bidder.

SEC. 602. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for the purposes of this Act, but appropriations for public works projects authorized by titles I, II, III, IV, and V shall not exceed(1) for title I: Inside the United States, $252,661,000, outside the United States, $7,391,000, section 102, $39,470,000, section 103, $10,000,000 or a total of $309,522,000.

(2) for title II: Inside the United States, $225,877,000, outside the United States, $34,436,000, section 202, $41,099,000, section 203, $10,000,000 or a total of $311,412,000.

(3) for title III: Inside the United States, $210,630,000, outside the United States, $42,683,000, section 302, $71,063,000, section 303, $10,000,000 or a total of $334,376,000.

(4) for title IV: A total of $100,051,000. (5) for title V: Military family housing, a total of $684,388,000.

SEC. 603. Any of the amounts named in titles I, II, III, and IV of this Act, may, in the discretion of the Secretary concerned, be increased by 5 per centum for projects inside the United States (other than Alaska) and by 10 per centum for projects outside the United States or in Alaska, if he determines in the case of any particular project that such increase (1) is required for the sole purpose of meeting unusual variations in cost arising in connection with that project, and (2) could not have been reasonably anticipated at the time such project was submitted to the Congress. However, the total costs of all projects in each such title may not be more than the total amount authorized to be appropriated for projects in that title. SEC. 604. Whenever

(1) the President determines that compliance with section 2313(b) of title 10, United States Code, for contracts made under this Act for the establishment or development of military installations and facilities in foreign countries would interfere with the carrying out of this Act; and

(2) the Secretary of Defense and the Comptroller General have agreed upon alternative methods of adequately auditing those contracts;

the President may exempt those contracts from the requirements of that section.

SEC. 605. Contracts for construction made

the United States and its possessions under by the United States for performance within this Act shall be executed under the jurisdiction and supervision of the Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, or the Bureau of Yards and Docks, Department of the Navy, unless the Secretary of Defense determines that because such jurisdiction and supervision is wholly impracticable such contracts should be executed under the jurisdiction and supervision of another department or Government agency, and shall be awarded, insofar as practicable, on a competitive basis to the lowest responsible bidder, if the national security will not be impaired and the award is consistent with chapter 137 of title 10, United States Code. Regulations issued by the Secretary of Defense implementing the provisions of this section shall provide the department or agency requiring such construction with the right to select either the Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, or the Bureau of Yards and Docks, Department of the Navy, as its construction agent, providing that under the facts and circumstances that exist at the time of the selection of the construction agent, such selection will not result in any increased cost to the United States. The Secretaries of the military departments shall report semiannually to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives with respect to all contracts awarded on other than a com

SEC. 606. (a) As of October 1, 1966, all authorizations for military public works (other than family housing) to be accomplished by the Secretary of a military department in connection with the establishment or development of military installations and facilities, and all authorizations for appropriations therefor, that are contained in Acts approved before August 2, 1964, and not superseded or otherwise modified by a later authorization are repealed except

for appropriations therefor that are set forth (1) authorizations for public works and in those Acts in the titles that contain the

general provisions;

(2) the authorization for public works projects as to which appropriated funds have been obligated for construction contracts or land acquisitions in whole or in part before October 1, 1966, and authorizations for appropriations therefor;

(3) notwithstanding the provisions of section 606 of the Act of August 1, 1964 (78 Stat. 341, 363), the authorization of the following items, which shall remain in effect until October 1, 1967:

(a) operational and training facilities, maintenance facilities, supply facilities, medical facilities, administrative facilities, troop housing and community facilities, utilities and ground improvements in the amount of $611,000 at Fort Benning, Georgia, that is contained in title I, section 101, under heading "Inside the United States" and subheading "Continental Army Command (Third Army)" of the Act of July 27, 1962 (76 Stat. 223).

(b) operational and training facilities, maintenance facilities, administrative facilities and utilities in the amount of $833,000 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that is contained in title I, section 101, under heading "Inside the United States" and subheading "Continental Army Command (Third Army)" of the Act of July 27, 1962 (76 Stat. 223).

(c) operational and training facilities. troop housing and community facilities, and utilities in the amount of $4,241,000 at Fort Dix, New Jersey, that is contained in title I, section 101 under heading "Inside the United States" and subheading "Continental Army Command (First Army)" of the Act of November 7, 1963 (77 Stat. 307).

