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film or plate in winter is quite different from what it is in summer. The summer-season amateur taking up snow photography for the first time will have poor success unless he acquires a new set of exposure rules. Any one wholly unfamiliar with light conditions can easily be fooled into thinking that there is more light on a bright winter day with the glare of the sun on the white snow than on an ordinary summer day. The camera, however, cannot be fooled. It knows very well the difference between summer and winter light, knows that the matter is wholly one of light intensity. The light of summer is direct, while that from the snow in winter is reflected. And reflected light can never be as intense as direct light. This means that an open snowscape almost universally demands a longer exposure than does an open summer landscape, although of course the winter scene which is wholly devoid of snow takes a longer exposure than the snowscape.

This matter of exposure is in some respects the most important element of all in taking snow pictures. It demands careful study. There are a number of general rules, of course, which are applicable both to summer and winter work, as, for example, the nearer a given object is to the camera, the longer the exposure. Even so, you are almost

sure to make mistakes in timing unless during the early stages of your snowscape experiments you rely upon a good exposure meter. One of these can be purchased in any photographic store.

Even when guided by a reliable exposure meter one would do wisely to make a certain amount of allowance for the physical changes which the mechanism of a camera goes through in winter. Cold weather affects the metal parts. It oftentimes happens that a shutter works more slowly on a cold winter day than it does in summer. Indeed, there have been times with my own camera when the shutter has refused to function at all. I have been forced to go indoors and allow it to thaw out.

Inattention to the physical changes to which a camera is subject in winter is an important element in getting good pictures. Only by knowing one's camera thoroughly, knowing what to expect under given conditions, can one make the proper amount of allowance for temporary shortcomings.

It is essential to know, for example, that when you .take a camera from a heated house into the extreme cold of outdoors there almost invariably forms on the lens a cloudy coating of moisture. If a picture were taken under these conditions, the finished print would be an indistinguishable blur,

which you would find it hard to account for unless you knew the reason.

After stepping outdoors in winter to take a picture, it is advisable to look at your lens to make sure that the moisture has cleared. It will do so after the glass has become acclimated to the cold. If the coating of moisture is slow in evaporating, you can speed matters along by wiping the lens with a clean linen handkerchief. But wipe very gently indeed, so that the glass will not be scratched.

Photographic plates and films should be carried in such a way that there is no possibility of getting them wet. Small round tin containers sealed with strips of adhesive tape serve as waterproof protection for films. For the size of film known as 1A or smaller an empty shaving-stick tube does very well.

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Plates and films, so far as practicable, should be protected from continued extreme cold. If it is found possible to keep a set of plate-holders warmly wrapped in a blanket or some article of clothing before and after exposure, this care may prove an element in securing satisfactory pictures. It does plates no good to get them chilled. In any case, it is unwise to develop a plate or film immediately upon bringing it indoors. Before doing so allow the plate or film to become acclimated to the heat of the house.

CAPITAL SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT

A LETTER FROM THREE ARMY AVIATORS

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland, November 14, 1921.

The Editor of The Outlook,

New York, N. Y.

Dear Sir:

C

The

AN it be that the question of the vulnerability of battleships to attack from the air is again being discussed on the negative side? Apparently such is the case in view of the article in recently published Outlook and written by Commander Cleary, of the United States Navy. Officers of the Army Air Service who participated in the bombing maneuvers off the Virginia Capes this summer had believed that the question of battleship vulnerability had been settled once and for all. Certainly, nobody who saw the Ostfriesland, the masterpiece of German naval construction, the pride of the Imperial German Navy, roll over on its back and take up its final resting-place on the sandy bottom of the Atlantic Ocean can ever be convinced that a ship could be constructed capable of resisting attack from the air.

In this connection, the Ostfriesland, which has been referred to as an "obsolete ship," cost the German people $40,000,000 to construct, was one of the most modern ships of the German navy,

and had two protective steel decks especially designed for defense against aircraft.

