in his fight; and thofe who are more especially under his care, and to whom he is under advantage, and has more opportunity to do good. And he will feel himself united, in a peculiar degree, and with a more fervent love, to those who appear to him to be benovolent and engaged in defiring and promoting the greatest general good, in the exercife of true love to God, and man. As fuch who are friends to God and his kingdom, to Jefus Chrift, and the greatest public good, appear to the benevolent to have more real existence than others, and to be of much more importance in the fcale of being, and are objects of the peculiar benevolence of the Deity; they are in this view peculiarly dear to them, and excellent in their eyes; and they embrace them with a diftinguifhing, ftrong and fweet, benevolent and complacential love.

Having given a more general view of converfion, which is the effect of the regenerating influences of the Holy Spirit, and which confift in the volitions and actions of the regenerate, it is of importance that what has been mentioned, fhould be more particularly explained; which will be attempted in the following fections.

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SECTION IV.

On Difinterested Affection.

T has been already shown that moral depravity, or fin, confifts in felf love; and that holiness confifts in difinterested benevolence. which is in the nature of it, and in all its excercifes, wholly contrary and opposed to felf love. [See Part I. Chap. VIII. page 330, &c. to which the reader is referred.] But as this is a fubje& fo very important, and neceffary to be well underflood,

in order properly to dististinguish true religion, and real converfion, from that which is not fo, but falfe religion, and mere delufion, it is thought proper to bring it again into view here, in order farther to explain and confirm this truth, which is overlooked by too many, and oppof ed by others.

Not a few have believed and afferted, that there is no fuch thing in nature as difinterested affections; and that all factions of men flow from felf love, as their foundation and fource. Others allow that difintere ed affection may take place in the human heart; but that it either fprings from felf love, and is grafted upon it; or fo coincides with it, and regulates it, that both these forts of affection, if they do really differ in their nature, are included in the exercifes of true holinefs; and that self love is the real foundation of all true religion.

These sentiments and pleas in favour of self love, it is believed, are owing, in many inftances, to wrong or confufed ideas, and not properly diftinguishing between felf love, and that which is of a different nature and kind.

Firft. Many do not appear to diftinguish between self love, and a defire or love of happiness; or a capacity of pleasure and enjoyment, and of being pleafed with and choofing one object, rather than another. Thefe are quite diftinct and different things: The latter is really nothing but a capacity or power of will and choice, for without this there could be no fuch thing as prefering one object to another, or exercife of choice. This therefore is effential to the existence of a moral agent, or to any act of will whatever, and is neither felf love, nor difinterefted affection, but neceffary to both. Self love confifls in a moral agent's placing his happiness in what he views as his own private perfonal intereft, and in nothing else, in diftinction from the intereft or happiness of any other being, and in contradiction to it. This only pleases

him, for its own fake, and is the ultimated object of all his defires and exertions.

Difinterested benevolence is pleased with the publick intereft, the greatest good and happiness of the whole. This is the higheft good to the benevolent perfon. In this he places his happiness, and not in the interest and happiness of any individual, or of himself, any farther than it is confiftent with the greateft intereft and hap piness of the whole and really included in it, and ferves to promote it. In this ftate of the cafe, is it not easy to fee the diftinction between a capacity of pleasure and choice, or being pleased, and enjoying happiness; and placing our happiness in our own perfonal good and intereft only; or in the public good, for its own fake? And who does not fee the difference and oppofition between the two latter ?

Secondly. By many there is not a proper diftinction made, and kept in view, between felf love, and that regard which the benevolent perfon must have for himself and his intereft and happiness, which is neceffarily included in difinterested affection. Difinterefted, impartial benevolence, to being in general that is capable of good and happiness, regards and wishes well to every being and creature in the fyftem, according to the degree of his existence, worth and capacity of happiness, so far as all this comes into the view of the benevolent person, and so far as the good and happiness of each is, or appears to be, confiftent with the greatest good of the whole. And as he himself is one individual part of the whole, The muft of neceffity be the object of this difinterested impartial benevolence, and his own intereft and happiness must be regarded and defired, as much as that of his eighbour, or any individual of the whole fociety; not ecause it is himself, but because he is included in the -hole, and his happiness is worth as much, and as defirble as that of his neighbour, other circumflances being .equal.

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equal. This is not felf love; but the fame univerfal, difinterested, impartial, public benevolence, which wishes well to being in general, and therefore to himself, because he has an existence, and is one among the reft, and equal to his neighbour. This is loving his neighbour as himfelf; not with the leaft degree of felf love; but with the fame difinterested, public affection, with which he loves being in general. The leaft fpark of felf love, will interrupt this reasonable and beautiful moral order and harmony, and render him partial and interested in his affection, and fo far detach him from the whole and make him fet up a selfish, private intereft of his own, in diftinction from that of the reft, and in oppofition to it.

By not making this distinction, and not attending to the nature of difinterested benevolence, as it regards the intereft of the benevolent perfon himself; and therefore taking it for granted, that all the regard a perfon has for himself and defire of his own happiness is felf love, in diftinction from difinterefled benevolence, they have concluded with great affurance, that felf love is effential to man, and even his duty. But when the diftinction is properly made, and the matter plainly ftated, the miltake is discovered, and it appears that difintere fled be. nevolence, will take all proper and fufficient care of every individual in the fyftem, and will defire and feek the best interest and happiness of all, and of the benevolent perfon himself, fo far as is confiftent with the greateft good of the whole: And that this is not felf love, but the fame difinterefted, impartial benevolence, when it takes into view his own happiness, and values and feeks. it as much as that of his neighbour. The felf love which can be diftinguifhed from this univerfal, difinterested benevolence, and is not of this kind, cannot be diftinguifhed from felfifhnefs; but is the very fame affection, and is directly and wholly oppofed to difinterefted

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boly love: And is, as has been obferved, the root and effence of all fin.

To diflinguish between felf love and felfifhnefs, is to, attempt to make a diftinction where there is no differ-. ence; unless by felf love be meant difinterefted benerolence. Difinterefted affection and felf love are very diftinct and oppofite affections, and the latter, in every degree of it, cannot be diftinguifhed from felfishness: For these are two words, for one and the fame thing.. Some would diftinguish between inordinate, and well regulated felf love; and fuppofe the former is felfishness and finful; but the latter innocent, and even good and virtuous. But unlefs by well regulated felf love be, meant difinterested affection, the diftinction is groundlefs and vain. And to fuppofe a certain degree of felf love, fubordinated to a contrary affection, love to God, and to our neighbour, is virtuous, or even innocent; and that the fame felf love in a higher degree of it, and not fubordinated by a different and contrary affection, is finful, is very unreasonable and abfurd, and a fuppofition which is utterly impoffible. For if holiness and in do not confift in the nature of moral affection and exercife, there can be no fuch thing as either fin or holiiefs. And to fuppofe thefe oppofites to confift in the degree of the fame affection exercised, and not in different kinds of affection, is really to make them not oppohites, or not.to differ in nature and kind; but to be one and the fame thing, under different modifications. For he nature and kind of moral exercife and affection is not changed by there being more or lefs of it, or by beng under reftraints, or not. If the loweft degree of fuch ffection be innocent and good, the highest poffible degree of it must be fo much better, and have a proporionably greater degree of moral goodnefs. And if the igheft poffible degree of fuch affection be finful and rong; the leaft poffible degree of the fame kind of af fection

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