whereas there was no protection of Great Britain or France or America in this treaty, there was for the mainland of Japan. It was intimated that the treaty might be construed to give to Japan such a guaranty of security against foreign aggression as the American Senate had refused to sanction with regard to France. There was at once conjured up the picture of American boys being sent to fight in any quarrel that Japan might choose to get into with some other Power.

At once a great body of press correspondents started off on the new scent.

If Senator Lodge in his speech which accompanied the presentation of the treaty had thought to mention the islands of Japan as he pictured the scattered islands of the Pacific ranging "from Australia, continental in magnitude, to atolls where there are no dwellers but the builders of the coral reefs or lonely rocks marking the peaks of mountains which rise up from the ocean's floor through miles of water before they touch the air," possibly this diversion might have been avoided; for in his speech Senator Lodge made perfectly plain that there could be no guaranty to the mainland of Japan, for the simple reason that there was no guaranty in the treaty whatever.

What started many of the press correspondents off to follow the red herring can perhaps be understood after a consideration of the circumstances under which press correspondence is prepared and despatched. Each day the correspondents of the daily newspapers seek for some special news which will command attention and be worthy of display. It is impossible for such a conference as this to reach critical decisions every day. Consequently there are days when the progress of the Conference, though important, is without sensational features. Anything that promises to be picturesque or sensational on such off days is naturally welcome. With the best intent in the world, every daily newspaper correspondent is under pressure to make the most of anything that seems rather out of the ordinary. Watching this Conference, moreover, are men who have been long trained in following the tortuous ways of the traditional kind of diplomacy, and they naturally believe that any course that goes off to one side is likely to be the true trail. There are also newspapers that have partisan ends to serve, and they are not always above misrepresentations which are likely to occasion trouble to the party in power. Unfortunately, too, many of the men representing the so-called liberal thought are bitter, suspicious, and over-fearful of being thought credulous. Some of them are so habituated to revolt against social conditions that they see intrigue and false pretense in everything about them. Some of them, professed pacifists, are suffering apparently from what they like to call a complex, in this case

suppressed pugnacity, and, being determined to do all they can to prevent war, find relief in a war of words against everybody not of their own faction. Naturally, too, in the course of such a Conference as this dealing with complicated questions there is bound to be a certain by-product of bewilderment, and this is particularly to be expected to make its appearance in the minds of those who have been thinking for weeks or months in the terms of international guaranties and then find themselves in a Conference which ignores guaranties altogether and builds its plans upon national self-restraint and international

understanding.

Here, then, were two "stories" of a sort that could be put into headlinesthe story of an alleged pledge of armed security for Japan, and the story of alleged concealment and furtiveness. Then came the opportunity for another "story"-disagreement between the President and the Secretary of State. In answer to the inquiry of a correspondent President Harding was reported to have said that he understood that the scope of the treaty did not include the homeland of Japan. Within a few hours of the publication of this report, which was correct, the President issued the following statement:

When the President was responding to press inquiries at the afternoon interview to-day, he expressed the opinion that the homeland of Japan did not come within the words "insular possessions and insular dominions" under the four-party agreement, except as territory proper of any other nation which is a party to the agreement. This expression has been emphasized as a division between the President and the delegates to the Conference in construing the four-party agreement.

The President announced to-night

that the difference in view in nowise will be permitted to embarrass the Conference or the ratification of the agreement. He had assumed all along that the spirit of the Conference contemplates a confidence which pledges respect of territory in every way which tends to promote lasting peace.

He has learned from the United States delegation to the Conference that they have agreed to the construction which includes the homeland of Japan in the term "insular possessions and insular dominions," and has no objection to that construction.

What this proved was not disagreement as to anything vital, but it did show that the American delegates were acting with so free a hand that the President was not even following from day to day the details of their work. At Paris the Commissioners were evidently not kept informed of the decisions which the President was daily making. At the Washington Conference the President is keeping himself so much to one side that he gives an interpretation of the delegates' work which the delegates themselves do not share. It seems to me that Mr. Harding's method in this respect is better than Mr. Wilson's. When he selected the plenipotentiaries to act for the Executive, he first made sure that the men he selected believed in the object he had in view and were competent, and then he left them to act as free agents. If any proof were needed that the Conference was free from Executive dictation, it is supplied in this incident.

