be swept away by a simple resolution of the First Raad, whenever it suited its purpose. It is clear that our Government could not possibly have accepted these offers as a settlement; but something at least was gained for negotiation in the language held by the President. The grievance was admitted, and the discussion of the proper measure of relief, so far as the franchise grievance was concerned, seemed likely to enter on the not unhopeful field of more or less.

In May a new chapter in the history of our relations with the Republic was opened by the publication of Sir Alfred Milner's despatch to Mr. Chamberlain, which was telegraphed from Cape Town on the 5th, and which was at once sent to the newspapers.

It was

a paper written with much force, and with a warmth of language unusual in diplomatic documents intended for publication. When negotiation is in contemplation or in actual progress it is often a difficult question to decide how far it is wise to make public the communications that are passing between the agent on the spot and the Government whom he serves. But in this case, no doubt, Mr. Chamberlain thought it of supreme importance to inform the British public of the precise attitude of the Colonial Office towards the difficult problems with which it had to deal; and as a matter of fact the despatch was accepted as a manifesto of national policy. As such it deserved and received almost universal support.

It is desirable to recall the principal points insisted upon in this memorable despatch. To begin with, the grievances alleged in the petition to the Queen were substantiated, and it was pointed out that, far from anything having been done to alleviate them, the treatment of the uitlanders was becoming worse and worse. British subjects resented

the personal indignity involved in the position of permanent subjection to the ruling caste, which owes its wealth and power to their exertion. The political turmoil in the South African Republic will never end till the permanent uitlander population is admitted to a share in the government, and while that turmoil lasts there will be no tranquillity or adequate progress in her Majesty's South African dominions.

The only condition on which the South African Colonies and the two Republics can live in harmony and the country progress is equality all round. South Africa can prosper under two, three, or six Governments, but not under two absolutely conflicting social and political systems, perfect equality for Dutch and British in the British Colonies side by side with permanent subjection of British to Dutch in one of the Republics. It is idle to talk of peace and unity under such a state of affairs.

Sir Alfred goes on to point out that it is the right and the interest of Great Britain to secure fair treatment of the uitlanders, of whom the majority are British subjects, and that the system hitherto followed of remonstrating, generally in vain, about every injury to individual Englishmen had become an impossible one. "It may easily lead to war, but will never lead to real improvement." Then comes an important paragraph, which must be quoted entire.

The true remedy is to strike at the root of all these injuries-the political impotence of the injured. What diplomatic protests will never accomplish, a fair measure of uitlander representation would gradually but surely bring about. It seems a paradox, but it is true, that the only effective way of protecting our subjects is to help them to cease to be our subjects. The admission of uitlanders to a fair share of political power would no doubt give stability to the Republic; but it at the same time will remove most of our causes of difference with it, and modi

fy and in the long run entirely remove that intense suspicion and bitter hostility to Great Britain which at present dominates its internal and external policy.

The spectacle of thousands of British subjects, he continues, "kept permanently in the position of helots" (an absurdly exaggerated phrase to apply to men who came to, and remained in, the Transvaal solely for the personal advantage they found in so doing) was undermining all respect for the British Government in her own dominions. The Dutch press in and out of the Transvaal was libelling the British Government, and producing an effect upon the loyalty even of our Dutch fellow colonists, of whom thousands were being drawn into disaffection, thereby creating exasperation on the side of the British.

eign lands, and to secure the peace and prosperity of South Africa. Had similar conditions sprung up across the Portuguese and not across the Transvaal frontier we should have equally been bound to take the requisite steps, whatever might have been the most appropriate ones, to bring to an end a permanent and highly dangerous condition of unstable equilibrium.

Mr. Chamberlain accordingly in his reply to Sir Alfred's despatch, recounted at length the uitlander grievances, declared that they had become quite intolerable, and based the right of Great Britain to insist upon their redress on a threefold ground. The Convention of 1884 was designed to secure equality of treatment in the South African Republic for uitlander and Boer. Great Britain was the Paramount Power in South Africa. It was a national duty to protect British subjects residing in a foreign country.

"The British Government," he wrote, "still cherish the hope that the publicity given to the present representations of the uitlander population, and the fact, of which the Government of the South African Republic must be aware, that they are losing the sympathy of those other States which, like Great Britain, are deeply interested in the prosperity of the Transvaal, may induce them to reconsider their policy, and by redressing the most serious of the grievances now complained of to remove a standing danger to the peace and prosperity not only of the Republic itself but also of South Africa generally."

And the Secretary of State went on to propose to President Kruger that Sir Alfred Milner and he should meet and discuss in a conciliatory spirit the best means of removing uitlander grievances and restoring good relations between Great Britain and the South African Republic.

Before, however, Mr. Chamberlain's despatch was shown to President

Kruger, or made public, a conference had been held at Bloemfontein on the invitation of the President of the Orange Free State, which was naturally most anxious that a peaceful solution should be found for the difficulties between its two neighbors. The conference failed, but the report of the discussions serves a very useful historical purpose in making clear the views of the two sides and the motives that actuated the negotiators. The action taken at the time by the Orange

Free State and the Prime Minister and Government of Cape Colony also deserves the most careful attention. Nothing is to be gained by shutting our eyes to the difficulties of the other side; and the statement, so often made in this country, that we have been asking for nothing more for uitlanders in the Republic than is given by the Orange Free State, or by the British Colonies to resident foreigners within their boundaries, conceals the essential differences between the cases. Sir Alfred Milner put forward his case at the conference frankly and clearly.

