The President did not want it that way. At Johns Hopkins, he stated emphatically his preference for peace. He has since emphasized it at every opportunity. He offered then, and he has offered again and again, to enter into "unconditional discussions," in an effort to bring the war to an end. These appeals for negotiation, unfortunately, have either been ignored, dismissed with derision, or otherwise rejected. The efforts of various intermediary nations to initiate negotiations-efforts which have been endorsed by the United States--have met a similar fate. These attempts, in short, have all drawn a blank.

It might be concluded, therefore, that Hanoi and the Vietcong have no interest whatsoever in negotiating peace. As if to reinforce this conclusion, Ho Chi Minh has talked in terms of a 20-year war. It would appear, then, that Hanoi is determined to continue the military struggle until the United States is driven into the sea. But the President has made clear that we will not permit that to happen and it will not happen.

There the matter stands. Hanoi and the Southern Liberation Front insist that they will not desist from the struggle and we will not yield. Is there, then, no alternative but a trial by arms in the 3-, 5-, or 10-year conflict which is projected by some of our own officials or the 20-year war which was mentioned by Ho Chi Minh?

Hanoi has indeed talked of a 20-year war. But from that same city there has also come talk of the conditions on which the war might end. Hanoi stated these conditions for peace in a radio broadcast on April 12, 1965, in response to the President's Johns Hopkins speech. The conditions were underscored subsequently by Peiping and by Moscow. From these announcements, it would appear that negotiations to end the conflict are feasible, insofar as Hanoi is concerned, on the basis of these four conditions.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that these conditions be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the conditions were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

1. That the rights of the Vietnamese people-peace, independence, sovereignty, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity-on the basis of the Geneva agreements are recognized;

2. That the division of Vietnam into two zones will continue, pending peaceful reunification and that there will be no foreign military alliances, bases, or troop personnel in connection with either zone;

3. That the internal affairs of South Vietnam will be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves alone in accordance with the National Liberation Front

program and without any foreign inter

ference;

4. That the peaceful reunification of Vietnam will be settled eventually by the Vietnamese people themselves in both zones and without foreign interference.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I cite these conditions which have been set forth by Hanoi because it is important that we do not assume that we are engaged in Vietnam against a group or a government which has no objective ex

On the contrary, it would appear that the leaders in Hanoi and the Southern Liberation Front and their allies in Peiping and their supporters in Moscow have a very clear idea of why they fight and, in the four points to which I have referred, of the conditions on which they will cease fighting.

In a similar fashion, while some U.S. officials have suggested, as noted, that we are engaged in a 3-, 5-, or 10-year war, the President has also spoken of peace and the great desirability of restoring it as quickly as possible in Vietnam. There are conditions on which we, too, would be prepared to see this conflict terminated, although there may still be confusion both at home and abroad as to what these conditions may be.

To be sure, there have been pronouncements from various sources and in general terms, about ending aggression from the north. the north. There has been talk of aiding the South Vietnamese Government as long as our aid is sought. There have been individual views of why we fight expressed in the press, in Congress, and in the departments of the Government. But with all due respect there could be set forth, cohesively, even now, the basic conditions which U.S. policy regards as essential to peace in Vietnam. Such conditions do exist. They can be distilled ditions do exist. They can be distilled from President Johnson's many statements on Vietnam and other official pronouncements. And it may be useful at this time to set them forth, once again, in cohesive form. A clarification on this point may not only be helpful to public understanding; it may also be a spur to the initiation of negotiations.

In any event, the Communists have not alone set forth the conditions for not alone set forth the conditions for peace in Vietnam. peace in Vietnam. We have also done so even though they may not be fully understood. Given the degree of American involvement and sacrifice, we, too, ican involvement and sacrifice, we, too, have the right and responsibility to define again and again as concisely and as clearly as possible, the basic conditions for peace in that nation, as we see them. Indeed, it may be-and certainly, it is to be hoped-that the clear juxtaposition of the two sets of conditions for peace may lead to the "unconditional discusmay lead to the "unconditional discussions" which are properly and urgently sought as a means of bringing this bitter and brutal struggle to an end.

