H. OF R.] Freedom of Elections. [JAN. 25, 1837. a per centage of their salaries-that, in other words, they are regularly taxed for the support of the candidate of the party in power. If this be true, it is proof of the progress of corruption in our political system, that should carry alarm into the bosom of every patriot in the land. What, sir! and can the money exacted from the people for the support of Government be converted by their own agents, with impunity, into a fund for their own corruption? If I am mistaken as to the fact of the existence of such a practice, I hope some gentleman will correct me. office-holders are bound by gratitude, or any other obligation, to conform to the wishes of the appointing power in elections. The suspicions and misrepresenta tions that office-holders are exposed to in an excited canvass for the presidency, and the eagerness with which hungry office-seekers, and other informers with whom the country is filled under this system, are looking out for some delinquent to denounce to the Government, will compel them, for their own safety and protection, to take an active part in elections, and to become officious and open in their interference. Another powerful incentive to such interference will always be found under an administration which fills the public offices chiefly with men whose principal merit has been their zeal and activity in past elections. In nine cases out of ten, honest and competent public servants were removed, to make way for these new incumbents, and the latter are under the most powerful inducements to make a desperate struggle to uphold the administration or party that put them in office. Hence the desperate, the deathstruggle of the office-holders in the late election, wher-ity, gratulation, and triumph. A direct attempt has ever the contest was doubtful; and it is due to their exertions to say that they saved the election of Mr. Van Buren. As to the fact of the interference of public officers in the late elections, openly and directly, is there any one here who will deny it? Is there one member in this House who will deny that this interference was general? If there is such a member present, I call upon him to stand up in his place and make the denial. Sir, I go further, and I put the question whether the whole machinery of party, so far as it was composed of caucuses, conventions, and committees, employed in the late elections, was moved and guided by office-holders and applicants for office. I do not say that a majority of the delegates in these conventions were office-holders or office-seekers; but I do mean to say that the exciting spirit, the soul of them, consisted of that class. But, for fear that I may be thought to exaggerate, I must ask leave to refer to a few facts. At the convention which assembled at Columbus, Ohio, on the 8th of January, 1834, to nominate delegates to the Baltimore convention, which sat in 1835, there were thirteen postmasters, three registers and receivers, two light-house keepers, two superintendents of the national road, one collector of customs, one inspector, one bearer of foreign despatches, a commissioner under the treaty with Naples, and four printers of the laws of the United States, besides numerous officers under the State authority; and we have the authority of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. HAMER] for saying that they make common cause with the federal officers, wherever they belong to the same party. In the State convention of New York, which sat at Albany to appoint delegates to the Baltimore convention, there were eighteen postmasters, thirteen judges of courts, seven masters in chancery, three sheriff's, two surrogates, and a State comptroller. Among the delegates appointed to the Baltimore convention there were seven postmasters, a collector of customs, and a superintendent of the custom-house in New York. I give these details as a specimen of the voluminous evidence which might be adduced of the same nature. It would present a singular result if a statement were made of all the office-holders and office-seekers who attended the Baltimore convention; and the interest of the statement would be increased if it should include an account of all those delegates who have since received appointments. But 1 have been informed of a mode of interfering in elections by office-holders which far outstrips all that I had imagined could exist at this day under our free GovernIt is alleged that the office-holders, in some sections of the Union, and especially in the State of New York, are in the habit of contributing a portion or ment. But I now proceed to notice the interference of officeholders of a higher grade. I will first call the attention of the House to the letter of the Postmaster General [Mr. Kendall] to a comminee of gentlemen in Philadelphia, written on the 22d of October last, (1836.) "Did public duties permit an acceptance of your kind invitation," says Mr. Kendall, "no occasion has presented itself since the late war with Great Britain on which it could have given me more gratification in festiv been made to govern your State by corruption, and it has been rebuked and repelled in a spirit worthy of '76. It is not a triumph of one man over another; it is a vic tory of principles over profligacy--the triumph of a virtuous people over concentrated wealth, mercenary tal ent, and licensed corruption." When it is recollected that this letter was written by a member of the executive cabinet, in reference to the result of a State election, which was expected, and no doubt did produce