both countries, which, if suffered to continue, must unavoidably interrupt for . the time the commercial intercourse between them."-(State Papers, Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, p. 683.) But, notwithstanding this strong language, his influence was thought to have prevailed so far that President Washington ventured to announce, in a confidential message of February 20, 1795, good news for our plundered merchants. "It affords me,' ," he said, "the highest pleasure to inform Congress that perfect harmony reigns between the two republics, and that these claims are in a train of being discussed with candor, and amicably adjusted.”(Wait's American State Papers, vol. 3, p. 402.) But this perfect harmony was short-lived, and the hopes which flowed from it were nipped in the bud.

The knowledge of Mr. Jay's negotiations with England had already produced uneasiness in France; but, when the treaty was finally divulged, on its ratification, in October, 1795, there was an outburst against us. The treaty was pronounced to be in violation of existing engagements with France, and our whole policy was openly branded by the president of the Directory, in his reply to Mr. Monroe, as a "condescension of the American government to the wishes of its ancient tyrant." The Directory refused to receive Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, who had been sent by our government in the place of James Monroe. Meanwhile, by a succession of cruel edicts, it unleashed all its cruisers to despoil our commerce, and to cry havoc wherever they sailed. On the 2d July it was declared that "the French republic will treat neutral vessels, either as to confiscation, searches, or capture, in the same manner as they shall suffer the English to treat them." The indefinite terms of this edict were justly denounced by our government as giving scope for arbitrary construction, and consequently for unlimited oppression and vexation.-(French Spoliations, Ex. Doc., 1826, p. 434.) And these results were soon manifest. With contagious injustice, the French agents at St. Domingo reported to the government at home, "that, having found no resource in finance, and knowing the unfriendly disposition of the Americans, and to avoid perishing in distress, they had armed for cruising, and that, already, eighty-seven cruisers were at sea; and that, for three months preceding, the administration had subsisted and individuals been enriched out of those prizes."—(Ibid., p. 435.) So extensively did this brutality prevail, that it was announced that "American vessels no longer entered the French ports unless carried in by force.”—(Ibid.) But this spirit of retaliation broke forth in still another edict of the Directory, which became at once a universal scourge to American commerce. This edict, which bears date March 2, 1797, after enlarging the list of contraband, and ordaining other measures of rigor, proceeds to declare all American vessels lawful prize, if found without a rôle d'équipage or circumstantial list of the crew; all of which was in violation of existing treaties, and also of the usages of the United States, which notoriously did not require, among a ship's papers, any such list. No edict was so comprehensive in its sweep; for, as all our vessels were unprovided with this safeguard, they were all defenceless. Spoliations without number ensued, which were so absolutely lawless and unjust that John Marshall did not hesitate to record of them in his journal, under date of December 17, 1797, that "the claims for property captured and condemned for want of a rôle d'équipage constituted as complete a right as any individual ever possessed."—(French Spoliations, Ex. Doc., 1826, p. 471.) But this right, thus complete, according to the judgment of this great authority, is a large part of the claims which are still pending before Congress.

As if to complete this strange, eventful history, another edict, at once inhospitable and unjust, was launched by the Directory, January 17, 1798, which prohibited every vessel that had entered an English port from being admitted into any port of the French republic; and, still further, handed over to condemnation "every vessel laden in whole or part with merchandise coming out of England or its possessions."-(French Spoliations, Ex. Doc., 1826, p. 483.)

This edict was promptly denounced by the American plenipotentiaries newly arrived at Paris. In earnest, vigorous tones they said that it invaded at the same time the interests and the independence of neutral powers; that it took from them the profits of an honest and lawful industry, as well as the inestimable privilege of conducting their own affairs as their own judgment might direct, and that acquiescence in it would establish a precedent for national degradation that would authorize any measures which power might be disposed to practice. Thus did the plenipotentiaries depict the spirit in which the French spoliations had their origin, and the humiliating consequences of submission to the outrage. But the personal sufferers are, down to this day, without redress.

