the military critics say, "to the recognized principles of strategy," but some risk must be run, and, while he did not know all of the facts, he knew something of his enemy's inefficiency that was co-operating with his own great ability. In pursuance of this bold project, Jackson, on the morning of August 25, was despatched with 25,000 men on a forced march, his aim being to cross the Rappahannock above the position of the Union army, to move through Thoroughfare Gap, strike the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in Pope's rear and sever his communications with Washington. He took no transportation but ambulances and ammunition wagons; all baggage was left behind. A few days' cooked rations in the haversacks, some live cattle, some salt for the ears of corn which the men expected to pluck in the fields and roast, were to be the food supply until they could reach the rich stores of the Northern army. Twenty-five miles were covered that day, and Jackson's troops slept at Salem. Commencing the day before, Lee continued for some days to threaten vigorously Pope's front for the purpose of misleading him. From the officers of his Signal Corps Station, Pope learned, probably as early as noon of the 25th, of the movement of a large body of the enemy,' and without suspecting the real aim of the movement, made up his mind by nightfall that their whole force had "marched for the Shenandoah valley by way of Luray and Front Royal." 2 Ropes, who is friendly to him, maintains that in the afternoon of the 25th, while he was in doubt of the Confederates' design, or even though he believed that they were going into the Shenandoah valley, he should have abandoned his position in the neighborhood of Warrenton, and occupied Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville for the purpose of preserving his lines of communication.3 This move would have frustrated Lee's plan at the outset. Pope was perhaps so plagued by the recollection of his injudicious 1 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 654. 2 Despatch of 9.30 P. M., ibid., part ii. p. 67; see, also, part iii. p. 665. The Army under Pope, p. 45; Civil War, part ii. p. 265. CH. XVII.] JACKSON'S MOVEMENT 123 address to the Army of Virginia, that he would not entertain the idea of further retreat, or perhaps he thought it would be contrary to the orders he had received from Washington, although in this event he had time and opportunity to communicate with the general-in-chief and gain his consent. Halleck, on the other hand, who probably had all the facts by the morning of the 26th, ought perhaps to have taken into account the possibility of Jackson's destination, and suggested a falling back, especially as the movement of the different corps of the Army of the Potomac had not been as rapid as he had expected. August 26 Jackson marched swiftly on. He went through White Plains, Thoroughfare Gap, and Gainesville, unopposed and unobserved. By evening he had reached Bristoe Station, torn up the railroad track, cut the telegraph wires, severing Pope's line of supplies and his direct telegraphic communication with Washington. He sent a detachment to Manassas Junction which captured rich quartermaster and commissary stores, so that the Confederates obtained the clothes and shoes of which they stood in need, and feasted on Northern bread and meat while Pope's troops went hungry. There was bustle in the Army of Virginia that day, but in the wrong direction. Pope certainly was to blame, affirms Colonel Thomas Livermore, that he did not discover that 25,000 troops were marching twenty miles in his rear, and close to his position. He might have fallen upon Jackson with his superior force, and crushed that wing of the Confederate army;' but ignorant of the enemy's movements, he thought that his fight, which he hoped to postpone for two days, should be made at Warrenton, and ordered the disposition of his troops to that end.2 About eight o'clock that evening, immediately after writing a despatch to McDowell outlining his plan, he learned that his communications had been severed at Manassas Junction, and taking this news in connection with other information pre 1 Papers of the Milt. Hist. Soc. of Mass., vol. ii. p. 323. viously received, he suspected that a large force of the Confederates was in that vicinity. Full of confidence and eager to meet them, he decided, in the early morning of August 27, to abandon his front on the Rappahannock and march with his main body to Gainesville, a wise determination, say both Ropes and Allan.' This day was spent largely in marching, and was productive of a skirmish between Hooker and Ewell in which Hooker got the better of his opponent. Jackson at Manassas Junction rested and fed his tired and hungry troops. In the evening Pope arrived in person at Bristoe, and learn ing of the whereabouts of Jackson, and deciding to concentrate his army on Manassas, issued orders at nine o'clock to McDowell, who was at Gainesville, and to his other lieutenants, to march thither at dawn. "If you will march promptly and rapidly," he said to McDowell,“ we shall bag the whole crowd," meaning Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill.2 . An ordinary general might have been satisfied with the capture of stores and the alarm created in Washington, but Lee's strategy went further. He thought Jackson's move would disconcert and delay the reinforcements which were coming from Alexandria, and cause Pope to retire from the Rappahannock in the effort to preserve his communications. He himself with Longstreet's wing proposed to join Jackson, and seize a favorable opportunity, which would probably offer, to give battle. Late in the afternoon of August 26, leaving one division in position on the Rappahannock, he started with Longstreet to march by the same route over which Jackson 1 The Army under Pope, p. 53; Civil War, part ii. p. 266; The Army of Northern Virginia, p. 218. William Allan was an officer in the Confederate army, almost constantly at Jackson's headquarters and with him during this campaign. He is a clear and candid writer, and "his abilities as a military critic," in the opinion of Ropes, "were of a high order." — Introduction to Army of N. Va. 2 O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 72. "All that talk of bagging Jackson, &c. was bosh."-Porter to Burnside, Aug. 28, ibid., part iii. p. 732. This despatch was transmitted to Halleck and seen by the President. 3 Allan, p. 200. CH. XVII.] LEE'S AND POPE'S ARMIES 125 had so successfully passed. The night of the 27th they spent at White Plains. 1 As battles are near at hand, it will be well to contrast the opposing forces as they stood on the morning of August 28. Lee had, in the two wings of Jackson and Longstreet, at least 49,000 men. Pope, with the reinforcement of Heintzelman's and Porter's corps of the Army of the Potomac, had no more than 70,000; but the correspondence shows so much straggling from Pope's army on account of hunger, fatigue, and discouragement, that it may be questioned whether any estimate made from the returns would not exceed the number actually under his command. Moreover, it must be said that in the various reports and accounts of these operations discrepancies exist as to the size of both armies. Accepting, however, the figures that Southern authority gives, 49,000 and 70,000, the odds were in favor of the Confederates. In Pope's original army there was but one efficient corps commander. McDowell was a capable man, and served his general loyally; his corps alone was trustworthy.2 The corps of Heintzelman and Porter and the men who came to him from Burnside were good soldiers; but a collection of parts of three armies is not, in Ropes's judgment, an army, but merely "an aggregation of troops." In this case many of the men lacked confidence. in their commander, and if the officers and privates of the Fifth Corps took their cue from Porter, their commander, the defection was still more serious.* 1 Figures agreed on by Allan and Ropes. - Papers of the Milt. Hist. Soc. of Mass., vol. ii. p. 197. 2 Ante, p. 118. 8 Papers of the Milt. Hist. Soc. of Mass., vol. ii. p. 218. 4 Porter himself felt disdain for Pope. I presume that we shall "get behind Bull Run in a few days if strategy don't use us up," are his words of sarcasm to Burnside. "The strategy is magnificent and tactics in the inverse proportion. . . . I believe the enemy have a contempt for the Army of Virginia. I wish myself away from it, with all our old Army of the Potomac, and so do our companions." - Despatch from Warrenton, Aug. 27, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 700. This and other despatches of Porter were transmitted by Burnside to Halleck, and made known to the President, for the reason that they contained almost the sole information of Pope's |