1974, the Saudis have committed through bilateral and multilateral channels well in excess of $10.0 billion in economic assistance. As we find it increasingly difficult to raise capital for foreign assistance, the possibility of wedding Saudi capital to U.S. technology may provide the best hope of development for many of the poor countries.

The Sinai accord in 1975 demonstrated the need for American diligence and American instruments of diplomacy; only after the United States induced Egypt to take another step forward, and then induced Israel to close the remaining gap, by providing it with the added security and other assets it sought in exchange for the Sinai passes and the oilfields, did the process succeed. That is our goal again.

In summary, I shall vote for these sales. I know there are inherent risks involved, but I expect the United States, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to gain more than they lose by them. These are the objectives:

First, that the United States increase its diplomatic influence and leverage in the region.

Second, a resumption of face-to-face negotiating efforts by Israel and Egypt in the near future.

Third, the United States-Israeli bilateral relationship to be as special and strong in the future as it has over the last 30 years. Fourth, the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia also to remain close and strong.

Fifth, that the Soviet Union will not be involved in the peace process. Moscow has demonstrated it has no positive role or willingness to play. The Russians consistently refuse to risk their necks on behalf of reconciliation and rapprochement.

Sixth, that tangible support of Sadat will begin paying off within Egypt, between Egypt and Israel, and within the Arab world. Hopefully, with our support, the Egyptian approach will be viewed as more productive than the Syrian approach.

And seventh, that the whole Middle East will receive the strong political signal that the United States is deeply involved and will remain that way with those forces who share our objectives and who actively support countries which share our objectives. In turn, the United States is prepared to consider and meet their respective needs.

Cong. Rec., Vol. 124, No. 69 (daily ed. May 11, 1978), pp. S7438-S7440.

Prohibitions Upon Use

The Department of State received Congressional inquiries, as to whether Israel, by its military operations in Lebanon commencing March 15, 1978, had not violated its agreements with the United States so as to require a report to the Congress under section 3 (c) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended by Public Law 94-329, June 30, 1976 (90 Stat. 729, 754-755; 22 U.S.C. 2753 (c) (1976)). In reply, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance informed Speaker of the House

of Representatives Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., in a letter of April 5, 1978, as follows:

Those operations have involved use of defense articles furnished to Israel by the United States under the foreign military sales program. Sales to Israel under this program are governed by a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of July 23, 1952, which provides:

"The Government of Israel assures the United States Government that such equipment, materials, or services as may be acquired from the United States . . . are required for and will be used solely to maintain its internal security, its legitimate selfdefense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state."

In the circumstances, I must report that a violation of the 1952 Agreement may have occurred by reason of the Israeli operations in Lebanon.

We have discussed with senior officials of the Israeli Government these operations and the use of U.S.-origin equipment in them. The Israeli Government has said that it intends to comply with U.N. Security Council Resolution 425, which among other things calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. We are actively engaged in discussing with officials of the Israeli Government the date for the completion of such withdrawal.

In these circumstances, including the ongoing efforts to restore momentum to the vital peace negotiations and Israel's assurance that it intends to withdraw from Lebanon, I am not recommending to the President any further action.

Dept. of State File No. P78 0061-2329.

A reply by Counselor of the Department of State Matthew Nimitz on April 13, 1978, to a similar inquiry from Director of Public Affairs John P. Richardson, National Association of Arab Americans, referred to the Secretary's report to Congress, ante, and stated:

Procedurally, section 3 (c) (2) [of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, see, post] requires the President to "report to the Congress promptly upon receipt of information that a violation described in paragraph (1) of this subsection may have occurred." However, ineligibility is not a necessary result in each case where a report is submitted. Rather, according to section 3(c) (3) (A), “[a] country shall be deemed ineligible" for credits, guaranties, cash sales or deliveries pursuant to previous sales in the case of a violation described in section 3 (c) (1) "if the President so determines and so reports in writing to the Congress, or if the Congress so determines by joint resolution."

Thus, under the statute, the President is required to report to Congress in any instance where a substantial violation may have oc

curred. Thereafter, ineligibility results from a Presidential determination or from a joint resolution of the Congress . . . .

In the case of the recent Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon, the Secretary of State reported to Congress on April 5 that a violation "may have occurred." The President has not determined that Israel is ineligible for further U.S. assistance. . . . Israel's assurance that it intends to withdraw from Lebanon and our ongoing efforts to restore momentum to the vital peace negotiations underlay this U.S. position.

I am confident that in the near future Israel will comply with the withdrawal provision of U.N. Security Council Resolution 425, thus obviating the need for further U.S. action.

Dept. of State File No. 78 0149–1642.

Earlier, by a letter of Dec. 7, 1977, to Congressman Paul Findley, replying to an inquiry about the use of foreign military sales equipment by Israel in southern Lebanon in Sept. 1977, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Douglas J. Bennet, Jr. had noted:

[W]ith respect to Israel's use of U.S. aircraft to bomb targets in south Lebanon, the Israelis take the position that this action was legitimate selfdefense, in response to provocative rocket attacks from south Lebanon . . As we stated publicly, we consider the Israeli response to have been excessive. Given the provocation, and other circumstances, including the fact that Lebanon did not choose to call a meeting of the Security Council, we decided that a conclusion that the Israeli action in this one case might constitute a substantial violation of its agreement with us was not appropriate.