When the official statements of the

policy of the United States of the past few months are examined, it would appear to me that these conditions for peace in Vietnam have already been identified by the President and his principal spokesman during the past few months:

First. There must be a verified choice by the people of South Vietnam of their own government-a choice free of terrorism, violence, and coercion from any quarter. In this connection, the President clearly stated at Johns Hopkins:

We want nothing for ourselves-only that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way.

Second. There can be a future for South Vietnam either in independence or as a part of a unified Vietnam on the basis of a peaceful, free, and verified ex

Third. There shall be a withdrawal of all foreign forces and bases throughout Vietnam, north and south, provided peace can be reestablished and provided the arrangements for peace include adequate international guarantees of noninterference, not only for Vietnam, but for Laos and for Cambodia as well. This point was underscored by Secretary McNamara on June 16 when he said:

The United States has no designs whatsoever on the territory or the resources of southeast Asia or any country in it. Our national interests do not require that we introduce military bases for our forces in southeast Asia. They don't require that the states of southeast Asia become members of Western military alliances. The ultimate goal of our country, therefore, in southeast Asia is to help maintain free and independent nations there in which the people can develop politically, economically, and socially, according to patterns of their own choosing, and with the objective of becoming responsible members of the world family of nations.

Further, we are parties to the Geneva accord of 1962 which is designed to achieve essentially these ends in Laos and we have expressed our willingness to join in a resumption of a Geneva conference for the purpose of considering international guarantees of the independence, integrity, and borders of the Kingdom of Cambodia.

To these three basic conditions of peace, I would add two corollaries which all of us must realize are obviously essential if peace in Vietnam is to be reached via the operations of negotiation rather than through the exhaustion of

war.

I can say, on the basis of my conferences with the President on this matter, that the following two points have always reflected his viewpoint, and do so now:

First. There needs to be provision for a secure amnesty for those involved in the struggle on all sides in Vietnam as an essential block to an extension of the barbarism and atrocities of the struggle into the subsequent peace and, indeed, as an essential of that peace.

Second. There needs to be a willingness to accept, on all sides, a cease-fire and standfast throughout all Vietnam, which might well coincide with the initiation of negotiations.

President Johnson has made it clear, time and again, that we seek no larger war. He has made it clear, time and again, that we do not have any territorial, or military, or other claim whatsoever in Vietnam. He has said, time and again, that our only purpose is to help the South Vietnamese people to secure their own future, free from coercion. He has said, time and again, that we are prepared for unconditional discussions with

anyone, anywhere, to bring about peace. From that policy, as it has been enunciated and as it is quoted, it would seem to me entirely valid to distill American conditions for peace along the lines which have been enumerated.

To be sure, others may brush aside these conditions, even as we tend to do the same with respect to the conditions which they have set forth. Hanoi may reach, via an automatic reflex, the conclusion that these conditions, since they originate in the United States, can only mean domination of South Vietnam by ourselves and those whom we support. And, in all frankness, we are prone to a converse conclusion, via the same reflex, with respect to the conditions which are suggested from Hanoi. The reflex of mistrust and disbelief is understandable. But unless the military conflict is to expand and to continue into the indefinite future, whether it be 3, 5, 10, or 20 years of war, the degree of accuracy of these automatic reflexes must be tested in negotiations..

The high purpose of negotiations, if they can be initiated, should be to see to it that the conditions of peace wherever they may originate come to mean in fact and in detail the domination of the Vietnamese people themselves over their future. Beyond other considerations, this conflict involves primarily their country, their lives, their children. It is the Vietnamese people, north and south, who suffer most from its devastating and tragic consequences. And in the end it is they who should have the right to determine the shape of the Nation in which they live. That is where negotiations can lead. That is where the President wants them to lead. That is where they must lead, if there is ever to be a valid peace in Vietnam.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the Senator has just made an historic and most vital pronouncement.