As a matter of fact, the point upon which the varied interpretation centers is of no significance. No question can arise which would be materially affected by including or excluding the homeland islands of Japan within the scope of the

Keystone

treaty. Any question arising in the Pacific, if it is serious enough, will bring these four Powers together for common counsel if the treaty is observed, and that is all that the treaty requires. It is not a question of waiting until some military attack is made and then coming to a common defense. That is the method of an alliance. That

is a method that has been tried many times. That is so common that some people seem to imagine that no nations can come to a common agreement without involving themselves in an alliance. That is a method that contemplates war and provides for a course of action in case of war. This Four Power Treaty does nothing of the sort. This does not contemplate war. This makes no provision for military or naval action. What this contemplates is the possibility of differences of opinion and policy, and it provides for doing under such a condition exactly what the nine nations assembled at Washington have been doing for the past six weeks.

The difference can be shown perhaps by a supposititious case such as was propounded to me. Let us suppose, said in substance a press correspondent in the course of a discussion on the subject, that Japan should send a submarine across the Pacific into the Panama Canal and there set off a mine and block the passage; that would be an attack upon one of the possessions of the United States, but it would not be an island possession in the Pacific. Would that involve this treaty? Such an instance is of exactly the sort that is contemplated in a treaty of alliance. If this were a treaty of alliance and such an act came within the scope of it, our allies would have to come to our

defense. But this is not a treaty of alliance, and such an act as that is not contemplated as an incident requiring its application. Such an act would be an act of war, and when war begins the time is past for conferences and consultation. What this treaty undertakes to do is to establish such relations that such an act on the part of any one of the four Powers would be inconceivable.

So far as the objection to including the homeland islands of Japan has any effect at all it plays into the hands of the militarists of Japan. It provides them with what advertisers call "a talking point." It enables them to say that Americans are not willing to pledge themselves not to make an aggressive attack upon Japan. It enables them to argue that, while pretending to promote mutual confidence, the Americans are, after all, suspicious. Indeed, if any country has a reason for sentimental objection to the inclusion of the islands of Japan in the scope of the treaty it is Japan itself, for it may be argued that it tends to set Japan apart as a country whose homeland is dependent for safety upon the promises of other nations. Of course all these arguments pro and con have no bearing upon the real purpose of the treaty or its operation in practice. This is made clear by the following statement issued from the White House on December 23:

The President will offer no comment on the disputes which attempt to magnify the differing constructions on the four-party treaty. To him these are unimportant. The big things aimed at are understandings for peace and an agreement to meet and discuss the preservation of peace whenever it is threatened. No alliance or entanglement is thought,of,

none will be negotiated. It would be better to rejoice over things accomplished than to dwell on different views which can be of no great consequence.

The President is unwilling that the unjustified charge that the United States delegates are withholding information shall go unchallenged. He has full confidence, else he had not chosen them, and he has full confidence now and is more than gratified over their efforts, because they are working out the greatest contribution to peace and good will which has ever marked the Christmas time in all the Christian era.

It is one thing to talk about the ideals of peace, but the bigger thing is to seek the actuality. This the Conference is doing, in harmony with an overwhelming American sentiment, and a world sentiment, too, and in full accord with cherished American traditions.

When this statement was issued, President Harding was asked by a correspondent whether he thought that during 1921 there had been progress in peace and good will, and he answered:

I think I made some such reply to a similar question at the last interview. I do think so. I believe it with all my heart. I do not say that with the thought of arrogating to the United States of America any greater part of the contribution than that which has been made by other nations of like importance and like civilization. But it seems to me that in 1921, as we have come to know more fully the aftermath of the war, as we have come to appraise the unspeakable cost of it all, there is a new conviction in the hearts of men that that sort of appeal-the appeal to arms-to settle the international questions is a futile thing, and that we are unworthy of our position and unworthy of the blessings which fall to a righteous civilization if we do not find some means for a righteous adjustment without appeal to slaughter and waste and all the distresses that attend. I think that conviction has rooted itself throughout the world, and there must come some helpful, progressive expression of it. I think that expression is being given at this Conference. I have no thought to preach on this subject to-day, but make your own applications, please.

When men sit about the Conference table and look each other in the face and look upon the problems deliberately, without passion, they find the way to come to an agreement. And after all there has never been a conflict in the world that has not been settled in the end in that way. You have a war; you destroy thousands or millions of men and measureless treasure, and then you gather about a table and settle it. I have a feeling that mankind has become wise enough to sit down before the war and try to settle it. And that is the object of the four-party treaty. That is why I say the small lack of agreement in construing it is not significant.

