conventional design of an engineer officer, and was foreseen independently by Davis, Longstreet, and D. H. Hill.1 Know ing the Federal superiority in artillery, it is little wonder that they regarded the movements of the Union army with apprehension. Perhaps they did not guess what Lee seemingly took for granted, that McClellan's procrastination would bring to naught his strategy. Nothing indeed could have been more dangerous to the Union forces. Encamped in the swamps of the Chickahominy, unaccustomed to an atmosphere so damp and malarious, drinking the water of the marshes, his soldiers suffered from diarrhoea and fevers, many of them also from scurvy, with the natural result that the morale of his army had lowered distinctly from the 1st to the 20th of June.2 But more than this, his delay was even fatal in that it afforded Lee time to mature and execute a project which needed a greater genius than McClellan to frustrate. Davis visited the lines of the army frequently, and from his own observations and friendly intercourse with the commanding general, comprehended the situation and saw clearly the problem to be solved. "The enemy," he wrote June 13, "keeps close under cover, is probably waiting for reinforcements, or resolved to fight only behind his own intrenchment. We must find if possible the means to get at him without putting the breasts of our men in antagonism to his heaps of earth."3 As a measure towards this end, Lee decided to reinforce with two brigades Jackson, who was still in the Shenandoah valley, directing

1 D. H. Hill, the general of a division, wrote, June 10: "The enemy has now ditched himself up to the very gates of Richmond. In a week or two weeks at furthest he will open his siege batteries and the capital must fall." O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 587. Davis wrote his wife, June 11: "The enemy's policy is to advance by regular approaches covered by successive lines of earthworks, that reviled policy of West Pointism and Spades which is sure to succeed against those who do not use like means to counteract it."— Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 310. Longstreet wrote D. H. Hill, June 16: "I don't think we have as much to apprehend in the way of an attack as the long guns." O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 603.

2 C. W., part i. pp. 285, 286, 293; O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 228; Palfrey, Papers of the Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass., vol. i. p. 208.

To his wife, Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 312.

CH. XVII.]

LEE'S PLAN

35

1

him with his main body to "move rapidly to Ashland by rail or otherwise . . . and sweep down between the Chickahominy and Pamunkey, cutting up the enemy's communications." 1 Lee, having made up his mind that a direct assault upon McClellan's left wing was "injudicious if not impracticable," would, with the larger part of his force, cross the Chickahominy and fall upon Porter, who commanded the right wing of the Union army.2 Proceeding with caution, he ordered Stuart with his cavalry to make a reconnaissance "around the rear of the Federal army to ascertain its position and movements."3 Having now some apprehension that McClellan, if aware of the weakening of his force by the reinforcement to Jackson, might attack the Confederates, he asked the Secretary of War to influence the Richmond newspapers not to mention the project. June 16 Lee made a personal reconnaissance of the Federal position north of the Chickahominy, and the question to his military secretary, "Now, Colonel Long, how can we get at those people?" showed that he was still revolving the details of his plan. Shortly after this he submitted his ripened project to his President, showing that the successful execution of it depended upon the ability of the small Confederate force left before Richmond to hold in check the more powerful left wing of the Federal army which was on the south side of the Chickahominy. "I pointed out to him," writes Davis, in his relation of the

1 Lee to Jackson, June 11, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 589.

2 The clause "while this army attacks General McClellan in front," which follows the cited part in the text of Lee's despatch to Jackson of June 11, prevents me from affirming that Lee as early as June 11 had substantially decided on the plan which he executed. Longstreet (From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 120) states that Lee had intended to attack McClellan's left wing while Jackson fell upon the right: at the suggestion, presumably of Longstreet, this was changed, the day after the return of Stuart from his reconnaissance (June 17), to the plan indicated in the text. See discussion of this subject in Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 165 et seq. 3 Lee's report, O. R., vol. xi. part ii. p. 490; Lee to Stuart, June 11, part iii. p. 590.

Lee to Randolph, ibid.

