The effect of the amendment upon the original statute under which the judges had the power to establish and to change by rule the rule days for pleading and the periods at which pleadings shall commence and be continued, is to take wholly from the judges the power to fix general rule days and partially from them the power to regulate the time and manner of pleading, by establishing with the certainty and the force of law made by statute, what days shall be rule days, and upon what rule days, in certain classes of cases, the pleadings shall commence and continue. Over these matters the judges have no further discretion, and with respect to matters allied with them, the judges will endeavor to make rules and rulings that conform to the spirit of the new law. [4] Divining that the statute has for its object the dispatch of pleading and the speedy bringing of causes to issue, its provisions are plain and must be interpreted and enforced as they are expressed. [5] General rule days are declared by the statute to be the first and third Mondays in each month, these days fortunately coinciding with the first day of the different terms of court in the several counties. General rule days are thus fixed by statute and will remain as fixed until changed by statute. [6, 7] The statute is equally clear, that in certain cases, namely, "in all cases, in which no affidavit of demand is filed," the plaintiff shall file his narr., and in scire facias and ejectment cases, the defendant, his plea, "on the first general rule day after the process is returnable." This provision we consider mandatory and as the statute suggests no exception to its mandate, we construe its meaning to be, that "in all cases, in which no affidavit of demand is filed," the plaintiff is required to file his declaration on the first general rule day after the process is returnable, whether the return upon the process shows service upon the defendant or not, and whether the defendant by appearance is in court or not; and that in scire facias cases in which no affidavit of demand is filed, and in ejectment cases, the defendant, if in court by service, is likewise required to file his plea on the first general rule day after the process is returnable. If the defendant is not in court by service but appears during the term to which the process is returnable, the judges will supply the omission of the statute and direct that in scire facias cases in which no affidavit of demand is filed, and in ejectment cases and in any other case in which a declaration has been filed, the defendant shall be ruled to plead by the next general rule day after his appearance, if there be two full calendar weeks between the date of his appearance and the next general rule day, and if there be not two weeks between these dates, then the rule upon him to plead shall be to the second general rule day thereafter. [8] When once begun pleadings shall continue under general rules to general rule days, without regard to term time or vacation. [9] As the provisions of the statute as to time of pleading, extend by expression only to "cases in which no affidavit of demand is filed," it leaves open for direction by the judges, the manner and time of pleading in cases in which affidavits of demand are filed. [10] In cases in which affidavits of demand are filed and which do not go to judgment thereon either at the first or at a succeeding term, according to the existing practice, the plaintiff shall be required to file his narr., and in appropriate cases, the defendant his plea, on the next general rule day after the date upon which the affidavit of demand has for any reason become ineffective as a method of procuring judgment, if there intervene two full calendar weeks, and if not, then on the second general rule day thereafter. When an affidavit of demand is filed in a case and for any legal reason ceases to have the force of an affidavit of demand, and thereupon ceases to be the effective instrument of obtaining judgment without pleadings, the case then is in just the same position of a case in which no affidavit of demand has been filed at all, and with regard to time of pleading, comes within the class of cases included by the statute in which pleading is required to be begun two weeks after the return of process. Therefore, if upon the defendant's motion judgment on the plaintiff's affidavit of demand is refused, or if the defendant files an affidavit of defense, and judgment notwithstanding an affidavit of defense is neither asked nor allowed, or if the plaintiff fails to move for judgment on his affidavit of demand within the term, either upon the original or alias, according to his service, the case becomes one as though no affidavit of demand had been filed in it, and the pleading should at once begin and continue in the two weeks intervals contemplated by the statute. [11] Applying these rulings to the precise matter under consideration, we say that if leave had been granted the relator to file his information on the first day of the May term which was also the first rule day in May, the defendant should have been ruled to plead on the third Monday in May. As the leave to file the information was granted the relator on this second Wednesday in May and as the next general rule day is next Monday and is therefore less than two weeks distant, the defendant is instructed that the rule day for his plea is the second general rule day from this date, which is the first general rule day in June. RICE, J., delivering the opinion of the (4 Boyce, 272) (Superior Court of Delaware. New Castle. 