North American has hundreds of millions of dollars worth of contracts with the Defense Department and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

It is the builder of the three-man capsules in which astronauts will travel to the moon; liquid rocket engines for the Atlas and the B-70 experimental bomber.

A spokesman for the company, whose headquarters are in Los Angeles, said in a telephone conversation that North American had decided to own and operate its own vending machines.

He said a notice of intent to cancel had been sent not only to Mr. Baker's firm but also to Automatic Canteen, which has vending contracts with North American totaling about $4 million a year.

Serv-U, starting from scratch at the end of 1961, built a business grossing more than $3.5 million annually in less than 2 years.

BIGGEST CUSTOMER

North American has remained by far the biggest customer. Much of the rest of ServU's business is done with the Northrop Corp., another large aerospace company. aerospace company. Still a third, Space Technology Laboratories, has a small vending contract with the Baker company.

The big question now is how well Mr. Baker will be able to withstand the financial blow from the North American cancellation. Serv-U, in addition to its vending business,

is the owner of the Carousel Motel, in Ocean City, Md. But Serv-U's purchase of the motel was reported at the Senate hearings

to have been an effort to bail it out of financial difficulties. Whether business has improved in the interim is not known.

The Senate committee has issued two reports on the Baker investigation, with the Democratic majority and the Republican minority splitting acrimoniously in both cases.

On July 8, 1964, the first report said Mr. Baker was "guilty of many gross improprieties" but it did not find him guilty of breaking any laws.

The Republicans, in their dissent, accused the majority of refusing to explore leads that promised to shed important new light on Mr. Baker's activities.

The running debate was continued at high pitch during the Presidential contest between President Johnson and Senator Barry Goldwater.

The second report, issued June 30, used sharper language in regard to Mr. Baker. It also suggested that consideration be given to indicting him for violation of the conflictof-interest laws in connection with an alleged payment of $5,000 to him by a lobbyist backing legislation dealing with the licensing of ocean freight forwarders.

The senior Republican on the committee, Senator CARL T. CURTIS of Nebraska, characterized the second report, as he had the first, as a "whitewash."

There has been no report of what, if any, response there has been from the Government to the suggestion that an indictment on the alleged $5,000 payment be considered. Nor has there been any culmination of investigations of the Baker case begun early last fall by a Federal grand jury.

administration department of Govern

ment.

I invite attention to a significant paragraph found in the minority views of the last report on the Baker investigation. These views are signed by Senator JOHN COOPER, of Kentucky, Senator HUGH SCOTT, of Pennsylvania, and myself. In the report we say:

The backbone of Baker's financial empire was, and still is, the Serv-U Vending Co. It was through the vending business that Baker was able to acquire monthly cash kickbacks as well as inaugurate a highly profitable vending operation with defense contractors whose almost sole source of income was from the U.S. Government. It was in these vending operations that Baker became associated with questionable individuals who ranged from gamblers to those convicted of income tax evasion. Likewise, when Baker's Carousel Motel was in the midst of financial difficulties, it was his vending business that had the wherewithal to bail out the Ocean City property. Until such time as defense contractors such as North American Aviation and Northrop decide they no longer want to do business with Baker, his complex financial empire

may continue.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the minority views in the last Baker report, which are found on pages 25 to 52, inclusive, and signed by the three minority members of the committee, be printed at this point in the RECORD. In making that request, I wish to exclude from the request any photoprinting of copies of exhibits that cannot be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the minority views were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MINORITY VIEWS

I. RÉSUMÉ OF THE FIRST HEARINGS Robert G. Baker was secretary to the majority of the U.S. Senate. He was elected to occupy this full-time $19,000-per-year position by the Democratic Members of the Senate. In this job Baker possessed the most intimate knowledge of the probable success or failure of pending legislation to be considered by the Senate. Consequently, he became known in the words of a witness as a man "with innumerable friends and connections," and, as the investigation developed, generally those friends and connections had some special interest before the Senate or with the Government. Thus, when Baker's activities were brought under public scrutiny by Senator JOHN WILLIAMS, and his friends and connections were of questionable character, it cast a shadow on the legitimacy of Baker's amassing a claimed net worth in excess of $2 million while his Government salary, comparatively, remained so small.

The investigation disclosed that between January 1, 1959, and November 1, 1963, Baker participated in 65 loans wherein he borrowed at least $2,784,520, which figure does not include loans to corporations in which he was personally interested. Likewise, the in the purchase of real estate worth $1,634,000 and had available enormous amounts of cash and currency, some of which came from regular kickbacks.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I promised to yield to the Senator from Nebraska. I yield to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. CURTIS. I commend the distinguished Senator from Delaware for his efforts to bring an end to the gross cor

The backbone of Baker's financial empire was, and still is, the Serv-U Vending Co. It was through the vending business that Baker was able to acquire monthly cash kickbacks as well as inaugurate a highly

profitable vending operation with defense contractors whose almost sole source of income was from the U.S. Government. It was in these vending operations that Baker became associated with questionable individuals who ranged from gamblers to those convicted of income tax evasion. Likewise, when Baker's Carousel Motel was in the midst of financial difficulties, it was his vending business that had the wherewithal to bail out the Ocean City property. Until such time as defense contractors such as North American Aviation and Northrop decide they no longer want to do business with Baker, his complex financial empire may continue.