I wish that every one of the Senators entitled to sit in the Chamber had been here to hear it. We should constantly

reiterate, in terms that cannot conceiv

ably be misunderstood anywhere on earth, not only our willingness to negotiate, but also our willingness to negotiate on fair conditions and the fact that we are not opinionated.

The best thing that the Senator said, and I know that he speaks most authoritatively, is that we will look with an unprejudiced eye on suggestions and ideas, no matter where they come from, once we are at the table of peace which is

the negotiating table.

I welcome the statement of the Senator warmly. I think it should mean a great deal to the millions of people in our country who thoroughly back what is being done in that part of the world, but who, at the same time, are unhappy about the fact that we have to do it with the resulting casualties in a time of relative peace in the world. This situation is a tragic thing in the hearts of all Americans.

I am grateful to the majority leader. I hope that he will speak out again and

again and make it crystal clear, in the again and make it crystal clear, in the highest forum of the land, in the hope that America will remain not only strong and unhampered by anything that has occurred, but that we will also intelligently and reasonably work toward and implement a solution of the problem in implement a solution of the problem in the way in which the majority leader has just suggested.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I thank the senior Senator from New York. Mr. PELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I congratulate the majority leader on his speech, late the majority leader on his speech, which so clearly defines the issues that exist between us and the Communists in

southeast Asia.

I find myself nearly always in agreement with the views, wisdom, and estimates of the future expressed by our majority leader.

I call the attention of the Senate to the service which the Senator from Mon

tana rendered in delivering his speech sometime back when the talk of negotiation was not quite as much in vogue as it is now, and in which he suggested that we ought to give thought to reconvening of the Geneva Conference under the leadership of the cochairmen, the British

and the Soviets.

work of history.

Our majority leader has knowledge of the Far East and a sense of history there, both beyond parallel in the Senate today.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I express my deepest thanks to the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, with whom I had an opportunity to visit South Vietnam and other areas of south

east Asia a few years ago, as a result of which visit, we were able, along with the Senator from Delaware [Mr. BoGGs), to issue a report which I think would stand up even today.

May I say, speaking for the President, that no one is more interested concerning what is happening in Vietnam than is the man in the White House.

I do have conferences with him one way or the other almost every day. This is the main topic of conversation. I know how he feels about it. I know of the many avenues that he has traveled in his attempts to seek a way out of the impasse in which we find ourselves.

Not only does it take up every waking moment of his time, but a good bit of his sleeping time as well. I think we are extremely fortunate to have in the White House a man who has this forward view, a man who is interested in trying to bring about a just settlement, a man who has the welfare of the people at heart, a man who has this responsibility to shoulder and who is doing the best he can, with all the wisdom he has, to bring about a just and lasting conclusion to the struggle in which we are engaged.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I wish to add to the splendid colloquy which has just taken place with respect to Vietnam that I share that solicitude and concern, and I share what the Senator from Rhode Island has had to say about escalation and the concern of the American people with respect to that. I have urged speaking to the people through Congress by means of a resolution similar to the resolution adopted in August of last year, which is now obsolete. These are manifestations of a dynamic freedom and do not represent one with a lessening of American determination to proceed solidly.

It is very important that people in Asia, and everywhere in the world, should not misunderstand our country because of its many representations that it desires peace. The determination of this country stands unimpaired because of our soul searching to find a means for peace, in which the President has been leading us. It should be understood that nothing will stop us in our efforts to arrive at a fair and just conclusion, but that it is conditioned by the President's determination. I hope very much that these efforts are not misunderstood as indicating an irresolution on our part. It would be most unfortunate if those who do not understand us made that implication.

So I welcome this historic statement

by the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD]. It seems to me that what often. the Senator has said should be said

Our willingness to negotiate should be known and we should welcome efforts and suggestions, no matter where they come from, as to how this grave struggle may be brought to an end.