In the course of his article the naval commander says:

She was taken out and anchored for the purpose of sinking her... Generally ideal summer weather prevailed. The ship was without antiaircraft gunfire or ability to maneuver, and the planes bombed from the very low altitude of 1,200 to 2,000 feet. True, the Ostfriesland was anchored; but the inference that an anchored target is easier to hit than one in motion is far from the facts in the case. This had been demonstrated by extensive tests on towed targets near Langley Field the past summer. Army bombers secured a much higher percentage of hits on towed targets than they did on stationary targets, for the reason that the bombing plane travels in the same direction that the target is moving, and consequently is over it for a greater length of time. Obviously, the faster the target is moving, the easier it would be to hit.

As concerns maneuverability, it is a matter well known to all naval officers that it is an impossibility for a capital ship to change its course in the least degree within eleven seconds, which is

the time required for a bomb to drop two thousand feet.

As concerns anti-aircraft gunfire, the record of hits on the western front during the recent war was only one hit in 67,000 shots. The highest percentage claimed by ordnance experts even to-day is but one hit in 40,000 shots. It is merely a problem in arithmetic to figure the time it would take to secure one solitary hit. In fact, it is well known and realized by persons conversant with this subject that the effects of anti-aircraft fire are so small as to be practically negligible. The sooner this fact is admitted by naval experts, the simpler I will be the question of deciding the relative importance of capital ships and aircraft.

As concerns weather conditions: Ideal weather prevailed in the bombing of the Ostfriesland, but during the bombing of the Frankfort, four days before this time, one formation of Martin bombers went out, did their bombing, and returned during one of the worst storms that hit the Atlantic coast this summer. Only one ship of this squadron was forced down by motor trouble after the bombing was completed. It landed on. shore without serious damage. This flight got a higher percentage of hits than any other flight that bombed the

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Frankfort. Naval experts will admit that during that storm it would have been impossible for a naval vessel to have secured any reasonable percentage of hits by gunfire. Also, on their way out to bomb the German destroyer a squadron of pursuit planes, led by Captain Baucom, flew through seven rainstorms straight to their target and returned without the loss of a single plane. Let us get down to facts and admit that fog and bad weather are a far greater menace to naval vessels in action than to aircraft.

"As concerns the altitude from which we bombed: Even admitting that at an altitude of 2,000 feet aircraft might be in danger from machine-gun fire, or possibly from anti-aircraft fire, no one contends for a single minute that we might not suffer loss of ships and loss of life. We didn't join the Air Service with any expectation that we would rival Methuselah. Certainly we would have our casualties, but machine guns, artillery, and gas did not prevent the infantry from going over the top and accomplishing its mission. No more would the loss of airplanes prevent the Air Service from going to sea and accomplishing its mission. It is ridiculous to argue that bombing squadrons would not bomb from low altitudes simply because some of their planes might be shot down.

The naval commander writes as follows:

Furthermore, if the Ostfriesland had carried three or four or more fast light pursuit planes (armed with machine guns firing explosive and incendiary bullets), as all modern ships do carry or will shortly carry, these light planes, capable of outmaneuvering with ease the heavy bombing planes, would have shot down a number of the bombing planes before they came anywhere near the target ship.

For

Surely the commander knows that in time of war no squadron of bombing planes would go on a mission without their escort of pursuit planes. every bombing squadron we would have two pursuit squadrons, each of which contains twenty-one fast fighting airplanes. What chance would these three or four pursuit planes carried on a capital ship have against the fighting craft guarding the big bombers? None, absolutely none. The commander may say that the other capital ships of the fleet would also have pursuit planes. The answer is that in time of war, with a properly developed air force, we would not be limited to one bombing squadron and two pursuit squadrons of protecting planes. We wouldn't, or at least let us hope we won't have.to, wage war with one bombardment squadron and two pursuit squadrons. With a properly developed air service we would have sev eral wings of bombardment and several wings of pursuit to meet any approaching fleet. We would be able to mass at least a dozen pursuit planes for every plane the capital ships could send into

the air. That is the reason why the "three or four or more fast light pursuit planes" mentioned by Commander Cleary would not affect in any way the outcome of an engagement between battleship and aircraft. Such an engagement could end in only one waythe sinking of the battleship.

