and Management Act of 1976. The negotiating text does, however, serve our interests in regard to salmon, tuna, and fisheries off the coasts of other states.

It should be noted, however, that a comprehensive treaty will not of itself fully protect these U.S. interests but rather will foster regional and bilateral agreements. Finally, the negotiating text does promote international recognition of the need to protect marine mammals.

We believe that the understandable and legitimate interests in fisheries of the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states should be fairly accommodated as part of an overall package.

Continental Shelf. It is estimated that there are significant amounts of exploitable petroleum beneath the continental margin off our coasts. We support the coupling of coastal state jurisdiction over continental margin resources beyond 200 miles with revenuesharing for the benefit of the developing countries. Although the conference has not yet agreed upon a precise definition of the outer limits of that jurisdiction, we have every reason to believe that such a definition can be negotiated. The open-ended formula now contained in the negotiating text is undesirably vague and might be so interpreted as to lead to excessive claims of jurisdiction.

Without a treaty, the U.S. interest in the resources of the continental margin would nevertheless be protected. A comprehensive treaty, however, would enable us to protect this interest with greater predictability.

Marine Scientific Research. The United States places a high value on the conduct of research on a free and broad basis, accompanied by a maximum flow of information with respect to both the conduct of the research and its results.

Unfortunately, the United States has been unable to find more than minimal support in the negotiations for the creation of a free and open marine scientific regime in the economic zone and on the Continental Shelf. The consequence is that the negotiating text contains undesirably broad provisions requiring coastal state consent for research to be conducted within 200 miles. While the negotiating text introduces a degree of predictability that would make the administration and planning of research easier, it also creates rather complicated conditions for the granting of consent. In weighing the prospective benefits of a comprehensive treaty, therefore, science must be seen as a neutral factor. At a minimum the freedom of research must be maintained beyond the economic zone and on the deep seabed.

Marine Environmental Protection. The United States has a major interest in protecting its coastal areas from all forms of pollution. Regarding vessel source pollution, the negotiating text establishes a mixed system of port state, coastal state, and flag state jurisdiction that, given shipping patterns off our coasts, would afford substantial protection against hazards to the marine environment within 200 miles. It must be noted that the negotiating text gives flag states the right to preempt jurisdiction, albeit with important exceptions. Pro

tection of the marine environment will thus be, in part, a function of the responsible exercise of flag state jurisdiction.

At the same time the negotiating text makes binding on all participating states those standards adopted by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. The treaty also provides protection against pollution from Continental Shelf resource activities, deep seabed mining, and ocean dumping. While a treaty cannot accomplish all of our marine environmental objectives, it would create a useful framework for safeguarding the marine environment.

1 For a statement to the press by Ambassador Richardson on July 20, 1977, see Bulletin of Sept. 19, 1977.

Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 78, No. 2015, June 1978, pp. 47-48.

At the conclusion of the Geneva session, Ambassador Richardson reported to the House Committee on International Relations on May 24 that there had been "constructive, forward movement" on issues dealing with seabed mining, with more understanding of the economic factors involved than before. For example, the mandatory transfer of technology to the International Seabed Resource Authority was no longer a precondition to obtaining a contract to mine, although the operating arm of the Authority (known as the Enterprise) could subsequently request such a transfer, "on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions to be negotiated in good faith by the parties." In addition, texts covering a number of other issues had been sufficiently improved over the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), which had resulted from the sixth session of the Conference in 1977, to offer a "substantially enhanced prospect of consensus." In his statement prepared for presentation to the Committee Ambassador Richardson said in part:

Perhaps the most noteworthy achievement of the seventh session was its negotiation of the right of access of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states to the living resources of the 200mile exclusive economic zone. This negotiation brought within reach of consensus an issue which had stubbornly resisted compromise during all previous sessions of the Conference.

Some progress was also made toward agreement on a formula defining the outer limit of national jurisdiction over the Continental Shelf, a matter of vital concern to a number of broad-margin states. A compromise on the issue of revenue sharing in the proceeds of exploitation of the resources of the continental margin beyond 200 miles also made headway. Considerable hard work, however, remains to be done on these related issues.

A companion issue-settlement of disputes over the living resources of the EEZ [exclusive economic zone]-also gave way before

hard bargaining. From the extremes of rejection of any dispute settlement of fisheries questions to an insistence on compulsory adjudication in all cases emerged the middle ground of compulsory conciliation of claims that the coastal state has abused its power.

The United States drew considerable satisfaction from the negotiations on maritime pollution. In concert with France and Canada, we were the driving force behind improvement in the text with respect to the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution from ships.

The new texts expand the obligation of the world community to protect endangered species and fragile ecosystems from pollution. They widen jurisdiction to establish ship-routing systems needed to protect the environment, clarify the right of the coastal state to obtain prompt notice of events that may result in pollution off its coast in adequate time to act, and remove certain restraints on the powers of the coastal state to establish and enforce discharge standards stricter than international standards for ships in innocent passage in the territorial sea.

In the area of marine scientific research in the EEZ, the U.S. sought comparable progress. The Soviet Union and a large number of coastal states, however, continued to insist that the existing text on scientific research represented a reasonable balance that ought not be disturbed. We took issue with this view when it was expressed in the Plenary and gave notice that we intend to persist in our efforts to make the text more compatible with freedom of scientific research.