1. INSURANCE (§ 785*)—Mutual BENEFIT ASSOCIATION-BENEFICIARIES-ORDER OF PAYMENT-RULES OF ORDER-CONSTRUCTION. The constitution of a mutual benefit society provided that, if one or more of the beneficiaries died before the member, the survivors should be entitled to the benefit equally unless otherwise provided, and if all the beneficiaries so died, and no other direction was made as provided by the laws of the order, the benefit should be paid to his widow, if any, and, if none, then to his children in equal shares, etc. Held that, where a member's widow was not designated as his beneficiary, it was necessary, in order that she should take under such provision, that the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated should have died during the life of the member, and that he should have failed to make any other designa tion. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1943, 1974; Dec. Dig. § 785.*] 2. INSURANCE (§ 719*) MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES-BENEFICIARIES RESTRICTION BY-LAWS. - An amendment to a by-law of a mutual benefit society provided that each applicant should designate the person or persons to whom the beneficiary fund due at his death should be paid, who in every instance should be one or more members of his family or some one related to him by blood, or at the discretion of the Grand Master Workman might be an affianced wife, or one that was dependent on him, etc. Held, that such provision was prospective only in its operation, and did not invalidate a certificate made payable to a trustee, who was a creditor of the member, to secure payment of the debt, where the trustee, when the certificate was issued, was a proper beneficiary. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1855; Dec. Dig. § 719.*] 3. INSURANCE (§ 793*) BENEFICIARIES TRUSTS-RECOVERY OF FUND. Where a mutual benefit certificate was made payable to a trustee to secure a debt owing by the member, who died without changing the beneficiary, the proceeds of the certificate were payable to such trustee, in the absence of statute or a law of the order regulating the matter, regardless of the fact that the trust had terminated by the payment of the debt, though he might be required in a proper proceeding to account for the funds as trustee. This proceeding is based on the statements of claim filed by the claimants, to a fund of $1,609 paid into court under the court's order, in a petition for interpleader entered by "the Grand Lodge of the Ancient Order of United Workmen of Delaware." In the petition, the lodge disclaimed all interest in the fund, and prayed that Harry Emmons, trustee, the plaintiff in the suit against it, be ordered to interplead with Elizabeth A. Wittaker, claimant. The prayer was granted and order to interplead signed. Harry Emmons, trustee, claimed in his statement: That J. Jackson Wittaker had in his lifetime been a member of the Ancient Order of United Workmen, which had in 1885 issued a benefit certificate to him for $2,000, wherein Harry Emmons, trustee, was named J. Jackson Wittaker was a member in good as beneficiary; that, at the time of his death, standing; that, when this certificate was issued, the laws of the order did not limit the member to the appointment of a beneficiary within a restricted class; that Emmons, trustee, is entitled to the fund paid into court under the bill of interpleader. Elizabeth A. Wittaker in her statement of claim alleges: That she is the widow of J. Jackson Wittaker, who died on May 1, 1912, intestate and without issue, and as widow under the intestate laws of this state is entitled to an interest in his estate; that J. Jackson Wittaker became a member of the A. O. U. W. in 1882, and was granted a benefit certificate wherein his brother was named as beneficiary; that the certificate was applied for and accepted with the express agreement that the member would comply with the laws, rules, and regulations of the order, then existing or thereafter enacted; that in 1885 her husband changed his beneficiary, and the lodge issued to him a certificate in which Harry Emmons, trustee, was named as beneficiary; that subsequent to 1885 and prior to 1893 the order passed a law restricting the person or persons that an applicant for membership might name as [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. 1967-1972, 1980; Dec. Dig. beneficiary, to one or more members of his 793.*] family or some one related to him by blood; Wittaker that he change his beneficiary, as classes, this Wittaker refused to do; that Bill of interpleader by the Grand Lodge of the Ancient Order of United Workmen of Delaware, an unincorporated association, to determine, as between Harry Emmons, trus-named, did not come within the restricted tee, and Elizabeth A. Wittaker, the legal title to the proceeds of a benefit certificate on the life of J. Jackson Wittaker, deceased. On demurrer by Emmons, trustee, to the claim of Elizabeth A. Wittaker, claiming the fund as the widow. Sustained. Argued before WOOLLEY and RICE, JJ. Harry Emmons, of Wilmington, for claimant. Herbert H. Ward, of Wilmington, for interpleader. since this refusal, Harry Emmons, trustee, has been an illegal beneficiary, and is not now entitled to receive the benefit of the cer tificate; and as the beneficiary named was an illegal one, under the laws of the order existing at the time of her husband's death, she as widow of J. Jackson Wittaker, is entitled to the fund under the provisions of the section of the laws of the order entitled "Order