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neutrals entirely clear of any belligerent taint has usually been free in time of war, except that neutral ships have been liable "to visit and search."

The existing practice having been thus sketched we turn to the second point in President Wilson's peace program, which reads:

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

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The allied governments took exception to this clause as being open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept." As some justification for this caution it may be remarked that absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, in war seems to mean peace at sea and war on land, as otherwise there will be no war at all. War at sea will only begin when international action is taken. Thus, war at sea is to be limited by international action, but war on land is to remain unlimited. This result tends to undermine the principle that action by land and sea is interdependent. Again, it is to be specially noted that President Wilson accepts the long-established practice that the seas may be closed in whole or in part, but by international, instead of national, action and only to enforce international covenants. Everything will depend upon whether international action, in a righteous cause, can be made as rapid and efficient as that of a belligerent nation or group of nations fettered by friction with neutrals-an important point, seeing that upon it may depend the security of Great Britain and other countries.

[COPYRIGHTED]

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.

MINING OPERATIONS IN THE WAR

By LIEUT. COMMANDER NORMAN VAN DER VEER, U. S. Navy

From the very beginning of the war, Germany adopted a policy, and vigorously pursued a campaign of minelaying in the vicinity of the English coast; apparently she lost no opportunity of laying floating mines, where the water is too deep for anchorage, and fields of anchored mines in shoal water. To this policy, together with her universal reliance on the submarine, may be credited many of her successes, while England had recourse principally to gunfire. In the event of a decisive engagement in the North Sea these methods might easily have had a more far-reaching effect than is, at first glance, apparent. Certain it is that they caused the British fleet to concentrate at various bases on the coast of England and Scotland, where it, in turn, was thoroughly protected by mine-fields. And this widespread use of the mine has had another effect, in that it has served to create and develop that miniature navy, the trawler arm of the Grand Fleet. All along the coast of Great Britain these small craft gathered in surprisingly large numbers; in one port alone, over a thousand trawlers have been fitted out, and, it is said over 12,000 men were required in this branch of the service.

In the war mines were used for two distinct purposes: (1) To close military ports; (2) As a distinct operation against a hostile fleet or ship. The object of these uses requires no explanation. But, in addition to these recognized uses, mines have also been used in connection with no definite military scheme. The Germans seem to have scattered them on the chance of destroying individual men-of-war or merchant vessels of the enemy. An article of the Hague conference forbids the laying of automatic contact mines off the coast of the enemy with the sole purpose of intercepting commercial shipping. Germany signed this article "with reservation;" and this paper is not concerned with the situation from

the standpoint of international law, except, in passing, to invite attention to the fact that, as a result of serious damage to neutral shipping, we, in our note of February 22, 1915, suggested that "isolated drifting mines should be laid by neither party, that anchored mines should be laid exclusively for defensive purposes within range of harbors, to become harmless after breaking loose from their anchorages."

Considering first the laying of the mines for the purpose of closing military ports, and the effect thereof on naval strategy and tactics, reliable sources indicate that, during the latter part of the war, the following was the situation in regard to the ports of the North Sea.

Early in the war British submarines succeeded in entering the harbor of Kiel, only, as might have been anticipated, to find the German fleet protected by many minefields. Cuxhaven was heavily mined, as well as the mouths of the Weser, Jahde and Elbe, the mouths of the Scheldt and the approaches to Antwerp, the waters around Borkum, and, of course, Helgoland. There was no opportunity for these minefields to cause any actual damage to the British fleet. On the contrary, they proved to be a source of danger to the Germans themselves. For we read of a German patrol boat striking three mines near Borkum; and, pursuant to striking a chain of mines that blocked the entrance to Jahde Bay, the cruiser Yorck was totally destroyed, a tragedy that resulted in the sentencing of her commander to two years' detention in a fortress as a penalty for his negligence.

But even though these minefields in the vicinity of German ports caused no direct damage to the British, their strategical and tactical value has been vast. After the injuries to the Lion resulted in the temporary withdrawal of Sir David Beatty from the Dogger Bank engagement, the British fleet gave up the chase and countermarched at a distance of about fifty miles from Helgoland. The first English report of the battle states that the reason for abandoning the pursuit was due to the danger of running into minefields. In confirmation of this, there is the German report that Von Hipper, shortly after sighting the British squadron, some 120 miles from Helgoland, changed course to the southeast in order to draw the enemy toward the minefields. The mooted question as to whether the British would have turned back had Sir David Beatty been able to hold his place in formation does not now con

cern us. The fact remains that the abandonment of the pursuit presumably because of the danger from mines may, as one writer has aptly pointed out, have robbed the British of a complete victory "in the Nelsonian sense.”

Early in the war, the British Admiralty, as a result of the great activity of the Germans in minelaying, developed, on a considerable scale, an aggressive policy in this form of war on the sea. To reduce the risk to non-combatants, the Admiralty announced the parallels and meridians bounding a rectangle in the North Sea which was to be considered as a danger area, supplementing the notification with the caution: "Although these limits are assigned to the danger area, it must not be supposed that navigation is safe in any part of the southern waters of the North Sea. Instructions have been issued to His Majesty's ships to warn east-going vessels of the presence of minefields." In May, 1916, it was deemed advisable to extend the eastern and southern limits of the danger area and to publish the new limiting parallel and meridian.

In October 1914 the battleship Audacious sank after striking a mine off the North Irish coast, presumably while seeking suitable waters in which to hold her great gun practice. Shortly after this disaster neutral vessels were warned of the presence of mines off the north coast of Ireland, and there was set out in the North Channel a danger area the limits of which were made public. The purpose of this move was to close the greater portion of the North Channel, leading from the Atlantic into the Irish Sea. The parallelogram limiting this danger area occupied the north part of the channel, leaving a narrow passage between it and the Irish coast. This passage was to be used only in daytime, and no ship was to be within four miles of Rathlin Island between sunset and sunrise. This rendered it a simple proposition to examine vessels entering the Irish Sea from the westward, and made it extremely difficult for enemy minelayers to operate. It is also probable that this step had the effect of diverting the greater part of Atlantic traffic around the south of Ireland, where, owing to more sea room, there are greater facilities for maneuvering to avoid the attack of submarines.

In the Baltic, Germany originally conceived the project of forcing an entrance to Riga and landing an expeditionary force to co-operate with the left wing of her army. This she was unable to accomplish because of the well guarded minefields at the

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