of the sympathy and respect he would otherwise have received. Indeed, as far as all his vulgar and villainous speeches were concerned, he was utterly unworthy of respect. In this particular no President had so disgraced the country. John Tyler had had a severe struggle with Congress, but throughout it all he did not forget that he was President, or what was due from him as such. A few days after the session began a resolution was introduced in the Senate expressive of the strong desire of that body to cherish and uphold the honor of the Nation, and condemning and censuring the President's views of repudiation. The resolution was adopted by a party vote of forty-three Republicans and six Democrats. The House also on the same day declared "That all forms and degrees of repudiation of national indebtedness are odious to the American people." A number of Democrats joined the Republicans in sanctioning this honest proposition, but it remains a singular fact that six members of that party voted against it, and one of these was defeated as a candidate for governor of Kentucky in the convention in that State in 1883, by what his friends claimed as trickery of which he knew nothing. A great part of the time of this short and unimportant session of Congress was taken up in discussing another amendment to the Constitution, as follows: "ARTICLE XV. "SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. "SEC. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." On the 30th of January, 1869, the House passed the joint resolution proposing the submission of this amendment to the States, by a vote of one hundred and fifty against forty-two, four of the nays being Republicans. Thirty-one members did not vote, and most of these were Republicans. The Senate in February finally concurred in substantially the same form; but it was left to General Grant's Administration to carry out this last act in the work of reconstructing the rebel States. As a merely party scheme this amendment to the Constitution has not resulted so favorably to the Republicans as it was believed and hoped it would do. And viewed from a statesman-like point, and one of justness and fitness, events have not justified the hopes of the friends of the measure, nor put beyond a doubt the question of the propriety of the act. Yet it may be perfectly safe to say that a majority of the white voters of this country would not undo this act of Congress, or deprive the negro of the privilege of voting. That would be the verdict of to-day, perhaps, although time is yet needed to show this momentous legislation in its true light. In a merely civil privilege, or right perhaps, like this, the "color line" is fading out, but it was a morally bold class of men who dared to stand up for and bring about negro suffrage against their own preferences and prejudices (it may be without offense to say), and those of the greater part of their own race. If this has been a blessing to the colored race, and no evil to the white, and time shall prove it to have been greatly beneficial to the Nation and the world, the courageous men of the "Fortieth and Forty-first Congresses" who brought it about should richly deserve, and would have thrust upon their memory and their deed, the praises which are yet cautiously bestowed. No doubt the judgment of time will be correct. On the 4th of March, 1869, with the incoming of the new Administration, Congress convened in extraordinary session according to previous provision. The Government for the last three or four years had virtually been under the administration of Congress, and the good that was done must be accredited mainly to that body. What President Johnson would have done, he could not do, and the good or evil of his policy must, to some extent, remain a question among good judges. One thing is, however, certain. He started out in the exact tracks of President Lincoln in his reconstruction plans, using, indeed, the very paper prepared by his predecessor, or using it as a foundation for his first steps in Virginia and North Carolina; and the general spirit that actuated his course gradually prevailed under his successor. He claimed with characteristic bitterness, that the Congressional plan was not only vicious and wicked, but that it was an utter failure. Still such is not the judgment of history. Doubts as to its being the best which could have been devised, may be admitted. But General Grant and others who were sent South at the close of the Rebellion and who favored President Johnson's plan at the outset, believed later, when they saw a change in the disposition of the rebels, that his plan could not possibly result well for the country. And this opinion was confirmed by the appeals and the sufferings of Southern Unionists. The policy of Congress was severely disciplinary. But was that discipline not necessary? Slavery, the thing on which the Rebellion was based, had been struck down. Could this past source of all evil be left to the uncertain chances by which it was naturally surrounded? Would it have been wise to leave the work so incomplete, or the battle to be fought again? Where are to be found the indubitable proofs that all of this discipline and hardship to the South, and all of this vexatious military and political turmoil, were not necessary and best in the work of securing perpetual and eternal good to the regenerated Nation? Were not the blood of the war and the ills of reconstruction a price for the condition of permanent peace and union? Yet all of this admitted does not preclude the reflection that there might have been a more perfect way. CHAPTER XIX. A REVIEW - THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS PLANS OF RECONSTRUCTION-WHO WAS RIGHT?-PRESIDENT ATTRACTIVE PICTURE. T may be admitted as a fair and honest matter IT of dispute to-day whether the plan of reconstruction proposed and attempted by President Johnson was not preferable to the one adopted by Congress and put in its place. The opinion very largely prevalent at that time that Congress had the right to do anything it chose with the insurrectionary States was, perhaps, one of the many errors of the moment. A class of men favored the plan of reducing the rebellious States to territorial condition, and under military rule passing them gradually, after a long probation, by the usual steps, to the condition of loyal Free States. It may not yet be clear that this course would not have been better than the one which was taken. But the difficulty about the whole matter was that Congress had no right or power to do anything of the kind. It was a great error to suppose that the rebellion of a State gave the General Government the right to do what it pleased with the State after putting down the rebellion. Neither rebellion nor anything else could ever confer such |