he was able to prevent it, if he had pleafed to do it. How then is it poffible that evil fhould take place, under the government of this God; while he fits at the head of the universe; has all things in his hand, abfolutely dependent upon him, and rules infinitely above all control? This queftion cannot be answered, on any plan, to the fatisfaction of a rational, inquifitive mind, or the difficulty in any measure folved, unless it be fuppofed and granted, That all the evil which does take place, is neceffary for the greateft poffible general good; and therefore, on the whole, all things confidered, wifeft and best that it should exift juft as it does.

All who believe the divine foreknowledge, or admit that an infinitely perfect Being made and governs the world, muft adopt this folution, and grant that, on the whole, it is best that evil, moral and natural, should take place; or be left wholly without any: And indeed, they do either exprefsly or implicitly grant it, however they may differ as to the mode of explaining the matter, and the reasons why it is better that evil fhould exist, than otherwife. They who oppose the doctrine of the divine decrees, and yet allow that God could have prevented evil taking place, had he pleafed to do it, cannot account for his not preventing it, unlefs they allow that he faw it was on the whole beft, that it fhould not be prevented; and therefore it was, on the whole, beft it fhould exift.

And they who fuppofe that fin could not be prevented, if God made free moral agents, and continued them in the exercife of their freedom; and account for the introduction of evil in this way; yet muft grant that, all things confidered, it was better that there fhould be fin, rather than that there fhould be no moral agents; and that the system or plan which includes evil, is the beft that was poffible. For if God forefaw, that if he

made

made moral agents, vaft numbers of them would, in the exercise of their freedom, fall into fin and ruin, he would not have made them, and continued them in the exercise of their liberty, if it were not beft, on the whole, that evil fhould take place; and if this was not preferable to any other poffible plan; and he did not, all things confidered, choofe that evil fhould exift, juft as it does. For to say that God made free moral agents, when he knew that they would fin, if he made them; and yet knew that it was not beft, all things confidered, that moral evil fhould exift; is to say, that he is neither wife, nor good, as well as not omnipotent. This is fo plain that it is needless to say any more to make it intelligible and evident to the lowest capacity.

And the fame thing, in effect, must be granted even by them who deny the divine foreknowledge of the actions of creatures made free. For if God knew that fin might poffibly take place, if he made moral agents; and at the fame time knew that it was not, all things confidered, beft that it fhould take place; but infinitely to the contrary, it could not be beft to make any fuch creatures, and run this dreadful venture; and open a door for the poffible introduction of this infinite evil, which never could be remedied: and therefore it was not confiftent with wisdom and goodness to make them free, and continue them fo, on this fuppofition. They must therefore grant that it was, in God's view, on the whole, better that evil fhould take place, and to have the world fall into fin and ruin, than not to create moral agents, and have no moral kingdom; and that he preferred fuch a world, and to have finful miferable creatures, rather than not to create; or they must allow that their God was deceived, and is dreadfully difappointed, and now heartily wishes he had not created; or is neither wife nor good : Which is to have no God, or fomething infinitely worse! It mul therefore be obferved,

II. Ir

II. It is abundantly evident, and demonftrably certain, from reafon, affifted by divine revelation, that all the fin and fufferings which have taken place, or ever will, are neceffary for the greatest good of the universe, and to answer the wifeft and beft ends; and therefore must be included in the beft, moft wife and perfect plan.

1. This appears evident and certain from the being and perfections of God. God is omnipotent; his understanding is infinite, and he is equally wife and good. He is infinitely above all dependence and control; and hath done, and can and will do, whatsoever pleafeth him. It hence is certain that he will do no thing, nor fuffer any thing to be done, or take place, which is not, on the whole, good, wifeft and beft, that it should take place; and is not moft agreeable to infinite wifdom and goodnefs. It is impoffible it fhould be otherwife. Therefore, when we find that fin and misery have taken place in God's world, and under his government; we may be as certain that it is, on the whole, beft it should be fo; and that all this evil is neceffary in order to anfwer the beft ends, the greatest good of the universe, as we can be, that there is a God, omnipotent, and poffeffed of infinite wildom, rectitude and goodness; and he who denies or doubts of the former, equally queftions and opposes the latter. If it be once admitted that any evil, or the leaft event may, or can take place, which is not, on the whole, beft, and therefore not defirable that it fhould be, it muft, with equal reafon be granted, that nothing but evil, and what is, on the whole, undesirable, may take place; and that the universe may become wholly evil, or infinitely worfe than nothing: And all would be left without any ground or reafon to trust in God, or any thing elfe, for the leaft good for himself, or any other be ing. The divine perfections and character, are the only fecurity against this, and are the ground of an equal

