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contiguous dominions of our ally the Nizam, and ultimately to those of the Company, and would have compelled the British government to engage in the con

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119. The establishment of Holkar's power at Poona would probably have occasioned demands on the part of that chieftain, upon his Highness the Nizam; but even under a contrary supposition, it is demonstrable from the state of the country, that Holkar could not long have maintained an army in the Deccan, without invading the dominions either of the Nizam or of the Company.

120. The territory around Poopa, for a considerable extent, having been entirely desolated by the troops of Holkar, that chieftain would have been compelled to invade the territory of the Nizam, or to penetrate into the country situated to the southward of the river Kistna, for the subsistence of his numerous troops and follow

ers.

121. The adoption of the latter alternative would have retarded for some time, the predatory incursion of Holkar's troops into the territory of the Nizam or of the Company; but when the immediate resources of the Peishwa's southern provinces should have been exhausted, Holkar would have been compelled to draw the means of subsistence for his troops from the plunder of the Company's contiguous territories, on the resources of which we must principally have depended for the supply of our troops in the contest which that irruption would have rendered inevitable. If therefore the British government had not adopted measures for the restoration of the Peishwa's

authority, either the Company's territories or those of our ally the Nizam would have been exposed to all the evils of war, while neither the Company nor the Nizam, under such circumstances, could have possessed the means which both now command of averting the war from their own dominions, and of accelerating its prosperous conclusion by a vigorous system of attack upon the enemy.

122. The restoration of the Peishwa, under the protection of the British power, was a measure indispensably necessary for the defence not only of the territories of our allies, but of our possessions bordering on the Mahratta dominions in the peninsula of India.

123. The continuance of the existing convulsions in the Mahratta empire would have afforded a favourable opportunity to the government of France, for the successful prosecution of its fa vourite object of establishing a dominion within the peninsula of Hindustan, by the introduction of a military force to aid the cause of one of the contending parties; and the views of France would have been favoured by the strength of M, Perron's forces, established in the Doab of the Junna and Ganges, at Agra, Delhi, and in the Punjeeb, and by the facility of communicating with the mas ritime possessions retained by Scindia in Guzerat. The security and tranquillity of the British empire in India, therefore, might ultimately have been endangered as much by the effects of a protracted warfare in the Mahratta state, as by the immediate consolidation of a dangerous extent of power and dominion in the hands of one of the contending parties.

124. While the views of the

government of France shall be directed to the establishment of its authority within the peninsula of Hindustan, it is manifestly the policy of the British government to accomplish such a system of alli ances with the powers of India, as may preclude the occurrence of those internal convulsions which would afford to France the most favourable opportunity of effecting her ambitious purpose. Independently of this consideration, the prosecution of such a system of alliances is prudent and advisable in the degree in which the tranquillity and prosperity of any dominion is endangered by the disturbed and distracted condition of neighbouring states.

125. The restoration of the Peishwa, therefore, to the just exercise of his authority, under the protection of the British government, and the conclusion of defensive and subsidiary engage ments with his Highness, afforded the only means of precluding the dangers to be apprehended either from the consolidation of a formidable power, or from the con tinuance of the distractions in the Mahratta empire.

126. In a letter which the Governor General addressed to the Honourable the Court of Directors, under date the 3d of August 1799, containing a review of the interests, the power, and disposition of the several states of India, under the change produced in the relative condition of those states by the conquest of Mysore, the Governor General expressed his opinion, that the consolidation of the power of the Mahratta em pire was highly improbable; and that it would require a most vi olent exercise of injustice and oppression on our part to dispose

the suspicious and cautious councils of the court of Foona to fayour the progress of a French force in India.

127. That opinion was amply justified by the situation of affairs in the Mahratta empire at that period of time. Since that time, however, the internal condition of the Mahratta empire has suffered a material change.

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128. The ascendency which Scindia had then established in the state of Poona was such as to menace the actual dissolution of the constitutional form of the Mahratta empire, or to produce a civil war among its component branches: and the contending interests of the seve ral feudatory chieftains appeared to afford a sufficient security against any dangerous consolida tion of the Mahratta power.

