war. division commanders of the Army of the Potomac had lost confidence in their general.1 This strained situation while the Army of Northern Virginia under its able leader was advancing into the heart of the North might well have dismayed many a stout soul. Lincoln met the crisis without faltering. When Lee's northward movement seemed certain, Hooker broke up his camps on the Rappahannock. In his march to the Potomac his management and dispositions were excellent. The Confederates kept to the west of the Blue Ridge, he to the east, covering Washington constantly. Until this campaign the South had enjoyed the advantage of better cavalry: that superiority had now disappeared. This is one of many indications how surely the North was mastering the trade of The improvement in the Federal cavalry, which now did credit to the service, was in some degree due to Hooker, for it was a part of his efficient reorganization of the Army of the Potomac. During the march northward they met in combat several times the Confederate horsemen, and in the main fought successfully. Yet so obstinate were the contests and so skilful were the manœuvres that each body of horse acted as a screen to its army, and Lee and Hooker were each kept in ignorance of the movements of the enemy. Formerly it had been too frequently the case that the Confederate knew everything and the Union commander little or nothing. Ewell waited at Hagerstown, Maryland, until Longstreet and Hill should be within supporting distance. June 22 he received orders allowing him to move forward. "If Harrisburg comes within your means, capture it," was one of the directions which came from Lee.2 Ewell, advancing into Pennsylvania to Chambersburg, reached Carlisle on the 27th, and sent Early with one division to seize upon York. On the formal surrender of the town by the chief burgess and a deputation of citizens, Early laid it under contribution, receiving 1000 hats, 1200 pairs of shoes, 1000 socks, three days' rations of all kinds, and $28,600 United States money. He destroyed between 1 O. R., vol. xxv. part ii. p. 479. 2 Ibid., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 914. MAP SHOWING ROUTE OF EWELL'S CORPS FROM FREDERICKSBURG, VA., TO CH. XX.] LEE'S INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA 273 Hanover Junction and York the Northern Central Railroad, which ran from Baltimore to Harrisburg, and sent an expedition to take possession of the Columbia bridge over the Susquehanna. He intended to march his division across it, cut the line of the Pennsylvania Railroad, take Lancaster, make a requisition upon the town for supplies, and attack Harrisburg in the rear while the rest of Ewell's corps assailed it from the front. But a regiment of Pennsylvania militia in fleeing before the Confederates set fire to the bridge and destroyed it. Meanwhile Ewell sent forward his cavalry with a section of artillery to make a reconnaissance. They approached within three miles of Harrisburg, engaging the pickets of the militia forces assembled there under General Couch for its defence. June 29 Ewell had everything in readiness, and purposed moving on the defences of Harrisburg. Two days previously Longstreet and Hill had reached Chambersburg, and Lee was there in command. His whole army, numbering 75,000 men, was on Pennsylvania soil. By the middle of June the movements of Lee in Virginia warned the North of the approaching invasion. The President called for 100,000 militia from Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia,' the States regarded as in immediate danger. The Secretary of War asked help from the governors of thirteen of the other States. No response was so prompt, no action so effective, as that of Horatio Seymour of New York. "I will spare no effort to send you troops at once was the word which came from him over the wires.2 June 16 the Confederate cavalry were heard of at Chambersburg, and busy preparations were made to defend the threatened points. At first the surmise gained ground that Pittsburg was in jeopardy. Alarm spread through the city, business was suspended, shops were closed, factories stopped. 1 Proclamation of June 15, O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 136. 2 Ibid., p. 138. 8 "Lee's army is in motion towards the Shenandoah valley. Pittsburg and Wheeling should be put in defensible condition as rapidly as possible." - Halleck to Brooks, June 14. IV. - 18 The citizens turned out in crowds to throw up intrenchments on the surrounding hills. One day it was reported that 14,000 were at work with picks and shovels, and these men were ready to take up rifles or man the batteries should the enemy appear. Mill-owners organized their laborers into companies, and the government furnished them arms and ammunition. A number of prominent citizens, representing the committee of public safety, requested the President to authorize Brooks, the general in command, to declare martial law, although Brooks thought this step unnecessary and unwise. Some desired that McClellan be placed in command of the militia for home defence; others urged the President to give them Frémont, who would inspire confidence and enthusiasm, and bring forward many thousand volunteers.1 At one time there was some anxiety for Washington and Baltimore. Stuart in a cavalry raid passed between the Union army and these cities. It was in the Cumberland valley of Pennsylvania, however, that the presence of the enemy was actually and painfully felt. Yet the Confederates under the immediate command of Lee committed little or no depredation and mischief. Before he himself crossed the river into Maryland, he wrote to Davis, "I shall continue to purchase all the supplies that are furnished me while north of the Potomac, impressing only where necessary," 2 and he exerted himself to the utmost to have his wishes in this regard observed. His order of June 21 enjoined scrupulous respect for private property, and that of the 27th, after he had reached Chambersburg, manifested his satisfaction with his troops for their general good behavior, but mentioned that there had been "instances of forgetfulness," and warned them that such offenders should be brought to summary punishment.3 Military discipline, mercy, and the desire to do everything possible 1 O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. pp. 143, 168, 188, 204, 240, 348; despatch from Pittsburg to Phila. Inquirer, June 23; N. Y. Times, June 26; Pittsburg Gazette, cited by N. Y. Times, June 27. 2 June 23, O. R., vol. xxvii. part ii. p. 298. 8 Ibid., part iii. pp. 912, 942. |