of the Germans." In the first part the German Empire is declared to be a republican State, sovereignty being vested in the people. The generally recognized rules of international law are held as binding on the State. The President is to be elected every seven years. Elections to the National Assembly are to occur every four years. The Chancellor's position is virtually that of a Vice President, he and the rest of the Cabinet being appointed by the President. The second part declares that all Germans shall be equal before the law, and all men and women shall have basically the same rights. Provision is made for a second chamber, somewhat analogous to the American Senate; a Supreme Court, a budget system and other legislative machinery necessary to the functioning of the Government. It is declared that no State Church exists, and that religion has no bearing on citizenship. Immediately after the promulgation of the Constitution President Ebert appointed Premier Bauer as Chancellor, and issued a decree that all members of the defense forces should take the oath under the Constitution.

While the new charter was being debated and adopted controversy was provoked by the disclosures of Erzberger, the "stormy petrel" of German politics. He alleged that negotiations for peace had been initiated through the Vatican by the French and British Governments in August, 1917, and that only the ineptitude of the then German Government, headed by Michaelis, in neglecting or rebuffing the overtures had prevented Germany from securing an advantageous peace. The statement drew a denial from Alexandre Ribot, who at the time mentioned was Premier and Foreign Minister of France. Its repercussion in Germany was immediate. It loosed a flood of angry protests and recriminations

from which each political party sought to draw advantage. Bauer, Ludendorff, von Tirpitz, Hindenburg, Michaelis, von Bernstorff and von Bethmann Hollweg took part in the strife, which resolved itself into an attempt by the military party to throw the odium for the prolongation of the war upon the civil authorities, while the latter retorted in kind. Much of the responsibility was placed by both sides on the former KaiThe controversy subsided after a while, to revive with greater virulence later on in the Reichstag inquiry into the conduct of the war. To the world at large, surfeited with strife, the proceedings had only an academic interest, and the net result of the exculpations and accusations in this post-mortem analysis was a deepening of the conviction of Germany's guilt in bringing on the war.

ser.

The attempt to extradite the ex-Kaiser for trial before an allied tribunal ended in failure. Two difficulties stood in the way the lack of a charge recognizable by international law, and the reluctance of Holland to surrender a fugitive who had sought asylum in her borders. The Allies sought to surmount the former by charging a supreme offense against international morality," a charge that, in addition to its novelty and vagueness, had the drawback that always attaches to post facto proceedings. Two letters were addressed to Holland couched in persuasive terms, but carrying a hint of coercion if that should become necessary. Holland's replies were polite but firm. She refused to surrender the ex-Emperor, alleging the impossibility of departing from her customs and traditions in affording shelter to those charged with political offenses. She offered, however, to provide additional guards to prevent the royal exile from escaping to Germany or engaging in intrigues that might again prove a menace to the world.

With this concession the Allies were forced to be content and the matter was dropped.

Almost equally abortive was the attempt to secure the surrender or punishment of Germans charged with war crimes. As first prepared the list of alleged offenders included between one and two thousand names, including Ludendorff, Hindenburg and others in high command. A revision was made with these higher officials eliminated, and the number was reduced to about eight hundred. Protests were made by the German authorities, who represented that it was utterly impossible to secure the arrest and surrender of so many, and that attempts to do so would surely result in the overthrow of the Government. The Allies' fear of Bolshevism in Germany was stronger than their determination to see that adequate punishment was meted out to the alleged criminals, and after prolonged correspondence a compromise was reached by which fortyfive-the irreducible minimum to which the long list had dwindled-should be brought to trial before the German High Court sitting at Leipzig, the Allies to be represented at the sittings and reserving the right in case of a flagrant miscarriage of justice to insist on their original demands. The decision was an unquestionable triumph for German obstructionism, and there was every evidence that all the culprits would go unwhipped of justice.

Another indication of bad faith that aroused serious apprehension, especially on the part of France, was the maintenance by Germany of a larger armed force than the treaty allowed. Articles 160 and 163 of that instrument provided that within three months from its coming into force the effectives in the German Army must be reduced to 200,000, and after March 31, 1920, they must not

exceed 100,000. The old imperial armies were mustered out promptly enough, as they had become infected with Bolshevism and were not amenable to discipline. By August of 1919 the former military establishment was practically out of existence. Long prior to that date, however, Gustav Noske, the Minister of National Defense, had begun the building up of a new volunteer force that, by the middle of 1919, embraced 300,000 trained soldiers, each of whom had seen at least six months' service. The new force was known as the Reichswehr, but although the old military nomenclature was abolished, it was in reality an imperial militia, around which as a nucleus could be readily gathered a formidable army. Every possible means was used to secure enlistments. Special privileges and good pay were guaranteed. Recruiting offices were opened in towns and villages, posters placarded the walls and full-page advertisements appeared in the papers urging enrollment. Drill and discipline were of the strictest. By Aug. 1, 1919, the total strength of the Reichswehr, plus the strength of the old army units in the eastern theatre, added to the strength of independent volunteer units these latter disguised as "rifle clubs "was figured as being between 400,000 and 500,000 men.

