The Presidential certification required by section 13 (a) was set out in a Memorandum for the Secretary of State, by President Carter, dated September 26, 1978, the substantive portion of which reads:

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 13 (a) of the International Security Assistance Act of 1978, I hereby determine and certify:

(1) that the resumption of full military cooperation with Turkey is in the national interest of the United States and in the interest of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and

(2) that the Government of Turkey is acting in good faith to achieve a just and peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem, the early peaceable return of refugees to their homes and properties, and continued removal of Turkish military troops from Cyprus in the context of a solution to the Cyprus problem, and the early serious resumption of inter-communal talks aimed at a just, negotiated settlement.

You are requested on my behalf to report this determination and certification to the Congress.

This determination and certification shall be published in the Federal Register.

Presidential Determination 78-18, Fed. Reg., Vol. 43, No. 197, Oct. 11, 1978, p. 46821, corrected, ibid., No. 198, Oct. 12, 1978, p. 46953.

The Department of State strongly supported lifting the Turkish arms embargo. On April 6, 1978, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance reviewed security assistance proposals for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus for the period, October 1, 1978-September 30, 1979, before the Committee on International Relations of the United States House of Representatives. After outlining progress which had been made toward achieving a just settlement of the Cyprus conflict, he continued:

DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENTS WITH TURKEY

We have mutually agreed with the Government of Turkey to renegotiate the matters covered by the Defense Cooperation Agreement so as to serve our bilateral security interests in a manner that the two governments can be confident will reflect the broadest interests of our two democracies. It is not easy to predict when new arrangements will be concluded since the issues are complex. However, we have agreed with the Government of Turkey to give this effort prompt attention and to act promptly to implement the new agreement after it is concluded.

Of course we will consult closely with the Congress concerning such negotiations. Even as we are working towards this end, we believe we must deal with issues of immediate concern in the region. We are, therefore, submitting, in the form of an amendment to the Security Assistance Act, proposed legislation to deal with this new situation.

ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY

For Turkey, we propose the following with respect to fiscal year 1979: (1) To provide FMS [foreign military sales] loan guarantees of $175 million so that we can help meet the most urgent needs of the Turkish military. This is the same amount as we provided to Turkey last year. (2) To lift the embargo contained in section 620 (x) of the FAA [Foreign Assistance Act] so that we can fully cooperate with Turkey in a manner consonant with the requirements of an alliance important to our mutual security. This would facilitate joint and allied defense planning; enhance allied support for Turkey's NATO needs via third country transfers and improved standardization; and permit the delivery of items impounded since the embargo was put in force. (3) To provide a security-supporting assistance loan of $50 million to Turkey to assist that country in resolving its present economic difficulties. I would note in this connection that a stabilization package was recently worked out between Turkey and the International Monetary Fund staff, and is pending before the Board of the IMF.

ASSISTANCE TO GREECE

For Greece, we would likewise continue the level of FMS financing at last year's level; that is, $140 million. This is somewhat higher than the administration requested in its budget submission, and reflects our desire to maintain both Greece and Turkey at last year's FMS credit levels. No grant military assistance is being requested for either country at this time.

LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO ON TURKEY

The lifting of the embargo and the negotiation of new defense arrangements with Turkey will provide a core of stability to our bilateral relations and enable us to establish a renewed sense of trust so that we may work together to resolve important problems. It should be clear that this does not signal any shift in U.S. policy as regards Greek-Turkish differences. They are both friends and valued allies. We support their efforts to resolve all problems between themselves in a peaceful fashion. We strongly believe that our national interests require the restoration of sound, normalized bilateral relationships with Turkey and with Greece, and our proposals today are made for that reason.

They should help restore a stable and peaceful atmosphere in the Eastern Mediterranean; something which will benefit all nations in the region. In that regard, it remains the position of the United States that the disputes which exist in the area must be settled through peaceful procedures; that each side should avoid provocative actions and that neither side should seek a military solution to these disputes. The United States would actively and unequivocally oppose a military solution and would make a major effort to prevent such a course of action.

It has been suggested that lifting the embargo or even proposing further military or economic assistance for Turkey should be delayed until such time as a final Cyprus solution is achieved. The adminis

tration does not share that view and does not, for the important reasons I have outlined, believe U.S. national interests would be served by such a course.

The administration will continue to make every effort to help bring about a just solution to the Cyprus problem. The action we request today is not, in our view, inconsistent with those efforts. We believe it can actually facilitate the negotiation process. With the Cyprus negotiations entering a critical period, the United States can play a more useful role if we are seen, by all the parties, to be evenhanded in our approach. An embargo against one side makes it difficult to play that role.

