CH. XVII.] AVAILABLE REINFORCEMENTS 107 probably have been better to reinforce the Army of the Potomac for the purpose of offensive operations in the autumn from its base on the James River. The necessary troops could have been furnished, for Halleck had promised 20,000, and if Lincoln had reverted to his first impulse and drawn 25,000 from the West, leaving their places to be filled from the new levy, he would still have been in the region of safety; indeed, these 45,000 joined to the Army of the Potomac and a victory near Richmond were more favorable to the military situation in the West than the Western army intact and severe reverses in Virginia. The remaining troops needed could have been sent from the Army of Virginia, if an ́active campaign for Pope were given up, and it were deemed safe to intrust the defence of Washington largely to the new recruits which were now fast coming forward.2 Forasmuch as Washington was more valuable to the Confederates than Richmond to the North, the possibility could not be ignored, that Lee should leave his capital with a slight defence, and with the main part of his army make a vigorous attack on Washington.3 66 1 See Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 242. General J. D. Cox thus reports a conversation had with McClellan near Alexandria, Aug. 31 : McClellan discussed his campaign in the Peninsula with apparent unreserve. He condemned the decision to recall him from Harrison's Landing, arguing that the one thing to do in that emergency was to reinforce his army there and make it strong enough to go on with its work and capture Richmond. He said that if the government had lost confidence in his ability to conduct the campaign to a successful end, still it was unwise to think of anything else, except to strengthen that army and give it to some one they could trust. He added explicitly: If Pope was the man they had faith in, then Pope should have been sent to Harrison's Landing to take command, and however bitter it would have been, I should have had no just reason to complain.' He predicted that they would be put to the cost of much life and treasure, to get back to the position left by him." - Cox's Reminiscences, MS. Cf. Napoleon to Carnot, May, 1796, Lanfrey, tome i. p. 107. 2 In addition to the call for 300,000 three-years men, of which mention has been made, a call for 300,000 nine-months militia was issued Aug. 4. See Keyes's opinion given to Lincoln July 9. Lincoln, Complete Works, 202; his letters to Lincoln and Meigs, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. 338. In reckoning the available supply of troops, some thought given to the large number absent from the army. This had at All these considerations must have occurred to Lincoln and to Seward, who, in the many civil and military councils that took place before a decision was reached, were apparently the only men, except Burnside and possibly Halleck, to speak a good word for McClellan. The President was capable of resisting the unanimous opinion of his advisers, but he himself had lost confidence in the ability of his general to make an effective forward movement, no matter how large his resources and how favorable the opportunity. If, as Ropes points out, the government had reposed the same trust in McClellan that they did in Grant two years later, they would without doubt have furnished him what he asked for and permitted him to execute his plan. That he had forfeited their confidence was a natural result of his career as commander, yet in truth he was now more worthy of trust than when he first took command of the Army of the Potomac. His private correspondence is used by historical writers to show his conceit and lack of a proper spirit of subordination, even contempt of the government in Washington; but from the day on which he handed his Harrison's Landing political letter to the President a different spirit is manifest. His selfimportance is still conspicuous, his complacency and puerile vanity; also the usual complaints, the expressed lack of faith in the administration, boasts that he will take Richmond, uncompromising condemnation of those who do not agree with him, detraction of Stanton, disdain of Pope, and early suspicions of Halleck. There is still somewhat of the feeling that he is necessary to the salvation of the country, and that in his political letter he has shown himself a master tracted the attention of Lincoln, causing him to admonish McClellan, who was taking measures to bring back the absent officers and soldiers, and correct the evil.-O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 319, 321, 323. 1 The Army under Pope, p. 11. 2 See vol. iii. of this work, p. 496 et seq. 3 July 8. 