129. Since that time a new power has arisen in the Mahratta state, under the direction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which acquired sufficient strength to endanger the stability of all the principal feudatory states, and was actually directed to the subversion of the constitutional form of the cm, pire.

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130. If the progress of the contest which ensued between that chieftain, the Peishwa, and Dowlut Rao Scindia, had not been checked by the seasonable interposition of the British power for the restoration of the Peishwa's legitimate authority, it is reasonable to conclude, that in the moment of extreme danger, the Peishwa, or either of those chieftains, would have been disposed to accept the aid of a French force for the support of his cause, and that the contest would either have terminated in the consolida

tion

tion of a formidable power in the Mabratta state, accompanied by the complete establishment of the authority of France in the peninsula of India, or would have required the interposition of our arms after the aid of the French had actually strengthened one of the belligerent powers, and had consequently increased the difficulty, expence, and hazard of the war.

131. The security, therefore, which the British government might be supposed to derive from a balance of power and interests among the Mahratta states, and from the jealousy which the Mahratta nation has uniformly entertained of the influence and ascendancy of an European power, ceased to exist; and that security has been still further diminished by the augmented solidity and actual independence which the French force in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindia has gradually acquired since the termination of the war with Tippoo Sultaun.

132. After the expulsion of the Peishwa from his capital, not only the Peishwa, but Dowlut Rao Scindia and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, afforded the most unequivocal proof that the characteristic jealousy of the Mahratta states would not have deterred those chieftains from having recourse to the aid of France, if an opportunity should have occurred in any crisis of affairs in which their danger or their interest should have suggested the expediency of such a mea

sure.

133. The Peishwa directly solicited, and obtained, the aid of the British power for the restoration of his authority: Dowlut Rao Scindia indirectly invited our co-operation ostensibly for the

same purpose; and Jeswunt Ras Holkar in his own name, and in that of Amrut Rao, signified his consent to the terms of alliance which had been proposed to the Peishwa on the condition of our support.

134. If the danger or the interest of those chieftains was so urgent as to induce them to seek the aid and alliance of an European state, of which the established power, extensive dominion, and unrivalled ascendancy in Indiag had been the peculiar object of the jealousy and apprehension of the Mahratta states, it may reasonably be supposed that in such a crisis of affairs any of those chieftains would have been still more disposed to accept the aid of a military force from the French, who being destitute of any regular establishment in India, could not, in the same degree with the British government, be an object of jealousy and apprehension to the native powers, and especially to the Mahrattas.

135. If, therefore, the British government had refused to the Peishwa the aid which he solicited, it is reasonable to conclude that his Highness would have availed himself of any opportunity which might have occurred for obtaining the assistance and co-operation of a French military force, and the peace existing at that time with France might have afforded a favourable opportunity to the French power in India of aiding the Peishwa, or any of the contending parties in the Mahratta empire. Admitting, however, that the characteristic jealousy of the Mahratta nation might deter any of the Mahratta chieftains from accepting the aid of a considera ble body of European troops fur

nished by the government of France, it cannot be doubted, that in a situation of emergency, any of those chieftains would be disposed to receive into their service a number of French adventurers, to be employed in improving the discipline of their armies, and in augmenting the strength and efficacy of their military establishments. The evils which have arisen from the employment of French officers in the service of the native powers have been abundantly manifested in the gradual establishment of the formidable French force in the dominions of his Highness the Nizam, which was happily dissolved under the operation of the treaty concluded with his Highness in the year 1798, and in the growth and extension of the force lately under the direction of M. Perron in Hindustan.

136. In the actual situation of affairs, no argument unfavourable to the policy of our engagements with the Peishwa could justly be deduced from the jealousy with which the other Mahratta states might be expected to contemplate the establishment of the Briush influence in the state of Poona. The dangers which eventually menaced the security of the British dominions in India, under the circumstances above described, far exceeded any which could be apprehended from the effects of that jealousy, and could only have been averted by the interposition of the British power for the restoration of order and tranquillity in the Mahratta state.

