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in all directions on this side" (the Richmond side of the Chickahominy), remains an ineffaceable record of his misapprehension.

Meanwhile Fitz John Porter, as cool as if he were on parade, his tactics seemingly without defect, himself in the thick of the fight inspiriting his officers and men, repelled the assaults of nearly double his numbers, directed by the genius of Lee and Stonewall Jackson, led on by the courage and determination of the Hills and Longstreet. Higher praise can come to no general than that which Lee and Jackson unconsciously gave Porter in their reports. "The principal part of the Federal army was now on the north side of the Chickahominy," wrote Lee; both speak of the "superior force of the enemy." All accounts agree as to the discipline and bravery of the soldiers of both armies. When we consider their small experience in battle, we may describe the impetuous attack of the Confederates as did Jackson the charge of one of their regiments, speaking of it as an "almost matchless display of daring and valor." We may also borrow from him the words "stubborn resistance" and "sullen obstinacy" to describe the work of defence. On the Union side Meade and John F. Reynolds, commanders of brigades, made their mark that day. But skilful as was the general, brave as were the soldiers, 31,000 men, with no intrenchments, with barriers erected along a small portion only of their front, could not finally prevail against 55,000 equally brave and as skilfully led. The end came at about seven o'clock. Lee and Jackson ordered a general assault; the Confederates broke the Federal line, captured many cannon, and forced Porter's troops back to the woods on the bank of the Chickahominy. Then cheering shouts were heard; they came from the brigades of French and Meagher of Sumner's corps which had been sent to the support of their comrades. They came too late to save

1 At eight P. M., O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 266.

2 Walker's Hist. 2d Army Corps, p. 62.

3 Lee's and Jackson's reports, dated, respectively, March 6, Feb. 20, 1863, O. R., vol. xi. part ii. pp. 492, 556. Jackson says "superior numbers."

CH. XVII.]

MCCLELLAN DEMORALIZED

43

the day, but they efficiently covered the retreat of Porter's exhausted and shattered regiments, who withdrew dejectedly to the south side of the river.1

In his despatches during the battle McClellan does not display bewilderment. At five o'clock he thought Porter might hold his own until dark, and three hours later his confidence was only a little disturbed, but by midnight he had reached a state of demoralization which revealed itself in his famous Savage Station despatch to the Secretary of War. "I now know the full history of the day," he wrote. "On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. . . . The sad remnants of my men behave as men. I have lost this battle because my force was too small. . . . I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or

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1 My authorities for this account are: the correspondence, O. R., vol. xi. parts i. and iii.; McClellan's report of July 15, 1862, and general report of Aug. 4, 1863, ibid., parts i. and ii.; reports of Lee, Jackson, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, Magruder, and Fitz John Porter, ibid., part ii.; of Barnard, Heintzelman, and J. E. B. Stuart, part i.; letters to his wife in McClellan's Own Story; Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862; Davis, Confederate Government, vol. ii.; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox; Long, Life of Lee; Dabney, Life of Jackson; letter of J. E. Johnston to Beauregard, Aug. 4, 1862, cited by Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 432; Jefferson Davis, Memoir by his wife, vol. ii.; McClellan's, Franklin's, and Heintzelman's testimony, C. W., parti.; McClellan's, Fitz John Porter's, and D. H. Hill's articles, Century War Book, vol. ii.; Walker, History of the Second Army Corps; Palfrey, Papers of the Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass., vol. i.; Webb, The Peninsula; Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, vol. ii.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. v.; Swinton, The Army of the Potomac. See Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 177 et seq.

2 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 265, 266.

to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."1

The

The news was a terrible blow to the President. finely equipped army which had cost so much exertion and money, had gone forward with high hopes of conquest, and apparently bore the fate of the Union, had been defeated, and was now in danger of destruction or surrender.2 This calamity the head of the nation must face, and he failed not. Overlooking the spirit of insubordination in his general's despatch, with equal forbearance and wisdom, he sent McClellan a reply which, mingling circumspection with gentleness of spirit, offers the most charitable explanation possible of the disaster. "Save your army at all events," he wrote. "Will send reinforcements as fast as we can. . . . I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington he would have been upon us before the troops could have gotten to you. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the government are to blame." 3

The day of Gaines's Mill ended the offensive attitude of the Army of the Potomac. The story now deals with its retreat during the rest of the Seven Days' Battles, as the fighting from June 25 to July 1 is called. The force under McClellan at the beginning of this episode was somewhat less than 100,000; Lee's force was between 80,000 and 90,000. A few days before the battle of Gaines's Mill McClellan had anticipated a possible severance of his com

1 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 61. The date of this is 12.20 A. M., June 28.

