battle-cruisers. At present all that has limited the size of them, the power of the guns they carry, and their defensive armor is their cost-including the cost of docks and canals and the like adapted to their use. This Conference has not only limited their number, but has limited their size and the caliber of the guns they can carry. But conceivably the present form of the capital ship might, with the development of aircraft, become obsolete. Aircraft alone cannot become capital ships, but they can perhaps become the chief weapon of capital ships. That is, instead of carrying guns, the capital ship may conceivably carry aircraft. Instead of releasing a high-explosive shell the capital ship may conceivably release an airplane to drop a bomb or torpedo or to fight other airplanes. In that case the capital ship would be what we now call an airplane carrier. If, then, airplane carriers were not limited in tonnage and number, a nation might develop them so as to replace the battleship or battle-cruiser as the main fighting arm of its battle fleet and render the present limitation of naval armaments nugatory. It is therefore a significant fact that the naval Powers at this Conference have agreed to a very severe limitation of aircraft carriers both in number and size. They have assented to the proposal that no aircraft carrier shall exceed 27,000 tons, and the total tonnage of aircraft carriers shall not exceed 135,000 for Great Britain or the United States, 81,000 for Japan, 60,000 for France or Italy. During the period of this agreement, therefore, it is as certain as can be that while the present form of capital ship is limited no new form will be developed to take its place.

Another feature of this Conference which few people anticipated was the adoption of rules controlling the use of submarines in warfare:

I

The signatory Powers, desiring to make more effective the rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and non-combatants at sea in time of war, declare that among those rules the following are to be deemed an established part of international law:

(1) A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to determine its character before it can be seized.

A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuses to submit to visit and search after warning or to proceed as directed after seizure.

A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have been first placed in safety. (2) Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt from the universal rules above stated, and if a submarine cannot capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules, the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed molested.

un

IRVING BACHELLER

WHAT IS THE MATTER?

BY IRVING BACHELLER

MR

R. BACHELLER ought to be able to answer the question above if any one can. Every one knows that Mr. Bacheller is not only the author of "Eben Holden," "Keeping Up With Lizzie," and other popular books, and a lecturer of rare humor and vivacity, but that he is interested to the utmost in social questions, and especially in home and personal problems.

In the article to be printed next week in The Outlook he tells "The Fable of the India-Rubber Parents." That title is suggestive of the fun and the sense of the article.

II

The signatory Powers invite all other civilized Powers to express their assent to the foregoing statement of established law so that there may be a clear public understanding throughout the world of the standards of conduct by which the public opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon future belligerents.

III

The signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated in the recent war of 1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and non-combatants, and to the end that the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations they now accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as

between themselves, and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto.

IV

The signatory Powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of the humane rules of existing law declared by them with respect to attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant ships, further declare that any person in the service of any Power who shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is under orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy and may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of any Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found.

Virtually without question the nations assembled here not only unqualifiedly denounced and condemned as lawless the use of submarines as the Germans used them for the massacre of neutrals and non-combatants at sea, but, what is most important, agreed that it was in accordance with international law for any person, whether acting under orders or not, who sinks a merchant vessel without warning or without visiting and searching her if she obeys his warning, or even then without placing her crew and passengers in safety, to be tried wherever he may be found and punished as a pirate-that is, with death.

It should be noted that the rule to exclude submarines from the right accorded to surface vessels to stop merchant vessels for search and seizure was not to be adopted as a rule of international law until universally accepted; but it was agreed to as governing the practice of these five naval Powers as among themselves. Thus a French submarine commander in case of war with America (I choose an entirely unthinkable case) would violate a pledge of his own Government if he warned an American merchant vessel to stop, but in case of a naval war with Switzerland (in its way a case quite as unthinkable) he would have the right to stop a Swiss vessel without violating any rule at all. In neither case would he violate international law unless he went beyond stopping the vessel for search and seizure with full regard for the safety of the passengers and the crew.

In some respects the most surprising feature has been the unanimous agreement of the five naval Powers to recommend the outlawing of gas warfare. How difficult it is to make gas warfare (or chemical warfare, as it is technically known) the subject of international agreement that promises to be both beneficent and effective was made clear by the reports of subcommittees. The object of war is not to kill one's enemy but to impose one's will upon him. It is in many respects more effective to disable than to kill hostile troops; for dead men are no burden on an army, but wounded or disabled men are. Some forms of gas are for this

reason both more merciful and more effective than bullets and shells. There are practical difficulties in the way of making sure that a possible enemy will not use poison gas in war. This subject is discussed at length in a book by Victor Lefebure entitled "The Riddle of the Rhine" (W. Collins Sons & Co., Ltd., London). In spite of all the arguments showing the difficulty of preventing chemical warfare, the decision of the five Powers (America, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan) against this new and generally abominated practice was unanimous. The value of the action consists in its record of public opinion.

