T is doubtful if any phase of our part in the war has been more before the public than our "air program." Extravagant claims, bitter denunciations, investigations and reports of accomplishment, coming in rapid succession, have created a great confusion in the mind of the public and a general desire to know just what happened to the $640,000,000 and subsequent sums that Congress appropriated without question.

sary personnel for operation and maintenance. As a result of this request, and realizing its importance, the Joint Army and Navy Technical Aircraft Board met on May 25, 1917, and reported to the Secretaries of War and Navy a program for carrying it into effect. The members present were:

Major B. D. Foulois, U. S. A.
Lieutenant J. W. Towers, U. S. N.
Captain V. E. Clark, U. S. A.
Asst. Naval Constructor J. C. Hun-
saker, U. S. N.

Captain E. S. Gorrell, U. S. A.

This report estimated that to meet the needs of the United States Army alone, until July 1, 1918, the following numbers of training planes would be required, and it recommended that a building program to meet these needs be started at once:

The same report also recommended that the Aircraft Production Board of the Council of National Defense take steps immediately toward obtaining from Europe-as working models-two each of the following airplanes (including engines), with

For the navy-in order to equip the coast stations and to train 330 pilots -the Joint Board estimated that the following would be needed, not including service airplanes:

300 School seaplanes with 100 H. P.
engines.

200 Service seaplanes with 150-250
engines.

100 Speed scouts with 100-150 engines.
100 Large seaplanes with 200-400 en-
gines.

To meet the request of France for co-operation in a flying corps of 4,500 airplanes-to be available for active service at the front during the Spring of 1918-the further needs of the United States Army were stated thus:

SERVICE AIRPLANES AND ENGINES
(LATEST TYPES)

(To be produced between Jan. 1, 1918, and June 30, 1918)

.5,000 1,667 10,000 .1,000 333 2,000

Types.

Reconnoissance and

artillery control..3,000 1,000 6,000

2,000

Fighting

Bombing

Total

Grand total

3,334 666 .9,000 3,000 18,000 6,000 12,000 24,000

The recommendation of the Joint Army and Navy Technical Aircraft Board covering this service plane program was approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy about the same time as the recommendation covering training planes. The entire program then called for 8,075 training planes, 12,400 service planes, of which 300 of the training planes and 400 of the combat planes were for the navy, making the production as outlined for the army 20,475 planes in twelve months. The engine production estimate accompanying this plane program called for 41,810 engines in the year, with a maximum production of 6,150 per month.

Estimates were prepared after consultation with the French and British, and the total estimated cost for the program was $640,000,000. In the light of recent statements of the cost of the war that sum is not so impressive as it was when its appropriation was announced in headlines of every paper in the country. No such sum had ever been appropriated for any one purpose in the history of Congress, and it is small wonder that an admiring public pictured a sky darkened by airplanes. Congress had certainly done its duty. That sum was necessary, and it was appropriated without question and with no delay. The money was available, and it remained but to turn it into airplanes and to train the personnel for their operation.

ESTIMATE OF OUR SITUATION

On May 12, 1917, the Signal Corps had on order 334 airplanes of thirtytwo designs placed with sixteen firms or persons, not more than six of which had ever manufactured more than ten planes. There were not more than forty officers and civilians who were capable of instructing in primary flying, and none of them had ever seen a modern fighting or service type airplane. No firm had ever produced anything but an elementary training plane, and there were not more than ten men capable of designing them. The situation with respect to engines was little better, although several farsighted automobile sighted automobile manufacturers had experimented with aeronautical engines with some success. Most of the instruments and accessories of aircraft had never been heard of, and it was necessary to create a new order of instrument manufacturers capable of producing in great quantity, barometers, compasses, tachometers, speed indicators, angles of incidence indicators, thermometers, synchronizing mechanism, bombing sights, bomb release mechanisms, electrical gun and clothing heaters, automatic long range cameras, special radio ap

paratus and other super-sensitive instruments, the skill to make which did not exist in this country.

The program had been approved, the money appropriated, and the crying necessity for its accomplishment was only too apparent. The best of those whose previous experience seemed to fit them for the gigantic task were assembled and the fulfillment of our promises intrusted to them. These were men accustomed to success. No proposition had ever been too big for them, and they were determined to succeed. After a careful survey of the situation they were convinced that the program, huge as

it was, was not impossible of accomplishment, and in their enthusiasm and determination they announced that they would carry it through. That announcement was transmitted through the press to every citizen of the country in such glowing terms that it can never be forgotten.

There is a popular impression that our air program was a failure, and that the money so generously and trustingly appropriated was squandered without adequate return. It is certain that if our accomplishment be measured by what we in our enthusiasm and ignorance announced we were going to do, then we failed, in

deed; but if it be measured by the accomplishment of other countries under similar conditions, then even the most critical can find much cause for satisfaction.