Why, if there was a menace of peace in Japan, what objection could there be for the United States to sit down with her friend in the Orient

and with the other Great Powers and discuss how the matter could be adjusted? If some one had done that when Austria was threatening Serbia, there would have been no European War. The whole purpose of this Conference is to provide some means where just, thoughtful, righteous peoples, who are not seeking to seize something which does not belong to them, can live peaceably together and eliminate causes of conflict. This is in the American heart and it is in the British heart and it is in the Japanese heart, in the French heart, in the Italian heart-it is everywhere in

the world. If this present-day civilization cannot take advantage of this new realization, of that emphasized conviction, I would not give much for the civilization of the future. But there is a new spirit seeking and impelling peace, and it must add to our Christmas happiness.

What President Harding had in mind and what the nations are planning in their Conference is frankly an experiment. It is not a declaration of policy like the Monroe Doctrine, which contains a threat. It is not an alliance

which involves a mutual guaranty of armed protection. It is simply a plan to consider together any question at issue. It is an experiment that can be undertaken only by friends. Are these four nations good enough friends to undertake it? They have proved themselves good enough friends to try the experiment in Washington, and are apparently trying it successfully. No reason appears, so far as I know, why, whenever occasion demands, they may not keep on trying it. December 27, 1921.

r

HERE is a bill now before Congress which is the first necessary step in an important change of blic policy. It is S.-2749, on long'ge planning of public works, introed by Senator Kenyon on November on the recommendation of the Presi's Conference on Unemployment. he

Conference on Unemployment ted out the need for long-range thinkand long-range planning in public 'S. This bill will help to make that ing and planning an actuality.

Kenyon Bill advocates, as a defipolicy, the expansion and contracof Federal public works to accord the periods of fall and rise in priindustry and employment. Such a y is a right-about-face on the part e Federal Government. In the past s been much more likely to expand public works in boom times and to tract them in dull times. What this does is to call upon the various pubworks agencies of the Federal Goviment to be prepared in advance with gineering plans for proposed underkings, so that when an appropriation made in a time of depression the work n go forward immediately, rather than ait months or years until plans have en prepared and approved. Before the enyon legislation there has been no .ncentive for Federal public works agencies to keep ahead of the game. After this legislation it will be a breach of duty on the part of public works officials if they are not ready to proceed whenever called on to do so.

Many Government projects contain intricate problems which will require years to solve. For instance, the Boulder Canyon Dam in Arizona would develop more power than Niagara Falls, would light southern California, and would run the railways and many factories. But before it can be built agreements must be had from various States not to divert the head-waters into other watersheds; the Government policy must be determined, involving Federal, State, city, and private corporations; and engineering work planned over hundreds of

miles, not to mention irrigation subsidiaries for hundreds of thousands of acres of land. Again, post offices and Federal buildings are needed in hundreds of towns. The Federal Government rents many cramped and inadequate quarters. There is constant pressure on members of Congress to fill Federal needs locally. These buildings will be built. The only question is when. The Kenyon Bill proposes that plans for these undertakings be ready wherever possible, and the bulk of them executed during bad times rather than during boom times.

Vast areas are sure to be reclaimed through irrigation and drainage. The territory of the United States will eventually be increased, not by wars of conquest, but by the pick, the shovel, the dam, and the ditch. These great undertakings usually linger in Congress because there is no impetus to action. The Kenyon Bill would assist, not only in having ready the plans for such projects, but in giving the final impetus at a time when general industry and employment are in need of stabilization.

How can Congress know the proper time to go ahead? The Kenyon Bill provides that the Department of Commerce shall publish monthly statements of the rise and fall in cyclical waves of business expansion and depression as a guide in preparing in advance for the expansion of public works. A few large corporations have kept such statistics and have been able to predict the peaks of the waves of expansion. By making few purchases of raw materials at such times, by keeping their stores low, they have been able to make profits by refraining from buying at the top and having the resources to buy and manufacture as the wave falls. Each corporation which follows this policy takes a little off the top and fills in a little of the trough of the wave of depression. The barometer of business proposed by this bill would enable more business men and corporations, as well as the Government, to obtain this information and protect themselves accordingly.

The Kenyon Bill has value as an educational measure with respect to the public works policy of cities and States, the volume of whose public works is over five times that of the Federal Government. When Washington takes the lead, the cities and States will gradually follow. To-day advance planning of public works by American cities hardly exists. City plans over a period of years would enable a city to carry out some of its major improvements during periods of depression, when men and materials are plentiful. Municipal bonds are often in greatest demand when capital is timid about investment in industrial enterprises. Consequently the cities are able to go ahead during bad times when private industry is checked. Only a small part of the ordinary necessary public works needs to be deferred each year, in order to iron out an appreciable part of the inequalities of employment.