Baker had innumerable ventures not only with his fellow Senate employees, but also with individuals, corporations, and transportation companies having extensive dealings with the Federal Government. These ventures ranged from phenomenally profitable purchases of MGIC stock to more modest, in proportion, profits on the purchase and sale of Florida land. In almost every instance through information furnished by his "innumerable friends and connections" Baker had inside knowledge on which ventures would insure a profit. In some instances Baker ventured nothing. For example, in the Robert Thompson case he put up no capital nor shared a risk, yet was permitted by his benevolent Murchion representative to reap an extraordinary profit. Don Reynolds. The investigation of the relationship between these two men uncovered startling revelations. For instance, through Baker, Reynolds was allowed to write the performance bond on the District of Columbia Stadium which is discussed hereafter in more detail. Likewise through Baker, Reynolds was able to write the life insurance

Baker was in the insurance business with

policies on the then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson. It was the writing of these insurance policies that led to the gift to the then Senator Johnson of the stereo set, and the revelation that Reynolds was pressured by Baker and Walter Jenkins into the purchase of advertising time over KTBC-TV in Austin, Tex. Moreover, it was in part the circumstances surrounding the insurance policies and the TV time which led to the necessity of acquiring testimony from then Presidential Aid Walter Jenkins.

The committee's record is full of instances where Baker took pains to disguise his interests and conceal his activities. Ernest Tucker, Baker's law partner, held in trust Baker's shares of stock in Serv-U. Likewise, it was the use of interim transfers through Tucker and others that resulted in Baker concealing the racial restrictive covenant on his fashionable Spring Valley home. Baker concealed his true net worth by filing a false financial statement with the District of Columbia National Bank which granted him an extremely generous $125,000 unsecured loan. It was these overt efforts to camouflage, and we have named but a very few, that prompted our insistence on a full, complete, and thorough investigation.

The majority report discussed in some detail the investigation of Sweet Water Development Co., Ocean Freight Forwarders,

Blue Lake Manor Retirement Home, and the Redwood National Bank. This minority report is primarily confined to those areas where there was a marked disagreement between the majority and minority. We do wish to point out that none of the aforementioned matters would have been investigated had the majority had their way and closed up the committee's work in July of 1964.

II. EFFORTS TO CALL WITNESSES The minority members of the committee have repeatedly pointed out the failure of the

majority to call all the witnesses in open session and obtain their testimony under oath. This is not only the proper way to conduct the public business but also it is necessary if the truth is to be ascertained. The fact that the testimony of any particular witness was sought by the minority carries no implication of wrongdoing by such person. The efforts to obtain their testimony were because they may have had important and valuable information. The committee's records reflect that on 14 separate rollcall votes during the first hearings the majority successfully prevented the calling of witnesses and the acquisition of additional evidence.

Margaret Tucker Broome had been Baker's secretary and an integral part of his office. The committee's investigators recommended that she be called to testify and we of the minority agreed with the suggestion of the staff. However, during the first hearings a 6-to-3 vote prevented the acquisition of this evidence.

Rein J. Vander Zee was an assistant to Baker, the secretary to the majority. He could have told about the operations in Baker's office and might have provided information about the large amounts of cash observed to be in that office by other witnesses.

Our effort to summon Mr. Vander Zee was defeated by a 6-to-3 vote.

Jessop McDonnell who asked to be called to testify was another assistant to Baker and could also have furnished evidence about the activities in Baker's office. The motion of the minority to call Mr. McDonnell was defeated by a 6-to--3 vote.

Our motion on March 23, 1964, to summon Matthew McCloskey as a witness was voted down 6 to 3. Elsewhere in this report we comment upon why Mr. McCloskey should have been called as a witness during the first hearings.

Paul Aguirre was a business associate of

Baker's. During the first hearings, he had given statements to the staff and had indicated some willingness to testify. Nevertheless. the minority's motion to call Aguirre before the committee was voted down 5 to 4. If he had been called, the committee could have inquired as to what part if any Ellen Rometsch and other like individuals

had in the promotion of Baker's operations. In the second hearings, the majority relented, and Mr. Aguirre was subpenaed to testify. But at that late date, he took the fifth amendment in his appearance before the committee. If his appearance had not been denied in the first hearings, it is believed that he would have provided useful information.