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Perplexed and indignant at these proceedings, the United States had meanwhile constituted a special mission, composed of three eminent citizens, Mr. Pinckney, Mr. Marshall, and Mr. Gerry, who were charged especially to secure indemnity on account of these spoliations. In his elaborate letter of instructions, dated July 15, 1797, the Secretary of State, Mr. Pickering, lays down the following rule of conduct : In respect to the depredations on our commerce, the principal object will be to agree on an equitable mode of examining and deciding the claims of our citizens, and the manner and periods of making compensation. proposed mode of adjusting the claims, by commissioners appointed on each side, is so perfectly fair, we cannot imagine that it will be refused." Although this reparation was not made an "indispensable condition of the proposed treaty," yet the plenipotentiaries were enjoined "not to renounce these claims of our citizens, nor to stipulate that they be assumed by the United States government." (French Spoliations, Ex. Doc., 1826, pp. 454, 455.) Thus fully were all these claims recognized at that time by our government, and most carefully placed under the protection of our triumvirate of plenipotentiaries.

But the plenipotentiaries found the French republic in no mood of justice. Bonaparte was then triumphant at the head of the army of Italy, and Talleyrand was exhibiting his remarkable powers at the head of the foreign relations of France. Victory had given confidence, and the exulting republic was standing tip-toe, more disposed to strike than to negotiate, unless it could dictate, and implacable always towards England and all who were supposed to sympathize with this power. After exactions and humiliations hard to bear, the plenipotentiaries were compelled to return home without being received officially by the intoxicated government to which they had been addressed, but not before they had encountered the masterly ability of Talleyrand, who in reply to their statement of the claims of the United States, presented the counter-claims of France. Though remaining in Paris merely on sufferance, they had unofficial interviews with various agents of the republic, and even with Talleyrand himself; but without dwelling on details which are not pertinent to this occasion, it is enough to say, that, while refusing to offer a loan or a bribe, they were able to declare frankly to Talleyrand "that France had taken violently from America more than fifteen millions of dollars, and treated us in every respect as enemies."-(Wait's American State Papers, vol. 3, p. 497;) and also to receive from Talleyrand a concession, recorded in one of their despatches, that "some of these claims were probably just;" with the inquiry, "whether, if they were acknowledged by France, we could not give a credit as to the payment-say for two years?"-(French Spolations, Ex. Doc., 1826, p. 487.) Here again was an admission which must not be forgotten.

The return of our plenipotentiaries without satisfaction was aggravated by the unveiled circumstances of an attempted negotiation which an eminent continental writer has not hesitated to brand as "unique in the annals of diplomacy."(Garden, Traités de Paix, tom. 6, p. 120.) The American plenipotentiaries had been invited to pay a gratification of twelve hundred thousand francs, and the whole desperate intrigue, conducted by persons entitled in the correspondence X, Y, Z, was published to the world. The country was indignant,

and war seemed to be imminent. By various acts of legislation Congress made the proper preparations, and Washington was summoned from his retirement to gird on his sword once more, as lieutenant general. But the claims for French spoliations were never absent from the mind. By act of the 28th May, 1798, public vessels of the United States were authorized to capture all "armed vessels of the republic of France, which have committed, or shall be found hovering on the coast of the United States for the purpose of committing depredations on vessels belonging to citizens thereof;" and this statute was introduced by a preamble asserting "depredations on the commerce of the United States a violation of the law of nations and of treaties." By act of June 13, 1798, all commercial intercourse was suspended between the United States and France, until the "government of France shall clearly disavow, and shall be found to refrain from the aggression, depredations, and hostilities by them encouraged and maintained against the vessels and other property of the citizens of the United States." By act of June 25, 1798, merchant vessels of the United States were authorized to resist search, or seizure, by any French armed vessel; to repel assaults and to capture the aggressors, until "the government of France shall cause the commanders and crews of all armed French vessels to refrain from the lawless depredations and outrages hitherto encouraged and authorized by that government against the merchant vessels of the United States." By act of July 7, 1798, the treaties with France were declared to be no longer obligatory on the United States; and this statute was introduced by a preamble asserting that "the just claims of the United States for reparation of injuries had been refused, and their attempts to negotiate an amicable adjustment of all complaints between the two nations had been repelled with indignity." Thus, by express term, in repeated acts at the time, did Congress recognize the validity of these claims.

