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field-from half past four to seven P. M.-and ably assisted by Generals Howard, Doubleday, and others, he made the best disposition of the forces at his command which he possibly could. With magnificent judgment his military genius took in the whole situation. Culp's Hill, a commanding position about a half mile to the east, must be held, and Wadsworth's division of the First Corps, or rather what was left of it, was at once sent there. Round Top, three miles to the south, did not escape his eagle eye, and although he had not troops enough to extend the line down to it, he at once sent Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, when it arrived, to take position there, one brigade of which was thrown upon that eminence. The survivors of the Eleventh Corps were placed in the front and right center; and the remaining two divisions of the First Corps joined the left of the Eleventh and extended the line down on the left, toward Round Top. To this the cavalry were joined. The line thus formed made a considerable show of strength, but could easily have been broken, or the position turned, had a determined effort been made. This effort, however, was not made, and Sickles' Corps from Emmittsburg, and Slocum's from Two Taverns, coming up about seven o'clock, the opportunity was lost. The two Confederate divisions of Anderson and Johnson, which soon after came upon the ground, again gave the enemy the preponderance, but it was then too late in the evening to make the attempt.

The new position chosen by the Union forces was one of great strength, and had the Confederates followed up the advantages gained, and stormed Cemetery Hill at once, the results of the next two days fighting might have been

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sadly different from what they were. That this position. could have been carried, had an attack been promptly made, is asserted by one entirely competent to judge, General Doubleday, who says, "Both Hill and Ewell had received stunning blows during the day, and were disposed to be cautious. They, therefore, did not press forward and take the heights, as they could easily have done at this time."*

The failure of the Confederates to attack Cemetery and Culp's hills in the three hours which intervened between the time when the broken and shattered Federals took possession of them and the darkness of evening, was fraught with consequences of such vast importance that the reasons for it deserve special consideration. The following, taken from the highest and most important sources, is to the point. General Doubleday, in the same connection above referred to, says:

"General Lee reached the field before Hancock came, and watched the retreat of the First and Eleventh corps, and Hancock's movements and dispositions, through his field glass. He was not deceived by the show of force, and sent a recommendation-not an order-to Ewell to follow us up; but Ewell, in the exercise of his discretion as a corps commander, did not do so. He had lost three thousand men, and both he and Hill were under orders not to bring on a general engagement. In fact they had had all the fighting they desired for the time being. Colonel Campbell Brown, of Ewell's staff, states that the latter was preparing to move forward against the height, when a false report induced him to send Gordon's brigade to reinforce Smith's brigade on his extreme left, to meet a

*General Doubleday's "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," page 152.

supposed Union advance in that direction. The absence of these two brigades decided him to wait for the arrival of Johnson's division before taking further action. When the latter came up, Slocum and Sickles were on the ground, and the opportunity for a successful attack had passed." Colonel W. H. Taylor, Lee's adjutant-general, says: "General Lee witnessed the flight of the Federals through Gettysburg, and up the hills beyond. He then directed me to go to General Ewell, and say to him that, from the position which he occupied, he could see the enemy retreating over those hills, without organization, and in great confusion; that it was only necessary to press 'those people' in order to secure possession of the heights; and that, if possible, he wished him to do this. In obedience to these instructions, I proceeded immediately to General Ewell, and delivered the order of General Lee; and, after receiving from him some message for the commanding general in regard to the prisoners captured, returned to the latter, and reported that his order had been delivered. General Ewell did not express any objection, or indicate the existence of any impediment, to the execution of the order conveyed to him, but left the impression on my mind that it would be executed. In the exercise of that discretion, however, which General Lee was accustomed to accord to his lieutenants, and probably because of an undue regard for his admonition, given early in the day, not to precipitate a general engagement, General Ewell deemed it unwise to make the pursuit. The troops were not moved forward, and the enemy proceeded to occupy and fortify the position which it was designed that General Ewell should seize. Major-General Edward Johnson, whose division

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reached the field after the engagement, and formed on the left of Early, in a conversation had with me, since the war, about this circumstance, in which I sought an explanation of our inaction at that time, assured me that there was no hinderance to his moving forward; but that, after getting his command in line of battle, and before it became seriously engaged, or had advanced any great distance, for some unexplained reason, he had received orders. to halt. This was after General Lee's message was delivered to General Ewell."*

General Ewell, in his official report, states his reasons for not ordering the attack, which are as follows:

"The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position. that was known to us as Cemetery Hill, south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there. On entering the town I received a message from the commanding general to attack the hill if I could do so to advantage. I could not bring artillery to bear on it; all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours' marching and fighting, and I was notified that General Johnson was close to the town with his division, the only one of my corps that had not been engaged, Anderson's division of the Third Corps having been halted to let them pass. Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town, and I determined, with Johnson's division, to take possession of a wooded hill to my left, on a line with and commanding Cemetery Hill. Before Johnson got up, the Federals were reported moving to our left flank-our extreme leftand I could see what seemed to be his skirmishers in that direction. Before this report could be investigated by

*Colonel W. H. Taylor, in Annals of the War, pages 308, 309.