(d) training facilities in the amount of contained in title I, section 101 under head$290,000 at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, that is ing "Inside the United States" and subheading "Continental Army Command (Second Army)" of the Act of November 7, 1963 (77 Stat. 307).

(e) operational facilities, maintenance facilities, medical facilities, administrative facilities, and utilities in the amount of $236,000 at Fort Knox, Kentucky, that is contained in title I, section 101 under heading "Inside the United States" and subheading "Continental Army Command (Second Army)" of the Act of November 7, 1963 (77 Stat. 307).

(f) maintenance facilities in the amount of $449,000 at Fort Story, Virginia, that is contained in title I, section 101 under heading "Inside the United States" and subheading "Continental Army Command (Second Army)" of the Act of November 7, 1963 (77 Stat. 307).

(g) maintenance facilities, medical facilities, community facilities, and utilities in the amount of $512,000 at Fort Benning, Georgia, that is contained in title I, section 101 under heading "Inside the United States" and subheading "Continental Army Command (Third Army)" of the Act of November 7, 1963 (77 Stat. 307).

(h) training facilities, maintenance facilities, supply facilities, medical facilities, troop housing and utilities in the amount of $1,836,000 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, $1,836,000 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina,

that is contained in title I, section 101 under heading "Inside the United States" and subheading "Continental Army Command (Third Army)" of the Act of November 7, 1963 (77 Stat. 307).

(1) operational facilities, maintenance facilities, supply facilities, medical facilities, and administrative facilities in the amount of $553,000 at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, that is contained in title I, section 101 under heading "Inside the United States" and subheading "Continental Army Command (Third Army)" of the Act of November 7, 1963 (77 Stat. 307).

(j) training facilities, troop housing and community facilities in the amount of $919,000 at Fort Irwin, California, that is contained in title I, section 101 under heading "Inside the United States" and subheading "Continental Army Command (Sixth Army)" of the Act of November 7, 1963 (77 Stat.

308).

(k) operational facilities, maintenance facilities, troop housing and utilities in the amount of $719,000 at various locations that is contained in title I, section 101 under heading "Inside the United States" and subheading "Army Component Commands (United States Army Air Defense Command)" of the Act of November 7, 1963 (77 Stat. 309).

of $1,498,000 at Fort Richardson, Alaska, that (1) maintenance facilities in the amount is contained in title I, under the heading "Inside the United States" and subheading "Army Component Commands (Alaska Command Area)" of the Act of November 7, 1963 (77 Stat. 309).

(m) maintenance facilities in the amount of $721,000 at Schofield Barracks, Hawail, that is contained in title I, under the heading "Inside the United States" and subheading "Army Component Commands (Pacific Command Area)" of the Act of November 7, 1963 (77 Stat. 309).

(n) operational facilities, supply facilities, administrative facilities, troop housing, community facilities and utilities in the amount $968,000 at various locations that is contained in title I, section 101, under

heading "Outside the United States" and subheading "Army Security Agency" of the Act of November 7, 1963 (77 Stat. 310).

(o) operational facilities, maintenance facilities, supply facilities, troop housing and utilities in the amount of $5,995,000 in Ger

States" and subheading "Army Component many that is contained in title I, section 101 under the heading "Outside the United Commands (European Command Area)" of the Act of November 7, 1963 (77 Stat. 310).

(p) operational facilities in the amount of $6,900,000 at various locations that is contained in title I, section 102 of the Act of

November 7, 1963 (77 Stat. 310).

(q) training facilities in the amount of $7,600,000 for the Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, that is contained in title II, section 201, under the heading "Service School Facilities" of the Act of November 7, 1963 (77 Stat. 314).

(r) administrative facilities in the amount of $3,484,000 for the Naval Research Laboratory, District of Columbia, that is contained in title II, section 201, under the heading "Office of Naval Research Facilities" of the Act of November 7, 1963 (77 Stat. 315).

(s) community facilities in the amount of $550,000 for Camp Smedley D. Butler, Okinawa, that is contained in title II, section 201, under the heading "Outside the United States" and subheading "Marine Corps Facilities" of the Act of November 7, 1963 (77 Stat. 315).

