which, if vigorously applied now, will soon close this contest. It works doubly weakening the enemy, and strengthening us. We were not fully ripe for it until the river was opened. Now I think at least 100,000 can and ought to be organized along its shores, relieving all the white troops to serve elsewhere. Mr. Dana understands you as believing that the Emancipation Proclamation has helped some in your military operations. I am very glad if this is so."Ibid., p. 584. Grant wrote Lincoln, Aug. 23: "By arming the negro we have added a powerful ally. They will make good soldiers, and taking them from the enemy weakens him in the same proportion they strengthen us. I am therefore most decidedly in favor of pushing this policy to the enlistment of a force sufficient to hold all the South falling into our hands and to aid in capturing more." Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 466.

In August Fort Sumter was demolished, but was still held by the Confederates as an infantry outpost. Siege had been laid to Fort Wagner, and Sept. 7 it succumbed. Charleston was not taken.

CHAPTER XXII

We have examined the trend of English sentiment on our civil war and the action of the British government as late as the reception of the news of McClellan's defeat before Richmond, in June, 1862, and the escape of the Alabama in July.1 Bolstered by the Southern success, James M. Mason, the special commissioner of the Confederate States, residing in London, applied to Earl Russell for the recognition of his government asking also the honor of a personal interview, that he might the better impart by word of mouth the claim made in his formal letter. Russell declined the interview, and two days later, after submitting a draft of his answer to the Cabinet, replied to Mason's application and arguments that "Her Majesty's government are still determined to wait." 2

Then came the intelligence of Pope's defeat at the second battle of Bull Run, the last of August. The London Times was of the opinion that the federal government was "brought to the verge of ruin," but did not favor the recognition of the Southern Confederacy. This journal was not, however, at this time in the confidence of the ministry. The correspondence between Palmerston and Russell indicates that they were about ready to propose to the Cabinet that England should take the initiative, and ask France, Russia, and the

1 Ante, p. 76 et seq.

2 Letters of Mason to Russell, July 24, Aug. 1, 1862, Russell to Mason, July 31, Aug. 2, Confederate Dip. Corr., U. S. Treas. Dep't, Washington. This correspondence is printed in Life of Davis by his wife, vol. ii. p. 334.

3 Sept. 15, 16.

IV. - 22

I

other powers to join her in some intervention in the struggle in America. The Federals "got a very complete smashing," the Prime Minister wrote, September 14; and if Washington or Baltimore "fall into the hands of the Confederates," as "seems not altogether unlikely," should not England and France "address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon the basis of separation"? Russell replied: "I agree with you that the time has come for offering mediation to the United States Government with a view to the recognition of the independence of the Confederates. agree, further, that, in case of failure, we ought ourselves to recognize the Southern States as an independent State." He suggested, moreover, a meeting of the Cabinet, and if a decision were arrived at, to propose, first, the intervention to France, and "then on the part of England and France to Russia and the other powers. When Palmerston replied to this letter, he was watching the Antietam campaign, and thought that if the Federals sustained "a great defeat” it would be well to proceed with the project of mediation; but if "they should have the best of it we may wait awhile and see what may follow."1 At about the same time Lord Granville, who was in attendance on the Queen at Gotha, expressed an opinion averse to any present interference.2 While Adams got no inkling of this confidential correspondence, since he had at this time no interviews with Earl Russell, who was away from London, he was depressed at the state of affairs, and noted in his diary, "Unless the course of the war should soon change, it seems to me that my mission must come to an end by February." "8

1 This correspondence, the dates being respectively Sept. 14, 17, 23, is printed in Walpole's Life of Russell, vol. ii. pp. 349, 350.

2 Ibid., p. 351. Granville's letter may possibly be a confirmation of the apparently well-founded and general impression that the influence of the Queen was employed on the side of the North. But he spoke of "the strong antipathy to the North, the strong sympathy with the South, and the passionate wish to have cotton ;" and Russell's letter of Sept. 17 was written when attending the Queen.

8 Entry Sept. 21.

CH. XXII.]