Another feature of the Conference which I think has been generally undervalued is the service it has rendered to China. Those who expected this Conference to do for China what she has so far been unwilling or unable to do for herself have looked for something quite unsound in international architecturean arch without a buttress or a roof without supports. Not all has been done that might be done even with the material at hand, it is true; but a great deal has been done nevertheless, and much sound and, I believe, honest planning for future construction. Besides the statement of principles governing their conduct toward China and toward each other in China, a statement known as the Root Resolutions and called China's Charter, all the Powers have agreed on certain specific reforms. Among these perhaps the most complicated is the change in China's customs tariff. In 1842 China agreed by treaty

with Great Britain to stop the arbitrary exactions of her officials and substitute regular tariff charges at a rate of five per cent. Then, through treaties giving equal customs rights to other nations, China yielded her freedom to frame her own customs duties for herself. It may seem a simple matter for the nations to change their treaties, but it is not. China has first to put her own house in order, establish a stable and trustworthy legislative and administrative government, abolish the troublesome provincial tariffs (called likin), which are beyond the control now of any central Government she has, and acquire some responsibility commensurate with the freedom which Chinese of Western education and ways of thinking seek for her. For the time being the tariff system remains as it is, but the rates, by agreement at this Conference, will be changed to provide China with a somewhat larger revenue, and provision is made for further changes.

Perhaps the most trying experience in this process of building a new international relation has been that of watching for a conclusion to the discussions over Shantung. Strictly, these discussions have not been a part of the Conference, though parallel to it; but, whatever the outcome, the Conference will take note of it. This controversy between China and Japan has now been reduced to what seems to most people who are not directly interested as mainly, if not wholly, technical or subordinate. The Chinese believe they are standing out for a fundamental right;

the Japanese believe they are standing out for a reasonable security for their property. Both need a settlementChina for the sake of her self-respect, Japan for the sake of the respect of others. If they do not reach it, both will be rendered rather ridiculous. It seems almost unreasonable to suppose that Shantung will not be put into shape and moved up to the main structure.

What seems not yet to have arrived, though it is on the invoice of material shipped (called officially, not invoice, but agenda), is the question of Manchuria and Siberia. Certainly the Conference will look distinctly unfinished, or at least not very well proportioned, if its builders leave the job without providing for some understanding about these regions which have been the source of gravest misunderstanding. It would

push the analogy of house building to perhaps an absurd extreme to say that Manchuria and Siberia are the hinges of the Open Door, the bolts and locks against aggression, or the keys to the problems of the Far East, but they cannot be permanently ignored in any plan for such an understanding as ought to be the product of the work that has been done here at Washington.

Some of the workmen have gone, others are planning to go in a few days. There remain many last things to be done. Even at this stage, however, when the work of finishing seems interminable, the house seems commodious, well built, and adapted to this family of nations.

January 9, 1922.

RIOR to the calling of the "sympathetic strike" on December 12 by the New York local of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America there had been no strike in the industry in New York City since 1907, when the drivers and chauffeurs walked out.

The packing industry employers' association representative, Mr. W. H. Noyes, had always been able to agree satisfactorily with the union, through their most tolerant, fair-dealing local President, John Kennedy, on questions of wages and working conditions. At the beginning of the war period, when the cost of living began to mount, the workmen asked for an increased wage scale. This was accepted in toto, although the agreement under which they were then operating had not yet expired. Subsequently the packers' association voluntarily granted increases to the men on two different occasions, although in each

case the agreements had many months to run before expiration.

Under date of May 16, 1921, the packers and the union entered into an agreement covering rules and working conditions which were to govern the industry for a period of one year. Included therein was a provision that no question could be raised by either side prior to the expiration of sixty days, or before July 16, 1921; after that date, however, the question of a change could be proposed by either party on notice. About the last of October the President of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen started negotiations with the packers' association for a continuation of the agreement for a further period of one year from November 1, without granting the right to either side to open the question within that time. The packers refused to agree to this; although no thought had been given to a wage reduction, they did not want

to commit themselves to maintain the present wage scale until November 1, 1922.

After several conferences between the packers' and union representatives the Amalgamated undertook to force the packers into another agreement to continue the terms of the original agreement dated May 16, 1921. They addressed a letter to Mr. Noyes, signed by the local chairman and secretary, but not by the President, in which they stated that, since the association was no longer disposed to deal fairly with them, they would endeavor to enter into agreements with the individual firms comprising the association. The letter to Mr. Noyes was dated December 2, and was handed him in person on December 6, in rather an apologetic man

ner.

