Still remained the problem how to get on the high ground on the east bank of the river. McClernand's and McPherson's corps were set in motion for Hard Times, part of them in the steamers and barges, the others afoot. To mask the main movement, Sherman made a demonstration on Haynes's Bluff above Vicksburg. April 29 Porter's gun-boats attacked the fortress of Grand Gulf. Hoping that these would silence the enemy's batteries, Grant had ten thousand troops on board the steamers and barges, while he himself was in a tug-boat out in the stream, watching the assault, and ready, if the conditions warranted, to give the order to the troops to land and take the place by storm. But Grand Gulf was too high above the river, and its fortifications too strong to be captured by a front attack, and after five hours of bombardment the attempt was abandoned. "I immediately decided," wrote Grant, "upon landing my forces on the Louisiana shore and march them across the point to below the Gulf. At night the gun-boats made another vigorous attack, and in the din the transports safely ran the blockade."1 The vantageground on the east bank of the Mississippi was determined by intelligence from a negro who told Grant that there was a good road from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson. At daylight in the morning of April 30, employing the iron-clads and steamers as ferry-boats, he began the work of transferring the troops to Bruinsburg, on the east side of the river. Once across they commenced their march, and in two miles reached high ground. As soon as Grant had made sure that he would effect this landing, he had telegraphed Halleck, “I feel that the battle is now more than half won.' "2 Yet all the obstacles of nature had not been overcome. The country with its bayous, swamps, and ravines, its timber, undergrowth, and almost impenetrable vines and canebrakes, rendered offensive operations difficult and hazardous. But, urged by their general, the soldiers pressed on. At two o'clock in the morn 1 Grant to Halleck, May 3, O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 32. CH. XXI.] GRANT'S VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN 30" ing of May 1, on the road to Port Gibson they met the Confederates, whom they outnumbered. Skirmishing began, developing, as it grew light, into battle. "The fighting continued all day," said Grant, "and until after dark, over the most broken country I ever saw. . . . The enemy was driven from point to point." They were "sent in full retreat." 2 The next day Port Gibson was ours. The Confederates evacuated Grand Gulf. From that fortress Grant wrote a long despatch to Halleck, giving an account of his success. "This army is in the highest health and spirits," he said. "Since leaving Milliken's Bend they have marched as much by night as by day, through mud and rain, without tents or much other baggage and on irregular rations, without a complaint and with less straggling than I have ever before witnessed." Could the army have transmitted a collective despatch, they might have said, Our general has been subject to the same discomforts as we, he has shared all our hardships.1 Grant had now a secure base of supplies at Grand Gulf. He had intended to co-operate with General Banks in the reduction of Port Hudson, and after its capture move with the united armies against Vicksburg; but he now learned that Banks had not made the progress expected, and, on the other hand, that General Joe Johnston was on his way to Jackson to take charge of the defence of Vicksburg, for which, as the South had taken alarm, reinforcements were constantly arriving. "Under this state of facts, I could not afford to delay," was his after explanation. May 3 he announced his purpose to Halleck thus: "I shall not bring my troops into this place [Grand Gulf], but immediately follow the enemy, and, if all promises as favorable hereafter 1 Grant to Halleck, May 3, O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 32. 2 Grant's Personal Memoirs, vol. i. p. 484. May 3, O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 33. 4 See Grant's account of his inconveniences, Personal Memoirs, vol. i p. 490. 5 To Halleck, May 24, O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 38. as it does now, not stop until Vicksburg is in our possession." 1 He was soon joined by Sherman's corps, and had a force of about 43,000. Opposed to him was Pemberton with 40,000 in Vicksburg and along the line of the railroad, and Johnston with about 15,000 in Jackson.2 With the Napoleonic idea Grant proposed to beat these forces in detail. He moved with amazing celerity. With only a single road leading from Grand Gulf, he knew that he could not supply his army from that point, and therefore stopped long enough to arrange for the transport of his ammunition and to get up what rations he could of hard bread, coffee, and salt, intending for the rest to live upon the country. He cut loose from his base and moved forward. "As I shall communicate with Grand Gulf no more you may not hear from me again. for several days," was his laconic despatch to his government.3 May 12, outnumbering the enemy, he beat him at Raymond after "a brisk fight of more than two hours." "I will attack the State capital to-day," he said in his telegram announcing this victory. He was as good as his word. May 15 he telegraphed: Jackson "fell into our hands yesterday after a fight of about three hours. Joe Johnston was in command. The enemy retreated north, evidently with the design of joining the Vicksburg forces. I am concentrating my forces at Bolton to cut them off if possible." 