Commander Cleary presents a statement showing the number of bombs dropped on the Ostfriesland and the number of hits obtained. We desire to call attention to his statement that out of six Army 2,000-pound bombs dropped there were no hits. This is literally correct, but it was the 2,000-pound bombs which put the Ostfriesland under the water in less than thirty minutes. It was the mining effect of the bombs exploding near the ship and under the water which tore terrific holes in her sides that sent the vessel to the bottom. To be sure, we didn't hit her, but we did sink her. It is hardly fair to consider as hits only those bombs which came into contact with the target itself for the reason that every bomber tried not to hit the ship. He wanted to strike the water close to it, for he realized the greatest damage could be inflicted in that way. In fact, General Mitchell impressed upon us that he did not wish us to hit the vessel, but to place the bombs close to her in the water. To say we received only 16 hits out of 69 bombs dropped is a very misleading statement for the reason that every bomb striking the water within fifty feet caused more damage than a direct hit would have caused. Another statement made by Commander Cleary was that we dropped eleven Army 1,000-pound bombs and secured three hits. The writers took part in that particular phase of the bombing, and we remember clearly, as the records will show, that we did not drop eleven bombs of that type. We carried eleven Army 1,100-pound bombs, but after we had dropped five and secured three direct hits and two close to the ship in the water we were given the emergency signal to stop bombing by the Navy. Had we dropped the remaining six bombs it would have been unnecessary for the next flight of bombing planes to have left their airdrome, for the Ostfriesland would have sunk as a result of this attack.

The one vital point in this controversy which seems to have been absolutely lost sight of by the defenders of the capital ship is that prior to the bombing tests this summer naval officers were positive in their statements that aerial bombs could not sink a battleship under any circumstances. They ridiculed arguments of Air Service officers to the contrary. They were vitriolic in their articles written for publication. Why, one would have thought it was sacrilegious to even imagine that an airplane could carry a weapon capable of sinking, or even putting out of commission, for that matter, one of those great, big, beautiful floating palaces which cost the taxpayers of this

A MODERN AERIAL BOMB OF ABOUT THREE HUNDRED POUNDS WEIGHT

Its size may be judged by the white band on the upper left side of the picture. This is the arm of a man holding the bomb

Wide World Photos

AN AIRPLANE DESIGNED FOR USE FROM A SHIP THE CYLINDERS ABOVE THE
WHEELS ARE INFLATED FLOATS

country the huge sum of forty million
dollars to construct! That was the sub-
ject of dispute, and it was decided so
conclusively that it irritates those of us
who dropped the "bombs which were
heard round the world" every time an
article appears which attempts to cham-
pion the capital ship, the ship which
takes three years to build and which
costs the country more than is required
to construct one thousand of the type
of airplane which so speedily sent the
pride of the German navy to her
watery grave.

One

000,000.

few hits obtained by the Naval Air Service during that experiment. He intimates that the low percentage was due to the fact that the ship was moving at a rate of speed of about six miles an hour, and also because the planes bombed at 4,000 feet, an altitude higher than the bombing that was done during the sinking operations. He also lays emphasis on the fact that the Army did not participate in this maneuver except through the use of three blimps in the search part of the problem.

We wish to take advantage of this super-dreadnought costs $40,- opportunity to lay emphasis on the fact

One super-bombing plane costs $40,000; one thousand of these bombing planes can be built for the price of one battleship. These are not fancies, but facts. What chance would the king of the jungle have if attacked by one thousand poisonous reptiles-each carrying a fatal sting?

Why not admit frankly that an airplane can sink a battleship, or any type of war-vessel? Why cloud the issue with a multitude of collateral facts?

Every time an Air Service officer reads an article stating that a battleship cannot be sunk by airplanes he is reminded of the Swede who was in jail and who was informed by his lawyer that he could not be put in prison for that offense. The Swede replied: "Yah, but they got me in here just the same." Commander Cleary mentioned the bombing of the battleship Iowa and the

that the Iowa problem was primarily and principally one of location. Many naval officers were positive in their statements that airplanes could not locate a battleship if given merely a general location, and to establish this question one way or the other the Iowa, at zero hour, was somewhere between Cape Hatteras and Cape Henlopen, and not farther out to sea than one hundred miles nor nearer to land than fifty miles. The army was invited to participate in this problem, and sent three airships. The Iowa was located within two hours after the airships left their airdrome, and it was located by army airships, not naval seaplanes.

