dom and goodness, must perfectly know, what was the wifeft and best plan of creation and providence, of operations and events, which includes every thing defirable and good, and excludes whatever is not fo; and he must fix upon this plan, without any poffible error, and determine to prosecute it; for if any thing be left undetermined and uncertain, even the moft minute existence, event, or circumstance and appendage of any existence or event, it must be owing to a defect in wifdom and goodnefs, or in power to execute. No truth ever was, or can be more demonftrably certain than this; and none can be more agreeable to wisdom and goodnefs, or more important. If a man be to contrive and make any machine or building, the end which it is to anfwer must be in view, and fixed; and the plan of his operation must be laid, including every thing that is to come into the compofition, so as in the beft manner to anfwer the end defigned. And the more skill and wif dom the workman has, the more clear and perfect will be his idea and view of the whole plan, and of every part, even the moft minute, which is included in it; and the more fixed and determined he will be to prosecute this plan, without the leaft variation from it. And if he have fkill and wisdom fufficient to lay a perfect plan of operation, without the leaft mistake or error, he will be esteemed and prized above all others of less skill; and the more certain and fixed his plan of operation is, and the farther he is from a difpofition to make any alteration, or a poffibility of being impeded in his work, or unable to execute his design, according to his present purpose, the more agreeable it will be to all who are interested in his work which he is to execute; and to all who have the leaft spark of wisdom and goodnefs; and that in proportion to the excellence and importance of the defign.

PARTI. What a fource of unspeakable fatisfaction and joy muft it then be to all the children of wisdom, that the Moft High, omnipotent, infinitely wife, juft and good, has laid a plan to express and exhibit his own character; which therefore must be wife and good, like himself; and which comprehends and fixes every thing, and all events, from the greatest to the leaft, from the firft to the laft; and which is abfolutely perfect, infinitely wife, and comprehends all poffible good; so that not the leaft thing, event, or the smalleft appendage and circumftance, can be altered, left out, or added, without rendering it lefs defirable, excellent and perfect! And is it poffible that any one who is not unfriendly to infinite wifdom and goodness, and to the moft abfolute perfection and excellence, should have the leaft objection to this? Yea, will he not highly approve of it, and make it the ground of his chief comfort and joy? And is not this infinitely preferable to a world and feries of events, if this were poffible, fixed by blind fate, or exifting and taking place by mere, undefigning chance? Moft certainly this de monftrable truth, that God has, by the infinitely wife coun fel of his own will, from eternity foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, is infinitely more defirable than any other fuppofition whatever, were it poffible; and is a foundation on which a pious mind, a true friend to God, may teft with the greateft fecurity and fatisfaction. And if he should give this up, what fupport and comfort could he have? Where could he fly for refuge from evil? He muft fall into the most awful darkness, and horror!

OBJECTION. It is granted that this doctrine of the Divine decrees, as it has now been flated, might readily be admitted as certain and defirable, were it poffible, and was it confiftent with known fact, which it moft certain. ly is not: Therefore, however great and clear the evidence of this doârine may feem to be; and though it

appear

appear moft defirable that all events fhould be determin ed by infinite wisdom and goodness; yet it cannot be true, because it is impoffible and inconfiftent with what has actually taken place. It is impoffible, because inconfiftent with moral government, and with the freedom and moral agency of creatures; and fo excludes all poffibility of virtue or vice, praise or blame, reward or punifhment. And if this doctrine were confiftent with all this ; yet it is inconfiftent with the EVIL which has taken place, both moral and natural evil, which could have no place in a plan formed and fixed by infinite wifdom and goodness, and comprehending the greatest poffible good. Befides, to fuppofe all this evil was foreordained by God, and takes place in confequence of his purpose and decree, represents the Most High as the origin, caufe or author of it all, even all the moral evil in the univerfe: And what can be more fhocking and horrible than this!

In this objection are three diftin&t things, which require a feparate and particular confideration.

FIRST, It is to be inquired, Whether the doctrine of God's decrees, whereby he hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pafs, is inconfiftent with the liberty and moral agency of creatures, by fixing all events and all actions, fo as to render them infallibly certain. And here it may be proper to obfervé feveral things, in order to prepare the way to a more clear determination of this question.

I. If the doctrine of God's decrees be inconfiftent with the freedom and moral agency of man ; of man; then the foreknowledge of God is equally fo: Therefore the objection under confideration is as much against the latter, as it is against the former. For if it be foreknown what events and what actions will take place, then they must be fixed and certain; fince it is a contradiction to fay, an event is certainly foreknown,

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and

and yet it is uncertain whether it will come to pass; just as great and palpable a contradiction as to fay, an event is certain and fixed, and yet precarious and uncertain whether it will take place, or not. Nothing can be the object of the Divine foreknowledge, which is not fixed as certainly future. If it be not fixed by the decree of God, it must be fixed by blind fate, or by something else, if this were poffible; and this furely is as inconfiftent with the freedom of man, as if fixed by the counsel and decree of God: Yea, infinitely more fo. This is observed, to show that he who makes the objection under confideration, and yet believes the foreknowledge of God, is inconfiftent with himself; and muft, would he be confiftent, withdraw his objection, or give up the doctrine of God's foreknowledge.

II. IT being confeffedly fo very important and defir. able that whatsoever comes to pass, should be determined and fixed by infinite wisdom and goodness, if this can be done confiftent with moral government; and fince God is infinitely great, powerful and wife, there is reafon to conclude this is not impoffible; but that both are perfectly confiftent: Is it not prefumption and arrogance for fallen man, ignorant and deceived in a thousand things, peremptorily, and with affurance to determine that it is impoffible with God to make creatures, who fhall be absolutely dependent upon him, in all refpects, and fo as to act perfectly conformable to his moft wife plan, and fulfil his counfel, and yet exercise all the freedom neceffary to moral agency? If this were certainly known to imply a contradiction, it might fafely be pronounced impoffible: But fince many things have appeared to fhort fighted, partial man, inconfiftent and impoffible, and have been confidently pronounced to be fuch, which afterwards have been found to be otherwife, it may be fo in this cafe. And if both these be really and perfectly con

fiftent, how happy! Let this point then be examined without prejudice, and with the utmost care and attention, reviewing it again and again. And if the confiftence may be difcovered, what matter of confolation and joy will it afford !

III. It does not appear from our feelings and experi-, ence, that a previous certainty refpecting our actions in the least takes away or diminishes our freedom and moral agency. We feel ourselves free and accountable in our voluntary actions; and the fuppofition of a previous. certainty that we should act just as we do, does not alter our feeling ourselves free, and knowing we act so, so far as our experience is to be regarded. Is not this a just ground of fufpicion at least, that all objections and reasonings. against this, by which it is concluded to be impoffible, are fallacious and without foundation: Especially when it is confidered, that a mistake refpecting the Divine decrees and fuperintendency, determining and fixing all events, which are fo infinitely high, and above our reach 3 or about the nature of human liberty, &c. will lead to, groundless and very erroneous conclufions on this point,

IV. SINCE it is fo confonant to reason, and even demonftrably certain, that a Being of infinite understanding, power and wisdom, who is abfolutely independent, and on whom all creatures and events wholly depend, muft determine and foreordain whatsoever comes to pass; and at the fame time it is equally certain that men are free and moral agents: And fince Divine Revelation moft exprefsly and abundantly afferts both these; he who admits and believes them both to be true, however unable he may be to reconcile them, and show or conceive how they are confiftent, acts a more reasonable and