As IT LOOKED IN 1917

The possible aircraft production facilities of the United States, as they appeared to thoughtful men at that time, were set forth on June 13, 1917, in a long letter written by Howard Coffin, Chairman of the Aircraft Board, to Brig. Gen. Kuhn, Chief of the War College Division. Though this letter is too long to print here in full, any one who will consult it in the War Office files will find it very illuminating. It shows that the early statements of what we could do were no vainglorious boasts, but were the result of a very careful analysis of the situation, based on all available information. Mr. Coffin outlined, item by item, how we apparently could and should go about the building of 5,000 training machines, 2,500 DH-4s for reconnaissance, 800 of each of three types of pursuit planes, and 12,000 fighting, bombing, artillery control and reconnaissance machines. specified the airplane and automobile factories to which each type was to be assigned, and gave a complete list of thirty or forty others that could be enlisted in the work. The following passages show just how the situation looked and what was planned:

He

We will concentrate on the reconnaissance and artillery control types, relieving French factories of the heavy production of these types. This will permit them to concentrate on fighting types utilizing the rotary engines. In the meantime, the rotary engine production will be materially increased in this country. With the U. S. 8 A and U. S. 12 A in quantity production before Jan 1, and the Lorraine-Dietrich by March 1, 1918, we can meet the increased reconnaissance and artillery control program. With designs from Europe on or before Aug. 1, it will be possible to have planes in November from Curtiss and in December and January from sources of supply established to make training machines, but switched over to these as training orders are transferred to other new sources of supply. The output of these planes will temporarily exceed that of engines.

It is estimated that production of these types will have to reach and hold 1,800 per month by March, 1918. The Curtiss Company has estimated they can reach an output of 30 per day, or 750 per month, of pursuit or fighting machines by Jan. 1, 1918. We expect to have at least two other sources of supply equal in size and capacity to the Curtiss Company and to mobilize the productive capacities for wood working of some centres like Grand Rapids, Amesburg, Philadelphia and Camden, Cincinnati, Syracuse, Kansas City and St. Louis. * * *

The automobile industry is producing 100,000 engines per month, while the maximum required by the airplane engine program is 6,000 per month.

We firmly believe the airplane program can be met. We believe that the Aircraft Production Board can arrange for the production during the next twelve months of an engine for every plane and at least a spare engine for every five planes. The deficit in spare engines for training machines will be made up during the Spring and the deficit in engines for combat machines will be made up during the Summer of 1918.

The problem of increasing the production of French and English factories has been suggested, but there are so many questions involved in the transportation of all kinds of material, men, food, clothing, &c., that it seems best to defer an opinion on this point until our board has made an investigation of the subject abroad.

The program as submitted to the Aircraft Production Board is a gigantic one, but capable of accomplishment as outlined, provided funds are quickly appropriated and no delays permitted..

CAUSES OF PARTIAL FAILURE

Why did fulfillment in some respects fall so far short of these expectations? The reason is that, careful as was the Aircraft Board's estimate, it was based in part on premises which afterward proved to be false Chief among these were (1) the idea that engine production was harder to build up than plane production; (2) that the quantities of raw material needed were comparatively small and would not conflict with demands in other lines, and (3) that the manufacture of airplanes presented special difficulties which existing factories could not easily meet. The rapidity with which planes and engines were becoming obsolete on the front also was not known, nor was it realized that difficulty would be experi

enced in getting the Allies to furnish. sample planes and drawings for purposes of reproduction in this country.

The

The comprehensive inexperience of the United States in the manufacture of aircraft when we entered the war undoubtedly accounts for our overconfidence and for the heartbreaking delay in getting under way. source of knowledge was 3,000 miles away, and development there was so rapid that it became necessary to go to the scene of actual conflict to gain our knowledge of what to produce. Perhaps it was fortunate that the difficulties which were soon to appear were not anticipated. Our advent into the war was at a time when the development of special types of aircraft for specific purposes was at its height. Planes which were considered adequate one month were inadequate the next, and the combatants were striving to outdo each other in design as well as quantity production.

Foreign aeronautical engines are mostly hand-made; all our engines are machine made. It is readily seen that all the advantage in changing design lies with the hand-made engine. If we were to go into quantity production it was necessary to select engines that would not become obsolete before they could be produced. The same thing applied in a lesser degree to plane manufacture. Our lack of aeronautical engineers with the necessary experience made it necessary to make "Chinese copies " of both planes and engines. Great care must be exercised, therefore, in the selection of what we were to duplicate. Early in the war the Bolling Commission was sent abroad to confer on the ground with our allies and to select and ship back the planes and engines that were to serve as patterns. This could not be done in a day. In the meantime we could not sit idle.

In the Curtiss JN-4 we had an ele