That this program was an effort to retain German militarism was apparent, and evoked protests even from a certain section of German opinion, which declared that the plan was a clear violation of the treaty terms and that none could be deceived by the scheme into thinking that " Home Guards" would lose their military character and purpose. To justify his plan, Noske invoked the spectre of Bolshevism, and declared that his forces had no other aim in view than the maintenance of internal peace. With a lesser force, he pleaded, outbreaks

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could not be effectively held in check, and if internal order were not maintained the reparations demanded by the Allies of Germany could not be secured. a result of extensive correspondence, some diminution of the army was effected, but not to the extent demanded by the treaty. April 1, 1920, came and passed with the army still exceeding 200,000 men, although that was the date by which it was to be reduced to 100,000. It was not until the allied and German delegates met face to face at the Spa Conference, July 5, 1920, that a decision was reached that foreshadowed a belated compliance with the allied demands.

At that conference it was shown that Germany still had 200,000 soldiers, millions of rifles, 20,000 machine guns and 12,000 cannon. In explanation, it was alleged by the German delegates that the Government had met with insuperable difficulties. Strikes had been almost incessant. The rifles had been taken home by the soldiers and concealed so that they could not be recovered. Germany had no thought of revenge. The Government must have means to protect itself against Communism. In conclusion, they asked for a further delay of fifteen months in the matter of disarmament and army reduction. This was denied them, and the Allies laid down as terms that the safety police and home guards be disbanded; that concealed arms be found and yielded up under severe penalty for recalcitrants; that a law be passed converting the Reichswehr into a small regular army as provided by the treaty; and that all other military and aviation clauses be faithfully executed. On these conditions, the Allies agreed to extend until Jan. 1, 1921, the time for the reduction of effectives, but demanded that the army should not exceed 150,000 men by Oct. 1, 1920. They

threatened that if at any time the Allied Commission of Control should find that Germany was evading the fulfilment of the terms, the Allies would proceed to further occupation of German territory, whether in the Ruhr district or elsewhere, and would continue to occupy it until the terms were fully complied with. The German delegates demurred to the clause regarding occupation, but finally signed the protocol in which it was embodied. On Oct. 1, 1920, it was announced that the German Army had been reduced to 150,000.

Another evasion of the Versailles Treaty with which the Allies found it difficult to deal was that regarding coal. This was a matter of the most vital importance to France and Belgium, who relied upon the coal deliveries from Germany to build up their crippled industries. It had been originally stipulated that Germany should deliver 39,000,000 tons annually, of which 25,000,000 were assigned to France, 8,000,000 to Belgium and 6,000,000 to Italy. This total had been reduced by the Reparations Commission to 29,000,000 tons. In this as in other provisions of the treaty Germany defaulted. In May, 1920, her monthly deliveries had been reduced to less than half the demanded quota. In June of the same year this was further diminished by 10,000 tons daily, or 300,000 tons a month. Yet at the same time Germany was selling coal in large quantities to Switzerland, and had contracted to sell Holland 80,000 tons monthly. The matter was brought up at the Spa Conference for definite settlement, and provoked the most stormy discussions of the meeting. Hugo Stinnes, one of the most extraordinary figures of post-war Germany-a multi-millionaire, coal baron, owner of seventy newspapers-presented the German case in a speech whose truculence brought a rebuke from the presid

ing officer, and was afterward apologized for by the German Government. He declared that the allied demands for 29,000,000 tons monthly could not possibly be complied with, palliated the destruction of the French coal mines as due to military necessity, and bluntly asserted that in the matter of coal the Germans would make the terms and the Allies must accept them.

The crisis in the deliberations came July 12, when the Allies demanded that 2,000,000 tons a month be delivered. When the Germans refused the allied military chiefs were summoned. Still the Germans paltered, until the patience of the allied delegates was exhausted. On July 16 the latter threatened an invasion of the Ruhr district by six divisions on the following day unless their terms were accepted. The menace proved effective, and the Germans signed. It was stipulated that in case the total German coal deliveries for August, September and October should be ascertained by Nov. 15, 1920, to have fallen below 6,000,000 tons the Allies would occupy the Ruhr district or some other German territory. If, on the other hand, the Germans should within six months supply 12,000,000 tons of coal they would obtain credits amounting to about $100,000,000, which they would ultimately have to repay.