a decided effect upon the presidential election, which ensued during the next month, a moré audacious and unwarranted act of interference cannot be readily conceived of. I hope I shall be excused the digression, while I remind the House of the statements made by the gentleman from Ohio, [Mr. HAMER,] the other day, upon the subject of the abusive epithets, the gross charges of corruption, and violent denunciations, which he said members of the opposition were in the habit of dealing out upon this floor against the President and the party in the majority in this House. That gentleman said that it had been too much the habit of the friends of the administration to sit silent and make no reply to such tirades of abuse as were constantly pronounced against it. I am not one of those who are in the habit of employing abusive epithets either against the administration or the majority of this House, in debate; but I might appeal to the gentleman from Ohio, if those who do take that liberty might not find some countenance in the language employed by the Postmaster General in the letter to which I have referred. In what speech delivered upon this floor did he ever hear stronger language, or more abusive epithets, applied to the motives and principles of a party, than those deliberately penned and given to the people by a cabinet officer of the Government? But, I would further inquire of the gentleman from Ohio, whether he and his friends, during all the period of their silence and forbearance under those violent and abusive denunciations of which he complains, did not steadily look to the Globe to answer all the arguments as well as the denunciations of opposition members; and whether it was not found much the most convenient as well as effective mode of reply? Does not that gentleman know that the columns of that paper, during the past session as well as the present, have been devoted to the perversion and misrepresentation of every thing that is said, as well as done, by the opposition in this House--that its daily sheet is a daily libel upon the motives and character of every man who dares to arraig the course of the party or of its favorite leaders? We may the gentlemen of the administration be silent, whe they have such a pensioned engine of falsehood and ca umny in their daily service. JAN. 25, 1837.} Freedom of Elections. [H. OF R. I now come, sir, to speak of the interference, in the I might refer to the sentiment delivered by the Presilate election, of another high functionary of the Govern- dent, at the same period, to a large assembly of his felment. It is no less a personage than the President him- | low-citizens who had honored him with a public dinner self. The President exhibited himself a devoted parti- at Nashville; and to numerous letters besides, which san of Mr. Van Buren at an early period of the canvass. were industriously circulated, all containing evidence of The proof of his interference I consider so notorious the deep interest and the open zeal which he manifested that, but for the singular and unexpected assertions in the late election. I might refer particularly to a which I have lately heard upon the subject, I would not letter written to the late Willie Blount, which denounced think necessary to notice it. Those, sir, upon which I the course of Judge White, and his leading friends in shall rely in establishing the first act of his interference Tennessee, in the strongest terms; and which I am inare not dependent for their validity upon the uncertain formed a member of this House [Mr. JOHNSON, of Tenmemory of any man, nor can they be weakened or eva- nessee] was in the habit of reading at public meetings ded by the denial or misrepresentation of any man's in his own canvass before the people for a seat in Confriends. But I think proper, at this time, to state that, gress. A letter to the late B. F. Curry was of a similar if the subject shall be regarded as of sufficient impor- character; but I have already devoted more time to this tance by the House to appoint a committee with the point than I intended. The fact of the President's inproper power, all the statements of my colleague [Mr. terference is indisputable; it was also notorious; and the PEYTON] in relation to the language and denunciations knowledge of this preference had a decided effect in of the President, while in Tennessee, last summer, with- favor of Mr. Van Buren. It is true, sir, that there were out exception, so far, I believe, can be established by some minds upon which the course of the President had the evidence of gentlemen of the most unquestionable a contrary effect; but they were too few to control the character. I feel warranted in making the same state- result. The open and decided stand taken by the Presiment in relation to the charge made by a Senator from dent was a signal for the interference of all office-holders Tennessee [Judge WHITE] in a speech at Knoxville. and office-seekers throughout the Union; and, from that The first overt act of the President, in which he gave moment, Mr. Van Buren became, emphatically and truly, evidence of his interference in the late presidential elec- the Government candidate; and, of course, had the full tion, was to dictate the Baltimore convention, and to benefit of the patronage of the Government in strengthgive the sanction of his name and station to a party move- ening his interests. ment, intended, from the first, for the benefit of Mr. Van Buren. In his celebrated Gwinn letter he says: "Discarding all personal preference, I consider the true policy of the