Dept. of State File No. P78 0001-0518.

On the same date, April 13, 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in acknowledgment of letters to the President from Congressman Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., March 22 and April 10, protesting reported Israeli use of cluster bomb units in southern Lebanon, stated that the Israeli Government had confirmed that cluster bomb units had in fact been used there, "in contradiction to previous assurances given to us." He also stated that the Department of State had communicated to the Israeli Government the concern of the United States over the matter. A more detailed response to Congressman McCloskey was supplied by the Department of State under date of May 5, 1978, in a letter from Assistant Secretary of State Bennet, reading in part, as follows:

*

The Government of Israel has confirmed to us that it used cluster bomb units (CBU's) during the military operation in southern Lebanon, a use contrary to previous assurances given to us. At present there are no outstanding prior or current orders requiring delivery of CBU's to Israel.

The United States requested, and has received, a reaffirmation of Israel's acceptance of stipulations and conditions on the use of CBU's. This reaffirmation is in the form of a classified agreement concluded by an exchange of notes dated April 10 and April 11, 1978, and which has been transmitted to the Chairmen of the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pursuant to 1 U.S.C. 112b. We have also expressed our strong concern to Israel that effective procedures be instituted to ensure that the assurances given the United States are known and effective in the context of Israeli decisionmaking.

We appreciate your informing us of possible congressional action on the issue of CBU's and will be prepared to comment whenever such legislation is submitted.

The Departments of State and Defense share your concern about this issue. We can assure you that we will make every effort to ensure that the Government of Israel institutes measures that will prove effective in guarding against the misuse of this weapon in the future. Dept. of State File No. P78 0085-1720.

For correspondence between Congressman McCloskey and Ambassador Simcha Dinitz of Israel, concerning Israeli use of cluster bomb units against civilian areas in southern Lebanon, see the Cong. Rec., Vol. 124, No. 61, pp. E22182219 (daily ed., May 1, 1978).

P.L. 94-329, June 30, 1976 (90 Stat. 729), sec. 201 of which changed the title of the Foreign Military Sales Act (P.L. 90-629, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1320; 22 U.S.C. 2344, 2382, 2392, 2394, 2403, 2751 et seq.) to the Arms Export Control Act (90 Stat. 734; 22 U.S.C. 2751 (1976), note), provided, in sec. 304(b) (1), for an amendment of sec. 3(c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act (i.e., the Arms Export Control Act), to read as follows:

(c) (1) (A) No credits (including participations in credits) may be issued and no guaranties may be extended for any foreign country under this Act as hereinafter provided, if such country uses defense articles or defense services furnished under this Act, or any predecessor Act, in substantial violation (either in terms of quantities or in terms of the gravity of the consequences regardless of the quantities involved) of any agreement entered into pursuant to any such Act (i) by using such articles or services for a purpose not authorized under section 4 or, if such agreement provides that such articles or services may only be used for purposes more limited than those authorized under section 4 for a purpose not authorized under such agreement; (ii) by transferring such articles or services to, or permitting any use of such articles or services by, anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the recipient country without the consent of the President; or (iii) by failing to maintain the security of such articles or services.

(B) No cash sales or deliveries pursuant to previous sales may be made with respect to any foreign country under this Act as hereinafter provided. if such country uses defense articles or defense services furnished under this Act, or any predecessor Act, in substantial violation (either in terms of quantity or in terms of the gravity of the consequences regardless of the quantities involved) of any agreement entered into pursuant to any such Act by using such articles or services for a purpose not authorized under section 4 or, if such agreement provides that such articles or services may only be used for purposes more limited than those authorized under section 4, for a purpose not authorized under such agreement.

(2) The President shall report to the Congress promptly upon the receipt of information that a violation described in paragraph (1) of this subsection may have occurred.

(3)(A) A country shall be deemed to be ineligible under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of this subsection, or both subparagraphs (A) and (B) of such paragraph in the case of a violation described in both such paragraphs, if the President so determines and so reports in writing to the Congress, or if the Congress so determines by joint resolution.

(B) Notwithstanding a determination by the President of ineligibility under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) of this subsection, cash sales and deliveries pursuant to previous sales may be made if the President certifies in writing to the Congress that a termination thereof would have significant adverse impact on United States security, unless the Congress adopts or has adopted a joint resolution pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph with respect to such ineligibility.

(4) A country shall remain ineligible in accordance with paragraph (1) of this subsection until such time as—

(A) the President determines that the violation has ceased; and

(B) the country concerned has given assurances satisfactory to the Presi dent that such violation will not recur.

90 Stat. 729, 754-755.

For the Agreement between the United States and Israel relating to mutual defense assistance, by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv, July 1 and 23, 1952, referred to in Secretary Vance's letter, ante, see TIAS 2675, 3 UST 4985.