Other features of reparation were met by the Germans with equivocation or by counterproposals. A scheme presented by them dealt with the questions of indemnity, the rebuilding of devastated France and the delivery of materials for the restoration of the territories affected. The Allies were requested to extend the payment of reparations over a period of thirty years. Allied aid was asked in respect to food, fodder, fertilizers and raw materials. Regarding the obligation to pay on May 1, 1921, the sum of 200,000,000,000 marks in gold, the Germans

declared that they considered they had paid that amount already in other ways, thus calmly repudiating a future obligation. It was suggested that an international syndicate be formed to rebuild devastated France, the cost of which Germany would ultimately pay. As far as delivery of materials was concerned, she would do all that was possible. Nothing definite was done in the matter of these proposals.

On Jan. 10, 1920, the final exchange of ratifications between Germany and the allied powers took place at Paris. This formal act left the United States alone still technically at war with Germany. At the same time, a protocol was signed bearing on the indemnity to be paid by the Germans for the sinking of the interned fleet at Scapa Flow. The Allies had demanded 400,000 tons of docks, dredges and other maritime equipment as reparation for the sinking, but the final figure agreed upon was 275,000 tons.

On the same day that ratifications were exchanged the State Department at Washington announced that, as the United States had not ratified the treaty, it was the position of this Government that the armistice continued in full force and effect between the United States and Germany, and that accordingly the provisions of that instrument and its various extensions remained binding on the two nations.

GERMANS IN THE BALTIC STATES

During the greater part of 1919, a curious military situation existed in the former Baltic Provinces of Russia that engrossed the attention and finally aroused the apprehension of the Allies. The provinces in question-Esthonia. Lithuania and Latvia-Courland-had been for generations under the domination of the Baltic Brons, who, though of Russian ci wholly Ger

man in blood, served as intermediaries between Russia and Germany and could be counted on to further any German design. After the Russian forces had withdrawn from the war, the sons of the Barons enlisted in large numbers in the German armies. The Barons owned almost all the land in the provinces and ruled the peasants, whom they despised, with an iron hand. After the secession from Russia, the peasants rose, seized the land and evicted the former proprietors, who in most instances fled to Berlin. The effort of the Barons to recover their lost possessions was the moving cause of most of the events that followed.

They enlisted the services of a former Russian commander, Colonel AvalovBermondt, who had served with distinction in the Russo-Japanese war. Under his leadership an army was created of about 50,000 men, ostensibly to fight against the Bolshevists. The army consisted of diverse elements-mercenaries recruited in Germany, Russians who had been prisoners of war and other prisoners who had been sent by the Poles to join Yudenitch, but had been intercepted by Bermondt and impressed into his forces.

Co-operating with Bermondt was General von der Goltz's German "Iron Division." This was a creation of a German official, Winnig, a Social Democratic Army Commissioner, who had been sent by the Berlin Revolutionary Government soon after the armistice to reorganize the Eighth German Army in the Baltic region. He persuaded von Kathen, the commander, to form a complete division of 6,000 men, nominally to fight the Bolshevists, actually to perpetuate turmoil in the Baltic States and keep open a free passage from Germany to Russia. Only 600 volunteers could be obtained at first, but Winnig worked on the fears

of the Lettish Government so well as to secure a promise of Lettish citizenship and full political rights for every German soldier who agreed to fight for a month on the Letts's behalf against the Bolshevists. To this was later added the promise of inalienable grants of land for homestead construction. This latter promise proved illusory, and its non-fulfilment was the basis of the refusal of the troops later on to evacuate the provinces.

Volunteers were obtained by the thousands in Germany and hurried off in batches to Courland, where they were placed under the command of General von der Goltz, who had been summoned from Finland. The army grew rapidly in size and was splendidly armed and equipped. Money at the rate of 800,000 marks a day was sent from Berlin for its maintenance.

It soon became evident that the forces of Bermondt and von der Goltz were much more concerned in serving the interests of the Baltic Barons than in warding off the Bolshevist peril. Von der Goltz invaded Lithuania, and Bermondt, under pretense of needing Riga as a base for operations against the Soviet armies, attacked that city. The troops were guilty of the most outrageous excesses against the Lettish population. Though the Allies themselves had asked von der Goltz to remain in the Baltic regions to stabilize conditions there, they soon awakened to a realization of the true situation and demanded his recall, Aug. 27. The German Government resorted to tergiversation. In a note of Sept. 3, it pleaded inability to compel the German troops in the Baltic to comply with its orders. Yet, as it later developed, the flow of money and supplies to the army continued. On Sept. 28 the Supreme Council issued what in effect was ar ultimatum, re