True, as Commander Cleary says, the Army Air Service did not participate in the bombing exercises, for the reason that they were not to be conducted with live bombs. Nothing could be proved by the use of "dummies," inasmuch as

credit would be given only for direct hits, and, as the case of the Ostfriesland so well illustrates, direct hits are not the ones which sink a ship. The bombs which strike the water close to the ship inflict the death blows. The Army might have bombed the Iowa and dropped ninety per cent of its bombs within twenty-five feet of the vessel (any one of which would have sunk the ship if the bombs were live), and articles would have been published to the effect that the Army failed to hit the target ship. Had we been permitted to bomb the Iowa with a view to its destruction, the Army would have participated gladly, and there would now be one more battleship resting on the bottom of the Atlantic.

It is well known that dummy bombs are not true in their trajectory. What might easily be a direct hit with a live bomb, perfectly designed and constructed, would very likely be a one hundred or two hundred foot miss with a dummy bomb.

The Naval Air Service probably did not secure a high average on the bombing of the Iowa, but the slow movement of the vessel or the altitude from which they dropped their bombs had nothing whatsoever to do with the percentage obtained. Let's admit that it is hardly fair to conduct an experiment with dummy bombs with their false and untrue trajectories and then come before the public with a statement of the few hits obtained, laying emphasis on the fact that the vessel was moving and saying nothing of the type of bomb used. The commander also says:

Operations against her [the Iowa] were delayed one day by fog in which the airplanes could not operate, although this fog did not prevent the Iowa and the attending ships from maneuvering.

To be sure the experiment was delayed one day, but it was not delayed by Air Service officers. The searching parties were ready to take off. Army planes experienced no difficulty that day in flying because of poor visibility. The naval officer who considered it advisable to wait until the visibility was better probably considered that there was an element of risk involved and believed it unnecessary and unwarranted to risk the lives of his Air Service officers in times of peace. Surely the commander realizes that had there been war the Air Service would have operated regardless of the visibility. During the St. Mihiel offensive the visibility was so poor that the planes were flying barely over the tops of trees, but they operated and they secured results. It is hardly fair to lead the public to believe that an army, or a navy, for that matter, which postponed its maneuvers in time of peace for the sake of the health and possibly the lives of its men would hesitate in time of war because it was highly possible that some one might be lost.

Let us remember that it was the con

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viction of many naval officers that a ship could not be located at sea. Let us also remember that the ship was located, and that it was located easily and speedily.

Let us remember that some naval experts ridiculed the idea that airplanes could sink battleships. Let us also remember that a submarine, a destroyer, an armored cruiser, and a battleship were sent to the bottom with the greatest of ease, and that each one of these vessels went under in less than thirty minutes after the heavy bombing commenced.

We rest our case, satisfied with the verdict which is sure to be rendered by the jury of American people, whose money, in the form of taxation, pays for the construction of capital ships which,

tests have proved, are impotent when attacked by airplanes.

Very truly yours,
C. E. SHANKLE,

First Lieutenant Air Service, U. S. A.
HAROLD LEE GEORGE,

First Lieutenant Air Service, U. S. A.
CARLYLE W. GRAYBEAL,
First Lieutenant Air Service, U. S. A.

[We are glad to have the privilege of publishing this communication from three of the officers who took an active part in the bombing tests. We consider it a valuable contribution to the discussion which has been carried on in these pages concerning the relative power of airplanes and battleships. The testimony of these three officers is indeed weighty.

It should be borne in mind, however, that the armor-piercing shell, the torpedo-boat, and the submarine have all been heralded as sounding the knell of the battleship. A better case can be made out for the airplane than for any of these other weapons, but can we yet say that the verdict on the battleship is "thumbs down"?

Each new weapon of offense against the battleship has in turn developed new methods and tactics of defense. We confess that, despite the expert testimony which has been presented here, we do not expect to see the battleship yield control of the high seas at the present time. We are ready to grant that the airplane is the most portentous menace to its existence which has yet appeared.-THE EDITORS.]

