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(f) The blocking of the canal entrance at Zeebrugge could be accomplished in two ways: (1) Ram the lock gates and sink the ramming ship in place; (2) sink two ships across the entrance at its narrowest part and rely on silting to complete the operation. (g) The blocking of the Ostend entrance could be fulfilled by sinking one or more ships across the channel between the piers.

(h) A dark night with absence of fog and a certain state of the tide are necessary for maneuvering the force. Some kind of protection must be provided to conceal the approach.

Note. It seems to be evident from the published reports of this operation that the probable presence of a harbor net at Zeebrugge was not taken into 'consideration.

Decisions.-(a) A strong covering force of light cruisers and destroyers is to be maintained to the eastward and northward of Zeebrugge. This force to be drawn from Harwich.

(b) The presence of mines must be expected and the operation must proceed without taking them into account. Shallow draft vessels in sufficient number must accompany the deeper draft vessels in order to take off all personnel in case of the loss of any of the latter.

(c) The attacking force must be accompanied and covered by a force of destroyers sufficient to repel an attack by the enemy's full force of destroyers based on Zeebrugge.

(d) The strength of the protection of the entrance to the canal at Zeebrugge necessitates the employment of feints to attract the defender's attention from the main attack. This is to be accomplished by two means, viz: (1) the bombardment of adjacent batteries by monitors (covered by destroyers) and airplanes on prearranged targets; (2) an attack in force on the Mole, the landing to be effected on the seaward side and as nearly as possible abreast of the battery located on the Mole Head, the silencing of which is considered necessary for the safe passage of the block ships. Then the attack is to be continued. to the westward along the Mole followed by a demolition party for the purpose of accomplishing as much damage as possible during the time required to carry out the main operation.

Due to the exposed entrance of the harbor at Ostend the only feint to be undertaken will be the heavy bombardment of the shore batteries by monitors (protected by destroyers), airplanes and siege guns on preassigned targets.

(e) In order to prevent reinforcements reaching the defenders of the Mole the iron viaduct must be destroyed. This is to be accomplished by fitting two old submarines with large quantities of explosives, ramming the viaduct from the seaward side and detonating the charges.

(f) Three block ships are to be used at Zeebrugge. The block ships will proceed into the canal, timed to arrive about 25 minutes after the opening of the attack on the Mole. The leading ship, if her consorts are seen to be following, is to ram the lock gates and be sunk, the other vessels are to be run ashore near the entrance at the southern end of the piers, the narrowest part of the channel, and to be sunk. If the leading vessel should fail to reach the lock gates and should sink in the channel short of them she would make no obstruction. If only two of the block ships reach the canal they are to be sunk across the channel near the southern end of the piers.

(g) Two block ships are to be used at Ostend. Each ship in turn will ram one of the piers and then swing the ship across the channel in which position the sinking charges will be exploded.

(h) A smoke screen must be laid close to the enemy's position, to be laid down after the commencement of the bombardment, but before the arrival of the force for the attack on the Mole and of the block ships. Flotillas of motor launches and coastal motor boats are to be used for this duty and they will have rescue work as an additional duty.

Composition of Forces.-In order that all parts of the English Naval Service might share in this expedition officers and men were drawn from all parts of the home forces. The ships, destroyers and small craft were drawn from the Dover patrol, Harwich force and Dunkirk, augmented by eight destroyers and four motor launches from the French Navy. The block ships and submarines were obtained from Portsmouth and the Nore. The total force was composed as follows:

[blocks in formation]

In addition to the crews of such of the above ships as were in commission there was a force of 82 officers and 1698 menRoyal Navy 50 officers and 980 men, Royal Marines 32 officers and 718 men--for the manning of the other ships and the formation of the storming and demolition parties.

Preparation. A force thus composed and its weapons obviously needed collective training and special preparation to adapt them to the purpose.

The Vindictive was chosen to make the attack on the Mole. She was fitted out at the Chatham Dockyard with special fenders, mole anchors for making fast to the Mole, and brows to expedite the landing of the attacking force. Her light gun armament was increased especially by the placing of machine guns and flame throwers.

• Two special craft were necessary to accompany the Vindictive. The Liverpool ferry-steamers Iris-renamed Iris II-and Daffodil were selected after a long and careful search on account of their power, large carrying capacity and shallow draft. They were chosen with the view of pushing the Vindictive alongside of the Mole; bringing away all of the crew and landing parties of the Vindictive if she should be sunk; and their ability to maneuver in shallow water and to clear mine fields and torpedoes. They were refitted for this work much in the manner as the Vindictive at the Portsmouth dockyard.

The following ships were selected for block ships: At Zeebrugge, the Thetis, Intrepid and Iphigenia; at Ostend, the Sirius and Brilliant. Their holds were filled with cement and two sets of explosive charges were installed in each vessel at the Chatham dockyard.

The smoke producing apparatus in vogue was only intended for day use and was entirely unsuitable for this expedition as its combustion was accompanied by a bright flame. A new and satisfactory system was evolved by Wing Commander F. A. Brock, later killed during the attack. This equipment was manufactured and installed on the motor launches, coastal motor boats and destroyers at Dover.

As soon as the preparation of the material was sufficiently advanced the training of the personnel was commenced. With this end in view the block ships and the storming forces were assembled at Chatham towards the end of February. The Hin

dustan was used as receiving ship and training depot. On the 4th of April this force was moved to the West Severn anchorage.

The storming forces were composed as follows: Naval companies A, B and D; and the 4th Battalion of Royal Marines, companies A, B, C and machine gun. The demolition force was known as the Naval Company C and was divided into three sections.

For several weeks the 61st Wing was engaged in frequent aerial reconnaissances and took a large number of photographs in different conditions of the tide, from which plans and models were constructed. The storming and demolition parties were trained on a replica of the Zeebrugge Mole until each company became thoroughly acquainted with its share of the undertaking. This training was carried out in accordance with a plan to place the Vindictive abreast of the battery on the seaward end of the Mole.

To assure the efficient co-operation of all of the various forces it was found necessary to place navigational marks at certain turning points and to mark the positions to be taken by the monitors in order to assure the bombardment of all preassigned targets. This was well accomplished except at Ostend, where too much confidence was placed on the Storm Bank Buoy.

In order that the attack might have a reasonable prospect of success the following conditions were essential, viz: (a) a certain state of the tide in conjunction with darkness; (b) relatively calm weather; (c) more or less favorable direction of the wind; (d) absence of fog. The first of these fixed the dates between which it was practicable to make the attempt. The others it was not possible to reckon with in advance, owing to the uncertainty of the weather at that time of the year, owing to the fact that the weather conditions on the Flanders coast might be different than they were off the Goodwins and owing to a possible change in the seven hours necessary to make the passage from the point of concentration to the point of attack.

On two occasions previous to April 22d, the concentration took place, but on account of unfavorable weather conditions setting in, had to be dispersed. Although this caused great disappointment to the personnel it had considerable practical value as dress. rehearsals of the preliminary stages of the undertaking.

The last of the preparations was the long-range bombardment of the Flanders coast, carried out on several nights prior to

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