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CH. XVII.]

SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN

129

Lee's letter to Davis, in which he says that the attack of the Union troops was repulsed. The medical director of Jackson's corps, "recounting the many casualties which he had witnessed," said to Jackson: "General, this day has been won by nothing but stark and stern fighting." "No," was the reply, "it has been won by nothing but the blessing and protection of Providence." 2

5

The next day, Saturday, August 30, the Second Battle of Bull Run3 was fought on the already historic field. Pope, full of the illusion that he had inflicted a severe defeat upon the enemy, readily gave credence to the intelligence that they were retreating. His reconnaissances this morning and the reports of McDowell, Heintzelman, and Sigel confirmed him in this view, from which he could not be shaken by the strong representations of Porter, towards whom, indeed, he felt harshly for the supposed disobedience of orders the previous day. He was afraid that the Confederates would get away from him, and undoubtedly reasoned that since he must attack them at once he could not afford to wait for Franklin and Sumner with their 20,000 fresh and veteran soldiers, who he knew were on the way from Alexandria.8 At noon he

1 Sept. 3, O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 559. Carl Schurz, who commanded a division of Sigel's corps, and who did the principal part of the fighting in the first half of this day's battle, said in his report of the events of the afternoon: "If all these forces instead of being frittered away in isolated efforts had co-operated with each other at any one movement after a common plan, the result of the day would have been far greater than the mere retaking and occupation of the ground we had already taken and occupied in the morning, and which in the afternoon was, for a short time at least, lost again." — Ibid., p. 299.

2 Dabney, p. 531.

8 Called by the Confederates the Second Battle of Manassas.

O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 741.

The Army under Pope, Ropes, p. 129.

5 Ibid., part ii. pp. 340, 413.

7 See order of 8.50 P. M., Aug. 29, O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 509.

If it had been urged to Pope

"The quality and hair of our attempt

Brooks no division:"

he might have replied with Hotspur that their absence

"Lends a lustre and more great opinion,
A larger dare to our great enterprise."

To oppose this conglomeration, Lee had a compact, welldisciplined army, that worked like a machine. His two corps commanders, Jackson and Longstreet, men of eminent military ability, confided in him and loved him. The three wrought together like devoted brothers. Lee gave his orders in general terms, leaving the details to be worked out by his lieutenants according to circumstances. This spirit ran through the whole army. A. P. Hill having better and later information did not hesitate a moment to go contrary to an order he had received from Jackson, his superior.1 Lee's cavalry officer Stuart kept him thoroughly posted up,2 and until the night of August 28 he had regular reports from Jackson, and likewise knew pretty well what his enemy was doing. If furthermore we take into account that Lee was a much abler general than his antagonist, that his troops had gained a succession of victories since May, while most of the men under Pope had seen little else than defeat, the story of the next three days will cause no surprise.

Pope with the van of his army reached Manassas at midday, August 28, but Jackson had flown. Burning all the stores that he could not transport, he had left the night before, and when Pope arrived at Manassas expecting to strike him, he was some miles away, placing his army in position near the old battle-field of Bull Run, to await the arrival of Longstreet, who, he knew, was fast approaching. Pope was puzzled, but as usual came to a prompt decision, and countermanding orders set on again in pursuit of Jackson. Towards sunset King's division of McDowell's corps came into collision with some of Jackson's troops and fought the battle of Gainesville. The loss was heavy on both sides, and although it was a drawn battle, King deemed his position

position and movements.

Porter Court-Martial.

See Burnside's testimony before the Fitz John

1 See A. P. Hill's report, O. R., vol. xii. part ii.

2 Lee's and Stuart's reports, ibid.

Longstreet's article, Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 517.

Ropes, The Army under Pope, p. 77; Civil War, part ii. p. 272.

CH. XVII.]

BATTLE OF GROVETON

127

critical and retreated to Manassas. Pope was so intent on the capture of Jackson that he took no heed of Longstreet's rapid march, and did nothing to hold Thoroughfare Gap. McDowell had better information and used better judgment. He had proposed to have Sigel's corps, which was temporarily under his command, and one of his own divisions dispute the passage of Longstreet through the Gap, while he himself with two divisions joined in the chase after Jackson; but late in the night of August 27 he received the order from Pope directing him to march with his whole force to Manassas. Impressed with the vital importance of preventing the union of the two Confederate corps, he varied from this unfortunate order to the extent of detaching Ricketts's division and some cavalry to hold Longstreet in check. Meanwhile the Confederate general had reached the Gap, and finding his passage disputed thought himself in a "desperate strait;" but on the morning of the 29th he experienced great relief on ascertaining that Ricketts had withdrawn 2 and that he could get through the Gap unopposed. At dawn he was in motion, and hearing the noise of cannon before he reached Gainesville, quickened his march and had his troops deployed on the battle-field of Bull Run by noon of that day. The battle of Groveton had already begun. The Union right wing was contending with Jackson.