“T

THE RECTOR OF ALL
ALL OUTDOORS

HE Country Pew vs. the Country Pulpit" gave a depressing picture of Ohio communities where "the sheep look up and are not fed." To complete the picture Mr. and Mrs. Bruère should tell us what religious body of the present time willingly ordains ignorant men of limited intellectual power and sends them out as apostles to intelligent country people. I shall perhaps be accused of the arrogance sometimes ascribed to the Anglican communion if I say that at least I am sure they are not Episcopalians. Our educational standards are high, and an intelligent financial system tends to remove the clergy from the eleemosynary servitude that is suggested by the Bruère survey.

Perhaps the authors of this survey would see another evidence of clerical dependence in a minister who acts as barber to country boys, as middleman to sell pigs for an isolated farmer, as fertilizer mixer and general handy man for a scattered community, and then in eucharistic white feeds the souls of humble folk with the heavenly bread, after he has helped them to provide the earthly food that is too often obtained with strain and toil. Here is no ignorant preacher speaking to prosperous country people, secure (may I add, smug?) in the knowledge of their fat acres. His people are often ignorant, always poor, scattered, and isolated-sometimes the last feeble shoots of an old ancestral tree deeply rooted in American history, sometimes toiling peasants whose first knowledge of America was Ellis Island.

The great changes in the New England States came with the Civil Wartoo many of the young men never came back. Some made the Southern battlefield a piece of Northern ground; others wandered to the new lands of the West. 1 See The Outlook for November 16, last.

BY EMILY TAPLIN ROYLE

Large and thriving families dwindled down to lonely widows and spinsters; farms grew up to woodland, little mills and shops were abandoned,. and newcomers to the districts settled early in our history found pioneer conditions awaiting them. The hill lands of Connecticut, sold at modest prices, attracted land-hungry immigrants of many nationalities, to whom the possession of a little farm was the greatest gift the New World could offer. These farms are often on rough hill roads, so isolated that there are no neighbors, no passing traffic; and in many cases the husband and father leaves home, sometimes for weeks at a time, to take some job that will bring in cash to pay taxes and interest, while wife and children work the farm. Imagine these people, isolated, uneducated, often unfamiliar with rural American life, and you have the mission field in which the "Pastoral Parson" finds his work. He is, properly speaking, a diocesan missioner of the Episcopal Church, but his scope is so broad and so undefined that he might well be called the rector of all outdoors. Changes in rural conditions have caused other religious communions to give up their work. There are many disused and abandoned churches, lost in the hills or on untraveled roads where fifty years ago there was a small rural community. Now there are a few scattered families and a closed church. The Parson obtains the use of such a church; sometimes it is possible to buy it and turn it into a community center as well as church. A church is not, however, absolutely necessary for his ministrations, for he wrote us recently of an occasion when he baptized a family of eight children in the kitchen. Then the next time he came along that lonely road he had his stereopticon outfit, and there was a display of religious pictures and a talk about sacred things as well as a secular

and entertaining display. Since the consolidation of rural schools some of the old country schoolhouses are closed, and the Parson has been able to turn some of these disused schools into community centers. The Parson told us last winter how he drove twelve miles over very rough roads to hold a Christmas party in a closed Methodist church. He got to the little hamlet at dusk, and rang the church bell vigorously. In that community ringing the church bell means just two things-fire or a visit from the Parson. So people looked out to see if it was a fire, and as there was no sign of that danger, they ate their suppers with despatch and made ready for a party, the only dissenters being the bats, whose squeaks and flutters in the belfry followed the time-honored precedent of all bats, ecclesiastical or otherwise. The Christmas party included gifts from good friends of the missioner in the great city, games, dancing (the Parson's small victrola pays a good many parochial calls), and simple refreshments. These gatherings in isolated places are a regular part of the Parson's work. In many cases there is absolutely no amusement for the young people, and the results of this are altogether evil. Some strait-laced people have been rather shocked when the Parson acted as umpire at a Sunday afternoon ball game, after church; and, what is more, he brought bat, ball, and catcher's glove with him on Saturday night, incongruous company for his priestly vestments. But he thinks clean baseball is one form of Americanization for the growing lad of foreign parents, shut off in lonely hamlets where Satan is the most active purveyor of amusement.

And those very boys like to come to the Parson's Sunday school. He teaches them and talks straight to them, but, knowing boy nature, it is just possible that sessions held in the basement of

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