(b) Effective fifteen months from the date of enactment of this Act, all authorizations for construction of family housing which are contained in this Act or any Act approved prior to August 2, 1964, are repealed except except (1) the authorization for family

housing projects as to which appropriated funds have been obligated for construction contracts or land acquisitions or manufactured structural component contracts in whole or in part before such date, (2) the authorization for two hundred family housing units at a classified location contained in the Act of August 1, 1964 (78 Stat. 341, 359), and the authorization for 180 units at Site 4-S contained in the Act of August 1, 1964 (78 Stat. 341, 360).

SEC. 607. (a) It is the sense of Congress that all the land comprising the BollingAnacostia complex will be required for milltary purposes within the foreseeable future and should be retained by the Department of Defense for such use.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (40 U.S.C. 471, et seq.), the Housing Act of 1949, as amended

(42 U.S.C. 1441, et seq.), the Act of June 8, 1960 (40 U.S.C. 2662), or any other law, no portion of the Bolling Air Force Base or the Anacostia Naval Air Station shall be deter

mined excess to the needs of the holding agency or transferred, reassigned, or otherwise disposed of by such agency prior to July 1,

1967.

SEC. 608. (a) All construction under this Act shall be designed using techniques developed by the Office of Civil Defense to maximize fallout protection, where such can be done without impairing the purpose for which the construction is authorized or the effectiveness of the structure, unless exempted from this requirement under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense

or his designee.

(b) The Secretary of Defense shall make appropriate provision for the utilization of technical design and construction methods in the preparation of design and construction plans and in construction under this Act, to assure carrying out the purposes of this section; and for such purposes expenditures on individual projects shall not exceed one per centum of the amount authorized for that project.

SEC. 609. Every contract between the Secretary of the Air Force and the Aerospace Corporation shall prohibit the construction of any facility or the acquisition of any real property by the Aerospace Corporation unless such construction or acquisition has first been authorized to the Air Force by the Congress.

SEC. 610. Except in the case of hospitals authorized for construction under this or any previous Act, any military hospital hereafter constructed in the United States or its possessions shall include facilities for obstetrical care unless sound and specific justification is made by the Secretary concerned for omitting such facilities in any hospital authorized.

SEC. 611. (a) No camp, post, station, base, yard or other installation under the authority of the Department of Defense shall be closed or abandoned until after the expiration of thirty days from the date upon which a full report of the facts, including the justification for such proposed action, is submitted by the Secretary of Defense to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives.

(b) This section shall apply only to posts, camps, stations, bases, yards, or other installations that are located in the United States

and Puerto Rico and have a total military and civilian complement of more than two hundred and fifty. It shall not apply to any facility used primarily for river and harbor projects or flood control projects.

SEC. 612. None of the authority contained in titles I, II, III, and IV of this Act shall be deemed to authorize any building construction project inside the United States (other than Alaska) at a unit cost in excess of (1) $32 per square foot for cold-storage warehousing;

(2) $8 per square foot for regular warehousing;

(3) $1,850 per man for permanent barracks;

(4) $8,500 per man for bachelor officer quarters: unless the Secretary of Defense or his designees determines that, because of special circumstances, application to such project of the limitations on unit costs contained in this section is impracticable.

SEC. 613. The last sentence of section 2674 (a) of title 10, United States Code, as amended by changing the figure "$10,000" amended by changing the figure "$10,000" to "$15,000".

SEC. 614. Titles I, II, III, IV, V, and VI of this Act may be cited as the "Military Construction Authorization Act, 1966."

TITLE VII

Reserve Forces Facilities

SEC. 701. Subject to chapter 133 of title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense may establish or develop additional facilities for the Reserve Forces, including the acquisition of land therefor, but the cost of such facilities shall not exceed

(1) for Department of the Army: Army National Guard of the United States, $9,200,000. (2) for the Department of the Navy: Naval

and Marine Corps Reserves, $8,890,000.

(3) for Department of the Air Force: (a) Air National Guard of the United States, $9,000,000.

(b) Air Force Reserve, $3,400,000.

SEC. 702. The Secretary of the Navy is authorized to convey to the city of Little Rock, Arkansas, without consideration, all right, title, and interest in so much of the land and improvements comprising the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Training Center, Little Rock, Arkansas, as is agreed to be required for a right-of-way for construction of a public highway, at such times as that portion of the land and improvements may no longer be required as a part of said training center.