4 Aug. 4, "Halleck has begun to show the cloven foot already." Aug. 10," Halleck is turning out just like the rest of the herd." — Own Story, pp. 462, 465. CH. XVII.] MCCLELLAN 109 spirit, his policy shining with Christian feeling and humanity in contrast with that of Congress and of Pope.1 But notwithstanding the persistence of the old failings, reflection and his reverses are making a better man. "There never was such an army, but there have been plenty of better generals;" "I have tried to do my best honestly and faithfully for my country. That I have to a certain extent failed I do not believe to be my fault, though my self-conceit probably blinds me to many errors that others see." 2 These and similar expressions draw us to the writer with sympathy, and when we take into account that no man can go unscathed if his acts are interpreted by his inmost thoughts, a careful reading of these affectionate and confidential letters of McClellan to his wife cannot fail to force upon us the conviction that he had been improved by adversity, and to make us regret that the President could not see him as clearly as it is now given us to do. The acerbity which he displayed in his official letters must have incensed even a man with Lincoln's poise of temper and judgment; indeed this fault, if allowed to sway us too far, will lead us to do injustice to McClellan, for his geniality and sincerity in private intercourse show another and better side to the man, who too frequently dipped his pen in gall. 3 ... In answer to McClellan's able and warm protest against the removal of his army from the James River, Halleck replied at once: "The order of the withdrawal . . . will not be rescinded, and you will be expected to execute it with all possible promptness." If McClellan had been a great general with the high spirit that such greatness ordinarily carries, he would not have submitted tamely to the thwarting of his plans, a sequence to his supersession by Halleck, whom he considered his inferior and whose appointment he 1 Own Story, pp. 461, 463. 2 Ibid., pp. 447, 453. 3 Aug. 5, O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 82. 4 See Allan, Army of N. Va., p. 153. deemed a blow to his self-respect:1 he would have resigned his commission. Here, though, must be taken into account the problem of the working man, how in that event was he to get a living for himself, his wife, and child. He had already written his friend William H. Aspinwall, a man of large business connections in New York City, that if he lost the command of the Army of the Potomac he should give up the service; anticipating this contingency, he adds, "Be kind enough to cast your eyes about you to see whether there is anything I can do in New York to earn a respectable sup port for my family."2 This was July 19. Three weeks later his feeling is thus expressed: "Their [the government's] game is to force me to resign; mine will be to force them to place me on leave of absence." The natural and comprehensible desire to continue receiving the pay of a MajorGeneral was one reason, if not the main reason, why he did not resent by a signal act the humiliation of supersedure and the overruling of his plan. 8 Meanwhile a reconnaissance made towards Richmond at the suggestion of Halleck, had resulted in a skirmish in which Hooker drove the Confederates from Malvern Hill. It is from this place that McClellan dates his telegraphic report of it to Halleck, adding: "This is a very advantageous position to cover an advance on Richmond, and only 143 miles distant, and I feel confident that with reinforcements I could march this army there in five days." "I have no reinforcements to send you," was Halleck's prompt reply.5 General Sumner had supported McClellan by sending at the same time a telegram to Washington with the words, "I am convinced that if we had a reinforcement of 20,000 men we 1 "I am tired of serving fools. God help my country! He alone can save it. It is grating to have to serve under the orders of a man whom I know by experience to be my inferior." - Own Story, p. 453, also p. 455. 2 Ibid., p. 451. 8 Ibid., p. 464. 4 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 76. Aug. 5 and 6, ibid., p. 78. CH. XVII.] MCCLELLAN'S PLAN 111 could walk straight into Richmond."1 McClellan's private correspondence and Hooker's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War indicate that he entertained the project of a forward movement with the purpose of fighting Lee. This plan was recommended by Hooker, who was so confident of success that he told his commander he would willingly take the advance.2 But McClellan was not made of the stuff which ventures disobedience of orders where final ruin or lasting glory is the issue of the move, and the thought was not translated into action. So loath, however, was he to leave his present position, so impelled by a union of military judgment, patriotism, and selfinterest, that, after receiving Halleck's despatches which informed him that the enemy was fighting Pope and that the most urgent necessity existed for getting additional troops in front of Washington, he went to Fort Monroe and across Chesapeake Bay, travelling sixteen hours in order to have a conversation with his general-in-chief by wire, to learn fully about Pope's movements, and probably to urge with earnestness and force what he had already advised in two despatches of August 12: that he could help Pope with greater certainty and more surely relieve Washington from all danger by a movement on Richmond than by embarking his troops for Aquia Creek. He proposed to make an advance within forty-eight hours, fight a detachment of the enemy between him and the Confederate capital, and if he defeated and captured this estimated force of 18,000, he saw "but little difficulty in pushing rapidly forward into Richmond." He would need no reinforcements unless he were successful, but would then require them to maintain his communications. At 1.40 in the morning of August 14 Halleck said to him over the wires, "There is no change of plans; you will send up your troops as rapidly as possible," and then worn out by fatigue and anxiety left the telegraph office for his bed, to the 1 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 356. 2 Letter of Sunday, Aug. 10, Own Story, p. 465; C. W., part i. p. 579. |