on the 11th of November next, at the same hour, one of our nameless rather than unknown heroes, brought from the battle fields on the longendangered frontier of humanity, will join the bivouac of our glorious dead in Arlington, and the World Disarmament Conference of broadened scope will assemble in Washington. The memory of the dead, the thought of those who live to mourn as well as of the generations unborn who should be spared such experiences, if it is in our power to prevent them, are, as they should be, associated with the date that closed the slaughter and the destruction of Armageddon, let us hope for all time.

I say conference of "broadened scope," I think advisedly, because the principal naval powers of the world, as well as those with special interests and responsibilities in Asia, are invited in the solemn words of President Harding's invitation "to participate in a conference on the subject of the limitation of armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions should also be discussed."

The formal program of the conference, in so far as Far Eastern problems are involved, is subject to future agreements and is to be shaped by "suggestions to be exchanged before the meeting of the conference."

now in progress between the powers, the scope of the conference and the tentative program as outlined in the President's call is as follows, expressed in the President's own words:

1. The limitation of armaments, naval and others, which are a menace to the peace of the world.

2. The discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions.

3. To formulate proposals to control in the interests of humanity the new agencies of warfare.

4. By a common understanding with respect to Pacific and Far Eastern problems of unquestioned importance, to arrive at a solution through the conference that may serve to promote enduring friendship among the peoples.

able scope of the conference, now being received in Washington, are not followed. Without in the least seeking to minimize the force and the effect, since until they are adjusted that those far-seeing statesmen in Washington and elsewhere, who are seeking to establish a new world procedure enlightened by and open to the currents of aroused public opinion on the subject of war and armament, have secured an initial triumph and that a hopeful expectancy toward coming events is fully justified.

The pending questions awaiting solution and retarding the development of the countries across the Pacific, and, indeed, of world-wide effect, since until they are adjusted, all drastic disarmament proposals should be regarded as dangerous experiments, may be briefly enumerated as follows: First, the status of the Island of Yap, pivotal in world communications. Second, Japanese immigration to California, a casus belli whenever the will to war and conquest prevails. Third, the control of Shantung, from which is inseparable the policy of equal opportunity and the Open Door in China. Fourth, the scope of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, its renewal or discontinuance. This last question may be kept off the agenda, but it will and should figure in the real proceedings, as it is a very powerful factor in a situation which intelligent world opinion everywhere is seeking so to compose, that disarmament may be regarded as a sane policy.

THE OPEN DOOR

Great Britain, France, Belgium and the United States are all vitally interested in the Open Door to Chinese markets, but some of these powers, unfortunately, have other vital interests. For instance, France is vitally interested in the protection of her Indo-China possessions, and she has sought to safeguard them in a special treaty with Japan-imposing mutual obligations-that is still operative. Great Britain is, of course,

keenly interested in maintaining her possessions on and off the East Asian coast, and her sphere of influence in the Yangtse Valley, not formally renounced in favor of the later policy of equal opportunity. The leaders of the British Colonial Office are today embarrassed by a tie with Japan which is none the less binding because it is rarely emphasized. They know what would have happened in all human probability to British Malaysia but for the opportune arrival of the Japanese warships at Singapore in February, 1915, and the drastic way in which they suppressed the mutiny of the Indian troops with which the native Malays openly sympathized.

So perhaps it would be wise to admit that there are two categories in the ranks of the upholders of the Open Door: Those who think with us that it is a promise of peace and a guarantee of the salvation of China, and the others who see alternate measures a little way up-stage, by which, in certain contingencies, at least their commercial interests might be safeguarded.

England has generally maintained much the same attitude toward China as we have, but her financial affiliations are quite different from ours, and it is quite clear that there are certain British financial groups, powerful in the Far East, whatever their strength in Downing Street may be, of which I know nothing, who might be able to see with placid equanimity our attempt to internationalize Yap for cable purposes fail. For, if we succeed in our purpose as stated by Secretary Hughes, and President Wilson's contention as to what was agreed upon with respect to this infinitesimal speck of land at the council of the Big Four in Paris prevails, the present cable supremacy of the British in East Asia would be a thing of the past.

In business and in diplomatic circles it is not necessary to point out how imperative an all-American cable to China is in the present world situation. Without it, the Chinese

would continue to regard the Open Door as a delusion, perhaps as a snare. Our business circles, in the light of recent experience, not limited to this world quarter, are sufficiently enlightened as to the trade-getting qualities that a cable in the unrestricted hands of a commercial rival possesses. While other and more influential countries have acquiesced in our position, as so ably stated by Mr. Hughes, the warmest supporter of our policy in this regard is probably Holland, a country which was vitally interested and closely associated in the imperial German attempt to escape from the coils of the English cables during the ten years preceding the war. Indeed, the cables that Germany laid, and the connection with the Dutch cable from Java to Europe, constitute the present subject of contention: that, and the fact that the Japanese have transferred the former Yap-Shanghai cable to Japanese waters, and that American business to reach the Asiatic mainland must still pass over British or Japanese wires. Hope of reaching an agreement on this vital matter, before the formal conference, is widely held in Washington.

JAPANESE EXCLUSION ISSUE

The question of the status of the Japanese in California is really a petty domestic issue, but it is susceptible of being magnified into a grave question at the whim of political demagogues on either side of the Pacific. While little is printed to this effect, least of all in the Japanese press, Australia, Canada and New Zealand are much more drastic in their methods of excluding Japanese than we are, or than even the most ill-considered proposals of California legislation contemplate. When the real history of the Paris Conference is written, it will be plain that the Japanese plea of racial equality could and undoubtedly would have been accepted had the Japanese plenipotentiaries been willing to accept a stipulation insisted upon by Premier Hughes of

Australia expressly reserving the regulation of immigration matters as economic measures within the discretion of each State.

Although we did it with the best intentions, and were inspired by the most creditable motives, it was admittedly an initial mistake on our part to enter upon the "Gentlemen's Agreement" dealing with the immigration question. Both the Japanese and the American authorities have in an honorable spirit lived up to the terms of the agreement; nevertheless, since it came into operation the Japanese population of California has increased threefold, from thirty thousand to nearly a hundred thousand, largely through evasion of the terms of the agreement, by people who were not Japanese or American or gentlemen.

Japan has handled the same question as it arose in her ports in a commendably frank way, and frankness has proved to be the best policy. On this matter, all the world knows where Japan stands. By imperial ordinances and formal statutes, tho immigration of laborers into Japan is forbidden, and foreigners cannot obtain individual landholdings. They cannot engage in agriculture

or

in fishing, and the introduction of Chinese or Korean farmers or laborers is expressly and specifically forbidden. And yet these races do mix when they meet in other countries. Intermarriage is frequent, and not unsuccessful. In Japan, only the economic necessity of protecting the native farmer and laborer exists, and Japan reacts to it as we do, as do the Canadians, the Australians and the New Zealanders, but she makes her decision in the open light of day, and no Chinese or Korean troublemaker can misrepresent her action and her attitude, as I am afraid our policy under the "Gentlemen's Agreement is frequently misrepresented by men of low standing, but who, none the less, at times are influential molders of public opinion in Japan.