Warren Neil was another business associate of Baker. Neil should have been placed under oath and questioned about Baker's business and financial operations not only in Puerto Rico, but elsewhere in the Caribbean. A 6-to-3 vote prevented Mr. Neil from testifying.

Nick Popich, of New Orleans, La., should have been called as a witness. Popich could have been asked to explain the numerous long-distance telephone calls emanating from Baker's Capitol Hill office to him in New Orleans. Also, Popich could have been asked to relate what other business ventures if any he and Baker were in beside the Pasantic Corp. By a 5-to-4 vote we were denied the testimony of Mr. Popich.

In the early part of the investigation sworn testimony was received which clearly required the testimony of Mr. Walter Jenkins, a White House aid who had been an employee of the Senate and was a stockholder, director, and officer of the company that owned the KTBC-TV television station at Austin, Tex. Due to the determined opposition of the majority, Mr. Jenkins was never called as a witness.

CXI-1458

The testimony that was received was to the effect that Walter Jenkins had had a part in requiring Don Reynolds to pay $1,208 for television time on this TV station because Reynolds had sold $200,000 worth of life insurance on the life of the then Senator Lyndon Johnson. Mr. Albert G. Young, president of the Mid-Atlantic Stainless Steel Co., in his sworn testimony, supported the testimony on Don Reynolds. Mr. Young stated that an individual who said his name was Walter Jenkins called him on the phone and verified the purchase of the TV time. Mr. Young thereafter proceeded to Austin, Tex., and used the time.

The majority, through the chief counsel, early in the investigation presented to the committee a memorandum written by the chief counsel and the chief investigator, and sworn to by Jenkins which, among other things, said:

"Nor does he have any knowledge of any arrangements by which Reynolds purchased advertising time on the TV station."

The majority used their numerical superiority to prevent the calling of Walter Jenkins. In the second hearing written interrogatories were submitted to Walter Jenkins and his written answers received.

As a result of the refusal to call Mr. Jenkins and the use of interrogatories, members of the committee could not be present when the questions were submitted or the answers made. No opportunity was given to ask further questions or cross-examine Walter Jenkins in any manner. No opportunity was given for submitting additional questions to elicit additional information which Jenkins' answers might have brought to light. The inability of the minority to elicit information is the result of the majority's voting down the motion of the minority to call him as a witness in the first hearings.

The written interrogatories and written

ance on the life of the then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson. I was an officer of the LBJ Co. which was interested in the purchase of these policies, and I am sure several of the officials of the company were active in the search for insurance. If this question asks whether someone selected me to do the negotiation and 'authorized' me to do so, the answer is that no one did. It was more informal. The company officials in Austin were also in the market for the policies and had been unsuccessful up to that time in securing policies of the size desired.

"No. 5. Do you know one Robert G. Baker? "(a) Just how long have you known him? "(b) During the time you were an employee of the Senate how often would you see Robert G. Baker?

"(c) Did you ever have any discussion with Robert G. Baker concerning life insurance on the life of the then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson?

"(d) Who initiated the discussion? "(e) How many times, if any, did you talk to Robert G. Baker about this subject? "(f) Where would the discussions take place?

Baker have in the procuring of insurance for "(g) What part, if any, did Robert G. the then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson? "Answer. I do know Robert G. Baker.

"(a) I cannot remember when and exactly under what circumstances I met Mr. Baker. I feel sure it must have been very shortly after Mr. Johnson became a U.S. Senator in 1949. Mr. Baker was then working in the Senate and serving the offices of all Democratic Senators.

"(b) During the first few years I was a Senate employee I saw Mr. Baker very infrequently. When Mr. Johnson became minority leader in 1952, my contacts with Mr. Baker increased and from then until Mr. Johnson became Vice President in 1961, I saw

"No. 3. When and where and under what circumstances did you first become acquainted with Don B. Reynolds?

"Answer. In late 1956 or early 1957 I was seeking an insurance company from which

insurance on the life of the then Senator

Lyndon B. Johnson might be purchased.

I made no secret of this search, and I'm confident that Robert G. Baker knew of it, either from me or indirectly. Mr. Baker told me that he knew Don Reynolds, who represented a company which was beginning to specialize in insurance for former heart attack patients. Mr. Baker did not tell me that he had any interest in Mr. Reynolds' businesses, and I do not know to this day whether Mr. Baker had any such interest. The events discussed in this and many other answers took place over 8 years ago, and I cannot be sure about every particular, but I shall do my best to be as accurate as possible. At any rate, I am sure I indicated to Mr. Baker my wish to talk to Mr. Reynolds about the possible purchase of insurance. I believe Mr. Reynolds called me for an appointment at Mr. Baker's suggestion and I readily agreed to see him. To my best knowledge and belief I had never seen Mr. Reynolds before he came to my office to keep that appointment, and had never heard of him before Mr. Baker mentioned him to me as a possible source of insurance.