Another "first" for the seventh session was its willingness to come to grips with many of the seemingly intractable issues associated with deep seabed mining. There was none of the public posturing characteristic of earlier debate on these issues. Rather, the Conference revealed a more sophisticated understanding of the economic stakes at issue and broad acceptance of the aim of making the parallel system of seabed exploitation workable.

All of the texts dealing with the seabeds represent improvement over the ICNT. In some cases the improvement is significant; in others it is marginal. Many developing countries continue to view with suspicion the sincerity of the commitment of the developed countries to the viability of the Enterprise side of the parallel system. These apprehensions are reflected in the revised texts, particularly those on transfer of technology and the review clause.

Transfer of technology is no longer a precondition of obtaining a contract to mine. This is a major improvement. Under the new text the contractor must undertake to transfer such technology to the Enterprise at any time after the contract is approved-if the Enterprise so requests-on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions to be negotiated in good faith by the parties. The fulfillment of this obligation would be subject to conciliation and arbitration.

A new and highly controversial addition to the text requires transfer of technology to developing countries in certain quite limited cases. The U.S. is opposed to this requirement, which is not needed to make the parallel system of exploitation viable, and will seek to have it eliminated in a later stage of negotiations.

The review clause negotiated in Geneva is significantly better than the ICNT in that it eliminates automatic conversion to a unitary system and contains certain other textual improvements. However, the review clause remains a serious problem because of the power given to the Assembly-if the Review Conference is deadlocked after five years to impose a moratorium on new contracts and new plans of work for the Enterprise with the exception of areas already reserved.

The U.S. voiced strong reservations on this provision, emphasizing that it could not agree on the possible termination of its right to access to deep seabed minerals at the time the need for them may become acute.

U.S.-Canadian bilateral discussions produced a new productioncontrol formulation. This formulation is clearly an improvement over that contained in the ICNT. Like all compromises, it confronts both producers and consumers with painful decisions, but we hope that it provides the basis for final resolution of this longstanding issue.

Considerable improvements were also made in the texts dealing with financial arrangements. These texts had not previously been the subject of substantive negotiations, and the progress made during this session was encouraging. Nevertheless, much work remains to be done on the financial terms of contracts, and we shall have to dispel misconceptions of the value of seabed minerals and the economics of their exploitation before a consensus text can be obtained.

The issue of composition and voting of the Council-the executive arm of the Authority-was seriously and intensively discussed, but was not resolved at Geneva. Differences remain clear-cut and fundamental. The developing countries tend to regard the Council as simply an arm of the Assembly with priority for the principle of equitable geographic distribution.

The U.S. does not challenge the concept that the Assembly should operate on the basis of one nation, one vote. We believe strongly, however, that the Council-responsible for directing the operations of the Authority-should reflect not only a geographic balance among members, but also should assure adequate protection of the major economic interests affected by a deep seabed mining treaty; specifically those of seabed miners of manganese, nickel, copper, and cobalt; consumers of these metals; and land-based producers. Only if such protection is clear and convincing will the massive investments required to begin seabed mining be made.

In summary, the Conference made sufficient progress on the hardcore issues to support the hope that with additional time and the same high level of patience and dedication shown in Geneva, it can cut significantly deeper into these issues. It made sufficient progress to reinforce the conviction of the United States that it is still worthwhile to persist in the effort to construct a framework of international cooperation in the oceans.

*

Law of the Sea Conference Status Report, Summer 1978: Hearings before the House Committee on International Relations, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1978), pp. 8-13; Cong. Rec., Vol. 124, No. 80 (daily ed., May 26, 1978), pp. E2873-E2874.

For the U.S. Delegation Report, Seventh Session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Mar. 28-May 19, 1978, see Hearings, ante, pp. 15–50, and also, Law of the Sea: Hearing on Review of the Seventh Session of the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans and International Environment of the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1978), pp. 73-90.

For an outline of developments during the first six sessions of the Third Law of the Sea Conference, see Staff of Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, (and also of the National Ocean Policy Study [Group]), 95th Cong., 2d sess., The Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference (From the 1967 Pardo Resolution through the 6th Session of the Third UNCLOS) (Comm. Print (1978)). The study also provides, inter alia, a brief survey of the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences and of the preparatory conferences, and comparisons of the various negotiating texts produced during the different sessions. In a statement to the press prior to the commencement of the resumed seventh session of the Conference (August 21-September 15, 1978) Ambassador Richardson stated further:

For the United States, progress in Geneva was sufficient for us to renew our pledge to pursue an equitable treaty based on the principle of mutual benefit.

Let me pause at this point to emphasize that our satisfaction with the improved atmosphere of the Geneva negotiations should not be construed to mean that we see a treaty in the offing or imminent solutions to the hardcore issues. We are engaged in a long term effort. In the case of deep seabed mining, we have serious objections to many parts of the Geneva texts even though they are better than the Informal Composite Negotiating Text produced last year at the end of the sixth session.

The Geneva texts are valuable in that they provide the basis for further negotiation and move the conference closer to the goal of

Turning again to the negotiations which resume this week, the objective of the United States is, as it has been throughout these negotiations, achievement of a comprehensive treaty that protects our essential interests. We continue to believe, at the same time, that this conference will be judged to have been successful only if it protects the essential interests of all nations.

For the United States, these interests include assured access to seabed minerals. As a compromise, we shall continue to try to create a parallel system of mining which attracts investment, is economically viable over the long term, and accommodates the just claims of the developing world. This system should insure access and tenure by