By these vigorous measures the rights of these claimants were asserted, and the country was put in an attitude of defence. The French directory became less intolerable, and negotiations were invited again, with the assurance that the former rudeness should not be renewed. John Adams was now President, and for the sake of peace he seized the opportunity of this overture, by appointing Chief Justice Ellsworth, Patrick Henry, and William Van Murray as a second triumvirate of plenipotentiaries to France. As Mr. Henry declined, Mr. Davie, of North Carolina, was substituted in his place. In adjusting the instructions President Adams himself took a personal part, as appears by a letter to the Secretary of State, where he says: "The principal points, indeed all the points, of the negotiation, were so minutely considered and approved by me and all the heads of department that nothing remains but to put them into form and dress, which service I pray you to perform as promptly as possible.'-(Adams's Works, vol. 1, p. 553.) But "all the points" were three only. 1st. Indemnity for spoliations of American commerce. 2d. The unquestionable wrong of seizing American vessels for the want of the papers known to French law as rôle d'équipage. And 3d. The refusal to renew the treaty guarantee of the French West Indies. Such were the ultimata originally settled by the President and his cabinet on the 4th March, 1799, and afterwards fully developed in the elaborate instructions of Mr. Pickering, dated 22d October, 1799, which, after announcing that "the conduct of the French republic would well have justified an immediate declaration of war on the part of the United States," proceeded to declare, as the first point, that the plenipotentiaries, “at the opening of the negotiation, will inform the French ministers that the United States expect from France, as an indispensable condition of the treaty, a stipulation to make to the citizens of the United States full compensation for all losses and damages which they shall have sustained by reason of irregular or illegal captures, or condemnation of their vessels and other property." And the instructions end as they began, by declaring, as first among the ultimata, “that an article be in

serted for establishing a board with suitable powers to hear and determine the claims of our citizens, and binding France to pay or secure payment of the sums which shall be awarded."—(French Spoliations, Ex. Doc., 1826, p. 562, 575.) Mark here the positiveness of the assertion.

These instructions to our plenipotentiaries attest the interest of our government in securing these indemnities. Placed first among the ultimata adopted in the councils of President Adams, they were placed first in the diplomatic instructions. But there is yet other evidence of their character and amount. The Secretary of State, in a report to Congress, dated January 18, 1799, after attributing them to French feeling on account of the British treaty, proceeds to characterize them in remarkable words: "Yet that treaty had been made its chief pretence for these unjust and cruel depredations on American commerce, which have brought distress on multitudes, and ruin on many of our citizens, and occasioned a total loss of property to the United States of probably more than twenty millions of dollars."—(French Spoiliations, Ex. Doc., 1826, p. 480.) Such were the outrages for which our plenipotentiaries were to seek redress.

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The directory had ceased to exist; but on reaching Paris the plenipotentiaries were cordially received by Talleyrand, the citizen minister of foreign affairs, who without delay presented them to the First Consul, as he was about to mount for that wonderful campaign which, beginning in the passage of the Alps, ended at Marengo. Negotiations commenced at once, and Joseph Bonaparte, the elder brother of the First Consul, afterwards king of Spain, was placed at the head of the commission on the part of France. Appreciating, as they announced, "the value of time," the American plenipotentiaries, in a brief note on the 7th April the very day when the exchange of powers had been completed-proposed an arrangement to ascertain and discharge the equitable claims of citizens of either nation upon the other, whether founded in contract, treaty, or the law of nations;" all of which was to be done in order" to satisfy the demands of justice, and render a reconciliation cordial and permanent."-(French Spoilations, Ex. Doc., 1826, p. 581.) Thus distinctly were these claims presented at the very threshold. The French plenipotentiaries in their prompt reply admitted that the first object of the negotiation ought to be the determination of the regulations, and the steps to be followed, for the estimation and indemnification of injuries for which either nation may make claim for itself or for any of its citizens."-(Ibid., p. 581.) Here was the suggestion of claims, not only "individual," but also "national," under which loomed the counter-claims of France. The American plenipotentiaries, while professing to be free from "apprehension of an unfavorable balance," protested against the consideration of any "national" claims until some "convenient stage of the negotiation, after it shall be seen what arrangement would be acceptable for the claims of citizens.”—(Ibid., p. 582.) The French plenipotentiaries rejoined by enforcing "national" as well as "individual" claims.—(Ibid, p.583.) The issue seemed to be made. On the one side were the "individual" claims of American citizens, on the other side the "national" claims of France. The American plenipotentiaries were not authorized to recognize the "national" claims. The French plenipotentiaries were not authorized to recognize the "individual" claims, without a previous recognition on our part of the "national" claims. At last, after various efforts at harmony, it was officially announced that "the negotiation was at a stand on the part of France," as her plenipotentiaries were constrained by the instructions of the First Consul "to make the acknowledgment of former treaties the basis of negotiation and the condition of compensation."—(Ibid., p. 609.) The First Consul was then on the Italian slope of the Alps, about to pounce upon the astonished Austrians. Claims and counter-claims were at that moment of little interest to him.