5 From an intercepted despatch he knew correctly the intentions of Johnston, who before the loss of the State capital had ordered Pemberton to come up if practicable, on the rear of the Union army at once. Pemberton with a large part of his force had reached Edwards Station, but deemed the movement ordered by his superior "suicidal." Not comprehending that in Grant he had a man of original mind to contend with, one who had got from his West Point training mental 1 O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 33. 2 Johnston himself did not arrive in Jackson until May 13. 4 May 14, ibid. 5 Ibid. CH. XXI.] GRANT'S VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN 309 discipline and not merely a set of rules, he moved south of the railroad, intending to get between the Union army and its base on the Mississippi, a useless movement, for, as we have seen, the great general had some days before abandoned his base of supplies. Owing to the heavy rains and high water in the creek which he had to cross, Pemberton had not proceeded far with his southward march when he received a despatch from Johnston, who was ten miles north of Jackson, saying, "The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton:"1 He made a retrograde movement with the design of taking a road north of the railroad to Clinton, when he encountered the forces of Grant, who, after his victory over Johnston, had set out to vanquish the other Confederate host. May 16 the two armies met in the battle of Champion's Hill. Again the Union force was the larger, again the Confederates were discomfited. They fled, and Grant pursued them. The next day they made a stand at Big Black River bridge. He attacked. They had lost heart and were filled with consternation at the swift movements and impetuous onsets of Grant. Let Pemberton tell the story of the day: "The enemy. . . advanced at a run with loud cheers. Our troops in their front did not remain to receive them, but broke and fled precipitately. One portion of the line being broken, it very soon became a matter of sauve qui peut." 2 Himself depressed and his troops demoralized, he retired within the defences of Vicksburg. As soon as he could get across the Big Black River, Grant followed and took possession of the long-coveted heights of Walnut Hills and Haynes's Bluff, securing a base of supplies which had safe and unobstructed water communication with the North. As Grant and Sherman together rode up on the dry high ground north of Vicksburg and looked down upon the Confederate fortress and then upon the Federal fleet within easy distance, Sherman, perceiving the full force of what they had 1 May 15, O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 263. • Ibid., p. 207. gained, and overcome with the recollection of the time when he had panted for that position,1 broke out into enthusiasm which knew no bounds, while Grant, imperturbable, thought and smoked on. There was reason for rejoicing. In nineteen days Grant had crossed the great river into the enemy's territory, had marched one hundred and eighty miles through a most difficult country, skirmishing constantly, had fought and won five distinct battles, inflicting a greater loss upon the enemy than he himself sustained and capturing many cannon and fieldpieces, had taken the capital of the State and destroyed its arsenals and military manufactories, and was now in the rear of Vicksburg. From the demoralization of the Confederates, he hoped that he might carry their works by storm, and made an assault,2 which was unsuccessful. He then commenced the investment of the city. Since he had crossed the Mississippi only five days' rations had been issued from the commissary department; but the troops, drawing the rest of their supplies from the country, had lived fairly well, although they had suffered from the want of bread, as the cry from the private soldiers of "Hardtack! hardtack!" informed Grant as he rode one day along the lines.3 Solicitous for the comfort of the men, he soon made arrangements by which they had a full supply of coffee and bread. May 18 Pemberton received a despatch from Johnston, saying that if Vicksburg were invested it must surrender ultimately; "instead of losing both troops and place, we must if possible save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and march to the northeast." By immediate compliance with this order there is a bare chance that Pemberton might have saved a part of his army, but, after a council of war, he decided to make the attempt to hold Vicksburg. Grant still hoped that he might take the place by storm. His soldiers were eager, and the advantages of a speedy cap 1 Ante, p. 221. • Personal Memoirs, vol. i. p. 530. 2 May 19. 4 O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 272. |