the remainder is then vested in the existing members, subject to open and
let in new members, and to be wholly divested in favor of a substituted
devisee as to the share of a member dying. L'Etourneau v. Henquenet,
310.

4. WILLS - CONSTRUCTION - HOMESTEAD-ELECTION BY HEIRS - ESTOPPEL.
- When a testator by his will directed that his homestead claim to land
be perfected, and that all of his real estate be sold when it would realize
a certain sum, the proceeds to be equally divided among his children, it
will be presumed that he did not attempt to dispose of the homestead
claim by his will, and his children were not required to make any elec-
tion, but could have claimed the homestead as his heirs, and also shared
in the estate under the will. As the executor named included the home-
stead in the inventory of the estate, and sold and conveyed it with the
rest of the testator's land under order of court which was confirmed, and
the purchaser thereafter obtained a quitclaim deed thereto from the tes
tator's children who had come of age, and from the guardian of his minor
children, after which such children, on coming of age, received and re-
tained their respective portions of the purchase-money received at the
executor's sale, they are estopped from denying that their title to any of
the land, including the homestead, passed by the executor's deed. Lewis
v. Lichty, 25.

See ASSIGNMENt, 6; Legacies,

DISCRIMINATION.

See CARRIERS, 1, 2; JURISDICTION, 1; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 9, 10,

DISSOLUTION.
See CORPORATIONS, 6.

DISTRIBUTION.

See DESCENT.

DIVERSION.

See WATERCOURSES, 6, 12,

DOCK LINES.
See WATERCOURSES, 17.

DOGS.

See ANIMALS; LARCENY.

DOMICILE.

See ELECTIONS, 2, 8.

DOWER.

See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 5; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 14; PUBLIC LANDS, 2

DRUGGISTS.

See APOTHECARIES.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 4; WATERCOURSES, 8.

EASEMENTS.

--

1. EASEMENT OR SERVITUDE, PROPERTY PASSES SUBJECT TO, WHEN. Where
a continuous and apparent easement or servitude is imposed by the owner
of real estate on a part thereof for the benefit of another part, and the
portions are subsequently conveyed to different persons, the purchaser
of the servient property, in the absence of an express reservation or
agreement, takes it subject to the easement or servitude. Geible v. Smith,
796.

2. RIGHT OF MILL-OWNER TO RESTORE DAM.-When the owner of a mill
and of the land sustaining a dam which supplies the water-power for
the mill grants the mill, together with the mill seat and all water rights
appertaining thereto, the grantee has a right to restore the dam after-
wards washed away by freshet, although the land on which it is situated
has been conveyed to other parties. In restoring the dam, he may con-
nect it with the bank higher up the stream than it was formerly, if this
is rendered necessary by the freshet; and he may build the restored
dam higher than the old one, so long as he does not thereby increase
the water-power to which he was entitled at the time of his grant, al-
though the effect of such restoration is to overflow more than formerly
the land on which the dam is situated. Riverdale Park Co. v. Westcott,
249.

3. RIGHT OF MILL-OWNER TO REBUILD DAM-IMPROVED MACHINERY.
When the owner of a mill, mill site, and the water rights thereto ap
pertaining is entitled to rebuild a dam for furnishing him with power,
situated on the land of another, his right to restore the dam to its origi
nal power is not affected by the introduction of new and improved ma.
chinery in the mill, so long as the quantity of water used is not thereby
increased. Riverdale Park Co. v. Westcott, 249.

4. EXTINGUISHMENT. When the purpose, reason, and necessity for an ease-
ment cease, within the intent for which it was granted, the easement is
extinguished. Hahn v. Baker Lodge, 723.

See EMINENT Domain, 1; Grants; Injunction, 4; Privath Ways, 1.

GISTRATION.

-

ELECTIONS.

1. QUALIFICATION OF VOTER-VESTED RIGHTS-RULE OF EVIDENCE-RE-
-The right of an elector to have his qualifications to vote
determined by existing rules of evidence is not a vested right, and is
at all times subject to regulation by statute, so long as his constitutional
rights are not thereby invaded, and he is not precluded from presenting
them to the proper forum for determination. The forum for the determi-
nation of this question is the office of registration of voters. Southerland
v. Norris, 255.

2. QUALIFICATION OF VOTER-RESIDENCE-RULE OF EVIDENCE. Whether
or not a person is entitled to vote in a particular place where he is not
actually domiciled is a question depending to some extent upon his in-
tention to make that place his legal residence, and a statute which adds
no qualification of any kind, but simply makes provision for proving in
a particular and definite way what that intention is, invades no consti-
tutional rights and is valid. Southerland v. Norris, 255.