friends of republican principles is to send delegates, fresh from the people, to a general convention, for the purpose of selecting candidates for the presidency and vice presidency; and that to impeach that selection before it is made, as an emanation of Executive power, is to assail the virtue of the people, and, in effect, to oppose their right to govern." Here, sir, we have a denunciation, in advance, of every man who should dare to oppose the nomination of the Baltimore convention. I have heard it said that this letter was written in answer to a charge of preference for Judge White. There never was any thing more un true. In fact, this letter was foretold, and some of the friends of Judge White were admonished that the President would take a decided and open part in the election of Mr. Van Buren, before Judge White was generally regarded as a candidate. In a letter to a committee of gentlemen in Bedford county, Tennessee, while the President was on his late electioneering tour, he uses the following language: But, as might have been expected, when the highest officer of the Government stepped aside from the line of his official duties to become the electioneering partisan of a favorite candidate for the presidency, it was almost impossible that any appointment could be made of a public officer, without exciting some distrust that it was intended to advance the interest of the Government candidate. I consider this state of things a great calamity of itself—that the Chief Magistrate should place himself in a position which afforded no escape from the imputation of improper motives in administering the patronage of the Government; and, what is equally to be regretted, it was at the same time next to an impossibility that he could administer it without reference to the interests of his own candidate. And, accordingly, it will be found that various offices and employments have been conferred under such circumstances that it is impossible to come to any other conclusion than that they were given and received with improper motives. Whether the President was privy to the object of all these appointments, or whether they were in all instances bestowed through the agency of some political office broker, I know not; but the effect is the same upon the public interests and the public virtue. However this may be, it accidentally came to my knowledge that Government favors of some kind were distinctly offered in a letter from a person in the confidence of the Presi dent, and franked by him, to a gentleman in my own congressional district, upon the condition that he would take a more active part in the election against Judge White and one of Lis leading friends. I have seen the open partisan of one candidate become the supporter of another, and that other the Government candidate, and employment under Government following in the rear of conversion. I have seen the representative seduced from his constituents, and made to act in opposition to their wishes and his own professed principles, by artful suggestions of future rewards. I have seen gentlemen of distinction and high standing change their politics, and violate their personal honor, upon the promise of executive support and influence in accomplishing their "The President's views of the existing state of politi-plans of individual promotion. I have seen the corrupt cal affairs in Tennessee are here clearly and distinctly d.cated, and are so just and strictly conformable to truth that he who runs may read." "We live, fellow-citizens, in evil times, when political apostacy becomes frequent; when public menabandon principles, their former party attachments and associations, and, for selfish ends and personal aggrandizement, are attempting to undermine our republic system." Here is a direct attack upon the motives of the supporters of Judge White in Tennessee-a direct charge that they were attempting to undermine our republican ystem. That there may be no mistake as to the intenLinn of the President to excite the people of Tennessee against the supporters of Judge White, as the enemies of publican government, is manifest from a paragraph which appeared in the Union, the organ of the Van Buren party in Tennessee, in which the editor, referring to the President's letter to the Bedford committee, mys: apostate from his former principles and professions, too weak to resist the promise of offce, but lacking courage to pocket the well-earned reward, when offered to his H. OF R.] Freedom of Elections. acceptance. When, sir, the practice of official interference has arrived at this height; when rewards are openly bestowed for open apostacy and treachery to party engagements; when corruption walks abroad through the land in her own nakedness, without a veil or a mantle to cover her native deformity; when neither regard for principle nor the honor of the country can restrain such practices, so far, at least, as to preserve the semblance of purity; when disguises are rejected as unnecessary; is it not time to sound the alarm to the sleeping sentinels, and call every patriot to his post? I [JAN. 25, 1837. sions in the new world-the "imperial crown of America"-had been wrested from their King by the blunders of an incompetent ministry, supported by a corrupt Parliament. But the remedy came too late to prevent the catastrophe. It would be a singular incident in the vicissitude of human affairs, if the liberties of America should be lost by the same errors which afforded the opportunity for their existence. I must now, sir, go a little back in the order of time, to speak of the