EARL RUSSELL'S HONEST PURPOSE 381 CH. XXII.] rams would have been simple and brief: one friendly interview between him and Adams would have cleared up the matter, for both had the same end in view. It is the crossing of their letters which makes the story complex, and which necessitates a close attention to the dates when the notes were received as well as when they were sent. Had the Foreign Secretary been of the mind to admit our minister somewhat more to his confidence, such an unravelling of the correspondence would not be required to manifest that Russell deserves applause for his methodical straightforwardness and his honest purpose in this affair where action was hedged about with difficulties, owing to the evasion of the true ownership and to the force of the precedent made by the narrow and doubtful construction of the statute in the case of the Alexandra. As early as September 1 he was better than his word to Adams. Layard, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who was in London, wrote on that day to the Treasury: "I am directed by Earl Russell to request that you will state to the Lords Commissioners of her Majesty's Treasury that so much suspicion attaches to the iron-clad vessels at Birkenhead, that if sufficient evidence can be obtained to lead to the belief that they are intended for the Confederate States Lord Russell thinks the vessels ought to be detained until further examination can be made."1 Reflection, in which the belief that he had been tricked in the escape of the Alabama undoubtedly played a part, led him, two days later [September 3], to direct that the iron-clad rams be stopped. On this 1 Brit. Case, p. 343. He promised Adams future action; he acted at once. Cf. the letters of Sept. 1. 2 I have adopted this explanation of Russell's apparently sudden change in two days only after a very careful consideration. From the whole correspondence it seems to me that he was gradually working to this point. The steps are exactly those which a very honorable man given somewhat to vacillation would take. The additional evidence which Adams sent to the Foreign Office had not yet reached him. Another explanation may be suggested which it might be assumed that I should adopt in order to be consistent with my treatment of his alteration day he wrote from Meikleour, Scotland: "My dear Palmerston, The conduct of the gentlemen who have contracted for the two iron-clads at Birkenhead is so very suspicious that I have thought it necessary to direct that they should be detained. The Solicitor-General has been consulted, and concurs in the measure, as one of policy, though not of strict law. We shall thus test the law, and, if we have to pay damages, we have satisfied the opinion, which prevails here as well as in America, that that kind of neutral hostility should not be allowed to go on without some attempt to stop it. If you do not approve, pray appoint a Cabinet for Tuesday or Wednesday next [the 8th or 9th]."1 Palmerston did not dissent, and therefore called no meeting of the Cabinet. ... of opinion in October, 1862. Adams, on a visit to the Duke of Argyll at Inverary Castle, Scotland, makes this entry in his diary, Aug. 28: "In the evening a little conversation with the Duke of Argyll about the fitting out of the iron-clad vessels. He said that he had received a letter from Mr. Sumner, dwelling very strongly on the danger of war from this cause. I said that I felt the same apprehension. He wanted to know something of the French claim. I replied that I had exposed the motive of that pretence. . . . The Ministry dislikes to assume a responsibility which may make it the object of popular attack at home. It thus hazards the evil of war upon a doubt. He seemed a little impressed with my earnestness. I told him I had instructions on the subject far more stringent than I had yet been disposed to execute. My own inclinations had been to make as little of the difficulty as I could. But I could not fail to regard the question as grave and critical.” It is no unnatural supposition that the Duke should have communicated this conversation to Earl Russell by letter, and it may have been a slight contributing cause to the decision, but the main reason seems to me to have been that, full of regret at the escape of the Alabama and her depredations, he was determined not to give our country another similar cause of offence. The difference of feeling too in England after McClellan's reverses before Richmond, and after Gettysburg and Vicksburg, is an element to be taken into consideration. "The progress of the Federal arms," wrote Cobden to Bright, Sept. 8, "will help the Cabinet over some of the legal technicalities of the enlistment act." Morley, p. 589. The Northern victories undoubtedly strengthened Russell's arm to do what he considered right. The feeling of the ministry is probably well expressed by the Duchess of Argyll to Sumner, Sept. 8: "I have just heard that the iron-clads are to be arrested. I trust there may be evidence sufficient to do what we wish to do."- Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS. 1 Walpole, Life of Russell, vol. ii. p. 359, note. THE IRON-CLAD RAMS DETAINED 383 CH. XXII.] But Russell was not content to wait the slow course of the post or the approval of the Prime Minister, and on the same day [September 3] telegraphed to Layard to give directions to stop the iron-clads "as soon as there is reason to believe that they are actually about to put to sea, and to detain them until further orders."1 September 4 he sent word to Adams that "the matter is under the serious and anxious consideration of Her Majesty's Government;"2 but this the minister did not receive until after he had despatched his note, saying, "It would be superfluous in me to point out to your lordship that this is war." September 5 Russell ordered that the vessels "be prevented from leaving Liverpool” on a trial trip "or on any other pretext" "until satisfactory evidence can be given as to their destination," and on the same day he sent a confidential