the public wishes. And as the Electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the People, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.

Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly adversaries of republican Government might naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one quarter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our Councils. How could they bet ter gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the Chief Magistracy of the Union? But the Convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any preëxisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the People of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No Senator, Representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the Electors. Thus without corrupting the body of the People, the immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satis factory prospect of their continuing so, to the conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace so considerable a number of men, requires time as well

as means.

Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives, which, though they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty.

Another, and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the People themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his reëlection to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice.

All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the Convention; which is, that the People of each State shall choose a number of persons as Electors, equal to the number of Senators and Representatives of such State in the National Government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the National Government. and the person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes, will be the President. But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive, it is provided, that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall select out of the candidates, who shall have the five highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for the office.

The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the

requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it, as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters preeminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the Executive in every Government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says,

"For forms of Government let fools contest
"That which is best administered is best—"

yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a good Government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.

The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect to the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in respect to the latter.

The appointment of an extraordinary person, as VicePresident, has been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It has been alleged, that it would have been preferable to have authorized the Senate to elect out of their own body an officer answering that description. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the Convention in this respect. One is, that to secure at all times the possibility of a definite resolution of the body, it is necessary that the President should have only a casting vote. And to take the Senator of

any State from his seat as Senator, to place him in that of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the State from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme Executive magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great, if not with equal force, to the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable, that in this, as in most other instances, the objection which is made would lie against the Constitution of this State. We have a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the People at large, who presides in the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to exercise the authorities, and discharge the duties of the President.

PUBLIUS.

[From the New York Packet, Friday, March 14, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST.

No. LXVIII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

I

PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the proposed Executive, as they are marked out in the plan of the Convention. This will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness of the representations which have been made in regard to it.

The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the Executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be considered as a point upon which any comparison can

be grounded; for if, in this particular, there be a resemblance to the King of Great Britain, there is not less a resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the Khan of Tartary, to the man of the seven mountains, or to the Governor of New York.

That magistrate is to be elected for four years; and is to be reëligible as often as the People of the United States shall think him worthy of their confidence. In these circumstances, there is a total dissimilitude between him and a King of Great Britain, who is an hereditary monarch, possessing the crown as a patrimony descendible to his heirs forever; but there is a close analogy between him and a Governor of New York, who is elected for three years, and is reëligible without limitation or intermission. If we consider, how much less time would be requisite for establishing a dangerous influence in a single State, than for establishing a like influence throughout the United States, we must conclude that a duration of four years for the Chief Magistrate of the Union is a degree of permanency far less to be dreaded in that office, than a duration of three years for a correspondent office in a single State.

The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of the King of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a National revolution. In this delicate and important circumstance of personal responsibility, the President of Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a Governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the Governors of Maryland and Delaware.