course of the English Parliament, and how the spirit of Englishmen has always treated the interference of any of the high grade officers of state in elections. The first case of the kind which I have been able to find on record occurred in the reign of Queen Anne. A bishop of Worcester, who filled at the same time the office of almoner to the Queen, having some ground of resentment against Sir J. Parkington, a candidate for Parliament in the county of Worcester, wrote to several of his friends, soliciting them to oppose his election. His influence was unavailing, and one of the first acts of the member elected, after taking his seat in the House of Commons, was to complain of the violation of the privileges of Parliament, and the freedom of elections, by the bishop and almoner to the Queen. The House of Commons, upon hearing the proof, which was the production of some of the bishop's letters, instantly voted his conduct to be a violation of the liberties of the people of England; and, at the same time, voted that an address should be carried to the Queen, requesting her to dismiss the bishop from the office he held under her Majesty. The address was presented to the Queen, and she sent a gracious answer to the House of Commons, informing them that she had complied with their desire. The next example of the manner in which Let us pause here for a moment, and inquire how this subject of the interference of public officers in elections has been regarded and provided against, in the only coun. try in which the principles of free government are cor rectly understood and appreciated besides our own. mean Great Britain. Ever since the revolution of 1688, when the English Government assumed something like a regular plan of civil liberty, the people of England have been extremely jealous of the interference of public of ficers in elections. The slightest interference on their part, in the election of members of Parliament, has always been promptly met, complained of, and redressed as a grievance, and a violation of the freedom of election. As early as the 5th William and Mary, (1694,) an act of Parliament was passed, which, after reciting that elec tions of members of Parliament "ought to be free and uncorrupt," prohibited all excise officers from endeavor. ing, "by word, message, or writing, or in any other manner whatsoever," to persuade any elector to give or to withhold his vote in the election of any member of Parliament, under penalty of one hundred pounds, and disqualification to hold any office or place of trust ever afterwards. The act of 12 and 13 William III (1700) contained a similar prohibition, and prescribed the same penalties, against the interference of all custom-house officers in elections. By the act of 10 Anne, c. 19, several new excise duties were laid; and so tenacious was Parliament upon the subject of the influence and interference of public officers in elections, that, by a separate section of the act, all the new officers created by it were prohibited from intermeddling, under the same penalties provided by former acts. But when, towards the middle of the reign of George III, it was found that the public officers and other persons in the employment of the Government, by their own numerical force, in some counties and boroughs, were often able to carry the election of the court candidates; and that the influence of the Crown over them was so great that they generally voted in mass for the Government candidates, the whigs of England-the true old English whigs made a bold rally of their strength in Parliament, and by one act (22 George III, 41, 1782) disfranchised every officer employed in the customs, in the collection and management of the excise duties, and in the post office-forty thousand in number. A glorious triumph for Englishmen and English bberty! This act, which stands a glorious monument of the spirit of Englishmen, "That it is highly criminal for any minister or minis is entitled "An act for the better securing the freedom of ters, or any other servant of the Crown, in Great Britain elections of members to serve in Parliament." It was at directly or indirectly, to make use of the power of hi this period that the celebrated Mr. Dunning introduced office in order to influence the election of members o and carried the resolution in Parliament, that "the in- Parliament; and that an attempt to exercise that influ fluence of the Crown had increased, was increasing, and ence was an attack upon the dignity, the honor, and th ought to be diminished." The first measure which fol-independence, of Parliament, an infringement of th lowed was to deprive forty thousand office-holders of rights and liberties of the people, and an attempt to sa their right to vote in elections! The subserviency of the basis of our free and happy constitution." Parliament to the will of the Crown had been too gross and palpable to be longer endured. The ministry had carried every measure by a dead, invariable majority, just as we have of late seen measures carried through the Congress of the United States. This great measure of reform was justified and sustained by the English people, under the firm conviction that their proudest posses | this abuse has been treated in Great Britain occurred in 1779, when the power and influence of the ministers of that day were at the highest, and the condition of Parliament was consequently low indeed. A lord lieutenant of a county, an officer appointed by the Crown, was detected in writing to his friends in the county of Southampton, urging them to give their support to