"No. 4. To what extent were you authorized and by whom to negotiate for the purchase of life insurance policies insuring the life of the then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson beginning on or about January 1, 1957, and thereafter?

"Answer. I do not know that I was 'authorized' by anyone to negotiate for insur

sometimes more, sometimes less. During the time Mr. Johnson was Vice President I saw him much less frequently. "(c) Yes.

"(d) I do not recall.

"(e) I can't be precise, but I talked with Mr. Baker about this subject a number of times. It was through Mr. Baker that I met Mr. Reynolds, and when I had a questions about rates, physical examinations, policy details, etc., I usually asked Mr. Baker to get the information from Mr. Reynolds for me because it was easier for me to reach Mr. Baker than Mr. Reynolds.

"(f) Usually by telephone to either Mr. Baker's office or home.

"(g) As related above, Mr. Baker introduced Mr. Reynolds to me. He also talked to Mr. Reynolds for me on occasion and reported back to me. This is the only part I know of that he played in the procuring of insurance on the life of the then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson.

"No. 6. Did you ever discuss with Robert G. Baker alone or in the presence of Don B. Reynolds the subject of selling advertising time on television station KTBC to Don B. Reynolds, and if so, state fully when and where such discussions occurred and exactly what was said?

"Answer. During the time consideration was being given to the purchase of insurance through Mr. Reynolds, I received word from the LBJ Co. it would not be necessary to pursue the matter further because a local agent in Austin had become interested in selling the policies and that he not only had been an advertiser on the radio and television stations for many years, but also had always related the amount of his advertising to the amount of his business done with the station. I am confident I communicated this

information to Mr. Reynolds and I am reasonably sure, although not certain, that I did so through Mr. Baker and not directly to Mr. Reynolds.

"At any rate, I received word soon from either Mr. Reynolds or Mr. Baker and I think it was Mr. Baker-that Mr. Reynolds wished very much to sell the policies and would also like to purchase advertising time in the event he sold them. The rates of the Manhattan Insurance Co., Mr. Reynolds' firm, were lower and they were subject to mandatory reduction at the end of the second year. And, further, at one point they were willing to write a larger amount than the Texas agent could arrange. For these reasons and the fact of convenience of dealing with a Washington agent with respect to physical exams, forms. etc., as well as Reynolds' offer to meet the competition by purchasing advertising, it was decided to accept the Reynolds' offer. The policies were thereafter purchased through Mr. Reynolds.

"I am certain that the above conversations concerning advertising took place prior to the consummation of the life insurance purchases. As to 'where such discussions oc

curred and exactly what was said,' I do not remember beyond what I have stated above. "No. 7. In the order of their occurrence, please state as accurately and in as much detail as you can each conversation you have had with Don B. Reynolds in which any reference was made by either or both of you to the purchase by Reynolds of advertising time from the LBJ Co. or on television station KTBC at Austin, Tex.

"Answer. As stated in the preceding answer, there were these two conversations on the subject either directly with Mr. Reynolds or through Mr. Baker. I do not remember which it was although I think they were with Mr. Baker and I do not remember any other conversations with Mr. Reynolds on the subject. I merely communicated directly to him or through Mr. Baker that the station had found another source for the insurance, that that source was a long-time ad

vertiser and accordingly, the LBJ Co. planned

At

to buy its insurance from that source. that time Mr. Reynolds offered to purchase advertising for the purpose of meeting the competition of the Texas agent. Certainly I did not "pressure" him to do so.

"No. 8. At the time of any of these conversations, or at any other time during the negotiations for the purchase of life insurance by the LBJ Co. insuring the then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, were you an officer, employee, or stockholder in the company then owning the KTBC television station, and if so, state what position you held and what percentage of the capital stock you owned, either directly or indirectly.

Answer. As stated above, I was an officer of the LBJ Co. at the time these conversations were held. I was also a stockholder.

My position was that of treasurer and member of the board of directors. I owned slightly more than 32 percent of the stock of the company. All stock was held directly by me except for one share which was held by me on behalf of one of my children.

"No. 9. Did you at any time furnish to Don B. Reynolds or to anyone for him or at his request any information relating to advertising rates, time schedules, or the preparation and use of advertising materials on the KTBC television station of Austin, Tex., and if so, describe such information?

"Answer. No. I have no memory of doing so, and I am sure I did not.

"No. 10. If you have not answered the question in your previous answers to these interrogatories, please explain exactly what you meant by the following quoted words appearing in the report of the interview with you on December 16, 1963, and identified in

interrogatory No. 1, above, viz: 'Mr. Jenkins has no knowledge of any conversation between Mr. Baines and Mr. Reynolds, nor does he have any knowledge of any arrangements by which Reynolds purchased advertising time on the TV station.'