The last thing he wanted, he said, was to impair the independence of the Republic. If the uitlanders were enfranchised it would strengthen that independence and diminish all necessity for British interference. He did not wish to swamp the old burghers, but merely to give to the new residents a moderate representation, so that they might in constitutional fashion seek redress for their own grievances. President Kruger seemed honestly anxious to get the High Commissioner to understand, even if he did not agree with, the feeling of the Boers on the subject. "I have come," he said. "to the conference in the trust that your Excellency is a man capable of conviction, to go into all points of difference." He claimed independence as to the internal affairs of the State; but if his Excellency in a friendly way

would give him hints on internal matters he would listen and do his best to remove all points of difference. As to the franchise question, which was to take precedence of all others,

"I am not surprised," said the President, "that in other places the men would only have to wait a year to get it, because there are millions of old burghers, and the few that come in cannot outvote the old burghers; but with us those who rushed in to the

gold fields are in large numbers and of all kinds, and the number of burghers is still insignificant; therefore we are compelled to make the franchise so that they cannot all rush into it at once, and as soon as we can assure ourselves by a gradual increase of our burghers that we can safely do it, our plan was to reduce the time for any one there to take up the franchise, and that is my plan."

The Boer dislike to being swamped is a perfectly intelligible one, especially when one calls to mind the sacrifices which the Boers have made in the past to achieve their hard-won and beloved independence. It is hardly necessary to go into the details of the proposals made on the one side and the other. Sir Alfred suggested an increase of seats in the uitlander districts, and a five-year franchise for all residents who intended to remain permanently in the Republic, provided they would take an oath to obey the laws and defend the independence of the country; and he urged (probably with entire truth) that to grant less than this would satisfy no one and do no good. The Boer President's proposals were very different. They included indeed an increase of seats in the Gold Fields district, and a shortening of the period to qualify for franchise. Sir Alfred admitted that the scheme showed a great advance on the existing system; but as a settle ment of the question it was utterly and entirely inadequate The Presi

dent showed himself most anxious to agree to some plan for settling future differences between the two States by arbitration; but the High Commissioner refused to mix up the fundamental question of the franchise with other matters, and at his instance the conference, having accomplished nothing, was closed.

The result was disappointing; but as yet there were many reasons for hoping that some pacific and satisfactory solution, by way of compromise, would be arrived at. Under these circumstances it was evidently all-important that the British demands should be of a kind, and be put forward in a manner, to attract general support in South Africa. The feeling among a large proportion of the people of the Free State, was quite opposed to the narrow, exclusive, retrograde, and corrupt system of government prevailing in the Transvaal. Policy, therefore, as well as the national honor made it incumbent upon us to convince even suspicious men that Great Britain had no intention of harking back to its old project of annexation, or of lending an ear to the counsels of those who had planned the treacherous raid of three years ago. There had slipped into one of the High Commissioner's telegraphic despatches an unfortunate paragraph which in South Africa was construed to convey a reflection upon the loyalty of our Dutch fellow subjects. It had been for some time the party cue of Mr. Rhodes's followers, with the exaggeration belonging to the bitterness of faction, to attribute disloyalty to their political opponents; yet only recently the Schreiner Ministry, supported by colonists of Dutch blood, had given signal evidence of its pride in the Imperial connection and its allegiance to the British flag. It was important that as far as possible the struggle with the Boer President should be prevented from widening

out into a contest of racial supremacy. The Schreiner Ministry and the President and Government of the Orange Free State felt this keenly, and offered what assistance they could to bring about a resumption of negotiations. Mr. Chamberlain has in the past in many speeches shown his recognition of the importance of keeping as far as possible the loyal Dutch of Cape Colony and the people of the Orange Free State in sympathy with the Imperial policy towards the Transvaal. Important to Great Britain as would be a rupture with the South African Republic, to the Orange Free State it would be a matter of vital interest, and to our Dutch fellow subjects distressing to the last degree. Mr. Schreiner and the Ministry of Cape Colony had carefully considered the proposals of President Kruger, and had come to the conclusion that they afforded at least a basis upon which the franchise question might be settled; and they communicated, it appears, with some diffidence, their views to Sir Alfred Milner on the subject. The Governor, however, considered the differences between himself and President Kruger irreconcilable, and advised the Cape Ministry to apply rather to the latter than to him-an appeal which was reinforced by a telegram next day from the Secretary of State asking the Cape Ministry to bring what influence they could to bear on the South African Republic to modify their proposals, and so to remove the necessity for British interference in affairs of this kind. At the same time the uitlanders and the burghers at Johannesburg were resolving, the former, that Sir Alfred Milner's proposals were an irreducible minimum; the latter, that the President's suggestions left nothing to be desired. Between these extremists stood the Cape Ministry and the President of the Orange Free State. And at the end of July, when there was