his friend, who was also the Government candidate for Parliament. When his conduct was brought before the House of Commons, and some of the letters which he had written exhibited, Lord North ventured to say that he thought the case presented no great cause of alarm, and instant. ly, and it would appear from all sides of the House, there arose such indignant clamors that it was some time before order could be restored, and Lord North was obli ged to explain and qualify bis meaning. But the most decisive proof of the spirit which prevailed upon the subject, even in corrupt times, and the odium in which all intermeddling of office-holders in elections has ever been held in Great Britain, is to be found in the following resolution, which the House of Commons adopted upor that occasion, without a division, and without a dissent ing voice: Sir, this resolution has been regarded, ever since, a expressing the true principles of the constitution England. In every debate which has arisen since 1779 it is referred to as a standard authority. And, upon th subject of official intermeddling in elections, let it be r membered, to the eternal honor of Englishmen, that r party, that no member of any party in that country, ho ever weak, or however debased by corruption, has ever dared to question the soundness of the principles of the resolution of 1779. In this review of the course of British legislation in securing the freedom of elections, I must not omit to notice the act of 49 George III, c. 118, (1809.) Notwitstanding the numerous legal provisions which had been adopted to secure the purity and freedom of elections, it was notorious that members of Parliament were often returned through the influence of ministers, in giving or promising offices and employments to influential persons in the several counties and boroughs of the kingdom entitled to send members to Parliament. To reform this abose, Mr. Curwan brought forward a bill prescribing a penalty of five hundred pounds, and forfeiture of office, against every person who should be found guilty of selling his influence in an election, and a penalty of one thousand pounds against any person holding an office under the King, who should be guilty of giving any office, place, or employment, to any person, upon any contract or agreement that they should exert their influence in the election of any member of Parliament; but the ministry had the address to get it so amended that no officer of the Crown could be punished for such an act of corruption, unless the contract upon which the office was given was express. This amendment defeated the Salutary design of the bill in a great measure; but still, in the shape in which it passed, it attests, by its preamble as well as by the manifest spirit of the act, the sentiments of the English people in relation to this subject. The preamble recites that all such gifts and promises of office are contrary to the usage, right, and freedom of elections, and contrary to the laws and constitution of the realm." These are some of the securities which the wisdom of Englishmen has provided for the preservation of the freedom of elections; these are some of the bulwarks which the spirit and sagacity of that renowned people have created to defend their liberties, and to operate as barriers against the inroads of arbitrary power. Let us next see what we have done to secure the puriy and freedom of elections-to guard and preserve our berties. All that we have done presents but a barren catalogue. The constitution contains the only provision bearing upon this subject to be found in our statute bok. But, sir, we have had the most salutary doctrines laid down by some of our most distinguished and venerated statesmen; and it will be our own fault if we do not carry them into execution by prompt and effective legison. I have already referred to the authority of Mr. Madison and Mr. Jefferson, upon the subject of removals from office for opinion's sake. Upon the subject of the Werference of public officers in elections, Mr. Jefferson if possible, still more explicit and satisfactory. I beg eave to read an extract from his letter to Governor McKean, of Pennsylvania, in 1801, upon this subject; writ it appears, while the election between him and Colonel Burr was still pending in the House of Repre entatives: [H. OF R. smothered by the enormous patronage of the General Government. How far it may be practicable, prudent, or proper, to look back, is too great a question to be decided by the united wisdom of the whole administration when formed." After Mr. Jefferson was made President, he took steps immediately, in compliance with his pledge to Governor McKean, upon the subject of the future interference of public officers in elections; and the circular which I hold in my hand, and which I ask leave to read to the House, appears to have been issued by his order, to regulate the conduct of all in authority under him. The event of the election is still in dubio. A strong Partion in the House of Representatives will prevent an election if they can. I rather believe they will not be ale to do it, as there are six individuals of moderate aracter, any one of whom, coming over to the republean vote, will make a ninth State. Till this is known, is too soon for me to say what should be done in such atracions cases as those you mention, of federal officers recting the operation of the State Governments. The thing I will say, that, as to the future, interference with elections, whether of the State or General Govern. es, by the officers of the latter, should be