THE IMPORTANCE OF BACKING AMERICA'S STAND IN VIETNAM Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, the national commander in chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United

States, Mr. John A. Jenkins, is a distinguished attorney in Birmingham, Ala. He is also a close friend of many Members of this Senate, including myself.

During his year as commander in chief of the VFW, "Buck" Jenkins has worked tirelessly in the interests of our Nation's security. One of the reasons his opinions are so eagerly sought on defense matters is that he has personally visited many of

the trouble spots of the world.

"Buck" Jenkins was recently in South Vietnam, where he visited our troops in the forested highlands, the base at Da Nang, and the beachhead at Chu Lai.

Commander Jenkins reported to his fellow citizens in Birmingham a few days ago when he addressed the Birmingham Rotary Club.

Because he is so knowledgeable in the matter, his observations as to why our policy in Vietnam is correct are particularly noteworthy. His address before the Birmingham Rotary Club was the subject of a fine editorial in the Birmingham News on July 26, 1965.

In view of the importance of what VFW Commander in Chief Jenkins said, I ask unanimous consent to have the editorial printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Birmingham (Ala.) News]

BATTLE'S FOUGHT AT HOME, Too

The importance of firm backing by the American people of this country's stand in Vietnam has been stated many times by many people. Few have stated it more eloquently than John A. "Buck" Jenkins of Birmingham, who is the national commander in chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

Addressing the Birmingham Rotary Club last week, Jenkins did not indulge in empty oratory for oratory's sake. He spoke directly to the point: As leaders of the free world, Americans cannot turn their backs on "the problems and worries of the world," can't "abrogate and forget these obligations and responsibilities."

The fact is that if the United States of

America is not willing and able to stand in defense of freedom-however onerous the burden seems then the precarious thread by which freedom hangs may be strained to the breaking point by those who seek to replace human liberty with state tyranny.

The U.S. Government recognizes this obligation and in Vietnam is acting upon it. For the United States to back out now, Jenkins said, would be like "a general walking off and leaving his troops in the field." For America to stay and do what is necessary is impossible without the full backing, in full understanding of what is involved, of the American people.

The organization Jenkins heads is composed of men who have a most direct stake in freedom's preservation: Those who have gone abroad to fight this country's battles in its behalf.

There is a war being fought in Vietnam by soldiers who are asked to bleed and die if necessary. The war also must be fought on the homefront through commitment of the American people and readiness on their part to make the kind of sacrifices which Buck Jenkins reminded Rotarians are a concomit

ant to preservation of freedom. The sacrifices we at home might be asked to make are small in comparison with those asked of our men in freedom's frontlines, but they are not insignificant. They are just as important to ultimate victory.

REPORT ON THE U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE XXXII VENICE

BIENNALE 1964

In the light of the possibilities of an imposing American representation at the Biennale, I went to Venice in November 1963, with Lois Bingham of USIA and Michael Barjansky of USIS Rome. From the first, we were greeted with a spirit of great enthusiasm and cooperation by the officials of the Biennale, both because of the new fact of U.S. Government participation, and because of the prospect of an exciting and pathfinding American exhibition. (It should be pointed out that the recent decline of European art had been reflected in the Venice Biennale, which was losing its traditional reputation as a rallying point for modern art, and about which there had already been predictions of decline and actual demise. This also accounted to a certain degree for the official enthusiasm toward us.)

We asked the biennale for additional space for our exhibition, but there was none available on the grounds. They accepted in principle the idea of a precedent setting annex outside the grounds to make a larger American exhibition possible, and showed us a number of potential sites, including abandoned churches, the prison of the Doges, and the gambling casino, which is empty during the summer. For various reasons, none of these was appropriate, and we finally arranged to use the empty American Consulate.

