ernment established a force under English officers, increased the number of Englishmen in the customs service, and planned to give the chief inspector large powers with respect to internal finances. Small wonder that the fear arose that Great Britain was gradually insinuating herself into all branches of the administration.

The commission which visited the United States in 1908 hoped to check France by a treaty with the United States guaranteeing the territorial integrity and independence of the country, and hoped to check Great Britain by securing through the aid of our Government experts in various lines of administration who would help along rational reforms and dispense with British or other foreign officials.

That the United States could not undertake to establish a protectorate over Liberia is obvious, and the envoys were told so frankly. But the earnestness of their appeal convinced the Department of State that if anything could be done properly by our Government to assist these former wards of ours, it ought to be undertaken. Just what it might be was difficult to ascertain, and it was accordingly recommended that a commission be sent from the United States to Liberia and report upon the situation found there.

Before the American commission sailed it was clear that the reforms begun under British auspices had collapsed. Through a series of events, in which whatever blame attaches does not concern the principles involved but only the personalities of those entrusted with their execution, it had become evident that for the present at least, those excellent measures suggested by the British Foreign Office could not be carried out with the assistance of British officials. When the appointment of the American commission was under consideration, it was suggested by the British Foreign Office that the assistance which could be rendered by the United States would of necessity be additional to that being carried out by Great Britain. The situation had however changed when the commission reached Liberia. It was clear to the commission that if the United States were to render any assistance, she must take up the work which Great Britain was no longer in a position to perform and its recommendations have been made with that end in view.

The recommendations are now public property and may be briefly stated.19 They are:

1. That the United States extend its aid to Liberia in the prompt settlement of pending boundary disputes.

2. That the United States enable Liberia to refund its debt by assuming as a guarantee for the payment of obligations under such arrangement the control and collection of the Liberian customs.

3. That the United States lend its assistance to the Liberian Government in the reform of its internal finances.

4. That the United States should lend its aid to Liberia in organizing and drilling an adequate constabulary or frontier police force. 5. That the United States should establish and maintain a research station in Liberia.

6. That the United States reopen the question of establishing a naval coaling station in Liberia.

The foregoing is believed to be a consistent program of positive benefit to the people of Liberia, and a true embodiment of that peculiar interest in her welfare which has received such cogent expressions in our state papers. It is designed to render her substantial aid and furnish the basis for an orderly internal development. It introduces no new political principles and would tend to transform our oft-expressed "friendly interest" from words to facts.

ROLAND P. FALKNER.

19 Senate Document 457, 61st Congress, 2d Session, March 25, 1910.

THE SANITARY COMMISSION-THE RED CROSS

On April 29, 1861, at a meeting of a great concourse of women in the Cooper Institute, New York City, a movement was initiated which led to the organization of the United States Sanitary Commission.

As first formulated, the plan looked to an organization with full powers to establish for the benefit of the Army a preventive, hygienic and sanitary service, this under or independent of the Medical Bureau, as might be deemed most expedient.

To secure recognition from the War Department, the promoters of the movement laid their proposal before the Surgeon General in Washington, but received no encouragement.

It was well known to all and was called to the attention of the Secretary of War and the Surgeon General, that when the British Government, a few years before, learned of the dreadful mortality of the British Army in the Crimea, the most radical and previously unheard of measures were taken to remedy the situation.

For hospital reform and supervision Miss Florence Nightingale was sent to Scutari by the British Secretary of State for War with the most ample power to call upon the military authorities for any assistance she required and to adapt the administration of the hospitals to her plans in conformity with her orders. Miss Nightingale stated, what the official returns confirm, that during the first seven months of the campaign before Sebastopol, the British Army suffered a mortality at the rate of sixty per cent per annum. Other most radical steps for reform were taken, these consisting in placing the military authorities, so far as respected preventive measures and sanitation generally, under a civil commission of three British sanitarians.

The Secretary of State for War, in his instructions to those experts, said:

It is important that you be deeply impressed with the necessity of not resting content with the giving of an order, but that you see instantly,

by yourselves or by your agents, to the commencement of the work and to its superintendence day by day until it is finished.

Those who initiated the organization of the United States Sanitary Commission were familiar with the facts respecting this British Commission, whose report was dated December 1, 1856. They sought to secure from the Government at Washington similar plenary powers for supervision and intervention respecting preventive measures touching sanitation.

The Surgeon General and the other military authorities repelled the idea of their own subordination in respect to any military matter to a committee of civilians; the Sanitary Commission had to accept the role of a body invited to inquire into matters affecting health and to advise with the Medical Bureau relating thereto.

The official designation of the organization was A Commission of Inquiry and Advice in respect of the Sanitary Interests of the United States Forces. The War Department order notes that it was issued at the instance and in pursuance of the suggestion of the Army Medical Bureau and that the Commission was to exist at the pleasure of the Government, unless dissolved by its own action.

The persons to compose the directorate, which included the head of the Medical Bureau and two other military officers, were designated by the Secretary of War. He required that the inquiries of the Commission be directed

to the principles and practices connected with the inspection of recruits and other enlisted men; to means of preserving and restoring the health and securing the general comfort of the troops; to the sanitary condition of the volunteers; to the proper provision of cooks, nurses and hospitals; and to other subjects of like nature.

The Commission immediately organized, chose a president, vicepresident, secretary and treasurer, increased its personnel to twelve, and, on the 13th of May, 1861, submitted for the action of the Secretary of War a "plan of organization "2 in which were set forth in some detail the powers and responsibilities of the organizaThis was approved by the War Department the same day.

tion.

1 Printed in SUPPLEMENT to this JOURNAL, p. 229. 2 Printed in SUPPLEMENT to this JOURNAL, p. 230.

The two papers together, the order and the plan, constitute what may be called the Constitution of the Sanitary Commission.

Under the first branch of their responsibility - inquiry — the information sought was to cover the wants of the troops under the heads, what must be, what is, and what ought to be their condition.

In respect to the other branch - advice - the Commission was to prepare plans, undertake to secure their approval and enforcement by the military authorities, and their support by the benevolence of the public, in short, to aid the Medical Bureau without displacing it or in any manner infringing upon its rights and duties.

A comparison of the measures adopted at Geneva in 1863 and recommended to the signatory powers for acceptance (see below) with those adopted by the Government of the United States in 1865 will show that there was no substantial difference so far as concerned results to be secured. The single motive actuating both the Geneva Conference and the United States Sanitary Commission was to devise a plan and means for aiding the medical services of the armies in campaign. At Geneva much was said about succor of the wounded and nothing about the general health and comfort of the troops. At Washington the succor of the wounded, although not specially referred to, was covered by the phrase "preserving and restoring the health and comfort of the forces." At Geneva it was proposed that all those connected with the medical services wear distinguishing marks or badges. At Washington there was no such proposal at the outset, but before the war was ended the helpers of the sick and wounded at the front and in the hospitals were wearing distinguishing marks. The delegates at Geneva asked that the nations confer upon the army sanitary services and their helpers the privilege of neutrality. This was asking for what both belligerents in the Civil War in America had more than a year before the meeting at Geneva already conceded as respected medical officers and other non-combatants taken prisoners. From and after the spring of 1862 all doctors and chaplains held as prisoners of war by the Union or Confederate forces, as well as those liberated on parole, were released.3 General Beauregard appears to have been

3 Par. IV, G. O. No. 60, June 6, 1862, for the Union Army, and par. II and III, G. O. No. 45, June 26, 1862, for the Confederate Army.