SEC. 703. The Secretary of Defense may establish or develop installations and facilities under this title without regard to section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C. 529), and sections 4774(d) and 9774(d) of title 10, United States Code. The authority to place permanent or temporary improvements on land includes authority for surveys, administration, overhead, planning, and supervision incident to construction. That authority may be exercised before title to the land is approved under section 355 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (40 U.S.C. 255), and even though the land is held temporarily. The authority to acquire real estate or land includes authority to make surveys and to acquire land, and interests in land (including temporary use), by gift, purchase, exchange of Governmentowned land, or otherwise.

SEC. 704. This title may be cited as the "Reserve Forces Facilities Authorization Act, 1966."

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALBERT). Is a second demanded?

Mr. BATES. Mr. Speaker, I demand a second.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, a second will be considered as ordered.

There was no objection.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may require.

Mr. Speaker, the military construction bill which we are considering today contains a new section 611 in lieu of the base closure language contained in H.R. 8439, which was objected to by the Attorney General of the United States, torney General of the United States, and based on this objection, was vetoed by the President. The only changes we have made in the bill is in section 611,

plus technical changes and one other committee amendment which is on the Speaker's desk.

The total cost of the bill is $1,780,062,000, insofar as the authorization is concerned.

Now, of course, the true issue before the House is the veto message and I would like to discuss that matter with the membership.

in some respects to other veto messages

The President's veto message is similar

that are based on the allegation that a particular section of a bill is an unconstitutional invasion of the powers of the Executive.

I might point out, however, that in this veto message there are several rather important differences, or perhaps I might even say, concessions. I will discuss those in more detail in a few moments.

The Attorney General, being an appointee of the President, based his veto recommendation on the assumption that through section 611 the legislative branch sought to invade the prerogatives of the executive branch of Government.

And you can guess what would happen to any Attorney General who did not reach such a conclusion.

But, there is no Attorney General that the Congress can consult to raise objections to actions by the Executive when the Executive invades the prerogatives of the legislative branch.

Is there anyone here who is so naive as to believe that the real problem of today is the erosion of power of the Executive by the Congress? We all know the contrary is true. The executive branch, as well as the courts, have assumed, or have delegated so much power, that there remain only limited areas where the Congress is required to act.

I suggest that the time has come when the Congress should contemplate setting up an office of its own to determine the extent to which the Executive may have eroded or invaded the powers of the legislative branch of Government.

Now, let us look at this base closing provision, which was contained in the military construction bill and objected to by the Attorney General.

The original House language provided that a base could not be closed if either House adopted a resolution of disapproval. The conferees in a compromise effort agreed upon language that limited the submission of base closures to the period January 1 through April 30, but without reserving any veto power in the Congress.

The bill before you today, in section 611, says that no base shall be closed or abandoned until 30 days after the report has been filed with the Armed Services Committees of both Houses, and that report must include all facts and the justification for the base closure.

The conference language, in effect, established a period of time during which the Secretary of Defense could not submit any base closures. In this way, the language before the House today and the conference report differ, but in other respects the language before the House today and the language that was vetoed are similar, because in are similar, because in both cases the

Congress could not, by the adoption of a simple resolution, block the closing of a military base.

We must bear in mind that the Congress established each of these bases, in some cases by authorization, in other cases just with appropriations, but in all cases money had to be appropriated for their construction, and certainly their maintenance. In doing this the Congress acted under the clearest language in the Constitution, and the clearest grant of power; namely, article I, section 8, which gives to the Congress the power to raise and support armies and provide for a navy.

The President, in his veto message, made this very clear when he said:

Under the Constitution Congress has the power to enact laws to "raise and support" armed forces, and only Congress can provide the necessary appropriations for maintaining our fighting forces.

When the President signs into law an authorization bill, and later an appropriations bill, according to the Attorney General, he is bound to execute that law. But in the execution of the law the Congress obviously contemplates that the base it has authorized is required and will remain open. Therefore, whether or not a base should be closed might well be a question for the Congress to determine.

When a base is abandoned, without any further action on the part of the Congress, is it not possible that the President is not executing the laws of the Nation? Is it not possible to conclude that the President has seen fit not to do something that the Congress has required by law? When a base is closed, is this faithful execution of the laws? Or, could it be said that the closing of these bases is a failure to execute the laws of the land?