5 Long's Notebook, his life of Lee, p. 168.

interview, "that our force and intrenched line between that left wing and Richmond was too weak for a protracted resist ance, and, if McClellan was the man I took him for,. soon as he found that the bulk of our army was on the north side of the Chickahominy, he would not stop to try conclusions with it there, but would immediately move upon his objective point, the city of Richmond. If, on the other hand, he should behave like an engineer officer and deem it his first duty to protect his line of communication, I thought the plan proposed was not only the best, but would be a success. Something of his old esprit de corps manifested itself in General Lee's first response, that he did not know engineer officers were more likely than others to make such mistakes, but immediately passing to the main subject, he added, 'If you will hold him as long as you can at the intrenchment, and then fall back on the detached works around the city, I will be upon the enemy's heels before he gets there.""1 Not long after this interview Jefferson Davis wrote his wife: "I wish General J. E. Johnston were able to take the field. Despite the critics who know military affairs by instinct, he is a good soldier, never brags of what he did do, and could at this time render most valuable service." 2

One week after he had given the order for the reinforcement of Jackson, Lee, apparently reckoning on McClellan's certain inaction, played upon the credulity of his adversary and the fears of the authorities in Washington. He knew that McClellan was in the habit of reading the Richmond journals, which, in view of their faithful regard of his former request, were now asked to publish the news that strong reinforcements had been sent to the Shenandoah valley. newspaper asserted that Jackson, who now had as many men as he wanted, would drive Frémont and Shields across the Potomac, or, if they made a stand, would gain over them another glorious victory. This was evidence, the editor con

1 Davis's Confederate Government, vol. ii. p. 132.

2 June 23, Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 314.

One

CH. XVII.]

LEE AND JACKSON

37

tinued, of the immense military resources of the South; there were men enough to defend Richmond and to swell Jackson's army.1 McClellan, who had received the same intelligence from deserters, fell into the trap and telegraphed the President, "If 10,000 or 15,000 men have left Richmond to reinforce Jackson, it illustrates their strength and confidence."2 The War Department had like information from other sources, and induced the President to withhold troops from the Army of the Potomac that otherwise would have been sent. Yet Lincoln suspected this action of the Confederates to be a "contrivance for deception," but seems to have been alone in his suspicion.

Meanwhile Jackson was swiftly and stealthily moving his army towards the Chickahominy. To be present at the personal conference which Lee desired, he left his troops fifty miles from Richmond with orders to continue their progress; and, riding with haste, met in council at mid-day on June 23 the commanding general, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and A. P. Hill. Lee set forth his plan of battle, and assigned to each of his generals the part he should play. Jackson said that he would be ready to begin his attack on the morning of the 26th.4

While these astute soldiers were constructing this snare, what was McClellan doing? He had noted, June 23, the "rather mysterious movements" of the enemy; he had heard the next day that Jackson was marching towards him with the intention of attacking his rear, and that Confederate troops from Richmond intended to cross the Chickahominy near Meadow Bridge. He ought to have been cudgelling his brains to guess Lee's plan and to devise measures to

1 Richmond Dispatch, June 18; D. H. Hill, Century War Book, vol. ii.

p. 347; Richmond Examiner, June 19.

2 June 18, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 233.

8 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 232, 234, 236.

4 Dabney, p. 434; Longstreet, p. 121; D. H. Hill, Century War Book,

vol. ii. p. 347.

5 Own Story, p. 408; O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 49; part iii. p. 248.

thwart it; yet there is no evidence that McClellan was at this time gravely anxious. He had been engaged in writing an essay in the form of a long letter to the President, instructing him in the matter of military arrests and the exercise of military power in general, dictating to him what should be the course of the government in dealing with slavery: in short, the general admonished the chief magistrate with regard to his civil and military policy in the conduct of the war. Those parts of the letter that were not insolent were platitudes, and denoted a scattering of thought which augured ill in a man who had supreme responsibility. The injunctions that trenched upon the ground of the President would have been unbecoming in a general flushed with victory; in a commander who was not backed up by success they were outrageous. Not Lee nor Grant in any portion of his brilliant career can be conceived to have written to his President this letter of McClellan's.1

The

McClellan was getting ready for his gradual advance. first step, which was taken by Heintzelman June 25 in front of Seven Pines, resulted in a skirmish, but led to nothing further. All attention is now concentrated on the north side of the Chickahominy. On the evening of the 25th, McClellan visited Fitz John Porter's headquarters, where he was confirmed in the impression that Jackson would assail his rear; and detecting indications of an attack on his front, he made arrangements accordingly.

2

Through unavoidable delays Jackson was half a day late. A. P. Hill with five brigades waited at Meadow Bridge until three o'clock in the afternoon of this June 26 for Jackson to perform his part; then fearing longer delay, he crossed the river and came directly in front of Porter. This brought on a battle in which the Confederates met with a bloody repulse.

1 This letter is correctly printed by Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 447. While dated July 7, the correspondence (O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 48) shows that it had been substantially prepared by June 20. See remarks of Nicolay and Hay as to this, p. 449 et seq.

2 Porter commanded the right wing.