CH. XX.J

REJOICING AT THE NORTH

293

me? 300,000 men, and what are the lives of a million to a man like me!1

On the morning of the Fourth of July the people of the North received this word: "The President announces to the country that news from the Army of the Potomac, up to 10 P. M. of the 3d, is such as to cover that army with the highest honor, to promise a great success to the cause of the Union, and to claim the condolence of all for the many gallant fallen, and that for this he especially desires that on this day He whose will, not ours, should ever be done be everywhere remembered and reverenced with profoundest gratitude." 2 The rejoicing of the people was not boisterous; it took the character of supreme thankfulness for a great deliverance. The victory of Gettysburg demonstrated that Lee and his army were not invincible, and that the Confederates had lost in playing the card of an invasion of the North. Nothing remained to them but a policy of stubborn defence. That this would likewise end in ruin was foreshadowed by the fateful event of the Fourth of July. Vicksburg surren dered to General Grant. Meade's sturdy and victorious resistance to attack was followed by the glorious end of the most brilliant offensive campaign of the war. Had the war been one between two nations, it would now have undoubtedly terminated in a treaty of peace, with conditions imposed largely by the more successful contestant.

The Fourth of July at Gettysburg passed in tranquillity. "Under the cover of the night and heavy rain,” Lee began his retreat. Meade followed. The President comprehended the importance and moral effect of the victory better than did his general. He may not have seen the remark of Napoleon in 1809, "In war the moral element and public opinion are half the battle; " but the fact he knew well. Nevertheless, he wrote Halleck at seven in the evening of July 6 from his

1 Taine, Le Régime Moderne, tome i. p. 115.

2 Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 365.

3 Meade to Halleck, 8.30 A. M. July 5, O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p 79. 4 Sloane's Napoleon, vol. iv. p. 28.

country residence at the Soldiers' Home: "I left the telegraph office a good deal dissatisfied. You know I did not like the phrase [Meade's] 'Drive the invaders from our soil.'" Mentioning other circumstances, he added: "These things all appear to me to be connected with a purpose to cover Baltimore and Washington, and to get the enemy across the river again without a further collision, and they do not appear connected with a purpose to prevent his crossing and to destroy him. I do fear the former purpose is acted upon and the latter rejected."2 The next day he sent this word to Halleck: "We have certain information that Vicksburg surrendered to General Grant on the 4th of July. Now, if General Meade can complete his work, so gloriously prosecuted thus far, by the literal or substantial destruction of Lee's army, the rebellion will be over." 3 At the same time Halleck telegraphed Meade: "Push forward and fight Lee before he can cross the Potomac." He sent other telegrams, probably on the prompting of the President, urging Meade to attack the enemy, but forwarded two despatches inconsistent with the importunity of the others. "Do not be influenced by any despatch from here against your own judgment," he said. "Regard them as suggestions only." Again he wrote: "I think it will be best for you to postpone a general battle" until everything is ready. Perhaps all of those telegrams which urged prompt action were the President's.

4

By July 11 Lee in his retreat had reached the Potomac, his army covering the river from Williamsport to Falling

1 A paraphrase of the words of Meade in his congratulatory order of July 4. See O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 519. "This is a dreadful reminiscence of McClellan," he said; "it is the same spirit that moved him to claim a great victory because Pennsylvania and Maryland were safe. Will our generals never get that idea out of their heads? The whole country is our soil." - John Hay's diary, Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 278.

2 O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 567.

8 July 7, ibid., part i. p. 83.

4 Ibid.

July 8, ibid., pp. 84, 85,

6 Halleck to Meade, July 9, 10, ibid., pp. 88, 89.

CH. XX.]