If the President unilaterally entered into an agreement to disarm, and the Secretary of Defense closed all of our military bases, is the Congress powerless? How does the Congress fulfill its responsibility to "raise and support armies and provide for a navy" if the executive branch of Government can unilaterally negate this responsibility?

Perhaps there is a difference between closing some bases and closing all bases. But frankly, I do not know what that difference is.

This concerns me, because at some future date a President or a Secretary of Defense may decide to close more than just a few bases at one time. He might decide to close all military bases, and in this way, bring about almost complete disarmament.

I raise this point because we have not solved the problem, although I do think that we are closer to the solution than ever before.

I say this because the President's message stated that "a reasonable reporting provision consistent with the legislative powers of the Congress" would not warrant a veto.

abandoned until 30 days from the date upon which a full report of the facts, including which a full report of the facts, including the justification for the proposed action, is submitted to the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate.

The Presidential veto message and the new language recognize several principles which have not heretofore been explicitly which have not heretofore been explicitly spelled out. First, a reporting procedure on base closures is now required for the first time as a matter of law. Second, the reports will be made to the Armed Services Committees as agents of their respective bodies on military matters. Third, the reports will contain not only an announcement, but also and I think this is the key to the entire problem-“a full report of the facts, including the justification for such proposed action." This will enable the committees to study, to analyze and, if necessary, to hold hearings on the reasons for such action.

Frankly, the time period, in my opinknow of any closure action which has ion, is relatively unimportant as I do not been even substantially commenced within 6 months after the announcement.

But beyond this, I can assure the membership of this House that there will be no further base closure announcements that you will read about in the newspapers before you have been advised that these base closures are to take place.

I have been given assurance from the highest source in our Government that from here on out you will receive advance notice and not be taken by surprise as many of us were in the past.

But beyond that, we have every reason to believe that responsible officials will not only notify the committees and the individual members in the event of any future base closures, but also that such announcements will not take place when the Congress is not in session.

I have been urged by some to take the position that there should be no military construction authorization bill. I personally feel that we must have this authorization bill because of our problems abroad, and the problems in our own land. I am convinced that the military might of this Nation is the most important single item of concern to the American people.

Just remember, there are 1,299 separate items in this bill, affecting vital military bases all over the world.

Under the circumstances, Mr. Speaker, I feel that it would be wise for us to adopt the modified section we propose.

I think you will all agree that the most important elements involved in this particular dispute is the question of whether or not the Congress should be considered a partner in the matter of national security. The President, in his veto message, makes this clear-the Congress is a partner in national security matters.

And the message also makes clear that the President has no objection to a reporting procedure. It is unfortunate that such a reporting procedure was not in effect last November when so many bases were closed without so much as a

That no camp, post, station, base, yard or other installation under the authority of the Department of Defense shall be closed or

who have the responsibility, just as the President has indicated in his veto message, to provide for our national security.

I hope, now, that the Secretary of Defense is also equally convinced that the Congress is a partner, and that from here on out there will be no need for stronger language to maintain this position.

Perhaps this veto message and the whole issue involved here has eliminated a great area of uncertainty that has existed between the executive and legislative branches with respect to the position of the Congress and the position of the Secretary of Defense in the national security area.

We, after all, respond to the American people. people. We are responsible to them. The Members of the House must answer to them every 2 years. This is a government of the people and the only way that the people can be informed is to be told. And the only way that Members of the House can be told of what the wishes of the people are is to answer to their will at the end of each 2 years.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I do not propose to conclude my remarks on this measure by saying that the House Committee on Armed Services has won a victory, nor do I agree that we have met with a defeat. I think we have established certain principles. They were principles worth fighting for. The principle was one of partnership. The principle was one of recognition of article I, section 8, of the Constitution. The principle was one of separation of powers.

So, in a way, three principles have been established by this veto message, and we have responded, I believe, in a responsible manner. We could, of course, have made it a far greater issue. We chose not to take that path because we are dealing with the national security. And if there is ever an area in which there must be a partnership, it is in the area of national security.

In his message, the President said: The legislative and executive branches share responsibility for the security of the Nation and each has a vital role to play.

As I interpret that portion of the veto message, the President is saying that we are partners in the matters involving our national security.

The President, in the veto message, also said:

Also a President, under his oath of office, must be concerned about the cumulative erosion of Executive power by legislation such as section 611 of this bill.