137. From the preceding remarks, it appears, that the acknowledged policy of contracting defensive and subsidiary engage ments with the state of Poona was never so urgent as at the moment

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when those engagements were actually concluded; and the course of recent transactions in the Mah ratta empire, (as detailed in the several dispatches from the Govergor General to your Honourable Committee) combined with the relative power of the British government, and of the confede rated chieftains, with the commanding position of our armies, and with the exposed condition of the territories of Scindia and the Rajah of Berar at that period of time, constituted a crisis of affairs apparently favourable to the pacific accomplishment of that arrangement, or to the complete success of our arms in the event of opposition on the part of Scindia or of the Rajah of Berar.

[The subsequent paragraphs of this dispatch, down to агаgraph 183, relate entirely to military operations, and are therefore omitted, for the reason already stated.]

183. In our dispatch of the 1st of August the Governor-General in Council apprized your Honourable Committee of the expected death of his Highness the Nizam,

184. That event took place ou the 6th of August; his Highness's eldest son, Mirza Secunder Jah, was immediately proclaimed successor to the Soubahdary of the Deccan on the 7th of August. Mirza Secunder Jab formally took his seat on the Musnud, to which he was conducted by the Resident at lydrabad and by Rajah Ragotim Rao, the deputy of his late Highness's Prime Minister Azeem ul Omrah, and received the congratulatory presents of all the principal officers of his government at Hydrabad.

185. On that occasion the Resident at Hydrabad was received

by

188. The Governor-General in Council has great satisfaction in stating to your Honourable Come mittee, that the event of his Highness the Nizam's death has not occasioned any interruption of the public tranquillity; and that the accession of Mirza Secunder Jah has been generally and cheer. fully acknowledged by the younger sons of his late Highness, and by all the officers and subjects of his Highness's government.

by his Highness with the most in the most public and formal distinguished honours as the re- manner. A copy of that instrupresentative of the British government is inclosed. ment in India; and his Highness publicly delivered to the Resident an instrument, under his Highness's seal, acknowledging the obligations of the treaties subsisting between the British government and the state of Hydrabad. 186. The Governor General had previously directed the Resident to require from Secunder Jah the delivery of an instrument to that effect, as the first act of that prince's government, and his Highness subscribed to that requisition with the utmost readiness. A copy of that instrument is inclosed for your Honourable Committee's information.

187. Rajah Ragotim Rao on that occasion suggested the demand of a corresponding engagement on the part of the British government: which suggestion the Resident properly reject ed. The Governor-General in Council, however, being of opinion, that a voluntary act of recognition on our part would tend to conciliate the confidence of Secunder Jah, and would produce an impression on the minds of his subjects and of the several princes and chieftains of India, and particularly on the mind of his Highness the Peishwa, highly favourable to the credit of our justice, moderation, and public faith, deemed it expedient to execute an engagement in terms corresponding with the instrument delivered by Secunder Jah; and an instrument to that effect was accordingly executed by the Gover-, nor General in Council, under the seal of the Honourable Company, and transmitted to the Resident, with directions to deliver it to his Highness the Soubahdar

189. The preservation of tranquility at this crisis must be ascribed principally to the position of our armies under the command of Major-General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson; and of a considerable detachment from the army, under the personal command of his Excellency Lieutenant General Stuart, which his Excellency, under the orders of the Governor General, dispatched towards the southern frontiers of the Nizam's dominions, for the purpose of eventually proceeding to Hydrabad, if the situation of affairs should render such a movement expedient or necessary for the preservation of tranquillity, or for securing the regular order of succession on the death of the Nizam.

190. Adverting to the known designs and proceedings of the contederated chieftains with relation to the British government, to the int igues which they had long carried on at the court of Hydrabad

with a view to dissolve the connection subsisting between the Bri tish government and the state of Hydrabad, and to the position of their united armies on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions, it can scarcely be doubted that unless the movements of their armies

had

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