"Answer. As to the first part of the quoted words, I meant I had no knowledge of any conversation between Mr. Baines and Mr. Reynolds. So far as I know, no such conversation ever took place. As to the second part of the question, I meant that I did not have knowledge of any arrangements or of the specifics for the purchase of advertising. Your committee received testimony at length from Mr. A. G. Young about the arrangements for the advertising. I had no knowledge about those arrangements till I read Mr. Young's testimony. I did know Mr. Reynolds planned to purchase advertising time, and I have never asserted the contrary.

"No. 11. Did you ever have a telephone conversation with Mr. Albert G. Young of Silver Spring, Md., of the Mid-Atlantic Stainless Steel Co., in which you identified yourself and confirmed that Don B. Reynolds had bought advertising time on the KTBC television station in Austin, Tex., and if so, exactly what did you tell him?

"Answer. I have no memory of such a conversation. It is possible that Mr. Reynolds, directly or through Mr. Baker, asked me to call Mr. Young and to tell him that insurance had been purchased from Mr. Reynolds, and it is also possible that I did so. However, I have racked my brain over the matter and I cannot remember making such a call.

"No. 12. Did you know whether Don B. Reynolds or Robert G. Baker had any agreement or understanding between them providing for a division between them or sharing by them of commissions earned, or to be earned, by Don B. Reynolds as agent from the sale of life insurance policies insuring the life of the then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, and if so, what was the agreement or understanding and how did you acquire knowledge of it?

"Answer. No.

"No. 13. Did you ever meet and know Mr. Manhattan Life Insurance Co.? George P. Sampson, general agent for the

"(a) When did you meet him? "(b) Where did you meet him? "(c) Who introduced you?

"(d) What part did Mr. Sampson have in the insurance transaction with the then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson?

"Answer. Yes.

"(a) It is my recollection that I first talked to him on the telephone in late 1956 or early 1957, in connection with the insurance policies. Mr. Sampson was the general agent here for the Manhattan Life Insurance Co. and thus was the man who had to process any insurance contract written by Reynolds. I talked with Mr. Sampson several times about policy details, rates, physical exams, and the like. The only time I met Mr. Sampson in person was in early 1963, when he brought by some information on the possible conversion to permanent insurance of the policy purchased in 1961.

"(b) In my office.

"(c) No one. Early in the discussion of the insurance policies Mr. Reynolds gave me Mr. Sampson's name and subsequently Mr Sampson and I called each other several times.

"(d) As general agent for the Manhattan Life Insurance Co., his was the final local authority from the insurance company's standpoint for processing applications for insurance from that company.

"No. 14. Do you know a man by the name of Huff Baines?

"(a) Where does he live?

"(b) What is Mr. Huff Baines' business? "(c) Is Mr. Huff Baines a relative of the then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson?

"(d) Dr. Mr. Huff Baines sell any insurance on the life of anyone connected with the LBJ Co.?

"(e) If so, please give the details. "Answer. Yes.

"(a) Austin, Tex. "(b) Insurance.

"(c) Yes; a cousin.

"(d) I believe he did sell a number of policies on the lives of people connected with the then LBJ Co. In fact he sold a personal policy to me in about 1962.

"(e) I do not know the details of any sales of insurance other than the one to me. "No. 15. Did you ever mention Huff Baines to either Don B. Reynolds or Robert G. Baker or anyone else in connection with the insurance purchase from the Manhattan Life Insurance Co. by the then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, or any renewal, additions, or extensions of such purchase?

"(a) What was said?

"Answer. Yes; although I do not remember whether I used Mr. Baines' name or merely referred to him as a relative of Senator Johnson who was in the insurance business.

"(a) As stated above, I told either Mr. Reynolds or Mr. Baker that the station planned to buy the insurance policies on the then Senator Johnson from a local insurance man who was and would be an advertiser on the station. I was referring to Mr. Baines and I may have mentioned his name."

The foregoing testimony clearly indicates that the original affidavit sworn to by Walter Jenkins did not contain a full and correct statement of the facts. The foregoing testimony, also, to a considerable degree, supports the earlier testimony concerning the requirement that the television time had to be purchased by the agent who sold the insurance. Had Jenkins been required to submit to cross-examination under oath, the testimony could have been reconciled to a greater degree.

A reading of the other interrogatories and answers of Walter Jenkins fails to disprove the sworn testimony of Don Reynolds.

a matter of fact efforts were made by the majority to discredit the testimony of Don Reynolds, and they refused to call Walter Jenkins whose testimony would tend to corrobate Reynolds.

The refusal on the part of the majority to call Walter Jenkins throughout all the months of the first phase of the hearing was without any valid reason, medical or otherwise. The absence of the complete testimony of Walter Jenkins continues to leave the work of the committee unfinished.

During the first hearings on March 23, 1964, we of the minority moved to recall Don Reynolds as a witness. Had we not been voted down 6 to 3 much embarrassment could have been spared the committee at the opening of the second hearings.