The President went on to say:

The power of the Congress in which I served for nearly 2 dozen years is not served by assuming Exective functions. The need for wise legislative action and the dependency of our welfare upon it was never greater. The legislative burdens of the Congress were never greater. Not only the separation of powers fail when Congress impairs Executive function, but the sheer inability of the Congress to deal meaningfully with the multitudinous details of execution of its laws weakens government.

But on the other hand, Mr. Speaker, I think the Congress must also be concerned about the cumulative erosion of the legislative powers of the Congress, frequently based upon the assumption that Congress is unable to deal meaningfully with the multitudinous details of

execution of its laws. I do not think Congress is so devoid of ability and capability that it cannot, on occasion, go into details that vitally affect the welfare of the Nation.

And, frankly, I grow tired of the implication that Congress really only has the power to appropriate funds.

I also weary of the "execution" of laws philosophy. To execute means to carry out and I prefer to think that means carry out the will of the people expressed by their representatives in Congress and not the interpretation of Presidential appointees.

So, I suggest that there are times when the Congress must be jealous of its prerogatives and must also guard against the cumulative erosion of its powers. Perhaps we have vested too much power, not so much in the President himself, but in the executive branch of Government.

We must always be jealous at all times of the separation-of-powers concept. The theory of checks and balances in many ways is far more important than any single provision of the Constitution.

The whole concept of separation of powers, the whole theory of checks and balances, must be preserved if we are to remain a free people.

I could not agree more with those words of James Madison, who said in 1789:

If there is a principle in our Constitution, indeed in any free constitution, more sacred than another, it is just that which separates the legislative, executive, and judicial power.

I concur 100 percent with that observation and I believe I can say that the entire membership of the Committee on Armed Services concurs in that observation.

The question is, How do we maintain this separation of powers? How does the Congress meet its responsibility to provide for a navy and raise and support armies if, after we have exercised our responsibility and the power vested in us by the Constitution, an Executive fails to comply with the law, or fails to comply with the wishes of the Congress in this manner?

Furthermore, how can the Congress be fully conversant in matters of national security if bases which we have authorized and approved, for which funds have been appropriated, are closed without the Congress having any prior knowledge of these matters?

There is wisdom in a multitude of advice and I do not believe that the Congress is so devoid of intelligence that it, too, cannot offer advice on occasion that might be helpful be helpful to the executive branch of Government when they come to making decisions of this nature.

So in conclusion, Mr. Speaker, let me repeat that, while we do not claim a vic

tory, we do not admit nor imply a defeat, because in the long run what we are trying to establish, what we have said since last January, is that the Congress must be a partner in national security matters above all other matters.

I think that principle has been established. I think the President recognizes it. I firmly believe that our operations in the future will go much more smoothly than they have in the past.

I am perfectly willing to recommend the language contained in section 611 of the new bill. It is a step in the right direction.

I think we will be informed hereafter. I think Members will be informed hereafter when something is going to happen in their own area and I think that under these circumstances we can accept the bill that is now before the House, not with the idea that we have entered into a strategic withdrawal, but with the conviction that we have entered into a new viction that we have entered into a new era of understanding.

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. I would like to ask the chairman, for whom I have the profoundest respect, one question. Is there in this bill authorization for the expenditure of 1 additional cent other than already authorized for moving the headquarters of the 5th Army from my district?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. This bill contains the same provisions that were in the bill which the gentleman voted for and which passed the House unanimously.

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. While I may have been misinformed, and that is possible, I have been told that there is a provision tucked away in the bill for building some new sewerage out at Fort Sheridan, some million or two dollars of new sewerage, all to accommodate the 5th Army headquarters. I would feel I would feel easier in my mind, as would my constituents, if assured that such is not

the case.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina.

I

Unfortunately, the bill H.R. 8439 was vetoed by the President on the advice and recommendation of his Attorney General, who was of the opinion that the language in section 611 represented a fundamental encroachment by the Congress of powers specifically reserved under the Constitution to the executive branch.

Needless to say, I take strong exception to the opinion of the Attorney General that the original provisions of section 611 "are repugnant to the Constitution." However, it is not my purpose to belabor before this body some of the semantics of the legal and constitutional questions involved herein.

These intricate legal and constitutional questions have adequately been reviewed and discussed by my distinguished chairman. I am in complete accord with my chairman's assessment of these legal questions.

