the part of some of the press and many citizens, both towards men and affairs. Those who advocate adequate naval preparation must be prepared to bear scathing attacks, in and out of Congress, upon their patriotism, honor and self respect.

Some politicians will take advantage of opportunities to exploit the navy for political ends, irrespective of the navy's interests and of the country's interests.

In peace, as in war, the moral support of the country towards its naval and military services is essential to a high standard of efficiency within those services. Neither officers nor men can give their best endeavors, however much they may strive, without a conviction that the country is behind them. Consequently under the adverse conditions outlined above as probable, we must expect our general efficiency to be impaired considerably.

Unless he shares in the popular illusion as to the efficacy of an International League to prevent war, it is manifestly the duty of every naval officer at this time, gravely to consider the methods by which the inevitable lowering of service efficiency may be minimized.

POST-WAR PREPAREDNESS

First let us consider those matters which are external to the navy. Since its inception the navy has taken an important part in the foreign affairs of the country. It is sometimes assumed that, with the advent of a degree of permanency, and consequent increased competency, of our diplomatic corps, together with improvements in communication by cable and radio, naval officers need not be so well versed as heretofore in matters which concern primarily the Department of State. This assumption is believed to be incorrect. Only within the last few months an American admiral was called upon to undertake a very delicate and complex diplomatic task in the Adriatic in connection with placing the Armistice into effect. He had practically no instructions and no definition of the policy of our government; because of the suddenness of the event and the difficulties of communication. Notwithstanding these handicaps and the handicap of having but very recently arrived on the scene, he anticipated his instructions correctly upon every occasion demanding immediate decision.

Diplomatic situations of importance confront officers of command rank in these days almost as frequently as in the old navy,

under circumstances which often prevent the timely receipt of instructions from the State Department.

Furthermore the assistance which the State Department itself has sought of naval officers during the difficult negotiations of the past four years indicates the necessity of naval officers keeping themselves prepared to serve the country well in the diplomatic sphere.

Post-war conditions will require more than ever that naval officers occupying high positions shall feel a responsibility to the country at large for leadership in naval affairs. Such a rôle is quite foreign to all the training of an officer during youth and middle age. As a junior officer and subordinate commander, even of high rank, naval tradition and training impel a feeling of loyalty and responsibility to the immediate superior only-a condition required by elementary military principles, except when the competency or rectitude of the superior is questionable. Consequently a naval officer almost invariably will extend to a civilian superior a high degree of loyalty and support, and will tend to consider himself responsible only to such civilian superior.

There can be no question as to the need, under these circumstances, for the officer giving his whole-hearted personal loyalty. If unable to do so he should resign from office. But the extent to which he should support the official actions of civilians, against his own convictions, is quite a different question. Presumption is against the competence of civilians to decide correctly many professional matters, or to furnish sound leadership in naval policy.

Congress and the country have a right to expect and do expect that naval affairs will be handled efficiently, and that the navy will be maintained in sufficient strength to defend the country against probable enemies and be kept in readiness to perform this mission whenever called upon. It necessarily follows that officers immediately subordinate to civilians have a dual responsibility-to the civilians and to the country. To carry out the latter will frequently require great tact and courage. If the officer is called upon to put into execution important instructions detrimental to the interests of the navy (and therefore the country) he should resign his position and the reasons therefor should be made public. Such procedure will frequently result in hardship for the officer, but this is one of the conditions inseparable from positions

of high responsibility when conscientiously filled. Uuless it be followed, especially during a long period of peace, when public watchfulness over naval affairs inevitably will be only casual, the navy's afficiency will suffer greatly, and the safety of the country be jeopardized.

Recently there have been suggestions that the navy should take over the manning and general administration of a part of the new American Merchant Marine, and should absorb the Coast Guard Service. Doubtless considerations of expediency will suggest in the near future that the navy should undertake other nonmilitary functions. To a degree it is the duty and privilege of the navy to serve the country in any manner which exigency demands. But non-military duty is. obviously a secondary mission of a service which exists primarily for the national defence and security, and it should be our concern to safeguard always the essentially military characteristics of the navy. If we become too engrossed in side issues our fitness to fight will suffer necessarily. If it be impossible to avoid undertaking secondary missions we should at least strive to make them temporary only, and endeavor that they shall not place our major mission in jeopardy.

