In order that you may understand the results of the action which was fought between Beatty and Hipper, I ask you to glance over the characteristics of the opposing forces:.

You will note that the Germans had a great superiority in armor and that the British had an equally great superiority in guns. The displacements give the fairest test, and they show that the British were superior in about the ratio of 6 to 5, but Beatty had in addition the four fine battleships of the fifth battle squadron. These were certainly the finest ships afloat. They displaced 27,500 tons, carried eight 15-inch guns, had side armor of 13 inches and could make 25 knots. If these ships could enter the action, Beatty would have a superiority well in excess of 2 to 1.

At 3.45 a torpedo from a submarine passed through the battle cruiser line.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

[COPYRIGHTED]

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.

THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS1

By ADMIRAL SIR REGINALD CUSTANCE, R. N., G. C. B.

When the secretary to the society did me the honor to suggest reading a paper on the Freedom of the Seas, I was reluctant to do so until it occurred to me that it might be useful to set forth its military aspect. The wishes of the society will perhaps be met by an argument, based as far as possible, on the military side of the question and by reference only to the legal side where necessary to lucidity.

It is generally accepted that under normal conditions in time of peace the high seas are, and have been for some years, entirely free to those who pass upon their lawful occasions. As is well known this freedom is impaired on the outbreak of war. understanding of the reason for this change cannot be reached without a correct knowledge of the principles underlying the conduct of war. These may be briefly summarized.

It will be admitted that the difference between peace and war is that in lieu of argument to persuade, each side uses physical force to compel the other to yield to his will. Furthermore, the acts of all great commanders and the arguments of writers of acknowledged authority have shown that the decisive act in war is the fight or battle, and the decisive factor the armed force which alone takes direct part in the decisive act. The reciprocal primary military aim is, therefore, to destroy the armed force by battle, or, as that cannot usually be done by one instantaneous blow, to neutralize its action by the threat of battle or by a series of small blows during the interval of waiting. Second only to that aim is the need to impair the efficiency of the armed force, and thus to prepare its destruction by sapping the resources upon which it depends. The action taken to effect this is the same in principle whether ashore

'Read before the Grotius Society 15 July, 1919. A British Point of View.

or afloat. After the armed force has been defeated or neutralized, the victor or stronger side, on land overruns completely or partially the territory of the vanquished or weaker side, deprives him of its resources, and utilizes them himself, as did the Germans in Belgium, Northern France and Roumania during the late war.

Similarly at sea, movement on the ocean is more or less free to the stronger side, but is completely or partially denied to the weaker. Unarmed ships as potential instruments of war are seized and used by the captor. Supplies from the outside world can be imported by the stronger side, but are completely or partially cut off from the weaker. These supplies from abroad are sometimes very important, since they are often required to complete the food, clothing, armament and equipment of the armed forces and the food and clothing of the unarmed population, which by production and supply sustains the fighting man and thus plays an important part in carrying on the war, as was seen during the late war.

Moreover, the profits derived from handling the trade, especially that seaborne, are sometimes very large and may provide much of the wealth required to finance a war, as actually occurred in the case of Great Britain during the great French war. It will be seen that any stoppage of these supplies to a belligerent tends to reduce directly his armed strength by land and sea, and to impair indirectly the spirit and morale of both his armed force and his unarmed population. As a large proportion of these supplies is usually seaborne, the stoppage of sea trade cannot be looked upon as otherwise than an essential operation of war, since it prepares, success in the decisive battle on land and sea, and thus tends to shorten the war. We have constantly to bear in mind that the interdependence between land and sea is close, although not always plainly seen; also that the reaction of the land operations on those at sea, i. e. of the land battle on the sea battle, and vice versa may be prolonged in time, but is always working during the war; also that as the land battle and the sea battle are dependent activities the double decision by land and sea or its equivalent is necessary. Furthermore, since the greater contains the less, stoppage of sea trade is also a legitimate means of coercion as a substitute for war in time of peace.

Now, sea trade is stopped by capture and by the threat of capture, which has for several generations been specifically recognized by the law of nations as a legitimate operation of war probably for

the reasons above set forth-either explicitly stated as in the case of contraband or implicitly accepted as in that of enemy goods. Furthermore, it is common knowledge that the losses due to actual capture are small compared with those due to the stoppage of trade and therefore the value of the prizes is of relatively small importance. Whatever may have been the case in the past this right of capture is claimed and exercised now as a means to weaken the enemy's armed force and to shorten the war. To resign or to weaken that right of capture is to throw extra stress on the fighting men on land and on sea, and ultimately on the nation. Under modern conditions, when whole nations take part directly or indirectly in the fighting, this extra stress may become very great.

As is well known, attempts to weaken the right of capture have been made at intervals from the 18th century onwards. The principal argument used has been that ships and cargoes are private property and that their capture is a hardship on private individuals. The argument has no real foundation, since for several generations both ships and cargoes have been insured with the result that the losses and the cost of insurance are borne by the whole body of consumers, who pay increased prices to cover them. Is there not some truth underlying the layman's remark that: "Seemingly the only safe place for belligerent private property is at sea."

Again, exception has been taken to the right to capture property on the ground that a different practice is followed on land. The most important difference is that the military commander is a law to himself, whereas, the proceedings of the naval commander are reviewed by a prize court. The former acts outside the law, the latter under the law. Attention is invited to the difference between the proceedings before the British prize court and those followed by Napoleon's marshals during the great French war and by the German generals during the war just ended. These are well known to you and need not be set forth in detail.

That maritime capture is humane when carried out under the rules recognized by international law is evident from the procedure established under them and by the practice of the past. The duty of the captor was then to bring in, for adjudication by a prize court, any merchant ship he detained. If the ship captured was an enemy, the rule was not always observed. The United

States made a practice of destroying enemy prizes in the war of 1812, but the British and French rule was always to bring them in, if possible. Whether the ship was brought in or not, the safety of the personnel was always secure, and the captor had to justify his proceedings before a prize court. He always acted under the law and was liable for costs and damages, if he took a ship without probable cause. The great change introduced by Germany in conducting the recent war consists in making war at sea inhumane in that the lives of both crew and passengers have been deliberately risked and sacrificed. She aimed at making war at sea as ruthless, brutal and lawless as it too often has been on land. The wisdom of calling upon the captor to justify his proceedings before a prize court cannot be doubted. The decision of the Paris conference seems to extend the principle and to apply it to those who break the law of nations, not only to those who sink ships without warning and thus risk the lives of passengers and crews, but to those who issue the orders to do so.

Again, sea trade is carried on ships, of which some belong to belligerents and others to neutrals, as also their cargoes. Hence neutral interests are affected, and many disputes arise about the rules relating to blockades, contraband, continuous voyage, etc., by which the trade of neutrals with belligerents is regulated and the inconvenience and loss to neutrals in some respects mitigated. In these disputes the immediate interest of the belligerent is complete stoppage of trade, while that of the neutral may seem to be its continuance uninterrupted although the reverse is often the case, as in the late great German war, when the general security and the reign of law were menaced.

Usually each side is held back from making extreme demands by action either already taken in the past or possibly required in the future when the parts are reversed. Moreover, the political object of the war, the many sided friction in the political and international machines, the relative strengths not only of the belligerents but of the neutrals, and the progress of the war all tend to influence the relations between belligerents and neutrals and the action respectively taken by them. In fact, the stoppage of neutral trade with a belligerent has always been dependent upon action taken by the belligerents and either accepted or tolerated by neutrals, or so much opposed by them that they have ultimately joined in the war. On the other hand, trade between