In a growing country like the United States the amount of public works of Federal, State, and municipal governments is so great that if this policy were followed and the resulting accumulation, plus the normal, executed in a year of depression like the present, the actual wages paid in public works would be equal to a large percentage of the loss in wages in private industry during the period of depression. But the wages received in public works are only a small part of the total stimulus to industry. Orders for the necessary materials provide an additional wage payment. The wages received by direct workers and workers in production of materials create by their expenditure a demand for commodities and set new groups of workers to making garments, shoes, and textiles, and so liquefy the frozen credits in raw and finished materials.

A concentrated public works programme is like dropping a pebble into a pond. The waves extend to the farthest shores of industry. But before the pebble is dropped there must be forethought, there must be planning, and these the Kenyon Bill is intended to stimulate.

xpenses, inherent wealth, a small public debt, and backed by the credit of the United States, the problem of ehabilitating the credit of the Philipine Islands should be an easy one. he lesson has been a bitter one for Filipinos and the. gravity of the stake is generally appreciated.

s a result of the whole painstaking stigation General Wood and Mr. bes have reached conclusions which uld be of interest to all students of Government. These conclusions and ommendations are worth quoting in

1:

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

We find the people happy, peaceful, and in the main prosperous, and keenly appreciative of the benefits of American rule.

We find everywhere among the Christian Filipinos the desire for independence, generally under the protection of the United States. The non-Christians and Americans are for continuance of American control. We find a general failure to appreciate the fact that independence under the protection of another nation is not true independence.

We find that the Government is not reasonably free from those underlying causes which result in the destruction of government.

We find that a reasonable proportion of officials and employees are men of good character and ability. and reasonably faithful to the trust imposed upon them; but that the efficiency of the public services has Fallen off, and that they are now relaively inefficient, due to lack of inspection and to the too rapid transfer of control to officials who have not had the necessary time for proper raining.

We find that many Filipinos have shown marked capacity for Govern

ment service and that the young generation is full of promise; that the Civil Service laws have in the main been honestly administered, but there is a marked deterioration due to the injection of politics.

We find there is a disquieting lack of confidence in the administration of justice, to an extent which constitutes a menace to the stability of the Government.

We find that the people are not organized economically nor from the standpoint of national defense to maintain an independent government.

We find that the legislative chambers are conducted with dignity and decorum and are. composed of representative men.

We feel that the lack of success in certain departments should not be considered as proof of essential incapacity on the part of Filipinos, but rather as indicating lack of experience and opportunity, and especially lack of inspection.

We find that questions in regard to confirmation of appointments might at any time arise which would make a deadlock between the GovernorGeneral and the Philippine Senate.

We feel that with all their many excellent qualities, the experience of the past eight years, during which they have had practical autonomy, has not been such as to justify the people of the United States relinquishing supervision of the Government of the Philippine Islands, withdrawing their Army and Navy, and leaving the islands a prey to any powerful nation coveting their rich soil and potential commercial advantages.

In conclusion We are convinced that it would be a betrayal of the Philippine people, a misfortune to the American people, a distinct step backward in the path of progress,

and a discreditable neglect of our National duty were We to withdraw from the islands and terminate our relationship there without giving the Filipinos the best chance possible to have an orderly and permanently stable government.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We recommend that the present general status of the Philippine Islands continue until the people have had time to absorb and thoroughly master the powers already in their hands.

2. We recommend that the responsible representative of the United States, the Governor-General, have authority commensurate with the responsibilities of his position. In case of failure to secure the necessary corrective action by the Philippine Legislature, we recommend that Congress declare null and void legislation which has been enacted diminishing, limiting, or dividing the authority granted the Governor-General under Act No. 240 of the Sixty-fourth Congress, known as the Jones Bill.

3. We recommend that in case of a deadlock between the Governor-General and the Philippine Senate in the confirmation of appointments that the President of the United States be authorized to make and render the final decision.

4. We recommend that under no circumstances should the American Government permit to be established in the Philippine Islands a situation which would leave the United States in a position of responsibility without authority.

LEONARD WOOD, Chairman.
W. CAMERON FORBES.

October 8, 1921.

We wish that this report might have the fullest possible distribution. It is a historic document.