In times of profound peace the danger of gettting into the grip of unpreparedness through slackened public interest in naval affairs, requires that a certain amount of publicity be given the navy constantly. The propriety of naval officers taking an active part, even in perfectly legitimate propaganda, is questionable, and may lead to doing the service more harm than good. The importance of the matter, however, together with the necessities of the case, will justify encouragement being given by officers to civilians who may desire to engage actively in this work.

We will pass now to a consideration of internal questions. We naval officers of this generation owe to our predecessors a great debt for establishing standards and traditions which will always keep the service close hauled in what might be termed peace efficiency-cleanliness, smartness, respectability, and general administrative excellence. This is the groundwork of discipline and a higher efficiency, and is a necessary prelude to effective operations in the sterner work of war. Similarly we inherit fine habits and traditions with respect to design, operation, and upkeep of matériel. All of this makes for highly efficient individual ships, and no navy in the world possesses better ones. It will be

necessary to uphold these standards in spite of serious handicaps that may come, and in view of the strong influence of habit upon human endeavor we may count with comparative confidence upon our ability so to do.

But obviously it is not enough to be proficient in peace work. It is not enough to have good individual units. We must keep ready to go to war on short notice, and to operate and fight the fleet as a whole efficiently. Leadership of the highest type is required to keep the navy in such a state of readiness during periods when the interest and whole-hearted support of the country is lacking.

One of the big lessons of the present war is that successful operations depend to a great extent upon good administrative support, which requires above all that the central authority, the Navy Department, be properly organized for war. Our situation in the department has been in the past analogous to that afloatefficient individual units (bureaus and offices) without the ability properly to coordinate the whole organization in conformity with the administrative necessities of war.

An even more pronounced lesson of the great war is that success under modern conditions requires highly specialized General Staff work, including in addition to administrative functions those relating to planning, indoctrination, and other higher branches of the profession. Here again there is required a properly organized Navy Department to furnish the impulse to this form of efficient endeavor during war.

No criticism of the operations of the department during the present war is intended, in view of the difficulties with which it was confronted when the war broke out. But experience during long periods of peace has demonstrated conclusively the tendency to revert to an organization which will best serve peace activities, and to ignore the necessities which will be brought about inevitably by a condition of war. This tendency must be guarded against in the future. It is caused partly by the need for economy, and to that extent may be condoned if less excusable influences do not enter in combination with it. Another cause is the occasional personal ambition of heads of subdivisions in the organization, which leads to the over development of one function of the department at the expense of the others. The most serious cause of this tendency to revert to a peace organization however,

is the loss of perspective and the clouded conception of many officers as to the true rôle of various branches within the department and of the department itself; which can be prevented only by War College education of officers in general, including staff officers.

The department requires a permanent legalized office, similar to the office of operations, superior to and superimposed upon all bureaus, offices, and other subdivisions within the organization. This office should have sufficient authority and comprise adequate personnel to direct and coordinate all activities of the navy in peace and war. It should include functions relating to education, information, planning, and execution, as well as personnel, matériel, and inspection.

In modern warfare no fleet can be considered ready for battle unless the commanders of its units, even including those as small as destroyers, are well versed in the theory of their art, and are so indoctrinated as to be capable of timely coordination of effort in spite of delays in the receipt of instructions. No episode in naval history illustrates so conclusively as Jutland the need for this type of training in higher command. We must be prepared in the future for situations in which it is impossible for the commanderin-chief to keep himself informed of the actual situation to the minute, but which nevertheless require the collective effort of the fleet to be applied without loss of time in a manner which will insure coordination and mutual support between fleet units. Otherwise our fleet will be incapable of taking reasonable advantage of favorable tactical situations momentarily presented.

There is fresh in our memory the experience of the few years previous to the present war, of the evolution in the navy which was gradually bringing about a degree of higher training calculated to fit us for handling the fleet in action in the above manner. With the exception of the German Navy probably no other navy was so well advanced as ourselves in this important respect.

While the fleet must always be the finishing school for this kind of training, the War College course is a factor in the final result of even greater importance. So long as we have a navy we must preserve the War College and insist upon its being maintained actively as an integral part of the navy, in spite of any opposition which the future may bring about. Certainly it is the most economical part of the navy, since through it alone we can