deemed e of removal; because the constitutional remedy by flective principle becomes nothing, if it may be VOL. XIII-93 "The President of the United States has seen, with dissatisfaction, officers of the General Government taking, on various occasions, active parts in elections of the public functionaries, whether of the General or of the State Governments. Freedom of election being essential to the mutual independence of Governments, and of the different branches of the same Government so vitally cherished by most of our constituents, it is deemed improper for officers depending on the Execu tive of the Union to attempt to control or influence the free exercise of the elective right. This I am instructed, therefore, to notify to all officers within my department, holding their appointments under the authority of the President directly, and to desire them to notify to all subordinate to them. The right of any officer to give his vote at elections, as a qualified citizen, is not meant to be restrained, nor, however given, shall it have any effect to his prejudice; but it is expected that he will not attempt to influence the votes of others, nor take any part in the business of electioneering, that being deemed inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution, and his duties to it." The gen It seems that Mr. Jefferson did not think it expedient to remove all public officers who had intermeddled in elections before he came into power; but he took care to prescribe a rule for the future, which would leave no ground of complaint for any removal from office for any act of subsequent interference in elections. tleman from Ohio [Mr. HAMER] claimed to act with a party which practised upon Jefferson's principles. I call upon him and his friends now to confirm what they say by their example, and turn out every man in office in the United States who interfered in the late election. Sir, it is due to principle-the purity and freedom of elections demand this course it is due to consistency, among those who call themselves republicans and followers of Jefferson. It is due to the cause of liberty and free government, that every public officer who has dared to interfere in any election, State or National, should be made an example of in all time to come. But, sir, this is the business and duty of the Executive, so far as the past is concerned. What I propose that Congress should do, is simply to declare the removal of any public officer, upon political grounds, and for opinion's sake, to be a high misdemeanor, and leave the punishment to be applied by impeachment, or by the action of public sentiment at the ballot-box, as heretofore. I propose to leave the power of removal in the President, as it is now, believing that any attempt to limit it would be injudicious. But we are under no such restraint in providing an adequate penalty against all public officers who interfere in elections, except to cast their votes; nor is there any reason why we should not declare any gift, or promise of any office or place under the Government, as the consideration of service in an election, to be bribery, and to punish such offences for the future in a manner proportionate to their enormity. Until the National Legislature shall take this subject up, and act upon i', experience has shown that we have no security for the purity or the freedom of elections-none for the protection of our free institu tions. The only popular objection to the principles of the bill which I propose to enact into a law, is the principle of rotation in office. Whatever objections exist to the adoption of that principle, (and they are very serious and important,) still I infinitely prefer the adoption of it, according to the views recently expressed by some of the people of good old republican Pennsylvania, than the present practice of the Government. If we can agree upon no remedy for present abuses, let us adopt a uniform rule, at least, and let all officers go out at the end of four or eight years. Now, sir, when the Presi dent or any head of a department wishes to remove a meritorious officer, of offensive politics, in order to make way for some favorite partisan, he may cite the popular principle of rotation in office to support his conduct; but still the great mass of tractable and obedient office-holders, who are ready to become the creatures of executive will, are permitted to remain in office for life, in de fiance of the salutary and popular pr neiple of rotation in office. The rule, sir, should work both ways, or be discarded altogether. Mr. Speaker, experience, I think, has conclusively demonstrated, of late, that patronage is the vice, and is likely to be the euthanasy of our political system. The Virginia objectors to the constitution were mistaken. It is not the great powers of peace and war, of the purse and of the sword, vested in the Federal Government, which are most to be feared; nor is it so much the ggregate amount of patronage within the control of the Government, as it is the want of proper legal limitations and restrictions upon the use of it in the hands of the Executive, which is to be dreaded and guarded against. All other dangers in the operation of the Government will wear out by time, and are of small moment in comparison with this of patronage. Let it be understood that I do not propose to divest the President of one particle of the patronage which the constitution has conferred upon him, in giving him the power of nominating to all the important offices; nor do I wish to deprive the Executive of that due and proper