It is important, however, that this record clearly reflect the fundamental principles that have precipitated this

confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of our Government. In order to do this we should review some of the historical considerations and events which required the Congress to take the aggressive and positive steps now identified by our Attorney General as "repugnant" to the Constitution.

In my judgment, and I am sure one shared by the vast majority of the Members of Congress, the issue involved here today is nothing more, nor less, than the Congress effectively effecting its constitutional responsibility to act as a fullfledged partner with the President of the United States to insure the development and continued maintenance of a military capability adequate to guarantee our present and future national security. Under the provisions of the Constitu

PRICE].

Mr. PRICE. There are no additional funds in this particular authorization bill for the purpose for which the gen

tleman from Illinois stated.

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. I thank my colleague. I shall vote for the bill with the greatest enthusiasm.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr.

Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. HÉBERT] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the new military construction authorization bill for fiscal year 1966, H.R. 10775, as reported by the Committee on Armed Services.

At the outset, I wish also to state categorically, and without equivocation, my complete endorsement and support of the position taken by my chairman, the Honorable L. MENDEL RIVERS, on this revised bill.

As we all know, the bill being considered today is, except for section 611, identical with H.R. 8439, the military construction authorization bill previously recommended and passed by the Con

gress.

has the sole authority to raise and maintain our Armed Forces. This is crystal clear. Yet at the same time the Con

stitution designates the President as "Commander in Chief" of these Armed Forces, with the clear constitutional responsibility for the operation of these forces.

these positive areas of responsibility, recOur Founding Fathers, in spelling out ognized full well that neither the Congress nor the Executive acting as Commander in Chief could effectively discharge these individual and separate responsibilities without the full and complete support of the other. It therefore not only impliedly, but very clearly, created a situation which demanded the development of a full-fledged working partnership to insure that both partners could act promptly and effectively in coordinating, and I emphasize the word "coordinating," their common effort to provide for the national defense.

Our Nation has indeed been fortunate.

This working relationship and partnership between the executive and legislative branches of our Government has proven effective and responsive to our national security requirements. However, as is the case in any partnership, each of the partners must remain continually vigilant to the understandable

desire of the other to consciously or unconsciously arrogate to himself some of the responsibilities and powers properly to be shared with the other partner.

For almost 5 years the Congress, and more specifically the Committees on Committees on Armed Services of the House and Senate, have slowly but surely been forced into the role of a silent partner-a partner whose duties and responsibilities were becoming a mere formality with acquiescence taken for granted and assumed by the other partner.

The Executive, and in this instance the Department of Defense, has attempted to justify this tactic on the theory that the Congress is, in view of modern technology and related complications, simply incapable of dealing meaningfully with the profound intricacies of national defense. Consequently, like "big brother," he has "reluctantly" assumed the prerogatives of Congress.

I do not wish to be cast in the role of a prophet, but it should be evident to even the dullest student of constitutional history, that if the Congress permitted this condition to continue it would inevitably have completely forfeited its ability to discharge its constitutional responsibilities.

In other words, the Congress was forced to act positively, aggressively, and purposefully to remind the Executive and, in this instance, the Department of Defense, that it intends to fully discharge its constitutional responsibilities.

I am proud to be a member of the Committee on Armed Services. That committee, within the past few months, has reflected the determination of the Congress to defy and to reject any further encroachment by the Executive on its legislative and constitutional responsibilities.

The record of the Committee on Armed Services during these past 9 months gives eloquent testimony to the success of the Congress in this regard. For example, the Congress and the Committee on Armed Services has demon

strated its ability and determination to provide an equitable pay increase for the dedicated men and women in our armed services. This achievement, in spite of the opposition of the Department of De

fense, is a matter of historical record.

Again, the Secretary of Defense, with out consulting the Congress, announced to the country his intention to eliminate the Army Reserve. This, without a "by your leave" to the Congress.

Congress, the heretofore silent partner in the defense effort, replied with a resounding and unequivocal "No," despite the Department's abortive efforts to justify this action by offering the public vague assurances of new efficiencies and new economies.

Our military bases and installations represent the very heart of our military capability. A change in their composition, location, or level of activity inevitably and directly affects our military readiness and capability.

