judge of doctrines he is sole legislator; and supreme judge of controversies; and of the times, and occasions of war, and peace: to him it belongeth to choose magistrates, counsellors, commanders, and all other officers and ministers; and to determine of rewards and punishments, honour, and order. The reasons whereof, are the same which are alleged in the precedent chapter, for the same rights and consequences of sovereignty by institution.

Dominion is acquired two ways; by generation and by conquest. The right of dominion by generation is that, which the parent hath over his children, and is called "paternal." And is not so derived from the generation, as if therefore the parent had dominion over his child because he begat him; but from the child's consent, either express, or by other sufficient arguments declared. For as to the generation, God hath ordained to man a helper; and there be always two that are equally parents: the dominion therefore over the child should belong equally to both; and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible, for no man can obey two masters. And whereas some have attributed the dominion to the man only, as being of the more excellent sex; they misreckon in it. For there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without war. In commonwealths, this controversy is decided by the civil law; and for the most part, but not always, the sentence is in favour of the father; because for the most part commonwealths have been erected by the fathers, not by the mothers of families. But the question lieth now in the state of mere nature; where there are supposed no laws of matrimony; no laws for the education of children; but the law of Nature, and the natural inclination of the sexes, one to another, and to their children. In this condition of mere nature, either the parents between themselves dispose of the dominion over the child by contract; or do not dispose thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, the right passeth according to the contract. We find in history that the Amazons contracted with the men of the neighbouring countries, to whom they had recourse for issue, that the issue male should be sent back, but the female remain with themselves: so that the dominion of the females was in the mother.

If there be no contract, the dominion is in the mother. For in the condition of mere nature, where there are no matrimonial laws, it cannot be known who is the father, unless it be declared by the mother and therefore the right of dominion over the child dependeth on her will, and is consequently hers. Again, seeing the infant is first in the power of the mother, so as she may either nourish or expose it; if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the mother; and is therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the dominion over it is hers. But if she expose it, and another find and nourish it, the dominion is in him that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; because preservation of life being the end, for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him.

If the mother be the father's subject, the child is in the father's power: and if the father be the mother's subject, as when a sovereign queen marrieth one of her subjects, the child is subject to the mother; because the father also is her subject.

If a man and womar, monarchs of two several kingdoms, have a child, and contract concerning who shall have the dominion of him, the right of the dominion passeth by the contract. If they contract not, the dominion followeth the dominion of the place of his residence. For the sovereign of each country hath dominion over all that reside therein.

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He that hath the dominion over the child, hath dominion also over the children of the child; and over their children's children. For he that hath dominion over the person of a man, hath dominion over all that is his; without which, dominion were but a title, without the effect.

The right of succession to paternal dominion, proceedeth in the same manner as doth the right of succession of monarchy; of which I have already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.

Dominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war, is that which some writers call "despotical," from Aeonórns, which signifieth a "lord," or 66 master; " and is the dominion of the master over his servant. And this dominion is then acquired to the victor, when the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in express words, or by other sufficient signs of the will, that so long as his life and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure. And after such covenant made, the vanquished is a 66 'servant," and not before for by the word " servant," whether it be derived from servire, to serve, or from servare, to save, which I leave to grammarians to dispute, is not meant a captive, which is kept in prison or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do with him: for such men, commonly called slaves, have no obligation at all; but may break their bonds or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their master, justly: but one, that being taken, hath corporal liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his master, is trusted by him.

It is not therefore the victory that giveth the right of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is conquered; that is to say, beaten and taken, or put to flight; but because he cometh in and submitteth to the victor; nor is the victor obliged by an enemy's rendering himself without promise of life, to spare him for this his yielding to discretion, which obliges not the victor longer than in his own discretion he shall think fit.