3. QUALIFICATION OF VOTER-RULE OF EVIDENCE AS TO RESIDENCE. — A
statute which adds no qualification to a voter except to provide that all
persons whose names are registered, but who have removed from the

state and have acquired a new domicile elsewhere at the time of the pas
sage of the act, shall be conclusively presumed to have permanently re-
moved from the state, unless the person who has so removed rebuts
that presumption by making a prescribed affidavit of intention to return
and permanently reside within the state, and by subsequently returning,
simply provides a rule of evidence for the proof of legal residence, and
invades no constitutional nor legal right of a voter who has removed
from the state previous to its enactment, and who is in the employ of
the United States government in another state or country. Southerland
v. Norris, 255.

4. QUALIFICATION OF VOTER. STATUTORY RULE OF EVIDENCE in force at
the time a voter's qualifications as an elector is to be decided or deter.
mined, and not that in force when that question first arose, must con-
trol the admissibility and effect of evidence applicable thereto, when no
constitutional or legal right of the voter is invaded. Southerland v. Nor•
ris, 255.

5. "STICKER" MAY BE USED TO PLACE CANDIDATE'S NAME ON BALLOT. — Un-
der the ballot act of June 19, 1891, the name of any candidate not printed
on the ballot may be inserted therein by the voter by the use of a printed
adhesive slip, and need not be written. De Walt v. Bartley, 814.

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BALLOT LAW-ELECTIONS, POWER OF LEGISLA-
TURE TO REGULATE. — The legislature has undoubted power under the
constitution to regulate elections so long as it merely regulates the exer-
cise of the elective franchise, and does not deny the franchise itself,
either directly or by rendering its exercise so difficult and inconvenient
as to amount to a denial. De Walt v. Bartley, 814.
7. BALLOT ACT OF JUNE 19, 1891, NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

-

The act of June

19, 1891, prescribing and regulating the use of an official ballot, does not
contravene the constitution. Its main object is to secure a secret ballot,
and it prescribes reasonable regulations to effect its object, carefully
preserving the right of every elector to vote for whom he pleases, with-
out any unnecessary inconvenience. It is in harmony with the constitu-
tional requirement that elections shall be free and equal, and is not local
or special legislation. De Walt v. Bartley, 814.

See DEVISE, 4; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 5, 6.

-

EMINENT DOMAIN.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PROPERTY NOT "DAMAGED" WITHIN MEANING OF
CONSTITUTION UNLESS IT IS SPECIALLY AFFECTED. - The owner of prop-
erty, to be entitled to compensation for property damaged by a public
improvement, must show that either the property itself or some right or
easement connected with it is directly affected, and that it is specially
affected in a manner not common to the property owner and the public
at large. The owner of a city lot cannot, therefore, enjoin the city from
erecting a fire-engine house upon an adjacent lot until compensation is
first made to him for the anticipated depreciation in the value of his
property, in consequence of the noise and bustle incident to such a struc-
ture, where no special and peculiar damage is shown. Van De Vere v.
Kansas City, 396.
2 WHAT SUBJECT TO CEMETERIES. -The fact that lands have been pre-
viously devoted to cemetery purposes does not place them beyond the
reach of the power of eminent domain. That is an absolute transcend-

ent power belonging to the sovereign, which can be exercised for the
public welfare whenever the sovereign authority determines that neces
sity for its exercise exists, and the dwellings of the living and the rest-
ing-places of the dead may be alike condemned. Matter of Board of
Street Opening, 640.

See WATERCOURSES, 8.

EMPLOYMENT.

See INVENTIONS.

ENTICEMENT.

See HUSBAND and Wife, 5.

EN VENTRE SA MERE.
See NEGLIGENCE, 4.

EQUITY.

1. JURY TRIAL. IN A SUIT IN EQUITY, where there is a finding of facts by a
jury and also by the court, the latter is as conclusive as if no jury had
been impaneled in the case. Harris v. Lloyd, 475.

2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS- UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAX FOR STREET IMPROve.
MENT― JURISDICTION OF EQUITY TO SET ASIDE WITHOUT TENDER.
Where a tax levied for a street improvement is void and unconstitutional
for want of equality, a court of equity will set it aside and restrain its
collection, at the instance of a land-owner against whom it is assessed
without a tender on his part of his proper proportion of the cost of the
improvement. Howell v. Tacoma, 83.