The preview week made the effect of the American exhibition and its success abundantly clear. We gave two preview parties, partly under the auspices of the sponsoring

Jewish Museum, the first for the press and the artists, and the second, under the auspices of the Ambassador and Mrs. Reinhardt, for local officials and other guests. In everyone's account, these occasions were the high point of the week, in terms of public enthusiasm and response.

Meanwhile the jury (two Italians, an American for the first time, a Brazilian, a Pole, a Swiss, and a Dutch representative) met, and as we were subsequently informed, from the first felt the clear superiority of the American contingent. They voted to give the International Grand Prize in painting to an American, Robert Rauschenberg.

The effect of the prize was extraordinary, not only because it had gone to an American for the first time, but also because it had gone to an artist in his late thirties, and not, as it usually did, to a much older man. Furthermore, Rauschenberg was in midcareer, and the prize implied an acknowledgement of youth and not achievement in the past, as it had previously. Young artists were profoundly moved by this acknowledgement of youth and fresh new directions. To others, the prize (this one and the others granted were, it seemed to me, closer to the consensus of the international art audience gathered in Venice at the time than any previous awards within recent memory) seemed to mark the revitalization of the Venice Biennale, and the restoration of its prestige as an accurate mirror of present conditions.

There were, of course, others who were displeased with the result. These included the critics from the popular press, and the members of the art community more committed to the old than to the new. Another intense reaction came from the French critics; it was triggered by a public statement I made to the effect that "it is acknowledged on every hand that New York has replaced Paris as the world art capital." Although this is a generally understood fact, the remark upset the French in the context of the critical and official indifference to their own pavilion. After the biennale, the Paris press was full of indignation, hysteria, and later, soul searching about the situation in French art. To me the high point of this hysteria was the allegation in the newspaper Arts that the Americans and the Communists had conspired together against the French. Quite without our intending it, the American

exhibition had the effect of making dramatically apparent the end (temporarily at least) of 150 years of French dominance of art.

In the Italian and other European press there was an extraordinary response to the American show, and it received about 90 percent of the biennale press coverage (the biennale officials good naturedly objected about this to me). There were extensive color spreads in five or six major magazines, and hundreds of columns of text and pictures in the papers.

For the most part, the exhibition, while it generated all this excitement, was misunderstood by the press, which described the biennale as a takeover of Europe by American pop art, despite the fact that neither I nor any of the artists participating consider their work to be pop art (I had made a point of this in the selection of the exhibition). This kind of reaction is understandable and predictable, since new developments in art have experienced similar problems for the past 150 years, because it takes time for the public to understand the unfamiliar new objectives of artists.

Since our exhibition was arranged to show the major new indigenous tendencies, the peculiarly American spirit of the art is wholly unfamiliar to the European audience, and it therefore requires exposure to completely new experiences and modes of understanding, toward which I feel we took an important step on this occasion. The intense press response and the public reaction of bewilderment bring to mind what happened in America just 50 years ago, when we

were shocked out of our provincial isolation by the 1913 armory show in New York, which opened our eyes to the 20th century art of Europe and Paris in particular. I do not feel that it would be immodest to assert that we have done for Europe in the 32d biennale what the armory show did for

us.

On the other hand, the response of the informed public, the professional critics and artists was touching and impressive. Many of them sought us out during the preview week and later during the summer to express their astonishment at the vitality and authority of the young Americans. For example, Werner Haftmann, a distinguished German scholar, told me it was the most impressive biennale exhibition he had ever seen. Antonioni, the prizewinning Italian filmmaker, became so enthusiastic that he asked about working with several of our artists, and subsequently invited Oldenburg to design sets for a projected film.

Santomaso, one of the best known of the older Italian painters, who lives in Venice, spent the summer proselytizing among visitors for the new American art, which he feels shows Europe the way out of its present cultural dilemma. Music, a mature painter from Yugoslavia, who was regarded as one of the most important world artists in the fifties, told me that his whole vision as an artist had been altered in 30 seconds when he first saw our exhibition. He had wintered in Paris for 15 years, but his life there no longer interested him; this year he is coming to New York.