of Payment of Beneficiaries." This claimant also alleges: That Harry | provided by the laws of the order. Upon the Emmons, trustee, was named as beneficiary to failure of the happening of both contingensecure him as endorser on certain promissory cies the widow has no right to the fund unnotes or obligations, and as surety for cer- der section 6. tain indebtedness of J. Jackson Wittaker to Harry Emmons, all of which the said Wittaker paid before his death, and the trust created for the benefit of Emmons had ceased, and he, Emmons, at the time of the death of Wittaker, did not hold the benefit certificate in trust for any purpose whatever. Elizabeth Wittaker claimant also offers to reimburse Emmons out of the fund of $1,609, for any payments or advances he may have made to the Grand Lodge for Wittaker, together with interest. In the present case, the beneficiary did not die during the lifetime of the member, but is now alive, and therefore the first of the two things necessary to take place, before the widow would be entitled to the fund, did not happen. However counsel for Elizabeth A. Wittaker contends that section 6 should be construed to have the meaning, which would be given to it if the word "or" appeared in place of the word "and,” as found the second time in the section, in which event that portion of the To the statement of claim filed by Eliza-section would read as follows: "And if all beth A. Wittaker, Harry Emmons, trustee, the other claimant, enters a demurrer. The claims of Elizabeth A. Wittaker may be generally summed up as follows: (1) That under the laws of the order existing at the time of the death of J. Jackson Wittaker, Harry Emmons, trustee, was an illegal beneficiary not entitled to the fund, and she, as widow of the deceased member, is entitled to it under the provisions of section 6, article 28, of the Constitution of the A. O. U. W.; (2) that the trust was created by Wittaker to secure Emmons for various obligations or loans, and had ceased to exist by reason of payment of the said loans or obligations, to Emmons, by Wittaker in his lifetime, and on account of the trustee's loss of interest in the fund, it is payable to her as widow, under the laws of the order. [1] In considering the widow's claim it is necessary to refer to article 28, section 6, of the Constitution of "the Grand Lodge of the Ancient Order of United Workmen of Delaware," which is as follows: the beneficiaries shall die during the lifetime of the member, or he shall have made no other direction in the manner provided by the laws of the order." While we are not ready to accept the argument that such a meaning should be given to the section in question, yet briefly we will consider the effect of such a construction, as it pointedly raises the question, whether or not, the beneficiary named is an illegal one. [2] Harry Emmons, trustee, was named as beneficiary in 1885, when, as far as we have been able to ascertain, the laws of the order did not prohibit this designation. The constitution was changed, and limited classes of beneficiaries established in 1888 (year fixed at the argument), by the enactment of section 5, article 28, which is as follows: "5. Beneficiaries.-Each applicant shall designate the person or persons to whom the beneficiary fund due at his death shall be paid; who shall, in every instance, be one or more members of his family, or some one re"6. Order of Payment of Beneficiaries.—If lated to him by blood, or at the discretion of one or more of the beneficiaries shall die dur-.the Grand Master Workman, may be an afing the lifetime of the member, the surviving fianced wife, or who shall be dependent upon beneficiaries shall be entitled to the benefit him. Provided, in no instance shall a divorcequally, unless otherwise provided in the ed wife of a member remain his beneficiary beneficiary certificate; and if all the bene- after divorce." ficiaries shall die during the lifetime of the member, and he shall have made no other direction in the manner provided by the laws of the order, the benefit shall be paid to his widow; if any; if he leaves no widow, then to his children in equal shares, grand children to take the share to which their deceased parent would be entitled if living; if no children, or their issue, then to his mother, if living; if no mother, then to his father, if living; and all these failing, then to his legal heirs." It will be observed that two things must occur before the widow of a deceased member is entitled to the beneficiary fund under the provisions of this section: First, the death of the beneficiary or beneficiaries named in the certificate during the lifetime of the member, and, second, the failure of the member This section provides that each applicant shall designate the person, to whom the beneficiary fund shall be paid, who shall be a member of his family or a blood relative. It refers only to those who were at the time applicants for membership, or would afterwards become applicants. This section by its terms did not bring within its scope those persons who were at the time members of the order. It referred to those only who were applicants, or would thereafter become applicants for membership. It was in terms and in effect prospective and not retroactive. It has been held by this court that when a person is properly named as beneficiary under the laws of a beneficial order, and the laws are afterwards changed or amended in a manner to make such beneficiary an im the expiration of ten years after the issuance of the certificate, and the facts