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And that which men do when they demand, as it is now called, quarter," which the Greeks called Zwypia, "taking alive," is to evade the present fury of the victor by submission, and to compound for their life with ransom, or service; and therefore he that hath quarter, hath not his life given, but deferred till farther deliberation; for it is not a yielding on condition of life, but to discretion. And then only is his life in security, and his service due, when the victor hath trusted him with his corporal liberty. For slaves that work in prisons, or fetters, do it not of duty, but AA to avoid the cruelty of their taskmasters.

The master of the servant is master also of all he hath, and may exact the use thereof, that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, and of his children, so often as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life of his master by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning and authorizing whatsoever the master shall do. And in case the master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for his disobedience, he is himself the author of the same, and cannot accuse him of injury.

In sum, the rights and consequences of both "paternal" and "despotical" dominion, are the very same with those of a sovereign by institution; and for the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the precedent chapter. So that for a man that is monarch of divers nations, whereof.he hath in one the sovereignty by institution of the people assembled, and in another by conquest, that is by the submission of each particular, to avoid death or bonds; to demand of one nation more than of the other from the title of conquest, as being a conquered nation, is an act of

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ignorance of the rights of sovereignty; for the sovereign is absolute over both alike, or else there is no sovereignty at all; and so every man may lawfully protect himself, if he can, with his own sword, which is the condition of war.

By this it appears that a great family, if it be not part of some commonwealth, is of itself, as to the rights of sovereignty, a little monarchy; whether that family consist of a man and his children, or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children and servants together, wherein the father or master is the sovereign. But yet a family is not properly a commonwealth, unless it be of that power by its own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without the hazard of war. For where a number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of danger to save his own life, either by flight or by submission to the enemy, as he shall think best; in the same manner as a very small company of soldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their arms and demand quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. And thus much shall suffice concerning what I find by speculation, and deduction of sovereign rights, from the nature, need, and designs of men, in erecting of commonwealths, and putting themselves under monarchs, or assemblies entrusted with power euough for their protection.

Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point. To Moses, the children of Israel say thus: Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die" (Exod. xx. 19). This is absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the right of kings, God Himself by the mouth of Samuel, saith (1 Sam. viii. 11, 12, &c.): "This shall be the right of the king you will have to reign over you. He shall take your sons, and set them to drive his chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run before his chariots; and gather in his harvest; and to make his engines of war, and instruments of his chariots; and shall take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his cooks, and bakers. He shall take your fields, your vineyards, and your olive yards, and give them to his servants. He shall take the tithe of your corn and wine, and give it to the men of his chamber, and to his other servants. He shall take your manservants and your maidservants, and the choice of your youth, and employ them in his business. He shall take the tithe of your flocks, and you shall be his servants." This is absolute power, and summed up in the last words, you shall be his servants." Again, when the people heard what power their king was to have, yet they consented thereto, and say thus (verse 10): "We will be as all other nations, and our king shall judge our causes, and go before us, to conduct our wars.' Here is confirmed the right that sovereigns have both to the "militia" and to all " 'judicature;" in which is contained as absolute power as one man can possibly transfer to another. Again, the prayer of king Solomon to God was this (1 Kings iii. 9): "Give to thy servant understanding, to judge thy people, and to discern between good and evil." It belongeth therefore to the sovereign to be ". judge," and to prescribe the rules of "discerning good" and "evil;" which rules are laws; and therefore in him is the legislative power. Saul sought the life of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his servants would have done it, David forbad them, saying (1 Sam. xxiv. 6): "God forbid F For should do such an act against my lord, the anointed of God." obedience of servants St. Paul saith (Col. iii. 22): "Servants obey your masters in all things; "and (Col. iii. 20): "Children obey your parents in all things." There is simple obedience in those that are subject to paternal or despotical dominion. Again (Matt. xxiii. 2, 3): “The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' chair, and therefore all that they shall bid you

observe, that observe and do." There again is simple obedience. And St. Paul (Titus iii. 2): "Warn them that they subject themselves to princes, and to those that are in authority, and obey them." This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour Himself acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are by kings imposed, where he says, "Give to Cæsar that which is Cæsar's; " and paid such taxes Himself. And that the king's word is sufficient to take anything from any subject, when there is need; and that the king is judge of that need, for He Himself, as king of the Jews, commanded His disciples to take the ass, and ass's colt, to carry Him into Jerusalem, saying (Matt. xxi. 2, 3): “Go into the village over against you, and you shall find a she-ass tied, and her colt with her; untie them, and bring them to me. And if any man ask you what you mean by it, say the Lord hath need of them: and they will let them go." They will not ask whether His necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether He be judge of that necessity; but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.