Of all the individuals contacted by our staff, Deane Beman, former U.S. amateur golf champion and insurance consultant to Melpar, is the only one who refused to be interviewed. The staff report on Beman strongly suggested he be subpenaed and placed under oath to testify. Another 6-to-3 vote prevented us from finding out what this individual knew of Baker's activities.

Paul Ferrero, former Deputy Commissioner of the FHA, was contacted by Baker in behalf of Paul Aguirre. We do not know what Mr. Ferrero could have told us about Baker's call, but it should have been investigated and it was wrong that a 5-to-3 vote prevented the committee from securing this testimony.

On March 24, 1964, Senator JOHN SHERMAN COOPER moved to recall William Kentor as a

On June 30, 1964, Senator JOHN SHERMAN COOPER moved that Senator JOHN WILLIAMS of Delaware be recalled to present any additional information that might recently have come to him. The motion also included the calling of Senator CLIFFORD CASE, Senator THOMAS J. MCINTYRE, and Jack Anderson, a director of Riddle Airlines, all of whom offered to testify. The majority members never even permitted Senator COOPER'S motion in reference to these four witnesses to be considered on its merits and the motion was tabled by a straight party line vote.

There were presented to the committee allegations in reference to some political contributions alleged to have been made by some individuals with the International Telephone & Telegraph Co. A motion was made by Senator JOHN SHERMAN COOPER to investigate these allegations but it was defeated by a solid majority vote.

We think it is significant, and we thing it was wrong that the majority at no time adhered to the rule which provided for the calling of witnesses with relevant information as requested by the minority.

The re

Another practice followed by the majority over the protests of the minority is related to the refusal to call witnesses and likewise prevented a full investigation. We refer to the procedure followed by the majority of receiving as evidence reports from the Department of Justice containing selected material on individuals whose names came up in the course of the investigation. ports we refer to are those on Don Reynolds and Ellen Rometsch. These reports were received in evidence by the majority. The readers of this minority reports should be aware of certain facts. The ReynoldsRometsch reports prepared by the Department of Justice do not carry a statement that they are full reports of all the information the Department of Justice has in its files. They constitute a publication of selected material, and do not carry sufficient facts accurately to picture the true situation. The minority contends, as it did during the investigation, that the best evidence is always sworn testimony where the witness can be cross-examined by all members of the committee.

We would also point out that these reports which have been received as evidence place the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a position unfair to the Bureau. We believe that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a fine organization with a splendid record of thoroughness and impartiality in its investigations. The FBI does not publish reports on the individuals that they have investigated. Their files contain all the facts that they can gather about an individual including reports of accusations made and other similar material. It is their practice not to disseminate this information. We agree with that practice.

The long-established policy of the FBI has been not to make public their reports.

In the investigation by this committee the Department of Justice has furnished the committee with reports that have contained specific quotations and other information obtained from the files of the FBI. These summaries received in evidence are not reports of the FBI, yet, as presented, Senators and others might be led to believe that they were FBI reports. Our position is that this Our position is that this is unfair to the FBI and it gives an erroneous impression to the Senate and the general public. eral public. We point out that the method of using this type of summary from the Department of Justice is used by the majority in their report to discredit those who have given or might have been able to give useful testimony concerning individuals coming within the purview of the investigation.

In contrast, the majority did not seek a Justice Department report on Robert Baker. This practice is not only faulty but also fails the test of the best evidence and is misleading.

III. THE M'CLOSKEY AFFAIR

The Committee on Rules and Administration opened the second phase of the investigation only after being directed to do so by the Senate, and with specific directions to investigate further the case of Mr. Matthew H. McCloskey.

One of the questions for the committee to determine was, Was there an overpayment by McCloskey on the performance bond on the District of Columbia Stadium? The true and correct amount of the premium being $73,631.28, whereas the payment actually made was $109,205.60.

The testimony of Mr. McCloskey was vital to the investigation from the very beginning. The minority repeatedly requested that he be called. Under the rules of the committee, the minority or any member was entitled to have any witness called who had relevant information. These minority rights were constantly overrun. The repeated requests of the minority were not only denied, but also, when a formal motion was made and a

vote taken, we were voted down.

On March 23, 1964, the minority's request to call Matthew H. McCloskey was refused by the majority on a 6-to-3 vote not to call him.

The intended procedure of the committee, when the investigation started was that witnesses should be sought out and interviewed by the staff. Thereafter there should be an executive session to ascertain what information they could give under oath, and then this would be followed by the testimony in open session. In open session there would be an opportunity to develop all the facts fully. The minority had no reasons to suspect the majority would prevent the holding of open sessions when the testimony was obviously relevant to the investigation.