Let me make another point about the embargo. Section 620 (x) was enacted by the Congress to demonstrate that all facets of agreements undertaken with the U.S. Government must be honored or serious consequences faced. This is a point of principle which has had its impact both in Turkey and throughout the world, demonstrating the seriousness with which the American people view any unauthorized use of our military equipment. The point was made dramatically and effectively. Now the time has come to look forward rather than back. Continued maintenance of the embargo would be harmful to U.S. security concerns, harmful to NATO, harmful to our bilateral relations with Turkey and harmful to our role as a potential contributor to a Cyprus settlement.

Hearings and Markup on Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1979 before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9, (1978), pp. 18-20; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 78, No. 2014. May 1978, pp. 34-35; Dept. of State Press Release No. 151, Apr. 6, 1978, pp. 8-13. The Secretary concluded his presentation with a description of assistance being recommended for the coming year for Cyprus: toward relief and rehabilitation of displaced persons; for proportional distribution to the two ethnic communities on Cyprus; and toward support of the U.N. peacekeeping forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). He also stated that the Administration (of President Carter) was prepared, upon achievement of a settlement, to request additional aid from the Congress to assist both the Greek and Cypriot communities to make the neces sary economic, social and political readjustments.

The Defense Cooperation Agreement, referred to, ante, was the Agreement Relative to Defense Cooperation Pursuant to Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty in Order to Resist Armed Attack in the North Atlantic Treaty Area. signed by the United States and Turkey on Mar. 26, 1976. See the 1976 Digest, pp. 775-777. See further, Dept. of State Press Release 145, Apr. 4, 1978; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 78, No. 2014, May 1978, p. 34. That agreement has not entered into force.

87

Arms Control and Disarmament

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978

On March 10, 1978, President Carter signed the Nuclear NonProliferation Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-242; 92 Stat. 120), which

established conditions, criteria and procedures to govern continuing United States cooperation with other nations in efforts to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Section 2 of the Act, noting the grave threat to United States security interests and to continued international progress toward world peace and development, posed by proliferation of nuclear explosive devices or of direct capability to manufacture or otherwise acquire them, stated that the four elements of United States policy concerning nonproliferation were to:

(a) actively pursue through international initiatives mechanisms for fuel supply assurances and the establishment of more effective international controls over the transfer and use of nuclear materials and equipment and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in order to prevent proliferation, including the establishment of common international sanctions;

(b) take such actions as are required to confirm the reliability of the United States in meeting its commitments to supply nuclear reactors and fuel to nations which adhere to effective non-proliferation policies by establishing procedures to facilitate the timely processing of requests for subsequent arrangements and export licenses; (c) strongly encourage nations which have not ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to do so at the earliest possible date; and

(d) cooperate with foreign nations in identifying and adapting suitable technologies for energy production and, in particular, to identify alternative options to nuclear power in aiding such nations to meet their energy needs, consistent with the economic and material resources of those nations and environmental protection.

The purpose of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, as set out in section 3, was promotion of the policies described in section 2, ante, by:

(a) establishing a more effective framework for international cooperation to meet the energy needs of all nations and to ensure that the worldwide development of peaceful nuclear activities and the export by any nation of nuclear materials and equipment and nuclear technology intended for use in peaceful nuclear activities do not contribute to proliferation;

(b) authorizing the United States to take such actions as are required to ensure that it will act reliably in meeting its commitment to supply nuclear reactors and fuel to nations which adhere to effective non-proliferation policies;

(c) providing incentives to the other nations of the world to join in such international cooperation efforts and to ratify the Treaty; and

(d) ensuring effective controls by the United States over its exports of nuclear materials and equipment and of nuclear technology. See further, this Digest, Ch. 10, §§ 3, 8.

Use of Nuclear Weapons

U.S. Assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapons States

During the course of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD), May 23-June 30, 1978, President Carter decided, upon the basis of studies made in preparation for the special session and after consulting with principal United States allies, to elaborate United States policy concerning United States use of nuclear weapons and security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states. In so doing, the President sought to encourage support for halting their spread, to increase international security and stability, to create a more positive environment for success of the special session, and to enhance prospects for more effective arms control and disarmament.

Secretary of State Vance delivered the declaration on June 12:

The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear-weapons state party to the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the Ünited States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear-weapons state or associated with a nuclearweapons state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.

Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 78, No. 2017, Aug. 1978, p. 52.
See further, the 1975 Digest, Ch. 14, § 1, pp. 798-801.

On November 17, 1978, Ambassador Adrian S. Fisher, a former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the United States Representative to the Committee on Disarmament, submitted the following "Proposal of the United States of America for Strengthening the Confidence of Non-Nuclear-Weapons States in their Security against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons":

The approach of the United States to strengthening the confidence of non-nuclear-weapons states in their security against the threat or use of nuclear weapons takes into account paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the SSOD which provides:

"In the same context, the nuclear-weapon states are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon states and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons."

The United States position on the way to work out effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons states against the threat