As a partner in our defense effort, the Congress, and notably the committee which has been given jurisdiction and responsibility over defense matters, the Committee on Armed Services, had

throughout the history of our Republic kept itself intimately familiar and aware of changes in our military base complex. Unfortunately, during the past 4 or 5 years, there has been a positive diminution in the information provided Congress in respect to proposed changes in our military installations. Obviously, the Congress has been kept informed as to proposed increases in the size and tempo of activity at military installations through the demands of the legislative and appropriation process which "required" the Executive to seek both the authority and the funds with which to effect such changes. On the other hand, the Executive has not similarly been forced by the legislative and appropriation processes to inform the Congress of reductions or closures of military bases-and he has therefore simply ignored the Congress in this regard.

Consequently, despite the constitutional requirement that defense matters be handled by the partnership envisioned by our constitutional founders Members of Congress had been reduced to the humiliating position. of consulting our news media to obtain information concerning Department of Defense decisions to reduce or eliminate military bases. As a matter of fact, many constituents were apprised of these defense actions even before Members of Congress were given even the sketchiest details.

It is noteworthy that this appalling situation developed slowly and subtly through the gradual but positive drying up of information flowing from the executive branch to its defense partner, the Congress. Thank God, that silent partner has now awakened from his trusting and ill-advised sleep. His reaction was positively and unequivocally given in section 611 of H.R. 8439. fact that this action was given the overwhelming approval of both bodies should erase any doubt as to the temper of the Congress on this subject.

The

now gotten the message. It is significant that the Executive has

The remarkable veto message with which the President regretfully returned H.R. 8439 to the Congress reflects the President's assurance that he will, once form his defense partner, the Congress, again, accept his obligation to fully inof proposed changes affecting our military installations.

The revised section 611 as contained in this bill, H.R. 10775, reflects a reporting procedure which requires that the Congress be provided a full report of the facts justifying the proposed action prior to the time such decision is ex

ecuted.

However, more importantly, this statutory language is much broader in its implications than is evident in this required reporting procedure. The language marks, in my opinion, the resumption of a full-fledged partnership which had been permitted to atrophy for lack of use. It symbolizes, I believe, an honest effort on the part of both the legislative and executive branches to return to the former working partnership envisioned by our constitutional founders.

As an American, I am proud and happy to have been a party to this practical demonstration of the operation of our system of political checks and balancesa system which has no peer among all the governments on earth.

This political system of checks and balances insures that countless future generations of Americans will also enjoy the fruits of genuine freedom provided that we, and they, as Americans continue always to remain vigilant and jealous of our constitutional prerogatives.

It is for these reasons that I believe we have achieved our objective and won our fight. Let us accept the olive branch of peace offered by our President in his veto message and permit him an opportunity to work in harmony with the Congress.

I, therefore, ask every Member to support this legislation.

unanimous consent to extend my remarks Mr. HARDY. Mr. Speaker, I ask at this point in the RECORD.

objection to the request of the gentleman The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there from Virginia?

There was no objection. sideration by the House today of the Mr. HARDY. Mr. Speaker, the conmilitary construction authorization bill for fiscal year 1966 culminates 9 months of hard labor. Twice before, this session, a similar bill has come before you-once when the House passed the military construction authorization bill, and again when it considered the conference report. And after the bill passed both the House and the Senate without a dissenting vote, the President saw fit to veto it as he claimed it was an unwarranted invasion by the Congress on the responsibilities of the President.

The very question of the rights and the rights and responsibilities of the Conresponsibilities of the President vis-a-vis gress is as old as our established Government. The questions have not been and they probably will not be solved comsolved during our 178 years of existence under our present form of government. pletely as long as we continue to exist

In the past, we generally have been able to work out our problems with the executive branch through mutual accommodation—that is, without the into the law. Thus, we have been able to necessity of writing specific restraints avoid a head-on confrontation on the constitutional issues. And I think no real purpose is served by having such a confrontation. Really, all it proves is that, in certain periods in history, certain their power, or try to expand on their Presidents zealously and jealously guard

seems that any President can secure, power more than other Presidents. It from his appointed Attorney General, an opinion that any provision providing for any form of legislative oversight is an unwarranted invasion of the power of the Executive. I agree with others who feel that we ought to have the equivalent of an Attorney General to serve Congress in the same way.

There are nearly 40 laws on the books which give to Congress the right to negate an administrative action. The prin