THIRDLY, It is now to be confidered, whether God's foreordaining whatfoever comes to pafs, does imply that he is the origin, cause and author of fin, in a sense which is contrary to infinite holiness, and therefore very difhonorable to him. This is confidently afferted by many; and they have on this ground exclaimed againft this doctrine, and all that are implied in it; and reprefented it in a moft fhocking and horrible light. Therefore, though what has been faid of the nature of fin, as confifting wholly in the difpofition and will of the finner; and of the good of which it is the occafion, which renders it defirable that it fhould take place, may ferve to throw fome light on this point, and fhow that God's choosing and determining that fin fhould take place, as necessary to accomplish the greatest good, is a wife and holy choice: Yet it may be proper and important more particularly to confider this fubject, and attend to it in the light in which it is fet by the objection which has been introduc ed, and is now under confideration.

We ought to attend to this point, and think and speak of it with care and caution, and in the exercise of fear and reverence of the infinitely great and holy God, left, under the notion of thinking and fpeaking for him, and to his honour, our thoughts and words fhould be really. against him, and tend to his reproach. And this caution. and reverential fear ought to poffefs the minds of those who make the objection under confideration, as well as

of

from this friendship be induced to act like an enemy, and do that which tends to hurt and dishonour him. Therefore man never did do evil with 4 defire and design to promote the god of which God makes it the occafion, it being a contradiction, and therefore abfolutely impoffible. And as re bellion against God is as evil in its own nature and tendency, when God makes it the occafion of good, and the difpofition, views and motives of the finner are as vile and criminal, as if no good, but infinite evil were the coniequence, the finner is as blameworthy, and deferves punishment as much, as if no good, but all the evil which his fin tends to produce, took place. It is not thought. neceffary or proper to give a more particular answer to thefe objections here. This has been done in three fermons, on the fubje of the good of which fin is the occation, published in the year 1759, and reprinted in Bofton, and at Edinburgh in Scotland, in 1773

of thofe who believe and affert the doctrine against which the objection is made. For if indeed God has foreordained whatsoever comes to pafs; then all objections against it, however plausible they may appear, are really replying against God, and very difhonourable and dif pleafing to him. But if, on the other hand, the objection be reasonable and well founded; they who believe the doctrine of God's decrees, do really dishonour and displease him. We are happy that we have a revelation from God, in which this point, as well as every important one, is fet in a clear and eafy light; fo that no man can, with this in his hand, run into an error concerning it, and be blameless. In the light of reason, and this revelation, let the following things be well confidered.

I. It is of importance to observe here, and fix it as certain, that when the origin or caufe of evil is inquired after, or is afcribed to God, or any other being; the moral evil itself is not meant by the origin or cause of it. The origin or caufe of any thing, is neceffarily before the thing which is the effect, and muft exift and take place antecedent to the evil; and before the evil can exist. It is therefore certain that there can be no moral evil in the origin or cause of this evil, in whatever, and whereever it may be found: For to suppose the contrary, is a direct and plain contradiction. Moral evil cannot be the origin or cause of moral evil, any more than any effect can be the cause of itself, or a child be the cause of his father. We, in confidering what is the origin of moral evil, are going back to fomething which is antecedent to the evil, and where, or in which, no fuch evil does, or can be fuppofed to exift, to find the caufe of moral evil, or a reason why it does take place, rather than not. We muft go back therefore, till we get to that in which there is no moral evil, before we arrive to, or can find that which is the origin or caufe of it. If we find an exift

ence,

ence, object or exertion, in which there is moral evil, we may be fure, we have not yet found, or arrived to the origin and cause of it; and muft yet go a step farther back, even to that in which there is no moral evil, in order to find the origin of this evil.

It hence follows that if man, or any creature is, in any inftance, the origin or cause of fin, (meaning by cause, that which is antecedent to the exiftence of fin, and of which fin is properly the effect) that man or creature cannot be the finful caufe of that fin: And there is no moral evil in any conceptions, thoughts or exertions of fuch a creature, which are neceffary to take place, antecedent to the existence of fin, and in order to it, whatever they may be, or if any be neceffary.