3. FINAL JUDGMENTS IN EQUITY, WHAT ARE. — If, after a decree has been en-

tered, no further questions can come before the court except such as are
necessary to be determined in carrying the decree into effect, it is final;
otherwise it is interlocutory. Arnold v. Sinclair, 489.

4. A JUDGMENT IN EQUITY IS FINAL which determines that plaintiff and de-
fendant were partners; that the partnership has been dissolved; that the
profits and losses were to be shared equally between the partners; that
the assets of the partnership are in the possession of the defendant, and
requires him to account to plaintiff touching the affairs of and business
of the copartnership, and appoints a receiver to take possession of the
property and do such acts respecting it as the court may authorize, and
to close up the business, and directs that a referee be appointed to state
an account between the partners and report it to the court, and that the
residue of the property be divided between them. Arnold v. Sinclair,
489.

See ASSIGNMENT, 2-5; COMPROMISE; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 3;
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 9; INJUNCTION, 5; JUDGMENTS, 7; MINES AND
MINING, 3; MISTAKE; MORTGAGES, 4, 5; PUBLIC LANDS, 2; VENDOR AND
PURCHASER, 4.

ERROR.

See APPEAL; CRIMINAL LAW, 10; DAMAGES, 3; EXECUTION, 1; HOMICIDE, 1, 4;
SLANDER, 6; TRIAL, 6; WATERCOURSES, 16.

ESTATES.

1. A VESTED ESTATE, whether present or future, may be absolutely or defeasi
bly vested. In the latter case, it is said to be vested subject to being
divested on the happening of a contingency subsequent. L'Etourneau v.
Henquenet, 310.

2 REMAINDERS ARE CONTINGENT under the statute of Michigan if either the
person to whom the estate is given or the event upon which it is to take
effect remains uncertain. L'Etourneau v. Henquenet, 310.

See DESCENT; DEVISE, 3; MORTGAGES, 3; STATUTES, 4; WILLS, 10.

ESTOPPEL.

-

1. VENDOR AND VENDEE ESTOPPEL AGAINST GRANTOR. A deed of a gran.
tor purporting to convey the absolute title to land estops him from deny.
ing that before and at the date of the deed he had such absolute title, and
by the deed conveyed it to the grantee. De Frieze v. Quint, 151.
2 GRANTOR OF LAND ESTOPPED BY HIS DEED TO CORPORATION WHEN.
Where a grantor, for a valuable consideration and in good faith, con-
veys land, by a deed which is duly recorded, to a corporation named
therein as grantee, such grantor and those claiming under him will
be estopped to deny the capacity of such grantee to take the land, al-
though, owing to a mistake of the attorney, the incorporation of the
grantee was not perfected until after the conveyance was made. Rein-
hard v. Virginia etc. Mining Company, 441.

3. OWNER OF JUDGMENT ESTOPPED FROM DENYING DEFENDANT's Title to
PROPERTY SOLD UNDER EXECUTION ISSUED ON. - Where the real owner
of a judgment rendered in the name of another as the plaintiff on the
record has execution issued and property sold under it as the property
of the judgment defendant, he will be thereby estopped from afterwards
setting up that such defendant had no title to the property when it was
sold. Rapp v. Crawford, 780.

4. JUDGMENTS — PARTIES.

-

-

- A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction
sometimes operates as an estoppel against persons who were not named
in the proceedings and were not parties to the record by name. It is
enough that they were represented in the action or proceeding which re-
sulted in the judgment, or were entitled to be heard therein. Ashton v.
Rochester, 619.

5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS STREET IMPROVEMENT - UNCONSTITUTIONAL
ASSESSMENT. - A land-owner who is a petitioner for street improve-
ment, and who fails to avail himself of an opportunity given of appear.
ing and objecting to the proceedings therefor, or to an assessment which
is void and unconstitutional for want of equality, is not estopped by the
action of the city council in approving the levy. Howell v. Tacoma, 83.
See CLOUD ON TITLE, 1; DEVISE, 4; HUSBAND AND Wife, 8; Insurance, 17,
18; OFFICERS, 4, 5.

EVIDENCE.

1. FRAUD- EVIDENCE OF, IN OTHER TRANSACTIONS. - In an action to recover
money paid under a contract for the sale of land alleged to have been
procured by false and fraudulent representations, evidence of similar
representations made to a third party in a similar but distinct transac
tion is inadmissible. McKay v. Russell, 44.

2 HABEAS CORPUS, TESTIMONY TAKEN ON, NOT ADMISSIBLE ON TRIAL OF AC-