To these places may be added also that of Genesis (iii. 5): “Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," And (verse 11): "Who told thee that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee thou shouldest not eat?" For the cognizance or judicature of "good" and evil," being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, as a trial of Adam's obedience; the devil to inflame the ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautiful, told her that by tasting it they should be as gods, knowing "good" and "evil." Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them God's office, which is judicature of good and evil; but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is said, that having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place, as if they had been formerly blind, and saw not their own skins: the meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their nakedness, wherein it was God's will to create them, to be uncomely; and by being ashamed, did tacitly censure God Himself. And thereupon God saith: "Hast thou eaten, &c.," as if He should say, doest thou that owest me obedience, take upon thee to judge of my commandments? Whereby it is clearly, though allegorically, signified that the commands of them that have the right to command, are not by their subjects to be censured nor disputed.

So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from reason and) Scripture, that the sovereign power, whether placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly of men, as in popular and aristocratical commonwealths, is as great as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a power, men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The condition of man in this life shall never be without inconveniences; but there happeneth in no commonwealth any great inconvenience but what proceeds from the subject's disobedience, and breach of those covenants, from which the commonwealth has its being. And whosoever thinking sovereign power too great, will seek to make it less, must subject himself to the power that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.

The greatest objection is, that of the practice; when men ask where and when such power has by subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask them again, when or where has there been a kingdom long free from sedition and civil war. In those nations whose commonwealths have been long-lived, and not being destroyed but by foreign war, the subjects never did dispute of the sovereign power. But howsoever, an argument from the practice of men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason

weighed the causes and nature of commonwealths, and suffer daily those miseries that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is invalid. For though in all places of the world men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred that so it ought to be. The skill of making and maintaining commonwealths, consisteth in certain rules, as doth arithmetic and geometry; not, as tennis-play, on practice only: which rules neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.

CHAPTER XXI

Of the Liberty of Subjects.

LIBERTY, or "freedom," signifieth, properly, the absence of opposition; by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion; and may be applied no less to irrational and inanimate creatures than to rational. For whatsoever is so tied, or environed, as it cannot move but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some external body, we say it hath not liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures whilst they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls or chains; and of the water whilst it is kept in by banks or vessels, that otherwise would spread itself into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at liberty to move in such manner, as without those external impediments they would. But when the impediment of motion is in the constitution of the thing itself, we use. not to say, it wants the liberty, but the power to move; as when a stone lieth still, or a man is fastened to his bed by sickness.

And according to this proper and generally received meaning of the word, a freeman, is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to." But when the words "free," and "liberty," are applied to anything but "bodies," they are abused; for that which is not subject to motion, is not subject to impediment; and therefore, when it is said for example, the way 's free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop. And when we say a gift is free, there is not meant any liberty of the gift, but of the giver, that was not bound by any law or covenant to give it. So when we 66 speak freely," it is not the liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise than he did. Lastly, from the use of the word "free-will," no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.

Fear and liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into the sea for "fear" the ship should sink, he doth it nevertheless very willingly, and may refuse to do it if he will: it is therefore the action of one that was 66 free;" so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for "fear" of imprisonment, which because nobody hindered him from detaining, was the action of a man at "liberty. And generally all actions which men do in commonwealths, for "fear" of the law, are actions which the doers had 'liberty" to omit.

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Liberty" and "necessity" are consistent, as in the water that hath not only "liberty," but a "necessity" of descending by the channel; so likewise in the actions which men voluntarily do: which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from "liberty;" and yet, because every act of