mortgagor, or those claiming under him, against the mortgagee in possession, or those claiming under him, unless he or they have continuously maintained an adverse possession of the mort gaged premises, for twenty years after the breach of a condition of the mortgage, or the non-fulfilment of a covenant therein contained. New. Supersedes Miner v. Beekman, 50 N. Y. 337; Hubbell v. Sibley, id. 468. See Moore v. Cable, 1 Johns. Ch. 385; Demarest v. Wynkoop, Bid. 129; Slee v. Manhattan Co., 1 Paige, 48. - § 380. Other periods of limitation. The following actions must be commenced within the following periods, after the cause of action has accrued. Co. Proc., part of 74, and 89. $381. [Amended, 1877.] Within twenty years. -Within twenty years: An action upon a sealed instrument. But where the action is brought for breach of a covenant of seizin, or against incumbrances, the cause of action is, for the purposes of this section only, deemed to have accrued upon an eviction, and not before. Id., part of 90. Peters v. Delaplaine, 49 N. Y. 362; McCotter Lawence, 4 Hun, 107; Taft v. Wright, 2 T. & C. 614; Peck v. Schenck, Hun, 673. 8382. [Amended, 1877, ch. 416 and 422.] Within dx years. Within six years: 1. An action upon a contract obligation or liability express or implied; except a judgment or sealed instru ment. 2. An action to recover upon a liability created by statute; except a penalty or forfeiture. 3. An action to recover damages for an injury to property, or a personal injury; except in a case where a dif ferent period is expressly prescribed in this chapter. 4. An action to recover a chattel. 5. An action to procure a judgment, other than for a sum of money, on the ground of fraud, in a case which, on the thirty-first day of December, 1846, was cognizable by the court of chancery. The cause of action, in such a case, is not deemed to have accrued, until the discovery, by the plaintiff, or the person under whom he claims, of the facts constituting the fraud. 6. An action to establish a will. Where the will has been lost, concealed, or destroyed, the cause of action is not deemed to have accrued, until the discovery, by the plaintiff, or the person under whom he claims, of the facts upon which its validity depends. 7. [Amended, 1894.] An action upon a judgment or decree, rendered in a court not of record, except where a transcript shall be filed, pursuant to section thirty hundred and seventeen of this act, and, also, except a decree heretofore rendered in a surrogate's court of the State. The cause of action, in such a case, is deemed to have accrued when final judgment was rendered. In effect, as amended, April 17, 1894; Laws 1894, ch. 307. $383. [Amended, 1877.] Within three years. Within three years: 1. An action against a sheriff, coroner, constable, or other officer, for the non-payment of money collected upon an execution.(1) 2. An action against a constable, upon any other lia bility incurred by him, by doing an act in his official capacity, or by the omission of an official duty; except an escape. 3. An action upon a statute, for a penalty or for. feiture, where the action is given to the person ag~ |