of the trust were as claimed by Mrs. Wittaker. At the expiration of the ten years when the fund became payable, if Wittaker made no objection to the fund being paid to the trustee, we are not cognizant of any principle of law, by which the widow could come into court and successfully claim the money. In principle there is no difference between that case and the present one, and in the absence of statute law, we have failed to find any law which would authorize this court to order the fund here, to be paid to Elizabeth A. Wittaker, widow of J. Jackson Wittaker. change, the appointment is not invalidated, | case, as one where the fund was payable at if the change is in effect prospective and not retroactive. Emmons v. Supreme Conclave, I. O. H., 6 Pennewill, 115, 63 Atl. 871. Therefore if section 6 should be construed to mean that the widow has a right to the fund if the beneficiary named by the assured is an illegal appointment, as claimed by Elizabeth A. Wittaker, she would not be entitled to the fund in the present case, because this court has already held in the above case, that a like appointment was not made invalid, by the subsequent passage of a law similar to section 5, and under the doctrine of stare decisis, this court will follow the precedent therein established, and hold that the beneficiary is not an illegal one. [3] In respect to Elizabeth A. Wittaker's claim, as summarized by us under "2," we have diligently and exhaustively searched the constitution and general laws of the order, and have failed to find anything which, either in intent or terms, covers the proposition that where a trust created by a member has failed, the widow is entitled to the beneficiary fund. They are silent in that respect, and it is only reasonable to believe that the order never contemplated such a happening. As the laws of the association do not cover any set of facts as are claimed by Mrs. Wittaker to exist in the present case, her right to the fund must be determined by the application of the general policy of the law, in such cases. In Massachusetts and New Jersey they have statutes which provide, that associations may be formed to pay benefits to persons designated by the members, within certain restricted classes only. The courts of these states construe the statutes liberally, in cases coming within the statutes, and have held, where the beneficiary designated was an illegal one, the fund will not revert to the association because of the illegal designation, but it will go to the person or persons living at the time of the member's demise, first legally entitled to take, in the classes as set forth in the laws of the order, and coming within the provisions of the statutes also, and when this person is the widow the courts have directed the fund to be paid to her. American Legion of Honor v. Perry, 140 Mass. 580, 5 N. E. 634; Shea v. Massachusetts Beneficial Ass'n, 160 Mass. 289, 35 N. E. 855, 39 Am. St. Rep. 475; Britton v. Royal Arcanum, 46 N. J. Eq. 102, 18 Atl. 675, 19 Am. St. Rep. 376. In this state we have no statute covering the subject and therefore those cases, cited by counsel for the widow, which are decided by the courts under statutes as above, are of very little assistance to us. For a moment we will consider the present While under the law the widow is not entitled to the fund, nevertheless it does not follow and we do not decide that the trustee has a right to receive and keep it, if it is true that the trust has failed or lapsed by reason of the payment, by Wittaker, of the obligations. It would not be either equitable or just to have the trustee paid his debt, and permit him under objections by a proper person, to also keep the security placed in his hands. Under such circumstances the trust would fail or lapse, and we believe there would be by operation of law, a resulting trust of the security in favor of the person who had created the trust, and if that person should be dead then in favor of his estate. Bancroft v. Russell, 157 Mass. 47, 31 N. E. 710; Haskins v. Kendall, 158 Mass. 224, 33 N. E. 495, 35 Am. St. Rep. 490; Schmidt v. Northern Association, 112 Iowa, 41, 83 N. W. 800, 51 L. R. A. 141, 84 Am. St. Rep. 323. Bancroft v. Russell, 157 Mass. 47, 31 N. E. 710, was a case decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, and not decided under the provisions of any statute. The insurance fund was made payable to a trustee for the benefit of the mother of the assured. The mother died before the assured, and in a suit to determine what disposition should be made of the money, which had been paid to the trustee, the court held that there was a resulting trust in favor of the assured, and the proceeds of the policy were a part of his estate. The decision of the court in Bancroft v. Russell appeals to us to be a sound statement of the law. And while we are of the opinion that Elizabeth A. Wittaker, the widow of J. Jackson Wittaker, is not entitled to the fund paid into this court, under her statement of claim filed, yet we can readily conceive that if the fund should be paid to Harry Emmons, trustee, by order of this court, he can be compelled in a proper proceeding in a suitable court, to account for such funds, as trustee. Demurrer sustained. (4 Boyce, 279) SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS (§ 102*)— T. Bayard Heisel, of Wilmington, for plaintiff. Charles B. Evans and George L. Townsend, Jr., both of Wilmington, for defendant. Summons case (No. 64, March term, 1913). Case stated, the question before the court for determination being