FAILURE OF MEADE TO ATTACK

1

295

Waters. Three days before he had written Davis: "A series of storms . . . has placed the river beyond fording stage, and the present storm will keep it so for at least a week. I shall therefore have to accept battle if the enemy offers it, whether I wish to or not. . . . I hope your Excellency will understand that I am not in the least discouraged, or that my faith in the protection of an all-merciful Providence or in the fortitude of this army is at all shaken." The condition of the army "is good, and its confidence unimpaired." July 10 he sent confidentially this word to Stuart: "We must prepare for a vigorous battle, and trust in the mercy of God and the valor of our troops."2 July 12, after he had taken up his very strong position on the Potomac, he wrote Davis: "But for the power the enemy possesses of accumulating troops I should be willing to await his attack, excepting that in our restricted limits the means of obtaining subsistence are becoming precarious. The river has now fallen to four feet, and a bridge, which is being constructed, I hope will be passable by to-morrow.' "3

By July 11 Meade in his pursuit had come within striking distance of Lee. Reinforced by some fresh troops, he might have attacked on the 12th or 13th and ought to have done so.* Defeat could not result in disaster. A success no greater than Antietam would be a help to the cause, and a complete victory was possible that might end the war. While proceeding with great caution, Meade had determined to make an attack July 13; but, wavering in mind and weighed down with responsibility, he called, contrary to the best military maxims, a council of war. Five out of seven of his corps

1 O. R., vol. xxvii. part ii. p. 299. 2 5.30 A. M., ibid., part iii. p. 991. Ibid., part ii. p. 301.

4 I have been led to this judgment by the testimony of Warren, Humphreys, and Hunt (C. W., 1865, vol. i. pp. 379, 395, 455), supported by a mass of comment and opinion. Contrariwise, see Meade's testimony, ibid., p. 336; his unofficial letter to Halleck, July 31, O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 108; Hunt, Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 382.

6 Meade to Halleck, July 12, 4.30 P. M., O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 91.

commanders were opposed to the projected attack, which influenced him to delay giving the orders for it. He devoted July 13 to an examination of the enemy's position, strength, and defensive works, and the next day advanced his army for a reconnaissance in force or an assault if conditions justified it, when he ascertained that during the night previous the Confederate army had crossed the Potomac. "The escape

of Lee's army without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President," telegraphed Halleck.1 Meade asked to be relieved of the command of the army: his application was refused.2

During the 12th and 13th of July Lincoln was a prey to intense anxiety, and when he got the intelligence, soon after noon of the 14th, that Lee and his army were safely across the river, he could hardly restrain his irritation within bounds. "We had them within our grasp," he declared; "we had only to stretch forth our hands and they were ours, and nothing I could say or do could make the army move." I regret that I did not myself go to the army and personally issue the order for an attack. On the spur of the moment he gave vent to his feelings in a letter to Meade which on second thoughts he did not sign or send. Prefacing his censure with "I am sorry now to be the author of the slightest pain to you," he wrote: "You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated, and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him, till by slow degrees you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg; while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit; and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his leisure without attacking him.

1 July 14, O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 92.

3 John Hay's diary, Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 278.

Again, my

2 Ibid., p. 93.

CH. XX.]

LINCOLN'S GETTYSBURG ADDRESS

297

dear general, I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last Monday, how can you possibly do so south of the river, when you can take with you very few more than two thirds of the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect, and I do not expect [that] you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity is gone, and I am distressed immeasurably because of it.” 1

The disappointment of Lincoln was profound and enduring. Somewhat later he said: "Our army held the war in the hollow of their hand and they would not close it. We had gone through all the labor of tilling and planting an enormous crop, and when it was ripe we did not harvest it. Still I am very grateful to Meade for the great service he did at Gettysburg.'

"2

Nothing can so fitly close my account of the battle of Gettysburg as the reproduction of Lincoln's two-minute address at the dedication of the Gettysburg National Cemetery, November 19, 1863: "Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation or any nation so conceived and so dedicated can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate we cannot we cannot hallow this ground.

consecrate

1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 280.

The brave

2 John Hay's diary, Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 278.