immaterial matters testified to by him on cross- | of afterwards impeaching the testimony of examination. the witness by contradicting him in case he [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Witnesses, should answer in the negative, it would Cent. Dig. § 1224; Dec. Dig. § 383.*] render the inquiry, as Mr. Starkie very justAppeal from Court of Common Pleas, Luz-ly observes, which ought to be single and conerne County. fined to the matter in issue, intolerably comAction by William Launikitas, etc., and plicated and prolix, and cause it to branch another, against the Wilkes-Barre & Wyom-out into an indefinite number of collateral ing Valley Traction Company. From judg- issues. 1 Stark. Ev. pt. 2, 135; Spenceley v. ment for the plaintiff named, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

De Willott, 7 East, 108; Odiorne v. Winkley, 2 Gall. 51 [Fed. Cas. No. 10,432]. Besides the Argued before BROWN, MESTREZAT, danger of rendering the trial of a cause inPOTTER, ELKIN, and MOSCHZISKER, JJ. terminable by such testimony, it is very obviPaul Bedford, Frank A. McGuigan, and ous that the jury may likewise be readily and John T. Lenahan, all of Wilkes-Barre, for greatly misled by it, and induced to give a appellants. James L. Lenahan and James verdict fraught with the highest degree of McQuade, both of Wilkes-Barre, for appel-injustice." In the opinion of this court in lee.

Erie Railway Co. v. Decker, 78 Pa. 293, at page 295, Mr. Justice Gordon, with reference POTTER, J. The only question raised up- to a statement made by a witness on crosson this appeal relates to the action of the examination, said: "Now, as this answer trial court in rejecting certain evidence offer- was irrelevant to the issue trying, and as ed by the defendant. On the trial plaintiff there was nothing in the examination in chief called as a witness Mrs. Annie Thompson, which could properly induce a cross-examinawho testified that she had seen the accident, tion productive of it, the plaintiff who drew and described the circumstances under which it out was bound by it, and ought not to have it occurred. Her testimony tended to show been permitted, under a pretense of contranegligence on the part of the motorman. On dicting it, to throw evidence into the case cross-examination she testified as to her which, whilst prejudicial to the defense, was name and that of her husband; she stated foreign to the matter in controversy." And she had a former husband named Oleski, who again in Hester v. Com., 85 Pa. 139, at page was dead, and that she was afterwards mar-157, Mr. Justice Woodward said, quoting 1 ried to John Thompson by a priest in Kings- Greenleaf's Ev., par. 449: "If a question is ton; that she never went by the name of An-put to a witness which is collateral or irnie Glick or Annie Lecht; that she never relevant to the issue, his answer cannot be bought goods from a man named Honeywell; contradicted by the party who put the questhat she never rented from a man named tion, but it is conclusive against him." In Berthoff. As to these various matters which Com. v. Payne, 205 Pa. 101, 54 Atl. 489, this were neither material nor relevant to the is- court, speaking by Mr. Justice Mitchell, consue being tried, counsel for defendant offered demned the "vicious practice," which he said testimony tending to contradict the witness. at one time had a considerable hold in some One offer was to show by the priest whom states, of allowing indiscriminate attacks upshe said had married her that no such cere on the general character and private life of mony was ever performed by him between adverse witnesses, under the pretense of "letAnnie Oleski and John Thompson, and they ting the jury know who the witness is." If were never married in his church. There the truthfulness of the witness was to be atwas also an offer to show business dealings tacked, it should have been by showing a bad between the witness, who called herself An- reputation for truth and veracity in general. nie Thompson, and a man named Honeywell, In Wike v. Lightner, 11 Serg. & R. 198, at and also with a man named Berthoff. The page 199, Mr. Chief Justice Tilghman said: exclusion of these offers of evidence is as-"In order to discredit a witness, you can exsigned as error. We think the trial judge amine only as to his general character." took the correct view. The general rule is that when a witness has been cross-examined upon matters not relevant to the issue, he cannot be discredited by proof that he testified falsely as to the irrelevant matters. This rule, with its reasons, is fully set forth in Griffith v. Eshelman, 4 Watts, 51, at page 53. Mr. Justice Kennedy there said: "If such a course were to be tolerated, for the purpose and the judgment is affirmed.

And in Snyder v. Com., 85 Pa. 519, at page 522, Mr. Justice Mercur said: "Character can be impeached only by evidence of general reputation, and not by evidence of particular acts of misconduct." Under the authority of these cases the proffered testimony was properly excluded by the trial judge.

The assignments of error are overruled,

For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am, Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 153-156; Dec. Dig. § 89.*13. COURTS (§ 12*)—ADMINISTRATION of Trust

Petition by the Estate of Carmine De Fazio against the Goldschmidt Detinning Company for an allowance under the Employer's Liability Act. The allowance hav-4. ing been made, defendant brings certiorari. Affirmed.

Argued June term, 1913, before SWAYZE, BERGEN, and VOORHEES, JJ.