The individuals I have mentioned all have

some direct experience of the United States, which partly explains their rapport with our art. On the other hand, both in Venice and elsewhere in Europe where I visited during the summer, Paris, London, Holland, I was always approached by young artists who awesomely asked personal questions about our artists, and then intensely pursued their major preoccupation: How to get to New York.

A number of individuals in government played important parts in the project. One employee of USIS in Rome, an Italian named Giordano Falzoni, made invaluable contributions to our success, as sympatheic liaison with the Italians, and as someone with un

derstanding and experience of the American situation. I would like to point out that the energy and resourcefulness of USIS London, which had nothing to do with the exhibition, was most impressive; Francis Mason took ad

vantage of the presence of the exhibition in Europe to arrange an important show in London for one of the artists, Jasper Johns.

One other individual requires special mention, Geoffry Groff-Smith, of USIS Trieste, who was enormously helpful with local arrangements in Venice. Intelligent, dedicated to his job, efficient and reliable, he is a man whose value to us in Italy cannot be overestimated.

Apart from these Government people, I am deeply obliged to the staff of the Jewish Museum, New York, and to Mrs. Alice M. Denney, of Washington, D.C., for her important contributions as assistant director of the American exhibition.

If Government support of the biennale continues, and I earnestly believe it should, since there is no more effective and dramatic way of communicating to the Europeans the level of our artistic activity, the problem of an adequate pavilion must be confronted. I believe it would be a serious error to become involved in an annex again in Venice, as the details of our experience make quite clear.

We need a new pavilion, not simply because it would be desirable to have more space, but also in the interest of our national image, and our concern for cultural matters, since many smaller countries have far more imposing structures. Beyond this, the present space simply cannot serve to do the job properly, considering the trouble and expense involved.

On my own initiative I began exploring the problem of a new pavilion a year ago. I would be happy to communicate the information I have gathered, about local site problems, local regulations, building conditions, etc., to anyone interested in pursuing it. I would like to point out that Philip Johnson, one of America's most celebrated architects, and an ardent advocate of the new American art, has expressed to me his willingness to volunteer his services for the design of a new pavilion under appropriate circumstances.

By the measure of direct political expediency or the measure of popular antagonism toward new developments in the arts it would be easy to discount the importance and the impact of the American exhibition in the 32d Venice Biennale, apart from the important evidence of important evidence of the Rauschenberg prize and the other less tangible effects I have attempted to define. However, I feel that the exhibition was one of the most important enterprises undertaken on the cultural level by our Government in Europe since the war.

I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the nomination.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JORDAN of Idaho in the chair). Is there objection?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider executive business. Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, by unanimous vote of those present and those voting by proxy, this morning voted to recommend the immediate confirmation of the nomination of Lawrence F. O'Brien, of Massachusetts, to be Postmaster General.

Mr. O'Brien is well known to many Members of the Senate. His nomination was approved without any opposition. No witness testified in opposition to it. The committee was unanimous in its decision that the confirmation of the nomination should go forward forthwith.

Mr. O'Brien's dedication and public service and knowledge of public affairs are known to many of us.

POSTMASTER GENERAL

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The nomination will be stated by the clerk.

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Lawrence Francis O'Brien, of Massachusetts, to be Postmaster General.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the nomination?

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, reserving the right to object and I shall not object as has been stated by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Mr. O'Brien appeared before the committee, and after hearing and interrogation by members of the committee, his nomination unanimously approved.

As ranking minority member of the committee, I am not only pleased by the nomination, but I am most pleased that the President submitted his nomination.