certainty

certainty that nothing has taken place, or ever will which is not on the whole beft, or neceffary for th greatest good of the whole. And this is a fure and am ple foundation for the trust, confidence, comfort and jo of him who is a true friend to God, and defires the great eft good of the whole; and confequently is irreconcileably opposed to every event which is not, on the whole, wifef and beft. If this foundation were taken away and de ftroyed, what could the righteous, the truly pious and benevolent do? They must be left without any poffibl fupport, and fink into darkness and wo!

There can nothing take place under the care and go vernment of an infinitely powerful, wife and good Being that is not on the whole wifeft and beft; that is, for the general good; therefore, though there be things whic are in themselves evil, even in their own nature and ten dency; fuch are fin and mifery; yet confidered in thei connection with the whole, and as they are neceffary i the best system, to accomplish the greatest good, the mol important and best ends, they are, in this view, defirable good, and not evil. And in this view, "There is no ab folute evil in the univerfe." There are evils, in them felves confidered; but confidered as connected with th whole, they are not evil, but good. As fhades are nece fary in a picture, to render it most complete and beauti ful, they are, in this view and connection, defirable and the picture would be imperfect and marred, wer they not included in it; yet confidered feparately, and unconnected with the whole, they have no beauty, but de formity, and are very difagreeable: So moral evil is, i itfelf confidered, in its own nature and tendency, mo odious, hurtful and undefirable; but in the hands o omnipotence, infinite wifdom and goodness, it may introduced into the most perfect plan and fyftem, and f difpofed, and counteracted in its nature and tendency, a

to

b

to be a neceffary part of it, in order to render it most complete and defirable.*

It has been faid by fome, that it is not becoming us, but prefumption and arrogance, to say, that the fyftem in which moral evil takes place is, on the whole, preferable to one in which it is wholly excluded; and is, all things confidered, the beft fyftem, containing the greatest good. It is faid, we are infinitely unable to determine this, unlefs we could comprehend the whole of each opposite system, and compare them together, and without error, determine the advantage of either, and fee the good of each in their final iffue, and exactly balance the account.

The weakness, error, and impiety of such an objection, will be fufficiently discovered and exposed, by obferving, that though man is infinitely unequal to this, to take a comprehenfive view of all poffible systems, and determine which would be the beft, and comprehend the greateâ poffible good; and is far from feeing all the ends that moral evil will answer; and though he could not fee how it could be the occafion of any good, and why a plan, in which all evil is forever excluded, is not infinitely preferable to that in which evil exifts and continues forever: Yet we know that One, infinitely able to judge and determine in this matter, has actually chofen and

fixed

upon a system in which moral evil takes place, and preferred it to all other poffible fyftems; from which known fact, we may be as certain, that it is on the whole, the beft poffible fyftem, containing the most real good,

as

"Sin, in its own nature, hath no tendency to good, it is not an apt meCam, hath no proper efficacy to promote the glory of God: So far is it from a direct contributing to it, that, on the contrary, it is most real dishonur to him. But as a black ground in a picture,which in itfelf only defiles, when placed by art, lets off the brighter colours, and brightens their beauty; fo the evil of fin, which confidered absolutely, obfcures the glory of God; yet, by the overruling difpofition of his Providence, it ferves to illuftrate his name, and make it more glorious in the esteem of creatures. Without the fin of man, there had been no place for the most perfect exercise of his goodness."

BATES, on the Harmony of the Divine Attributes, Edit. iii. p. 8.