The insurance man, Don Reynolds, was interviewed many times. He was called in executive session to testify, and he did testify. His testimony was discussed in some detail in the first report of the committee. In executive session Reynolds testified about the sale of the performance bond in a very limited way. The minority fully expected that Reynolds would be recalled in public session, and a request for Reynolds' testimony in public session, and a request for Reynolds' testimony in public session was made repeatedly. On March 24, 1964, the minority request to recall Reynolds was refused by the majority in a 6-to-3 vote not to recall him.

"The following testimony given by Reynolds in executive session is important. The fact that there was a payment to Robert Baker and to William McLeod, then clerk of the District of Columbia Committee of the

House of Representatives, was ample notice to the committee that the entire performance bond transaction should be explored thoroughly and that the testimony of Mr. McCloskey was essential. Don Reynolds did sell the bond, as shown in the following testimony:

"Mr. MCLENDON. Did McCloskey receive the award of the contract for construction of the stadium?

"Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes, sir.

"Mr. MCLENDON. And did you write the bond?

"Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes, sir. As broker.

"Mr. MCLENDON. Do you remember the amount of the bond, face amount of the

"Mr. REYNOLDS. It was either $14 or $15 million. The penalty amount of it, sir. "Mr. MCLENDON. And what was the amount of the premium?

"Mr. REYNOLDS. I think the gross amount was in the neighborhood of $73,000 or $74,000. "Mr. MCLENDON. And do you remember the amount of your commission?

"Mr. REYNOLDS. It was about $10,000, sir." For the fact that the premium on the bond was $73,631.28 and the commission was $10,031.56, see Reynolds exhibit 1, first hearings.

Thereafter Reynolds made payments to Baker and McLeod for their services in connection with the bond, as shown by the following testimony.

"Mr. MCLENDON. Did you shortly thereafter on or about October 15, 1960, pay to Robert G. Baker the sum of $4,000 in compensation for his services in connection with the procurement of that bond?

"Mr. REYNOLDS. I did, sir.

"Mr. MCLENDON. I show you what appears to be copies of two checks of Don Reynolds Associates, one for a thousand dollars payable to McLeod and the second one for $500 payable to McLeod, and ask you to state whether or not they are copies of the two checks delivered by you to McLeod in payment for the invoices to which you refer? "Mr. REYNOLDS. They are, sir.

"Mr. MCLENDON. So you insist that this $1,500 was paid for services rendered in connection with the stadium?

"Mr. REYNOLDS. The stadium plus the fact that he had always tried to help me in other matters, sir, when I asked him."

The decision of the majority members to refuse to recall Don Reynolds in open session, and the refusal to call Mr. McCloskey prior to the order of the Senate to reopen the investigation, shut the door on an area of inquiry that should have been fully explored if the committee was to comply with the instructions that the Senate had issued.

Although the majority persistently blocked any effective investigation on the part of the entire committee, Senator JOHN J. WILLIAMS, of Delaware, continued with his efforts in order to bring out the truth and clean up the mess. For instance, Senator WILLIAMS learned from the witness, Don Reynolds, that Reynolds was of the opinion that there had been an overpayment on the bond by McCloskey. Reynolds had made no such accusation in executive session because, as stated by him, he had no record of the invoice, nor did he have the check. The invoice and the check were in the hands of McCloskey and the committee refused to summon him. After long and diligent efforts, Senator WILLIAMS did locate a photostatic copy of the check given by McCloskey for the bond. We wish to point out that Senator WILLIAMS had no power of subpena. He was not furnished a staff such as the committee had, but he did possess a desire to bring out the truth.

As illustrative of the failure of the majority to investigate, we wish to cite again the

The majority of the committee on the 8th day of July 1964, filed a report. The first The first paragraph on page 1 of that report carried the following language:

"The Committee on Rules and Administration, which, pursuant to Senate Resolution 212 * * *, was authorized and directed to make a study and investigation with respect to any financial or business interests or activities of any officer or employee or former officer or employee of the Senate, having concluded such study, submit the following report to the Senate thereon together with recommendations."

We, the minority members of the Committee on Rules and Administration, filed a dissenting report on July 8, 1964, which stated that the investigation had not been concluded and that the various avenues which should be inquired into had not been explored. Moreover, we asserted that the majority had refused to call the necessary witnesses so essential to a full and complete investigation.

The minority report, filed on the 8th day of July 1964, contained the following language: "We are unable to concur in the majority report of this investigation. We cannot concur because the investigation never has been completed. Proper judgments, conclusions, and recommendations can be drawn only when all the facts are in. An investigation, in order to be accurate and fair, must be complete and thorough. Every possible witness who may have helpful information should be called, placed under oath, and questioned. This is the only way to obtain the truth and the whole truth. This was not done in the so-called Baker investigation.

"The majority not only violated rule 19 repeatedly, but they used their superior numbers, six majority as against three minority, to frustrate and beat down every effort on the part of the minority to call witnesses and complete the investigation.