Pope did not know of the arrival of Longstreet's corps, and expected that McDowell and Porter in pursuance of a joint order sent them in the morning would assail Jackson in flank and rear. These two met about noon, and agreed that the order could not be fulfilled to the letter; but in the

1 Longstreet's article, Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 517.

2 The McDowell Court of Inquiry, Feb. 14, 1863, speak of this retirement of Ricketts and the retreat of King after the battle of Gainesville as grave errors, and find fault that McDowell was not present with his command when these movements were made. He had gone to Manassas to see Pope, and had "separated himself from his command at a critical time without any order of his superior officer and without any imperative necessity." O. R., vol. xii. part i. p. 330; Ropes, The Army under Pope, p. 82; Civil War, part ii. p. 275.

endeavor to carry out the spirit of it they had a misunderstanding. From this time dates the alleged most serious neglect and disobedience of Porter, which constitute the gravest charge against him in the interminable controversy known as the Fitz John Porter case.

At midday there was a lull in the battle, but in the afternoon Pope attacked again with vigor. Although his troops lacked food and were fatigued from the fruitless marching and countermarching of the previous day, they had a stomach for fighting and fought well. It was on both sides a desperate struggle to prevail.

At half-past four, observing that neither McDowell nor Porter had appeared on the field, Pope wrote an order to Porter saying, "I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank and if possible on his rear,"1 Porter in his court-martial declared that he did not receive this order until "at or nearly 6.30": that this is the truth of the matter is the conclusion of the Board of Army Officers of 1878, at whose head sat General Schofield.2 Porter made preparations for attack, but before they could be completed darkness came on, and "it was evidently impossible to accomplish any good that night." Even had he received the order sooner and assailed the force in his front, it would have availed Pope nothing, for instead of striking at Jackson's flank he would have rushed with his 9000 men against Longstreet's corps of four divisions. Of Porter's conduct this day it may be said that he rendered to his commander a measure of technical military obedience but not a zealous support,

In spite of his disappointment at Porter's inaction Pope fought on until dark and thought that he had gained a great victory. The truth, it seems to me, is better conveyed in

1 O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 18.

2 Sen, Docs. No. 37, 1st Sess. 46th Cong., part i. p. 251; part iii. p. 1707, 3 Ibid.

Ibid., part iii. p. 1709.

5 Despatch to Halleck, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 741.

CH. XVII.]

SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN

129

Lee's letter to Davis, in which he says that the attack of the Union troops was repulsed. The medical director of Jackson's corps, "recounting the many casualties which he had witnessed," said to Jackson: "General, this day has been won by nothing but stark and stern fighting." "No," was the reply, "it has been won by nothing but the blessing and protection of Providence." 2

The next day, Saturday, August 30, the Second Battle of Bull Run3 was fought on the already historic field. Pope, full of the illusion that he had inflicted a severe defeat upon the enemy, readily gave credence to the intelligence that they were retreating. His reconnaissances this morning and the reports of McDowell, Heintzelman, and Sigel 5 confirmed him in this view, from which he could not be shaken by the strong representations of Porter, towards whom, indeed, he felt harshly for the supposed disobedience of orders the previous day. He was afraid that the Confederates would get away from him, and undoubtedly reasoned that since he must attack them at once he could not afford to wait for Franklin and Sumner with their 20,000 fresh and veteran soldiers, who he knew were on the way from Alexandria.8 At noon he

1 Sept. 3, O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 559. Carl Schurz, who commanded a division of Sigel's corps, and who did the principal part of the fighting in the first half of this day's battle, said in his report of the events of the afternoon: "If all these forces instead of being frittered away in isolated efforts had co-operated with each other at any one movement after a common plan, the result of the day would have been far greater than the mere retaking and occupation of the ground we had already taken and occupied in the morning, and which in the afternoon was, for a short time at least, lost again." — Ibid., p. 299.

2 Dabney, p. 531.

3 Called by the Confederates the Second Battle of Manassas.

4 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 741.

The Army under Pope, Ropes, p. 129.

Ibid., part ii. pp. 340, 413.

7 See order of 8.50 P. M., Aug. 29, O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 509.

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he might have replied with Hotspur that their absence

"Lends a lustre and more great opinion,
A larger dare to our great enterprise."

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