I have one more thing to mention. I hope the nomination of Mr. Gronouski will be before the Senate for confirmation, in order that the nomination may be cleared without too much of a lapse between the time he was named and action on his nomination.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to join the chairman of the committee and the ranking minority member of the committee. There is not much I can add, except to say that in my

aware of the risks they might run, they understood, with a great deal of comprehension of the present cultural situation, the importance of taking a bold and decisive position. By giving me complete esthetic freedom in the exhibition, they have made possible an affirmation of America's new leadership in world art, the positive ramifications of which will be felt for a long time to come. ALAN R. SOLOMON, U.S. Commissioner.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, as in executive session, I report, from the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, the nomination of Lawrence Francis O'Brien to be Postmaster General.

cessor to Benjamin Franklin.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I shall not object, I have known Mr. O'Brien since he has been serving in the White House. He is a very fine person.

I would commend to him that he do something about the postal service in the country. Just the other day I sent a small tape airmail special delivery from Washington to my State. It left on Thursday and finally arrived on Sunday afternoon. It could have gone faster by automobile.

I have been informed of letters taking as long as a week to go from Denver, Colo., to Englewood, Colo., which is 12 miles away. We have had a series of

problems of this kind. Not only have there been delays, but service is not rendered at all in new subdivisions.

I believe a good deal of administrative assistance and help can be given in this Department, which is the closest form of government to the people.

Mr. MONRONEY. Iyield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I join the Senator from Oklahoma and others in expressing my enthusiasm for the appointment of Mr. O'Brien as Postmaster General of the United States.

I have worked with him, as have many other Senators, in many ways over the years.

Mr. O'Brien has performed his duties with dignity for the people of the country.

I believe it is an excellent nomination and I enthusiastically support it.

reserve behind our currency is an obvious first step toward a managed monetary system which must ultimately lead to a crippling inflationary trend.

A related problem is our seemingly perennial inability to balance the Federal budget. We are in an era where the concept of a balanced budget is passe; an era where big government spending, which staggers the imagination, is in vogue. The value of our dollar has greatly suffered through our unwillingness to face fiscal responsibility by balancing our Federal budget.

The consequences of our continued deficit spending and related diminishing gold reserves are brought into focus in an excellent article by Felix Morley entitled "Nobody Can Pay Bills With Bottle Caps," which appeared in the July issue of Nation's Business. I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in

Mr. MONRONEY. I thank the Sena- the RECORD. tor from Oregon.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, will the will the Senator yield?

Mr. MONRONEY. I yield to the Senator from Utah.

Mr. MOSS. I join the Senator from Oklahoma in expressing my support and my pleasure on the appointment of Lawrence O'Brien to be Postmaster General.

Not only has he shown himself to be a man of devotion and skill in the legislative field, but he has a rare quality for administration. I am sure he will be of great benefit in the Post Office Department, which is one of the keystone departments of the Government with its vast number of employees and responsibility placed on the postal service.

The appointment of Mr. O'Brien represents one of the finest appointments made by the President, and I give it my support.

Mr. MONRONEY. I thank the SenI thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I ask for an immediate vote on the nomination.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. With

out objection, the nomination is con

firmed.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation

of the nomination.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. With out objection, the President will be notified forthwith.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate will return to legislative session.

The Senator from Colorado [Mr. DoмINICK] is recognized.

DIMINISHING GOLD RESERVES Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, in February of this year the Senate considered, in an extended debate, the problem of our diminishing gold reserves. It was my contention at that time, and is still my contention, that an adequate gold reserve behind the dollar is necessary in order to assure the stability of our dollar. I, along with several of my colleagues, argued that to diminish the gold CXI-1423

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Nation's Business, July 1965] NOBODY CAN PAY BILLS WITH BOTTLE CAPS (By Felix Morley)

With the close of the fiscal year on June 30, the Federal Government recorded its fifth straight year of deficit financing.

Much is made of the fact that we went in the hole less deeply than was anticipated when the budget for fiscal 1965 was drafted. But this pleasant circumstance is overshadowed by the general acceptance of evermounting debt as something normal and officially unperturbing even during a stretch of unprecedented prosperity.