whether an automobile, owned and located in the consolidated district known as "the Newark Public Schools," is or is not, under the laws of this state, exempt from taxation for school purposes in said district. The facts and contentions are stated in the opinion. RICE, J., delivering the opinion of the court. The plaintiff is a corporation existing under the laws of the state of Delaware, having such powers as are conferred upon it by chapter 612, volume 19, Laws of Delaware, chapter 67, volume 21, Laws of Delaware, and all acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto. By the provisions of chapter 612, school districts in New Castle county known as school districts Nos. 39 and 41, were divided into school districts Nos. 39, 392, 41, and 412, and these four districts by the same act were incorporated and consolidated into one school district under the name of "the Newark Public Schools," to be governed by a "board of edu 19 Del. Laws, c. 612, divides two school districts into four districts, and incorporates those four districts under the title of the Newark Public Schools, and provides, under section 1, par. 6, that the districts thereby formed shall have all the rights, powers, etc., of school districts in the state. Section 4 provides that the board of education is vested with all the authority conferred by any law on the school committee of the two original districts, authorizing it to lay and raise by taxation any sums necessary to carry on the schools and for incidental expenses. Rev. Code 1852, amended to 1893, p. 325, c. 42, § 12, at that time provided that the school committees of the several school districts should make assessment lists, and that the rates of persons and personal property should be taken from the assessment list of the hundred on which such inhabitants were assessed, or if not on the list of any hundred the committee should rate them according to law. 21 Del. Laws, c. 67, § 18, provides that personal property of all white persons subject to tax for school purposes shall be liable to assessment and tax in the school district in which it is located, that the school committees in making assessment lists for their respective districts shall place thereon the rates of personal property subject to tax in the district in which it has an actual location, that they shall not take such rates from the assessment lists of the hundred, but shall fix the rates upon personal view thereof or other sufficient information, that the assessment lists shall only include the personal property actually located in the district, and that no property shall be assessed for school purposes which is exempt from taxation for county purposes. Section 30 provides that the provisions thereof, where not inconsistent with the acts incorporating the respective incorporat-solidated school district. The defendant in ed districts of the state, shall apply to such in- July, 1912, owned a motor car or automobile corporated districts. Rev. Code 1852, amended located within this district. to 1893, p. 114, c. 11, § 1, provides that all real and personal property not belonging to the state, the United States, etc., shall be liable to taxation for public purposes, but that provisions necessary for the use and consumption of the owner and his family for the year, farming utensils, the working tools of mechanics or manufacturers constantly employed in their business, the implements of a person's trade or profession, the stock on hand of a tradesman or manufacturer, household furniture, wearing apparel, ready money, goods, wares and merchandise imported, etc., shall be exempt. Held, that an automobile owned and located in the consolidated district known as Newark Public Schools was not exempt from taxation for county purposes, and was therefore taxable by such district for school purposes; it being conceded that its owner was not in the exempted classes specified in chapter 11, § 1, of the Revised Code, and that it did not constitute farming utensils, stock on hand of a manufacturer or tradesman, or goods, wares, and merchandise imported. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Schools and School Districts, Cent. Dig. §§ 233, 237-239, 252; Dec. Dig. § 102.*] Action by the Newark Public Schools against Samuel J. Wright. Judgment for plaintiff. cation." In the month of July, A. D. 1912, and for many years prior thereto, the defendant resided within the boundaries of said con In July, 1912, the board of education of the said consolidated school district, in order to raise money necessary to carry on the schools and for incidental expenses, for the ensuing year, in addition to the four dividends provided for in chapter 612, laid a tax upon said motor car or automobile of the defendant, at a valuation of $750, at a rate of $2.50 for each $100 of valuation, making a total of $18.75 tax on said motor car or automobile; the rate being the same as levied upon other personal property located in this school district, for school purposes, for the year. If the court is of the opinion that said motor car or automobile, at the time of assessing and levying said tax for the ensuing school year, was not exempt from assessment and taxation for school purposes, judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiff for $18.75, besides costs of suit; otherwise, judgment to be entered for the defendant. The court understands that no question is raised concerning the regularity of the assessment made by the "board of educa Argued before WOOLLEY and RICE, JJ. tion," and the only question for their de |