2 See Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 443; Schuckers's Chase, p. 447. 3 June 28, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 269.

* From a collation of all accounts I feel quite certain that McClellan did not have 100,000 men fit for duty, but I cannot explain the decline in his force from 105,000, of June 20, to less than 100,000, June 25. The only detachment from the force I have found is that of Stoneman's cavalry and two regiments of infantry to guard the communication with White House.

CH. XVII.]

RETREAT TO THE JAMES

45

munications with White House by ordering supplies up the James River for the purpose of establishing, if necessary, a new base at a convenient point below Drewry's Bluff. The contingency had now arrived. The defeat of Porter by a superior Confederate force on the north side of the Chickahominy had made it impossible for the Union Army to maintain its communications with White House; and McClellan, assembling his corps commanders at his headquarters on the night of Gaines's Mill, very properly issued the necessary orders to begin at once the movement for a change of base to the James. That he would undertake such an operation had not entered the mind of Lee. The Confederate general felt sure that McClellan would either give battle to preserve his communications, or else would cross the Chickahominy by the lower bridges and retreat down the Peninsula. But, during the forenoon of June 28, Lee, observing clouds of dust, which denoted the Federal army to be in motion, and having learned also that the railroad which brought them supplies had been abandoned, came to the conclusion that retreat down the peninsula was the alternative decided upon, and accordingly lay idle that day prepared to strike at the fit moment a telling blow. McClellan was allowed twentyfour hours to organize his retreat unmolested. Lee's misconception probably saved the Federal army from a crushing defeat, and secured the success of this operation. Many of the Union soldiers were busy that day in burning heaps of commissary and quartermaster's stores, while others loaded railway cars with the ammunition and shells of the siege guns, attached a locomotive under full head of steam, and, applying the torch, ran the ignited and exploding train into the river; still others set about the destruction of some of the officers' baggage. Meanwhile Keyes's corps marched across White Oak Swamp, and took a position to protect 5000 loaded wagons, 2500 head of cattle on the hoof, and the reserve artillery. Later in the day Porter followed. Everything progressed smoothly and in good order. It was a painful though necessary feature of the retreat that twenty

five hundred sick and wounded who were in a summer hospital, with five hundred attendants, had been left behind.

By sunrise of Sunday, June 29, the Confederates discovered that the Union army, which they had hoped to capture or destroy, had fled towards the James River. Immediate pursuit was given. Most of the troops had already gone by, but Magruder overtook Sumner's corps and Smith's division of Franklin's corps at Savage's Station, and a severe battle took place, in which the Confederates were defeated and the passage of the White Oak Swamp secured for the rear-guard of the Federal army. June 30 was fought the stubborn battle of Glendale, or Frayser's Farm. Longstreet and A. P. Hill contended with McCall's division and Heintzelman's, and part of Sumner's corps. Neither side prevailed, and the Union troops continued their retreat in good order. It was thought that if Jackson had come up at the time he was expected a portion of McClellan's army would have been destroyed or captured. The swift-moving Jackson had apparently been slow. He had been delayed in crossing the Chickahominy from the necessity of repairing the Grapevine bridge which the Federals had destroyed. He was late at Savage's Station, and on reaching the White Oak Swamp found the bridge and the passage disputed by Franklin. Dabney, his admiring biographer, thinks he would have managed somehow to cross the swamp, had not his genius suffered a "temporary eclipse " from sleeplessness and physical exhaustion. At all events, Jackson made no persistent attempt to force a passage at the bridge crossing or at Brackett's Ford, one mile above, and by his failure to support Longstreet and A. P. Hill, an important feature of Lee's plan miscarried. At the commencement of the battle of Glendale, Lee and Davis were so engrossed in watching the operations of their army that they came under fire, the Confederate President narrowly escaping accident. McClellan had left the field before the fighting began, seeking a defensive position for the next day.

1 Life of Jackson, p. 466.

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