"The full story has not been disclosed concerning Bobby Baker and those associated with him, including present and former Senators and Senate employees. It has not been told because the majority prevented the investigation from proceeding."

The assistance of Senator JOHN J. WILLIAMS to the committee has been invaluable. This was true in the original instance when the investigation was initiated and throughout the following months. Repeatedly Senator WILLIAMS passed on information or suggestions that, if followed, would have been most helpful. After the final report on the 8th day of July 1964 was filed, hearings discontinued and the staff substantially disbanded, Senator WILLIAMS found it necessary to report to the Senate because the committee was no longer active. On the 27th day of July 1964, on the floor of the Senate, Senator WILLIAMS made the following statement:

"But what the committee does not have and which the committee should have and

Result

6 to 3 to release it.

6 to 3 not to call.

Do.

Do.

Do.

5 to 4 not to call.

6 to 3 not to call.

5 to 4 not to call.

6 to 3 not to call.

Do. Do.

5 to 3 not to call.

Do.

5 to 4 not to call.

6 to 3 not to call.

evidence.

which I hope it will still try to obtain, is a copy of Mr. McCloskey's check to Mr. Reynolds as payment for this stadium insurI think it would be very important to have that information.

"While it may be merely routine, I should like to see the $73,631.28 check to see if that is exactly what was paid. I would sug

gest that even now the committee could obtain a copy of that check. It may be interesting."

Had the rules of the committee been followed and the efforts of the minority to call Mr. McCloskey and other witnesses prevailed, all of these facts, including McCloskey's check and invoice, would have been before the committee. The majority, through Chairman JORDAN, later contended that they were not closing up their work when they fled the first report. But even

after the time Senator WILLIAMS suggested that Mr. McCloskey's check be obtained, the majority could have proceeded to secure the check and the testimony of Mr. McCloskey. The majority made no such move. They totally ignored this very helpful suggestion that Senator WILLIAMS had offered. Even though the committee had the power of subpena and had been voted the funds necessary to employ a staff to conduct a full investigation, they still did nothing. None of these investigative resources was available to Senator WILLIAMS. Yet he continued to work until he obtained a copy of the check written by the McCloskey company to Don Reynolds. That check speaks for itself. is a document that cannot be impeached. The issuance and the delivery of the check have never been denied. That check was identified as "Exhibit No. 20" in the hearings, and it is reproduced here as follows:

It

number nor identification. Under any policy that my agency has ever issued or may issue there is a policy issued identifying it, and the premium on individual policies, sir.

"Mr. MCLENDON. Well

"Mr. REYNOLDS. It was a coverup that was made at the suggestion of Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Baker, Major McLendon; it wasn't mine.

"Mr. MCLENDON. All right; so the words 'general liability' are meaningless.

"Mr. REYNOLDS. Absolutely no meaning except for people who want to read it in there. "Mr. MCLENDON. That is camouflage?

"Mr. REYNOLDS. Well, I consider it as such. "Mr. MCLENDON. And you intended this to be an invoice for $109,000 as a premium on the bond only?

"Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. McCloskey knew that, sir.

"Mr. MCLENDON. I didn't ask you what Mr. McCloskey knew. Did you intend this invoice to be for $109,000 premium on the bond only?

"Mr. REYNOLDS. I intended for it to read the way Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Baker had instructed me to issue it, sir.

"Mr. MCLENDON. Well, you wrote it? "Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes; but I was given instructions, sir.

"Mr. MCLENDON. And wouldn't you admit as an experienced insurance man that anybody reading this would interpret it to mean that the two items constituting the $109,000 were, one, the premium on the bond; and the other, the premium on the general liability insurance?

"Mr. REYNOLDS. Not if I had been on the original conversation and knew the background and knew the request for the full amount I would not construe such, sir.

"Mr. MCLENDON. Well, suppose somebody would see this invoice that knew nothing about the background?

"Mr. REYNOLDS. Sir, I was instructed to mail it personal and confidential to Mr. Matthew McCloskey and no one else, which I did.

"Mr. MCLENDON. This letter doesn't show as personal and confidential?

"Mr. REYNOLDS. It was on the envelope and Mr. Baker so instructed me to put it.

"Mr. MCLENDON. You haven't got the envelope?

"Mr. REYNOLDS. I haven't got the envelope; Mr. McCloskey might be able to produce it. "Mr. MCLENDON. I am asking if there is anything on the letter that shows it. "Mr. REYNOLDS. No; but it was done because Mr. Baker asked me to do it.

"Mr. MCLENDON. Did you know when you prepared this invoice for $109,000 it was false?

"Mr. REYNOLDS. It goes without saying; I was instructed what to put and I put it. "Mr. MCLENDON. You knew it was false? "Mr. REYNOLDS. Certainly; I was told what to do.

"Senator CURTIS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question? Is this billing to McCloskey for this $109,205.60 in the column which is