Richard F. Jones, of Jersey City, for prosecutor. Charles T. Cowenhoven, of New Brunswick, for defendant in certiorari.

For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

Streeter, Demond, Woodworth & Sulloway, I schools, hospitals, and colleges, for the poor of Concord, for plaintiff. Elder, Whitman of a certain parish, and the like. These are & Barnum, William A. Morse, and Leon M. plainly gifts for the benefit of one locality Abbott, all of Boston, Mass., for defendant only, or else are to be locally administered. church. James P. Tuttle, Atty. Gen., and But here one state or one nation might as Robert L. Manning, of Manchester, for de- well be called the situs of the execution of fendant beneficiaries. the trust as any other. This trust, being as much for the benefit of this state as for any place, should be administered here, since this is the jurisdiction of its origin.

PER CURIAM. [1, 2] The church contends that this fund should be paid to it "without any further proceeding"; the Attorney General, that the plaintiff should hold it until the court appoints a trustee to administer it. The question as to which of these contentions, if either, is sound depends on Mrs. Eddy's intention; for it is the court's duty to effectuate her intention in so far as it can be ascertained and is legal. Adams v. Page, 76 N. H. 96, 79 Atl. 837; French v. Lawrence, 76 N. H. 234, 81 Atl. 705. The question of her intention was considered at length in Glover v. Baker, 76 N. H. 393, 83 Atl. 916, and it was held that she did not

[5] "Every trustee to whom any estate, real or personal, is devised in trust for any person, shall give bond to the judge of probate." P. S. c. 198, § 1. "Any person appointed a trustee who shall neglect or refuse to give bond when required shall be considered as having declined the acceptance of the trust." Id., § 4. These provisions, if applicable to charitable trusts, prescribe certain things which must be done before this administrator is authorized to pay over the funds in his hands. The trustee must have qualified as the statute requires.

[6] But it is said the statute does not apintend to give this property to the church (76 ply to charitable trusts, but only to those N. H. 401, 83 Atl. 916), but to create a public "for any person." If this might be thought trust for promoting and extending Christian to be the intent of the act as it stood before Science as taught by her to all parts of the 1891 (Drury v. Natick, 10 Allen [Mass.] 169), world (76 N. H. 425, 83 Atl. 916). It is prob- it plainly has not been so since that time. ably technically true, as the church contends, The provision that "no town or city in this that it was not a party to that suit, and that state shall be required to give a bond when the matters decided are not res adjudicata appointed trustee" (P. S. c. 198, § 2) was in so far as it is concerned, but that in and then adopted as a part of the revision of the of itself furnishes no sufficient reason for statutes. House and Senate Jour. 1891, p. re-examining the questions. Nothing that 963. As towns can act as trustees only in the has been said or written in this case has case of charitable trusts (Sargent v. Cornish, caused the court to doubt the soundness of 54 N. H. 18; P. S. c. 40, § 5), this provision the views already expressed, that Mrs. Eddy exempting them from the obligation to give did not intend to give this property to the church to administer as a part of its corporate assets, but to create a public trust to be administered by the church under the direct supervision of the court.

a bond was in effect a legislative declaration
that the' general statute as to trustees' bonds
applies to charitable trusts. The plaintiff is
advised that he should hold the property in
his hands on the settlement of his final ac-
count until a trustee or trustees are appoint-
ed by the probate court.
Case discharged.

[3, 4] The other question raised on this
branch of the case is whether the trust is to
be administered under the supervision of the
courts of this state or those of Massachu-
setts. The claim that the fund should go to
Massachusetts because the gift is to a resi-
dent of that state is disposed of by what has
already been said. The gift is not to the
defendant, but to a charity. The trust is (Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

(77 N. H. 105)

HUTCHINS v. BROWN.

Oct. 7, 1913.)

Carroll.

not for the benefit of residents of that state, nor are the funds to be expended or the 1. GUARDIAN AND WARD (§ 10*) · APPOINTMENT-LEGAL RIGHT. proposed work done there, any more than One has no legal right to be appointed in any other part of the world. Glover v. guardian of minors merely because he is their Baker, 76 N. H. 393, 424, 83 Atl. 916. The uncle and is competent, and because their famere fact that the trustee nominated in the ther, who died intestate, desired such appointwill resides in a certain state affords no sufficient ground for a decision that the trust fund must be administered in that jurisdiction. No well-considered case has been found holding to such a rule. If the trust were one to be executed in Massachusetts, a different

question would be presented. The cases relied upon are substantially all of this class. They involved gifts for certain designated

ment.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Guardian and Ward, Cent. Dig. §§ 23-33; Dec. Dig. § 10.*]

RIGHT OF APPOINTMENT OF

2. GUARDIAN AND WARD (§ 13*)
APPEAL INTEREST
GUARDIAN.
One who has not a legal right to be ap-
pointed guardian of infants, and is not their
next of kin, and so their heir presumptive, has
no such interest as, under Pub. St. 1901. c. 200,

§ 1, providing that any person aggrieved by an appointment by a judgment of probate which may conclude his interest may appeal therefrom, gives him a right of appeal from an order appointing another their guardian, and denying the appointment to him.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Guardian and Ward, Cent. Dig. 88 40-52; Dec. Dig. 8 13.*]

Young, J., dissenting.