GLADSTONE'S NEWCASTLE SPEECH

339

Soon afterwards came the news of the victory of Antietam, which had a "very considerable" effect on the popular mind,' and influenced Palmerston to write Russell, suggesting delay for the reason that "ten days or a fortnight more may throw a clearer light upon future prospects."2 With the succeeding intelligence, which lessened the import of the victory, the movement towards mediation went on, and, October 13, Earl Russell sent his colleagues a confidential memorandum, putting the question "whether it is not a duty for Europe to ask both parties, in the most friendly and conciliatory terms, to agree to a suspension of arms.'

Gladstone, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the third member of the Cabinet in importance, must have known of the interchange of views between Palmerston and Russell in reference to the policy of the government; at all events, he gave public expression to their meaning. October 7, at a banquet at Newcastle, he made a speech in which he denied that England "had any interest in the disruption of the Union," felicitated himself on her "perfect neutrality," and at the same time that he professed sympathy with the people of the Northern States, struck them the most telling blow they had received from any member of the English government. "There is no doubt," he declared, "that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made, what is more than either they have made a nation." This statement caused great sensation, and was received with loud cheers. He continued: "We may anticipate with certainty the success of the Southern States so far as their separation from the North is concerned." The construction which the country naturally put upon this speech was that the government had determined on the recognition of the Southern

1 Adams to Seward, Oct. 3, Dip. Corr., 1862, p. 205; London Times, Oct. 1, 2; Daily News, Oct. 1; Spectator and Saturday Review, Oct. 4. 2 Walpole's Russell, vol. ii. p. 351.

8 Ibid.

4 The Times, Oct. 8, 9. "Hear, hear!" was the response.

Confederacy,1 and it was looked upon by the manufacturers of Lancashire as an expression of vital significance. The trade

1 Disraeli said in the House of Commons, Feb. 5, 1863 : 66 Her Majesty's Government commissioned one of their members to repair to the chief seats of industry in the country to announce, as I understood it, an entire change in the policy which they had throughout supported and sanctioned. It was not an accident; the declaration [that cited in the text] was made formally, and it was made avowedly with the consent and sanction of the Government. Now, sir, what did that declaration mean? If it meant anything, it meant that the Southern States would be recognized; because, if it be true that they have created armies, navies, and a people, we are bound by every principle of policy and of public law to recognize their political existence.". Hansard, 82. Palmerston replied at length to Disraeli, but did not touch on his reference to Gladstone's speech or in any way on American affairs.— Ibid., 123.

"It is hard to believe that Mr. Gladstone, cabinet minister and dialectician, as familiar with English words as with European politics, would have used either of those expressions, except to announce a settled and official resolve. . . . The recognition may not be immediate, may be postponed till Parliament meets, or may await a combination of many powers, but the Cabinet has made up its mind that the American struggle is over, and that henceforward two nations must exist on the American continent. We cannot, bitterly as we lament the decision, honestly blame the Cabinet. They have only followed the lead of the people, and followed it at far distance. The educated million in England, with here and there an exception, have become unmistakably Southern. . . . The Cabinet is not to blame if, after enforcing delay sufficient for reconsideration, it obeys the national will. . . . The only point left is one of time, and the Premier will be wise to wait as long as events and precedents permit." Spectator, Oct. 11.

Adams wrote in his diary, Oct. 8: "If Gladstone be any exponent at all of the views of the Cabinet, then is my term likely to be very short. The animus as it respects Mr. Davis and the recognition of the rebel cause is very apparent." Oct. 9: "Unless things should materially change at home, I do not expect to stay beyond Christmas at the farthest." See Adams to Seward, Oct. 10, Dip. Corr., 1862, p. 209; the Times and Daily News, Oct. 9; Sat. Review, Oct. 11; Letter from Bright to Sumner, Oct. 10, Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 157.

Louis Blanc wrote, Oct. 18: "I fear that Mr. Gladstone yielded to the temptation of courting popularity." Oct. 24: "How eagerly did the Conservatives seize upon these words of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. . . . To hear them speak, it was now all over; the recognition of the Confederate States by England was about to take place. . . . The sympathies for the North are a dam; the sympathies for the South are a torrent. This is the reason why Mr. Gladstone's words went straight to the heart of the nation, and why they were interpreted with eagerness in the sense of an early recognition of the Confederate States."-Letters on England, pp. 176-178.