The next method tried was to wind the ship upon arrival. Coming in on a flood tide, the stem was placed against the dock and held fast, the tide, assisted by "twisting" with the engines, turning the ship end for end. This permitted a "clean get away," when it was time to go.

The last method was to back away from the dock, and, steering by engines and rudder, backing into the Potomac River, where it was only necessary to go ahead and down the river. This is shown by dotted lines.

These various operations were timed, and it was found that the last method saved several minutes.

CONCLUSION

Most of the foregoing remarks on the handling of destroyers are concerning "the little things that everybody knows," but in nine out of ten cases of damage or poor ship handling these little things are responsible. This article is not based on theoretical considerations, but on actual happenings.

It need not be assumed that a destroyer captain must analyze the forces at work while he is maneuvering his ship, or to have any "rule-of-thumb" methods. More likely, if he has gained some degree of expertness by practice, he will develop a sixth sense; he will handle the ship by the "feel" of it, as it were.

It may be remarked that in handling a destroyer it is best to take station where you can see the water close to the side. In this way you can judge your speed much better than by watching the beach or another ship.

Finally, be sure to give your junior officers, especially the executive officer, a chance actually to handle the ship under good conditions. In this way they, too, will get the " feel of the ship," and when the necessity comes for them to handle the ship in your absence they will have some degree of confidence to help them.

Remembering that there are many different ways of doing it, do not insist on their doing it exactly your way, and do not "butt in" except to avoid disaster. It is much better to talk over the whys and wherefores afterwards. I doubt if even the most phlegmatic "mate" could do well under the fire of his captain's criticisms.

[COPYRIGHTED]

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.

SOME NOTES AND SUGGESTIONS IN RE NAVY PAPER WORK

By LIEUT. COMMANDER F. WELDEN, U. S. Navy

After reading Admiral Fiske's article entitled "The United States Naval Institute " in the February issue, 1919, I am prompted to burst into song on the subject of naval paper work.

My first experience in navy paper work was some years ago on a beef boat where I was acting gunnery officer of a small battery and it was necessary for me to make all reports without the aid of a regularly assigned yeoman. This work by the way was terminated by turning in all gunnery department stores and most of her battery to the navy yard when the ship went out of commission.

My experience while on this job led me to believe two things; one of which was, that the reports were so detailed and so numerous that large inaccuracies could be submitted without being detected and corrected. I make this statement because, as I discovered, there had been many erroneous reports submitted and I suppose I added to them, without, to my knowledge, anyone getting called for them. The other observation was that in my acquaintance with ordnance forms I found that the man who proofed the print had never been guilty of ever making up one of these forms on a typewriter, since they oftentimes have to be put in a machine three separate times to get the data on them in the proper place and at that the numbers involved very often run over in the next column.

After this first experience with paper work I had no further details which involved making reports except such things as hull boards, surveys, court martials, etc., until four years later, when I was ordered to a naval base which had been established during time of war and about three months previous to the signing of the armistice.

Needless to say that under these circumstances, with almost all the officers, reserve force and the same with the enlisted personnel, the paper work was far from pure. Unfortunately my experience had only been that previously related and I was handicapped, but I wish to make the following observations: I believe that the most serious fault with navy paper work at present is, that even officers of considerable experience and frequently of lengthy service had depended too much on the old-time chief yeoman and as a result, things which should be clear enough to anyone of any intelligence and average experience are often very hazy and cloudy, since up-to-date publications and instructions have not been issued, such as the yearly rules for battle practice.

Under this heading I should like to note that I believe as a "First Aid" the navy must have a standard method of correspondence based on battleship organization and expanded or contracted for other ships and stations as the case may be. This is úndoubtedly contemplated in various rules for correspondence and instructions, but is not printed to the best of my knowledge in such form that any officer or yeoman can have a copy at any time he wishes it.

If standardization is worth anything at all, it is believed that navy paper work should surely be standardized and to this end there should be a standard system of procedure of correspondence involving at least the following:

(a) Each ship and station in the navy should have a central filing and mailing room.

(b) All incoming and outgoing mail should pass through this department with the possible exception of medical and supply correspondence not pertaining to the other offices aboard ship or station.

(c) Every department of a ship or station should be given a file letter, much the same as a fire control circuit is assigned letters. (d) That a universal set of file numbers be adopted.

(e) That every letter coming to and from a ship or station be made a matter of record, and copies retained in the central file, except routine correspondence not necessary for record.

(f) That a cross index system in connection with the files be adopted on each ship and station and each letter cross indexed under as many subjects as possible in order to facilitate the accessibility of all letters on file, and likewise all Bunav. Circular Letters, Alnavs, Alatlantics, etc.

(g) That every ship and station adopt a color system of paper, such as; original-white, file copy-green, desk copy-pink, tracer copy-yellow. The file copy is to be retained in the central files on each ship or station, pink copy to be retained by the department of origin for a desk copy, yellow copy to be retained by the central files if a reply is necessary.

(h) That the central filing and mailing room number consecutively all outgoing correspondence, keeping a record of it in the outgoing mail book.

(i) That all correspondence show an initial letter of the department of origin and the initials or sign of the yeoman preparing the same.

(j) That the distribution be shown on all copies. This to include all printed forms.

(k) That all correspondence show immediately following the office letter and yeoman's sign the date when a reply is expected or (O) meaning no reply is expected.

(1) That the month shall not be numbered in any correspondence, but will be abbreviated as, Jan., Mar., since there is a great deal of confusion resulting from placing the day of the month before the number of the month.

(m) That the file copy shall at all times be a signed copy.

(n) That every signature should be written out on a typewriter, including the original, so that anyone who reads may know whose name it is.

It is believed that if a survey be made to determine the number of obsolete forms now in use that a considerable number could be done away with absolutely and that others could be revised so that one form would answer several purposes. While on this subject it is earnestly requested that all forms be made up to be filled in with a typewriter and as nearly as possible should complete the action by the use of one form. This would tend to reduce the number of signatures required such as, at present, on misconduct reports involving a loss of pay, which required seven signatures from the commanding officer, two from the executive officer, two from the medical officer and one from the supply officer, making a total of twelve signatures from officers that should ordinarily be engaged in more profitable work. To be of real value forms must be easily understood and should be complete in themselves, but need to be constantly corrected and not allowed to become obsolete.