On December 12, when the first crews went to work at four o'clock there were pickets there to inform them that a

1922

strike had been called. The first day the men were practically one hundred per cent on strike, including the various butcher trades as well as the drivers and chauffeurs, and of course production and deliveries were practically nil. The next day, however, there were a good many cattle and sheep killed, and each succeeding day shows an increased production until at the present time production is again about normal and deliveries are absolutely up to ordinary times.

The various plants have replaced the men who walked out, not with so-called "strike breakers," but every man they have employed has been given to understand that he has a permanent place unless his work is unsatisfactory. They have also required the usual bond from

THE OUTLOOK

past fifteen years, when one has been with Mr. Noyes but a short time. He is a representative of the employers, to be sure, but he has the interest and welfare of the worker at heart. And likewise he admits John Kennedy to be a tolerant, fair-dealing, straightforward leader, a real executive, and not a radical type of labor leader by any means.

The men struck in sympathy with the Chicago workers, and now the packers refuse to allow them to return except on the merits of their individual cases, which will be given every legitimate consideration upon application by the The packers are individual workers. getting all the help they need, turning away at the doors of single plants as many as fifty or one hundred applicants a day.

N June 5, 1916, Lord Kitchener arrived at Thurso, crossed to Scapa Flow in the destroyer Oak, and lunched with Lord Jellicoe on board the Iron Duke. He had fixed upon three weeks as the maximum limit of his absence from the hub of affairs in Whitehall, and he consulted Lord Jellicoe several times upon the question of the shortest possible time in which he could make the passage to Archangel in the Hampshire. He was most anxious not to lose a moment on the sea trip.

The responsibility for the route to be followed by the Hampshire from the Scapa anchorage rested upon Lord Jellicoe. The intention was that she should take the route passing up the eastern coast of the Orkneys, using the channel which, as a routine measure, was ordinarily searched by mine-sweepers. Owing to the heavy sea caused by a northeasterly gale, mine-sweeping to the eastward of the Orkneys was out of the question on the day of the Hampshire's departure, and if that route were used escorting destroyers could not face the sea at high speed. If Lord Kitchener's wishes were to be met and all possible time saved, one of the westerly routes had therefore to be selected.

There

were two such routes, one passing close inshore up the west coast of the Orkneys and under their lee, the other farther to the westward, near Seele Skerry Lighthouse. The inshore route was selected, for the following adequate

reasons.

It is

seas.

Between 7:30 and 7:45 P.M. the Hampshire struck a mine about one and one-half miles off shore, between the Brough of Birsay and Marwick Head. She sank, bows first, in fifteen minutes. There were only twelve survivors, who drifted ashore on a raft. By the time of the disaster the wind had shifted to north-northwest, and its force was fifty miles an hour, so that the course of the Hampshire had not, as was anticipated, taken her to leeward of the islands, and owing to the head sea she was only making 131⁄2 knots, instead of the 16 ordered. Had there been such a lee, it seems probable that Lord Kitchener and a large proportion of the crew would have been saved by the escorting destroyers, by the Hampshire's boats, or by patrol craft which arrived at the scene of the disaster during the night.

We now know, from the evidence of a German track chart, that the mine which sank the Hampshire was laid on

May 29 by the German submarine U-75, which appears to have left harbor on an ordinary mine-laying trip on May 24 or 25. So much for the facts, which have all been published, some of them by Lord Jellicoe in "The Grand Fleet 191416," some of them in the Admiralty blue book on Jutland.

Now for the myth about Lord Kitchener having lost his life in the Hampshire because his mission to Russia and the route which he would follow was betrayed to the German Government. To establish the truth of these allegations it would be necessary to prove that the German Government knew by May 24, 1916, that Lord Kitchener would proceed to Russia via Scapa Flow, that he would leave that anchorage by the western outlet, and that he would take the inshore channel. Not a particle of evidence has been produced in favor of any such contention. The female spy who was crednews to ited with having sent the Germany of Lord Kitchener's trip to Russia in the Hampshire was in prison from May 8, by which date Lord Kitchener's plans had not been formed. The track of U-75 shows that she laid no mines in the usual channel (to the eastward of the Orkneys) which the Hampshire would have been expected to use, and which it would have used if a strong wind had not been blowing from the northeast on June 5, seven days after the mines were laid. Apart from the loss of the Hampshire, in all human Kitchener himsel probability Lord would have been saved if the strong northeasterly wind had not changed t a gale from the north-northwest betwee 5 and 7 P.M. on the evening of his de parture.

The Kitchener-betrayal myth is u worthy of the attention of any bein endowed with reason, or of repetition b any one equipped with a sense of ord nary decency.