note to the chargé d'affaires in Washington, requesting that Secretary Seward be apprised that they had been stopped from leaving port; but for some unexplained reason he did not advise Adams of this action until three days later." After the iron-clad rams were "detained," the Foreign Secretary employed the utmost circumspection to prevent the one almost ready from slipping away to sea through any artifice. While two different constructions may be drawn from the correspondence, it seems, on the whole, that he had confidence in the honor of the Lairds, although it was at times clouded with suspicions, born of the escape of the Alabama? and augmented by their persistence in asking permission for a trial trip, that, if the steamer went out to test her machinery, she would never come back, through causes ostensibly beyond their control. A large body of seamen from the Confederate 1 Brit. Case, p. 349. 8 Diary, Sept. 5. 2 Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 364. 5 Layard to Stuart, Sept. 5, State Papers, 1864, Corr. respecting ironclad vessels, No. 14; Memorandum State Dep't Archives, MS.; Seward to Adams, Sept. 19, "confidential," ibid.; Russell's statement in House of Lords, Feb. 11, 1864, Hansard, 438. Sept. 8, Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 368; Brit. Case, p. 355. Russell was still in Scotland. Palmerston was in London. 7 Ante, p. 89. cruiser Florida had recently come to Liverpool for the purpose, it was suspected, of carrying out a plan for the "forcible abduction of the vessel," and to checkmate this game Russell had moved the Board of Admiralty to authorize the Admiral of the Channel fleet, then in the Mersey, to place “on board the iron-clad, about to be tried, a sufficient force of seamen and marines in her Majesty's naval service to defeat any attempt to run away with the vessel."1 But it then turned out that the ship was not ready, and the trial trip was postponed.2 In the mean time the Foreign Office made a systematic and careful investigation, demonstrating, to a moral certainty, that the French ownership was a blind, and that the ironclad rams were intended for the Confederates.3 October 8, by the order of Earl Russell, the vessel the more advanced in her construction was seized, and the next day the Broad Arrow was likewise put upon the other. The Lairds were annoyed at this action, and their operatives showed much ill feeling. To ward off any attempt at a rescue, the ships were watched by a powerful naval force. The question whether the iron-clads should be condemned was never passed upon by the courts. Neither the government nor the owners were eager to run the chances of a trial. In the end, as the best way out of the complication, the vessels were purchased by the British Admiralty." 1 Brit. Case, p. 367 et ante. 2 Ibid., p. 370 et seq. Ibid., p. 353 et seq. 4 Ibid., pp. 388–391; Morley's Cobden, p. 589. When this word came to the immense audience Henry Ward Beecher was addressing in Manchester, "the whole audience rose to its feet. Men cheered and waved their hats, while women waved their handkerchiefs and wept."-Life of Beecher, p. 410. As indications of public sentiment at the time the rams were detained, see Times, Sept. 7, Daily News, Sept. 8, 9, Spectator, Sept. 5, Sat. Rev. Sept. 12. 5 Brit. Case, pp. 397, 415, 417, 420 et seq.; Bulloch, Secret Service of the Confed., vol. i. p. 435 et seq. The purchase was consummated in May, 1864 (Brit. Case, p. 457 et seq.,) but such an outcome was thought of by Russell as early as Sept. 14, 1863, See Life by Walpole, vol. ii. p. 359, note. CH. XXII.] BLOW TO THE CONFEDERATE CAUSE 385 every These iron-clad rams were formidable vessels of war, and had they got away they would undoubtedly have broken the blockade at Charleston and Wilmington; and as the blockade, constantly growing in efficiency, was a potent weapon on the Northern side, the harm would have been incalculable: the victories even of Gettysburg and Vicksburg might have been neutralized. Bulloch dreamed that "our iron-clads" might "sweep the blockading fleet from the sea front of harbor," "ascend the Potomac," and "render Washington itself untenable," and lay Portsmouth (N. H.) and Philadelphia under contribution.2 From some such damage Earl Russell, by his careful and decisive action, saved the North, and thereby prevented a war between the United States and Great Britain, which the energy of Bulloch and the sympathy and cupidity of a firm of Birkenhead ship-builders came near bringing about.3 The seizure of the rams was a blow to the Confederate cause." The debate in the House of Commons, June 30, made it evident that England would not recognize, singly or jointly, the Southern Confederacy, or offer to mediate between the two belligerents; and the proceedings which I have just re 1 Through the kindness of Mr. Charles F. Adams and Mr. S. A. B. Abbott, I have received the following statement made in Jan., 1898, from Captain Page, who had been selected as the commander of these vessels: I never received from the Confederate government any instructions, written or of any other kind, as to the course I should pursue after taking command of the rams, but I had outlined in my own mind a plan of operations. My intention was to sail at once to Wilmington and to raise the blockade there and at Charleston. Having accomplished this, I intended to raise the blockade of the gulf ports and cut off all communications of the North by water with New Orleans. I had at the time perfect confidence in my ability to accomplish my purposes, and I now believe, in the light of what I have since learned, that if the rams had been permitted to leave England I would have been successful. I never had any intention of attacking New York, Boston, or Hampton Roads, or any Northern port, as I did not believe in that kind of warfare. 2 Bulloch to the Richmond Secretary of the Navy, July 9, Secret Service of the Confed. States, vol. i. p. 411. 8 See Spectator, Sept. 5, Saturday Review, Sept. 12. Bulloch, vol. i. p. 414 et seq. |