new application of a general power, the particular powers, which are the means of attaining the object of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that object; and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same.

Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means not necessary or proper for carrying the general powers into execution, the task would have been no less chimerical; and would have been liable to this further objection, that every defect in the enumeration would have been equivalent to a positive grant of authority. If, to avoid this consequence, they had attempted a partial enumeration of the exceptions, and described the residue by the general terms, not necessary or proper, it must have happened that the enumeration would comprehend a few of the excepted powers only; that these would be such as would be least likely to be assumed or tolerated, because the enumeration would of course select such as would be least necessary or proper; and that the unnecessary and improper powers included in the residuum, would be less forcibly excepted, than if no partial enumeration had been made.

Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the general powers would have resulted to the Government, by unavoidable implication. No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included. Had this last method, therefore, been pursued by the Convention, every objection now urged against their plan would remain in all its plausibility; and the real inconveniency would be incurred of not removing a pretext which may be seized on critical occasions for drawing into question the essential powers of the Union.

If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case the Congress shall misconstrue this part of the Constitution, and exercise powers not warranted by its true meaning, I answer, the same as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power vested in them; as if the general power had been reduced to particulars, and any one of these were to be violated; the same in short, as if the State Legislatures should violate their respective constitutional authorities. In the first instance, the success of the usurpation will depend on the Executive and Judiciary departments, which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the last resort a remedy must be obtained from the People, who can, by the election of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers. The truth is, that this ultimate redress may be more confided in against unconstitutional acts of the Fœderal, than of the State Legislatures, for this plain reason, that as every such act of the former will be an invasion of the rights of the latter, these will be ever ready to mark the innovation, to sound the alarm to the People, and to exert their local influence in effecting a change of Foederal representatives. There being no such intermediate body between the State Legislatures and the People, interested in watching the conduct of the former, violations of the State Constitutions are more likely to remain unnoticed and unredressed.

2. "This Constitution and the laws of the United "States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and "all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the "authority of the United States, shall be the supreme "law of the land, and the Judges in every State shall "be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or "laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

The indiscreet zeal of the adversaries to the Constitution has betrayed them into an attack on this part of it

also, without which it would have been evidently and radically defective. To be fully sensible of this, we need only suppose for a moment, that the supremacy of the State Constitutions had been left complete, by a saving clause in their favor.

. In the first place, as these Constitutions invest the State Legislatures with absolute sovereignty, in all cases not excepted by the existing Articles of Confederation, all the authorities contained in the proposed Constitution, so far as they exceed those enumerated in the Confederation, would have been annulled, and the new Congress would have been reduced to the same impotent condition with their predecessors.

In the next place, as the Constitutions of some of the States do not even expressly and fully recognize the existing powers of the Confederacy, an express saving of the supremacy of the former would, in such States, have brought into question every power contained in the proposed Constitution.

In the third place, as the Constitutions of the States differ much from each other, it might happen that a treaty or National law, of great and equal importance to the States, would interfere with some and not with other Constitutions, and would consequently be valid in some of the States, at the same time that it would have no effect in others.

In fine, the world would have seen, for the first time, a system of Government founded on an inversion of the fundamental principles of all Government; it would have seen the authority of the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have seen a monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members.

3. "The Senators and Representatives, and the mem"bers of the several State Legislatures, and all Exec"utive and Judicial officers, both of the United States

"and the several States, shall be bound by oath or affir"mation, to support this Constitution."

It has been asked why it was thought necessary, that the State magistracy should be bound to support the Fœderal Constitution, and unnecessary that a like oath should be imposed on the officers of the United States, in favor of the State Constitutions?

Several reasons might be assigned for the distinction. I content myself with one, which is obvious and conclusive. The members of the Fœderal Government will have no agency in carrying the State Constitutions into effect. The members and officers of the State Governments, on the contrary, will have an essential agency in giving effect to the Fœderal Constitution. The election of the President and Senate will depend, in all cases, on the Legislatures of the several States. And the election of the House of Representatives will equally depend on the same authority in the first instance; and will, probably, forever be conducted by the officers, and according to the laws of the States.

4. Among the provisions for giving efficacy to the Fœderal powers might be added those which belong to the Executive and Judiciary departments: but as these are reserved for particular examination in another place, pass them over in this.

I

We have now reviewed, in detail, all the Articles composing the sum or quantity of power, delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Fœderal Government; and are brought to this undeniable conclusion, that no part of the power is unnecessary or improper for accomplishing the necessary objects of the Union. The question, therefore, whether this amount of power shall be granted or not, resolves itself into another question, whether or not a Government commensurate to the exigencies of the Union shall be established; or, in other words, whether the Union itself shall be preserved.

PUBLIUS.

For the Independent Journal.

THE FEDERALIST. No. XLIV.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE State of New York:

HAVING shown that no one of the powers trans

ferred to the Federal Government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several States.

The adversaries to the plan of the Convention, instead of considering in the first place what degree of power was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the Fœderal Government, have exhausted themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed degree of power to the Governments of the particular States. But if the Union, as has been shown, be essential to the security of the People of America against foreign danger; if it be essential to their security against contentions and wars among the different States; if it be essential to guard them against those violent and oppressive factions which embitter the blessings of liberty, and against those military establishments which must gradually poison its very fountain; if, in a word, the Union be essential to the happiness of the People of America, is it not preposterous, to urge as an objection to a Government, without which the objects of the Union cannot be attained, that such a Government may derogate from the importance of the Governments of the individual States? Was then the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hardearned substance of millions lavished, not that the Peo