Transferred from Superior Court, Carroll County; Pike, Judge.

Stephen H. Hutchins appealed from a decree of probate court, appointing Dana J. Brown guardian of the two minor sons of Frank Hutchins, deceased, of whose estate Brown was administrator. The superior court dismissed the appeal, plaintiff excepted, and the case was transferred from superior court. Exceptions overruled.

February 14, 1911, Betsey Lyford Hutchins and the plaintiff, grandmother and uncle of the minors upon the father's side, petitioned for the appointment of the plaintiff as guardian, while the grandmother on the mother's side filed a petition for the appointment of one Whelpley. The petitions were heard together, and at the December term, 1911, of the probate court the defendant was appointed guardian. From this decree the plaintiff claimed an appeal, assigning the following reasons: (1) Because Dana J. Brown is not a relative of the minors, and would not be interested in their welfare; (2) because it was the desire of Frank Hutchins that his brother, Stephen H. Hutchins, should have the custody and be intrusted with the education of his children; (3) because Stephen H. Hutchins is the uncle of the minors, and is competent to care for them and to manage their estate; (4) because Dana J. Brown is the administrator of the estate of Frank Hutchins, and his appointment as trustee places him in a dual and antagonistic position, and, being such administrator, he is legally disqualified to hold the position of guardian; (5) because the situation of the estate of Frank Hutchins is such that complications will arise between the administrator and the guardian which require the appointment of a different person as guardian. In the superior court, the defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal as insufficient in law was granted, in view of the fact that the administrator's final account had been allowed without appeal in February, 1912, the minors being represented at the hearing for the allowance of said account by a guardian ad litem specially appointed for the purpose. The plaintiff excepted to the order of dismissal.

PARSONS, C. J. "The judge of probate * * may appoint a guardian to any minor whenever there is occasion." P. S. c. 178, § 1. No notice is required. P. S. c. 185, § 2. "The judge may appoint the father or mother, or any person nominated by either, to be guardian of a child, as he shall think most

conducive to the interest of the child." P. S.
c. 178, § 3. The questions presented to the
Was there oc-
court by the petitions were:
casion for the appointment of a guardian,
and whose appointment would best promote
the welfare of the minors?
Sears, 72 N. H. 71, 54 Atl. 702. That some
one should have been appointed is conceded.
The plaintiff appeals from the decree appoint-
ing the defendant.

Hanrahan v.

"Any person aggrieved by a decree, order, appointment, grant, or denial of a judge of probate, which may conclude his interest * may appeal therefrom." P. S. c. 200, § 1. "Generally, it may be said that one cannot be legally aggrieved by a decision unless he has some private right which is affected thereby." Bennett v. Tuftonborough, 72 N. H. 63, 64, 54 Atl. 700, 701. "Every guardian shall have the custody and tuition of the minor and the care and management of his estate." P. S. c. 178, § 6. It has been held that the presumptive heirs of a ward have such an interest in the ward's estate as to be entitled to appeal from a decree affecting it (Boynton v. Dyer, 18 Pick. [Mass.] 1); but the plaintiff is not next of kin, and consequently not an heir presumptive. It is also held that an executor named in a will has an interest in his representative capacity sufficient to maintain an appeal from a decree disallowing the will. Shirley v. Healds, 34 N. H. 407. A foreign administrator may appeal from the appointment of an administrator in this state. Graves v. Tilton, 63 N. H. 192. In short, there is a right of appeal when the rights affected are held in a representative capacity.

Whether the act of St. 12 Car. II, authorizing the appointment of testamentary guardians, held to be in force in this state (Balch v. Smith, 12 N. H. 437), would create such an interest in the appointee as to entitle him to appeal from a decree appointing another, and whether the act, if ever in force here, has not been so modified by subsequent legis lation and judicial decision (Morey v. Sohier, 63 N. H. 507, 512, 3 Atl. 636, 56 Am. Rep. 538) as no longer to have such effect, if it ever had, need not be considered. pellant does not allege an appointment by will in terms, and the finding of the case that the father died intestate negatives any Edwin G. Eastman, of Exeter, Arthur L. purpose to prove by evidence of that charFoote, of Dover, and John Gage, of Sanborn-acter the father's desire, alleged as one of the ville, for plaintiff. Felker & Gunnison, of reasons of appeal. Rochester, Kivel & Hughes, of Dover, Fred H. Brown, of Somersworth, and William J. Britton, of Wolfeboro, for defendant.

The ap

[1, 2] Whether the plaintiff could maintain an appeal upon the broad allegation that, upon the whole case, he ought to have been ap