It is also certain that if God, the firft caufe of all things, be the origin or caufe of moral evil; and this can be proved, and may be afferted, as a moft evident truth; this is fo far from imputing moral evil to him, or supposing that there is any thing of that nature in him, that it neceffarily fuppofes the contrary; and that in be ing the cause of moral evil, there is no fin; and therefore that he may be the origin or cause of it, confiftent with infinite holiness, and exercise it in whatever exertions or influence may be neceffary or implied in being thus the cause of fin.

If any should fay or imagine, that the thought, exer tion, or influence, which tends to produce fin, and is in fact the cause or origin of it, must be itself finful or wrong this is only to contradict himself, and fay that fuch exercise or exertion is not the origin of fin, but fin itself confequently, as has been obferved, we must go farther back to find the origin of this fin, till we find fomething in which there is no fin. And, according to this notion, we must go back without end, and never find the origin of fin, unless fin itself be the origin and caufe of all fin: which is a contradiction. It therefore ftill appears demonftrably

monstrably certain, that if there be any origin or caufe of moral evil, which is fuppofed by all thofe who inquire after it, there is no moral evil, nothing morally wrong in this cause, wherever it may be found, and whatever it may be. Therefore God, in foreordaining whatsoever comes to pals, may be, in this fenfe, the origin and cause of fin, confiftent with infinite holiness; and the contrary cannot be supposed without a contradiction,

If it fhould be said, "There is no origin or caufe of moral evil except what is in the evil itfelf: It is the cause of itself, so far as it has any cause: Therefore the question concerning the origin of fin, meaning fomething antecedent to it, is groundless and vain, there being no fuch thing in nature. Moral evil has no cause, in this fenfe of caufe." Upon this it may be observed,

1. If this be admitted; then the objection under Goalderation, against the divine decrees, foreordaining all actions and events, as making God the origin, cause or author of fin, falls to the ground, and is given up : For, according to this, fin has no cause out of itself, or previous to its existence. But this cannot be admitted, for,

2. If moral evil may exift without a caufe, there being no thing antecedent to its actual existence, which had lny more influence or tendency to the existence of fin, than to the contrary; and there was no ground or reafon of its existence, or why it should be, rather than not be, Antecedent to its actually taking place; then there is an nd of arguing from any effect whatever, to a caufe; and be have not the leaft evidence that we ourselves, or any thing around us, or the world, have any origin or caufe. For if moral evil may exift without a caufe, fo

may ere. thing elfe which comes under our notice; and we have not the leaft evidence that there is a God, as the taufe of the things which we behold. Which is not only directly contrary to the affertion of St. Paul; but to the reafon and common fenfe of mankind in general. And

And why should any one choose to embrace fuch an ab furdity, and affert that fin has no origin or cause, ante cedent to its actual existence, and is the cause of itfel rather than to admit that God is the origin of it; find by admitting this, it is not supposed there is any mor evil in him; but the contrary is neceffarily implied, has been obferved above?

It will, perhaps, be farther faid, "It is not meant tha fin has no cause whatsoever in any fenfe; but that it h no pofitive caufe: It has a negative cause; and Go may be the caufe, in this sense, that is, he permitted mo al evil to take place, by determining not to prevent t existence of it, when he had power to prevent it, had been pleased to do it."Upon this the following r marks may be made.

1. If God could prevent every fin that is committe and yet has determined to permit all that takes plac which renders the event certain; then his determini to permit it, is really decreeing that it fhall take place or foreordaining that it fhall come to pafs: So that t objection that God's foreordaining fin, makes him t cause and author of it, is not the leaft obviated by t fuppofition or scheme. And it may be worth while. confider whether any other fuppofed difficulty is remo ed by this. This leads to observe,

2. This does not in the leaft obviate what has be juft obferved upon the affertion that fin has no caul For a negative caufe, is really no caufe. Ther fore to fay concerning any exiftence, It has no car but a negative one, is really denying that it has ar caufe. This therefore makes fin to exift without a cau or reafon of its exiflence, rather than of its non exil ence. If the world has only a negative cause of its e iftence; then there is no caufe of its existence, and reafon can be given why it does exist.

Moreover, this notion of a negative caule of mor evil fuppofes fome pofitive caufe, by which fin wou