Thus far the committee have exhibited the origin and history of the claims of the United States. But the time has come to change the scene, and to ex

hibit those counter-claims which played such a part in the successive negotiations, and finally produced that dead-lock, when the two powers stood face to face with antagonist claims, unable to go forward, and unwilling to go backward.

COUNTER-CLAIMS OF FRANCE, THEIR ORIGIN AND HISTORY.

II. The counter-claims of France differ widely in character from the claims of American citizens. They were not "individual," but " national," and they were founded on alleged violations of treaty stipulations, assumed by the United States in return for the aid of France in the establishment of national independence. In the course of the protracted controversy between the two republics they were detailed in numerous official notes; but they were brandished by Talleyrand, with offensive skill and effect, in the very faces of our insulted plenipotentiaries, under date of March 18, 1798, when, while driving them from Paris, he insisted" that the priority of grievances and complaints belonged to the French republic, and that these complaints and these grievances were as real as numerous long before the United States had the least ground of claim" (French Spoliations, Ex. Doc., 1826, p. 490.) A careful inquiry will enable us to see that this allegation, thus confidently uttered, was not without a certain foundation; and here we must repair to the history of our country.

The triumph with which our war of independence happily ended came tardily, after seven years of battle, suffering, and exhaustion, but it was hastened, if not assured, by the generous alliance of France. From Bunker Hill to Saratoga it was chequered with gloom, which even the surrender of Burgoyne did not suffice to dispel. Then came the dreary winter of Valley Forge, when soldiers of Washington, after treading the snows barefoot, were obliged for want of blankets to huddle all night by the fires, and even the stout heart of the commander-inchief bent so far as to announce, in a formal letter to Congress, that "unless some great and capital change takes place, the army must be inevitably reduced to one or the other of three things-starve, dissolve, or disperse." But the scene was changed when the glad tidings came that France, by solemn treaty signed by Franklin, February 6, 1778, had bound herself to "guarantee to the United States their liberty, sovereignty and independence, absolute and unlimited." The camp broke forth with the mingled joy of the soldier and patriot, as it turned gratefully to Lafayette, who was already by the side of Washington, the forerunner of the armies and navies now promised to our cause. Congress took up the strain of joy, and, by a unanimous vote, ratified the treaty which opened to our country the gates of the future.

It would be difficult to estimate the value of this treaty in money, especially when we consider its consequences. According to the report of Calonne, the French minister of finance, the war which ensued in the support of this guaranty cost France fourteen hundred and forty millions of francs, or about two hundred and eighty millions of dollars. But French blood, more costly than money, was shed on land and sea in the same cause, until at last the army of Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown to the allied forces of Rochambeau and Washington, and the war closed by the recognition of the independence of the United States. If liberty be priceless-if life be priceless-then was the aid lavished by France infinite beyond calculation.

But the engagements were not all on the side of France. Beyond the gratitude due for this powerful alliance, there were express obligations solemnly assumed by the United States, not only in the treaty of alliance, but also in the treaty of amity and commerce negotiated on the same day. These obligations, constituting the consideration of the mighty contract, were of two classes: first, a guaranty by the United States of the possessions of France in America; and, secondly, important privileges for the armed ships of France, with a promise of American convoy to French commerce.