Of the 20 years since the close of World War II only 6 have seen us in the black and that mostly by relatively small amounts. Another heavy deficit is anticipated for the fiscal year now opening. It will further inflate a national debt which is already over $316 billion. So Congress has been instructed by the Treasury to raise again the highly elastic debt ceiling. This is now only a reminder that the American people once really held the power of the purse.

No private business with a similar finan

cial record could expect to survive, let alone pay dividends to its stockholders. But Washington poses as an exception to the rule of covering expenditures with receipts. For all its monstrous debt, which will take $11.5 billion in interest alone during fiscal 1966, wholly unearned dividends, in the form of countless subsidies, are constantly increased.

To the uninformed it must seem as though Uncle Sam had rediscovered the secret of fabulous King Midas, to whom the gods temporarily gave the gift of turning everything he touched to gold. Yet there is actually no mystery about the ability of modern governments, whether of Soviet Russia, the United States, or hybrid socialisms in between, to spend continuously more than they take in.

It is not done with mirrors but by a device essentially similar to the trick of the emperors in the time of Rome's decadence, when they clipped the coinage in order to provide the popular circuses which the Senate refused to sanction. The managed currencies which are the space-age form of coin clipping have all been more or less legalized. The result, however, in the form of consequent depreciation in the value of money,

is much the same.

One might even surmise that the managed

currency racket, for a racket it essentially is, traces back to the Midas myth. At a time when gold was the universal measure of value, some imaginative Greek dreamed of a

ruler who could create purchasing power at will. Now we achieve the same end by putting the fable in reverse. Rulers dispense

with gold by telling their subjects that pieces of paper nicely engraved and printed, are all that we need for money.

Thus the $10 Federal Reserve note states on its face that the United States of America "will pay to the bearer on demand ten dollars." Try to secure this redemption, and probably you will receive a duplicate note, perhaps a little cleaner but otherwise identical. Conceivably two $5 bills might be substituted.

Alongside this hocus-pocus the fable of King Midas seems quite contemporary, not less so for the snapper with which it ends. Because his food turned to inedible metal as it reached his lips, the monarch starved. In other words, there is no way in which real value can be created by governmental fiat. The moral is one on which the Keynesian economists might profitably brood.

Since the United States turned to irrehas lost so much of its value that an annual income of $12,000 is now needed to equal the purchasing power of one of $4,000 then. This is coin clipping as extreme as anything practiced in ancient times. Nevertheless, those who have been able to up their incomes in proportion have not been injured. Some less appreciated results of managed currencies are more universally damaging. A loss affecting every citizen is that power of the purse which our forefathers strove so valiantly to achive. Subordination of the monarch to elected representatives of the people, in determining the amount and direction of governmental expenditure, was one of the great landmarks on the road to freedom. It is embodied in our Constitution by the provision that: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law."

deemable currency in 1933, the paper dollar

While technically observed, this prohibition actually became a dead letter when the dollar ceased to be redeemable. That now discarded safeguard provided an almost automatic check on governmental extravagance. The mere possibility of redemption meant that money would not be created, whether of monetized debt, beyond the limitation of by printing press or in the more refined form the gold reserve and the anticipated demands for redemption.

vice of irredeemable currency has changed all this. It has again placed the power of the purse in the hands of nonelected officials, just as it was when the Mayflower sailed. antee votes for everybody, after the vote There is certainly irony in the effort to guarhas become worthless as a control over any form of Federal extravagance.

The clever but fundamentally immoral de

It cannot be said that any Communist genius planned the substitution of irredeeming centralized dictatorship easy. During able currency with the clear purpose of makthe lifetime of Karl Marx, indeed, all the more important nations adhered scrupulously to the gold standard, the more so for the record of disaster that in the long run has always ruined countries that failed to protect the value of their money.

But Lenin publicly welcomed the change when the staggering costs of the first World War undermined the gold standard in all further Communist approval in 1933 when of Europe, Russia included. And there was President Roosevelt "made the manipulation of the value of the currency an open and

admitted instrument of public policy." The quotation is attributed to Secretary of the Treasury in Morgenthau, his famous