entire amnesty was stipulated by the Schah, to all public officers and other inhabitants of the Province of Adzerbaidjan. No one was to be prosecuted or molested for his opinions, acts or conduct, during the war, or while the province was occupied by the Russian troops. A year was to be allowed them to remove with their families, into the Russian territories, and to export or sell their moveable goods, and a term of five years for the sale of their immoveables. There was an exception with regard to any persons, who within the year might be guilty of any offence punishable by law. In the manifesto of the Emperor Nicholas, proclaiming the treaty, he says "Our object was to secure to the empire, a strong and natural barFier on the side of Persia ; to obtain a complete indemnity for all the losses occasioned by the war, and thus to discard all the causes which might lead to new hostilities. For us, one of the principal results of this peace, consists in the security which it warrants to a part of our frontiers. It is in this respect alone that we perceive the useful. ness, of the new territories acquired by Russia. Every thing not adapted to that end, in our con. quests, has by our order, been restored immediately on the fulfilment of the conditions of the treaty. Other essential advantages flow from the stipulations in favour of commerce, of which we always consider the free enlargement, as one of the most productive causes of industry and of labour, and at the same time, as the true guaranty of a solid peace, founded upon an entire reciprocity of wants and interests." "To him who rules the destinies of empires, belongs the humble tribute of our profound gratitude; let all our dear and faithful subjects, beholding the signal marks, and the favour and protection of the Most High, in the events of this war, and in its happy conclusion, bring to his altar their most fervent prayers, that this peace, the work of Providence, may be firm and lasting, and that his holy will may assist us in maintaining repose and tranquillity upon our borders." The spirit and temper of this proclamation is not the least glo. rious of the triumphs, which crown. ed the termination of the Persian war. We now pass to scenes of deeper interest, a more arduous struggle, and more momentous consequences. In closing this chapter, it will be proper to mention, that during the war between Russia and the Porte, the pacific relations so recently restored between Russia and Persia, remained uninterrupted; though shortly after their renewal, an incident occured, which might easily have rekindled the flame of war. On the 12th of February, the Russian minister at Scheran, with all the members of his legation excepting the first secretary of legation, Malzoff, and three others, were murdered in his house by a sudden popular commotion, excited by a quarrel between some of his servants, and some of the inhabitants of the city. To atone for this disaster, the Shah sent one of his own grandsons, prince Khosrew Mirza, son of Abba Mirza, in solemn embassy to St. Petersburg, where, on the 22d of August, he was received in state, by the Emperor Nicholas, and addressed to him a speech expressing the deep abhorrence felt by his grandfather, of this outrage upon the laws of nations, in the person of the Rus. sian minister. The speech was delivered in the Persian language, and a translation of it in Russian, was read to the Emperor; whose vice chancellor, count Messelrode, in his name and presence, read in Russian, a suitable and gracious answer, which was immediately interpreted to the ambassador in his own language. CHAPTER XX. RUSSIA AND TURKEY-NEGOTIATIONS. Conferences at Ackerman-Mediation for Greece-Treaty of London of 6th July, 1827-Treaty of Ackerman-Battle of Navarino-Conduct and policy of the Sultan-Manifesto of Russia declaring war-Conduct of the British Cabinet-Manifesto of the Sublime Porte-The two Manifestoes compared. Ir has been stated, that at the time when the mortal career of the late emperor Alexander was immaturely, if not prematurely, arrested at Taganrog, his forbearance, and deference to the jealous policy of his European allies were exhausted. Long enough had he closed his ears against the cry of oppression endured by the christian sufferers of Greece. Long enough had he borne the insolent prevarications of the Turk, in violation of the rights of his Russian subjects, and in contempt of the faith of treaties. He had determined to take the cause of justice into his own hands; and in preparing a lesson of chas. tisement for the Turk, he found himself necessarily drawn to the policy of associating the cause of Greece with his own. The cabi. nets of his allies were not unin formed of this his determination. They became alarmed, not only for the fate of the Ottoman empire, but for the inevitable prospect that the pacification of Greece would fall exclusively into the hands of Alexander. The Greeks them. selves, in their desperate and unfriended conflict, had implored the interposition of the French and British governments, to rescue them from total and impending destruc. tion. Until the death of Alexander, they had implored in vain. At the accession of Nicholas, those cabinets were fearful that he might at once adopt a more decisive policy, to which he was prompted by the undisguised wishes of his people, and by those indications of a rest. less and turbulent spirit in the army, disclosed by the conspiracy recently organized against his predecessor. Immediately after his accession, the emperor Nicholas had informed the Russian ministers at all the European courts, that he should continue the general course of policy, which had been established and pursued by his brother. Conferences were soon afterwards opened at Ackerman, for the adjustment of the differences between the Russian government and the Porte; and the duke of Wellington was sent by the British govern. ment on a special embassy to St. Petersburg, ostensibly to compli. ment the emperor Nicholas upon his accession to the throne; but in substance to press upon the Rus. sian government the importance to the general peace of Europe, of the preservation of the Russian peace with the Porte, and to come to an understanding upon the terms, on which the leading Christian powers of Europe should interpose in the affairs of Greece. This was settled by the protocol of the 4th April, 1826, signed by the Duke of Wellington for Great Britain, and by Prince Lieven and Count Nes selrode on the part of Russia. The substance of this arrangement is given in the second volume of this work,* as well as the course of negotiations under it, until it was matured into the treaty of London of 6th July, 1827, and the subsequent destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino on the succeeding 20th of October, by the combined squad. rons of Great Britain, France and Russia, the parties to that treaty. In the meanderings of the hu man heart, and in the labyrinth of state policy, may be found the clue to this protocol of 4th April, 1826, matured into the treaty of 6th July, 1827. It was an anomaly in diplomacy; a triple alliance against one of the parties to it. A bargain by which, under the ostensible pretence of interposing to re-establish peace between the Ottoman Porte and the people of Greece, Great Britain and Franee, intended to tie the hands of Russia, and thus prevent her from emancipating Greece entirely from the thraldom of Turkish oppression. ish oppression. To this treaty the ministers of the emperor Nicholas subscribed. The sovereign of Rus. sia suffered his hands to be bound, as the hands of Samson were bound by the Philistines, because they had discovered the secret of his strength. We do not mean to scrutinize this masterpiece of European cabinet policy; but we must say, that as respected the Greeks, the principle of the compact was unsound and unjust. We say this, because we believe that it never will and never can be carried into effect. We say this, because the same prin ciple has been perseveringly pursued in the protocol of the 22d of March, 1829, when, if the Sultan had ever been entitled to the bene. fit of it, he had forfeited all claim to it by his repeated rejection of the allied mediation till after the battle of Navarino, and after com* Vide 2nd vol. page 422. |