influence over the public councils and people of the country which the legitimate exercise of it naturally brings to him. The legitimate exercise of the patronage vested in the President insures to him a vast influence in the country, sufficient of itself to keep alive the jealousies and vigilance of a free people. The power of nominating to all new offices-to fill all accruing vacancies, by death, resignation, or removal for unfitness--the power of appointing all the heads of the executive departments, all foreign ministers, and the judges of the Supreme and other courts of the United States-a vast power of itself, and operating directly upon the highest talent and ambition in the country; beside these, the power of promotion in the army and navy, and the patronage of the Military Academy, exclusive of the other great branches of the public service, would of them. selves, when exercised with an eye single to the interest of the country, as it should be, constitute an aggregate influence great enough to be trusted in the hands of any one man. To this measure of influence, and more, the President is entitled. The constitution bestows it, and I seek not to deprive him of it. But, sir, this vast power was a necessary deposite for the public good; and not the smallest portion of it was given for the personal gratification, or to advance the private interests or wishes, of the President. It was a sacred trust, to be administered according to the spirit and intention of the great deed by which it was vested. The trustees have, in my opinion, abused this trust; they have converted the public estate to their own private uses; they have caused the public service to be regarded as subordinate to private interest and ambition. [JAN. 25, 1837. It is an old maxim that money is power. Patronage is even more powerful than money; for patronage is money, and more. It bestows honor, rank, and consideration, along with money-it gratifies every passion of the human heart. It is the most successful instrument of power ever employed by artful and ambitious men in a State. It is, of itself, sufficient to overturn and revolutionize Governments-it is able to neutralize all forms, and to consolidate all actual power in the hands of the possessor. Let us see what has been said upon this subject by one of the most acute and able writers upon this or any other subject; and one, too, who was no enemy to a strong Government. I allude to Dr. Paley. In his chapter upon political philosophy, and in giving his views upon the British constitution, he lays it down that, "When the constitution conferred upon the Crown the nomination to all employments in public service, the authors of this arrangement were led to it by the obvious propriety of leaving to a master the choice of his servants; and by the manifest inconveniency of engaging the national council, upon every vacancy, in those personal contests which attend elections to places of honor and emolument. Our ancestors did not observe that this disposition added an influence to the regal office, which, when the number and value of public employments increased, would supersede, in a great measure, the forms, and change the character, of the ancient constitution. They knew not, what the experience and reflection of modern ages bas discovered, that patronage is, univer sally, power; that he who possesses, in a sufficient de gree, the means of gratifying the desires of mankind after wealth and distinction, by whatever checks and forms his authority may be limited or disguised, will direct the management of public affairs. Whatever be the mechanism of the political engine, he will guide the motion." Sir, these are the maxims of wisdom and experience. We have seen that the King of Great Britain, even since the revolution of 1688, has, by the sole power of patronage, been able several times to annihilate the independence of Parliament, and to rule with absolute sway. How the spirit of Englishmen has as often broke the power of corruption and re-established the Government upon its free foundation, we have already seen. human nature is the same in this new world that it is in the old. Patronage is the same in its power to seduce and its liability to abuse; and the same jealous vigilance is demanded in this country to prevent the consolidation of all power in the hands of the Executive. Sir, The abuse of patronage, Mr. Speaker, and every other incidental evil of which I complain, it was supposed by our ancestors, when they framed and adopted the constitution, would no sooner become known than they would be redressed by the ballot-box-the panacea o the constitution; but, sir, in the language of Mr. Jeffer son, "the constitutional remedy by the elective princi ple" has "become nothing, because' it is smothered by the enormous patronage of the General Govern ment." It is to me, sir, matter of real wonder and amazement that a degree of abuse in the administration of the patronage of the Government should excite n particular alarm at this day, which, but eight years ago would have caused such a commotion in the land as mus inevitably have terminated in revolution, if no othe remedy could have been applied. Undoubtedly, man causes peculiar to the times have combined to produc this extraordinary result--the unrivalled popularity the President-the blunder of opposition in relation t nullification and the United States Bank; but the mo subtle, powerful, and successful element of evil has bee the introduction of the spoils principle, as an avowed an defensible incentive to party association and party se |